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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Net neutrality or ”Open Internet” rulemaking has been ongoing for 
more than a decade. Some 50 nations have adopted formal rules 
including the United States, the European Union, and a number of 
countries in Latin America while other countries such as India are 
exploring whether to adopt such rules. Among other arguments, it is 
asserted that net neutrality rules are necessary for application 
innovation. While the focus for policymakers has largely been to 
make rules, there is less attention on how to measure the impact of 
such rules and how well they achieve their innovation goals. The 
research thus investigates to what degree the introduction of rules in a 
given country stimulates innovation in that country’s mobile app 
ecosystem. The focus in on mobile because it allowed the most 
consistent data across countries.  
This thesis reviews a set of 53 countries, their net neutrality policies, 
and the results to the respective mobile application ecosystems of the 
countries adopting rules between the period of 2010-2016. This 
investigation tests the proposition that countries which adopt net 
neutrality rules should experience an increase in mobile app 
development innovation within their national economy. To test this, a 
statistical methodology was developed based upon measuring the 
number of locally developed mobile apps in the country for relevant 
periods before and after rules are imposed and the corresponding app 
downloads, usage, and revenue. Measurement was conducted with 
two independent toolsets and adjusted for the sophistication and 
penetration of advanced mobile networks in the country.  To make 
more meaningful comparisons and avoid inevitable heterogeneity 
across the countries, the investigation focuses on two similar countries 
with different rules, Denmark with soft rules (self-regulation) and 
Netherlands with hard rules (legislation).  
The thesis also reviews the leading theories of innovation as well as 
the foundational papers in net neutrality to explain the observed 
discrepancies. The research finds significant statistical support for 
“soft” net neutrality measures adopted on a voluntary basis. Hard rules 
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adopted through legislation and regulation were not associated with 
greater mobile app development for the given country. Denmark 
increased in local mobile app development while Netherlands 
decreased. Additionally the explosion of mobile apps from countries 
with no net neutrality rules and the general dearth of mobile apps from 
countries which have had hard rules for years runs counter to expected 
results. This suggests that policymakers revisit their assumptions and 
expectations for net neutrality policy. The thesis includes discussion 
of the limitations of the analysis, the challenges of measurement, and 
the possibility that the impact of net neutrality might not be able to be 
observed or measured. It concludes with recommendations for 
policymakers. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Debatten om netneutralitet eller "åbent internet"-regulering har stået 
på i mere end et årti. I dag har op imod 50 nationer vedtaget og indført 
en form for regulering  herunder USA, EU og en række lande i 
Latinamerika. I andre dele af verden ser man på, om man skal indføre 
en form for netneutralitetsregulering. Et af de argumenter, der ofte 
bliver brugt i forbindelse med, at man indfører denne form for 
regulering, er, at netneutralitetsregler er nødvendige for innovationen 
inden for teleområdet.  
Det politiske system har fokuseret på at lave reglerne for reglernes 
skyld, og der har været mindre fokus på, hvordan man kan måle 
effekten af sådanne regler, og om de har den positive effekt på 
innovationen, som nogle påstår. Målet med min forskning er, at 
undersøge i hvilken grad indførelsen af reglerne i et givet land 
stimulerer innovation i landets mobil-app-økosystem. 
Denne afhandling ser på 53 lande, deres netneutralitetspolitik og 
betydningen for de respektive mobil-applikationsøkosystemer i de 
lande. Afhandlingen ser på, hvad der er sket efter vedtagelsen af regler 
i perioden 2011-2016. Denne afhandling ser på, om lande, der indfører 
netneutralitetsregler, oplever en stigning i mobil-app-udviklingen og -
innovationen. For at teste dette har jeg udviklet en statistisk metode, 
som er baseret på at måle antallet af lokalt udviklede mobil-apps i de 
respektive lande i relevante perioder før og efter reglerne 
implementeres. Jeg har set på downloads, brugen, og på hvilke 
indtægter disse apps giver. Målingerne blev udført med to uafhængige 
værktøjssæt og korrigeret for hvor avancerede mobilnet, der er i de 
respektive lande. 
For at gøre sammenligninger mere meningsfulde og for at undgå 
heterogenitet på tværs af så mange lande, har jeg i denne afhandling 
inkluderet to lande, der minder meget om hinanden, men som har 
meget forskellige regler, Danmark og Holland. Afhandlingen ser på 
resultaterne i lyset af de førende teorier om innovation samt de 
fundamentale tidsskriftartikler, der er skrevet om netneutralitet med 
det formål at forklare de observerede forskelle. Min forskning viser, at 
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der er signifikant statistisk støtte for "bløde" netneutralitetsregler, der 
vedtages på frivillig basis. Hårde regler, der vedtages gennem 
lovgivning og regulering, vil ikke stimulere en større app-udvikling. 
Danmark oplevet en stigning i lokal mobil-app-udvikling efter 
vedtagelsen af selvregulering, mens man i Holland efter indførelsen af 
hård regulering så et faldt i lokal app-udvikling. Derudover er der en 
eksplosion af mobil-apps fra lande uden netneutralitetsregler og den 
generelle mangel på mobil-apps fra lande, der har hårde regler, tyder 
på, at politikerne må revidere deres forudsætninger og forventninger 
til netneutralitetspolitikken. Afhandlingen indeholder en diskussion af 
de begrænsninger, der er i analysen, og de udfordringer der er med at 
måle virkningen af netneutralitetsregulering. Afhandlingen slutter af 
med anbefalinger til de politikere, der har ansvaret for denne form for 
regulering.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The notion that nations should develop information communications 
technology (ICT) policy to stimulate innovation and subsequently spur 
economic growth1 is uncontested, but the ideal type and mix of ICT 
policy for any particular nation at any time is by no means agreed. 
Perhaps the most salient Internet policy issue in the past decade is the 
concept of net neutrality,2 frequently interchanged with “Open 
Internet.” Given that different countries define the term differently in 
their statutes, it can be concluded that there is not an official, globally 
accepted, definition of network neutrality. Even the new Merriam-
Webster Dictionary of the term is subject to controversy,3 which 
defines the term as “the idea, principle, or requirement that Internet 
service providers should or must treat all Internet data as the same 
regardless of its kind, source, or destination, a philosophical contest 
that's being fought under the banner of “net neutrality,” a slogan that 
inspires rhetorical devotion but eludes precise definition.”4 For 
example whether net neutrality applies only to the management of 
Internet traffic or both the management and monetization of Internet 
traffic is hotly debated and litigated.5 Now that some 50 nations have 
created net neutrality rules, frequently but not always with the 
argument that net neutrality support innovation, the question for ICT 
                                                          
1 See generally Bengt-Åke Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Toward a 
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning (Anthem Press, 2010). and Richard 
R. Nelson, National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
2 Jon M. Peha, William H. Lehr, and Simon Wilkie, “[Special Section on Net 
Neutrality] Introduction: The State of the Debate on Network Neutrality,” 
International Journal of Communication 1, No. 1 (August 9, 2007): 8. 
3 Brent Skorup, “Merriam-Webster’s Awful Net Neutrality Definition,” Plain Text, 
June 4, 2015, https://readplaintext.com/merriam-webster-s-awful-net-neutrality-
definition-16490d54b8bd#.6ra1tbrzg. 
4 “Definition of NET NEUTRALITY,” Merriam-Webster, accessed November 4, 
2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/net+neutrality. 
5 Ibid 
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policy researchers is to what degree does net neutrality support 
innovation.  
For example the European Commission proposed net neutrality or 
Open Internet rules as part of its Digital Single Market6 (DSM) 
initiative. The DSM “aims to open up digital opportunities for people 
and business and enhance Europe's position as a world leader in the 
digital economy.” According to the European Commission, a majority 
of the EU’s one-half billion residents use the Internet every day.  The 
opportunity to to increase the take up of new digital goods and 
services in the EU itself is estimated to be a staggering €415 billion in 
new growth.7 A net neutrality law was ultimately passed into the law 
by the European Parliament in October 2015. The legislation titled 
“laying down measures concerning open internet access” states that its 
goal is to “guarantee the continued functioning of the internet 
ecosystem as an engine of innovation”8 (italics added). 
In a press release announcing the new guarantee of an Open Internet, 
the European Commission explained, “Creating the right conditions 
for digital networks and services to flourish is a key objective of the 
Commission's plan for a Digital Single Market…The EU will have the 
strongest and most comprehensive open Internet rules in the world.” 9 
They further noted, “ 
Net neutrality is crucial for users and businesses. It 
ensures that Europeans have access to the online content 
and services they wish without any discrimination or 
interference (like blocking or slowing down) by internet 
access providers. This is also very important for start-up 
                                                          
6 “Digital Single Market,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, 
(December 7, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en. 
7 Ibid 
8 “Official  Journal of  the  European  Union,” EU, November 26, 2015, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2015:310:FULL&from=EN.  
9 “Commission Welcomes Agreement to End Roaming Charges and to Guarantee an 
Open Internet,” European Commission, (June 20, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5265_en.htm. 
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businesses that commercialise their products and 
services via the internet and need to be able to compete 
on an equal footing with larger players.”10   
Given the Commission’s observation that startups need such rules, it 
would seem a helpful research project to test the relationship of net 
neutrality rules to facilitating commercialization of startups. 
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
observed that its Open Internet rules “are designed to protect free 
expression and innovation on the Internet and promote investment in 
the nation's broadband networks”11 and that “Rules Will Preserve the 
Internet as a Platform for Innovation, Free Expression and Economic 
Growth.”12 The FCC declares that “Internet openness drives a 
‘virtuous cycle’ in which innovations at the edges of the network 
enhance consumer demand, leading to expanded investments in 
broadband infrastructure that, in turn, spark new innovations at the 
edge.” 
Net neutrality rules are frequently, though not entirely, based on the 
premise that such rules will protect and/or stimulate “innovation” by 
third party application providers (“edge providers” in American 
parlance). The rules are associated with a series of requirements and 
restrictions for broadband and internet services providers (ISPs). Such 
rules are necessary because, as the FCC claims, the ISP has the 
“incentive and ability” to deter “openness.”13  “Without Net 
                                                          
10 “Roaming Charges and Open Internet: Questions and Answers,” European 
Commission, (June 30, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5275_en.htm. 
11 “Open Internet,” Federal Communications Commission, January 12, 2011, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet. 
12 “FCC Adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet,” Federal 
Communications Commission, February 26, 2015, 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-strong-sustainable-rules-protect-open-
internet. 
13 “Federal Communications Commission,” Federal Communications Commission, 
accessed November 4, 2016, https://www.fcc.gov/. 
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Neutrality, the next Google would never get off the ground,”14 
observes Save the Internet, a leading global advocate for net 
neutrality. 
While policymakers and advocates express that the need for rules is 
immediate and dire to protect innovation, they are not clear whether 
such rules will ensure the status quo level of application innovation or 
actually increase innovation. If the former, it would seem to follow 
that countries without such rules would fall in their level of 
innovation.  In Brussels, the sense of “falling behind” the US and East 
Asia would suggest that European policymakers expect their rules to 
make European app economies more productive (as Europeans 
overwhelmingly use American and Asian apps). Similarly in Latin 
American and in emerging countries such as India, the level of locally 
made mobile app innovation is low, the notion suggests that these 
countries expect to be more innovative after rules are promulgated.   
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis reviews the foundational work on net neutrality and related 
concepts of free culture, the end to end principle, the neutral platform, 
and zero rating. 
In 2000 Lessig and Lemley appropriated the end to end argument, an 
engineering concept and applied it to Internet and network access 
regulation in “End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era.”15 Insisting that intelligence lies in the 
ends network, not the core, they declared that this end-to-end principle 
explains not only the internet’s operation and commercial success, but 
a justification for telecom regulation that will ensure the Internet’s 
continued functioning in the future.  They equated this end to end 
concept with the notion of an  “open” network to be facilitated by by  
                                                          
14 Free Press, “Net Neutrality: What You Need to Know Now,” Free Press, accessed 
June 20, 2016, http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-neutrality-what-you-need-know-
now. 
15 Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000, 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.247737. 
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“open access” policies. Such a regime is important to achieve the “free 
culture” digital commons which Lessig advocated in his subsequent 
book Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to 
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity.16   
Tim Wu, who studied with Lessig, developed the term network 
neutrality.17 He too was concerned about intellectual property and “big 
business” locking down culture and innovation. His 2003 article 
includes a survey of the “discriminatory” practices and contracts of a 
number of fixed line ISPs. Though he posits that the interests of ISPs 
are inherently in cross purposes to the public, he does not present a 
structural model or theory of why ISPs would discriminate against 
third party services that use networks.  Wu posits that rules may be 
necessary to restrict ISP behavior so that third party applications can 
enjoy “Darwinian” competition and end users can get the “best” 
innovation. 
Barbara van Schewick also studied with Lessig and published Internet 
Architecture and Innovation18 in 2010 which formalized the notion of 
“end to end” as policy principle. She asserts that the end to end 
principle explains the “neutral” architecture of the Internet and that the 
Internet was expressly designed for the the benefit of the application 
at end points of the network. Van Schewick confirms that is is 
appropriate therefore to “suppress”19 ISP innovation in networks, 
traffic management and monetization, to favor a regime for innovation 
in third party applications.  
Following these key arguments, the idea of a net neutrality policy is 
that it should control ISPs so that they do not get in the way of  vital 
                                                          
16 Lawrence Lessig, “Free Culture,” Freeculture.pdf, 2004, http://www.free-
culture.cc/freeculture.pdf. 
17 Tim Wu, “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,” SSRN Scholarly 
Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, June 5, 2003), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=388863. 
18 Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation, New edition 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010). 
19 Personal interview. Barbara van Schewick. 31 August 2016. 
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end point applications nor restrict users who connect to the Internet 
expressly for these end point applications. The ISP should thus be 
neutral to all applications and operate the network without any 
“discrimination” to applications.  Net neutrality rules are thus the 
embodiment of preserving the Internet in this “neutral” and “open” 
state for the primary  benefit of users and third party innovation at end 
points.  The needs of the network providers, whether their own 
innovation, efficiency, or solvency, are secondary. 
There is some degree of interpretation between the academic 
assertions of net neutrality and the codification into rules.  A review of 
the rules around the world finds that countries differ somewhat in their 
definitions, instruments, provisions, and punishments for the policy. 
While the very activity of companies on the Internet suggests 
innovative forces at work, it is not clear to what degree “neutrality” or 
the regulated or legislated “Open Internet” is responsible for such 
innovation.  However the verve and speed of the policymaking over 
the last decade suggests that policymakers’ should have an intuition 
about how the policy will work. Indeed if neutrality is necessary and 
desirable, there should be some idea about the optimal distribution of 
internet traffic and usage.  If not, it will be difficult to tell whether the 
policy is moving the nation in the right direction.  
It could be predicted that under neutrality that Internet traffic should 
lead to a random distribution to all possible end points, perhaps a 
Guassian (or bell curve) of distribution across all content and 
applications.  Alternatively, one might imagine a a Pareto distribution 
of traffic, in which 80 percent of the traffic goes to 20 percent of the 
content and applications. However Wu’s notion of an evolutionary, 
meritocratic, “survival of the fittest” competition between all 
applications, suggests traffic should follow to “the very best 
innovation.”  Perhaps today’s status quo is the manifestation of Wu’s 
prescription, as 99 percent of users go to 1 percent of the 
25 
destinations.20 Ostensibly this 1 percent is the “best” of the Internet’s 
innovation, following Wu’s definition. 
Wu’s description of an neutral platform suggests there is perfect 
competition for content and applications, that any end point can 
compete equally with any other. In a perfectly competitive world, 
there are homogenous products, homogeneous users, perfect 
information, no barriers to entry, and no switching costs. However the 
fact that global internet traffic is highly concentrated to a few 
particular end points suggests that the market for apps is imperfectly 
competitive.  Many of the top destinations on the Internet have held 
their position for more than a decade.  
For example, the top most visited internet sites in the USA are each at 
least 10 years old.21  It seems counterintuitive that under a neutral 
regime that the rank of the most popular destinations would have 
changed so little over time. Indeed it would seem that “neutrality” 
would enable more disruption to the established internet companies, 
that disruptors would more easily take the top positions in traffic, and 
that the “next Google” would emerge from those countries with the 
hardest net neutrality rules. In fact Google, which is almost 20 years 
old, has retained its top position as one of the most visited sites (if not 
the most visited site) in almost every country in the world in spite of 
the increasing number of countries with Open Internet rules. 
The question is whether this traffic distribution is result of 
“neutrality”, a competitive meritocracy in that users find these end 
points to be “the very best innovation” as Wu says.  Could neutrality 
work in the opposite way, for example by cementing the position of 
the largest players to the detriment of new entrants? Could it be that 
rules that require treating data the same have the perverse effect of 
rewarding the large companies which already have revenue and users 
while harming the upstarts which need differentiation in order to be 
                                                          
20 Ramos, Andreas. “Can We Just Build It and They Will Come?,” Andreas.com, 
accessed October 31, 2016, http://andreas.com/can-we-just-build-it-and-they-will-
come/. 
21 “Top Sites in United States,” Alexa.com, accessed October 31, 2016, 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US. 
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noticed?  The question is then to what degree net neutrality rules 
create this “neutral platform” for “the very best innovation” on mobile 
networks and to what degree this model also works for startup 
innovation.  
Such brisk rulemaking across so many countries would seem to 
indicate that policymakers believe net neutrality rules to be beneficial 
for their nations. It is surprising, however, that there is not more 
empirical research. Given the urgency and necessity of net neutrality 
rules, as it were, empirical research demonstrating the value of the 
policy would be more forthcoming.  In addition one would expect that 
the national innovation policy authorities would have weighed in in 
support for such policies, given net neutrality’s purported link to 
innovation. But strangely, these innovation institutes have little to say 
on the topic. 
In the US, the National Academies of Science, Engineering and 
Medicine organized a committee on Comparative National Innovation 
Strategies: Best Practice for the 21st Century.22 The committee met 
over 6 years and produced a number of reports including Innovation 
Policies for the 21st Century.23  It emphasizes the need to foster 
ecosystems, particularly local and regional ecosystems, as well as 
public-private partnerships.  A search of the institute’s archives found 
very little information on the topic of the Internet and nothing on “net 
neutrality” or “open internet”.  
The European Union also has a major research function in the 
European Commission’s Research and Innovation arm24 which by law 
must conduct research policies and implement research programs. It 
has not conducted research on net neutrality that is findable in its 
                                                          
22 “Comparative National Innovation Strategies: Best Practice for the 21st Century,” 
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, accessed October 
31, 2016, 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/ComparativeInnovationPolicy/. 
23 Innovation Policies for the 21st Century: Report of a Symposium (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11852. 
24 “Why European Research | Research & Innovation,” accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=why. 
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database, but its report on innovation “Models of Innovation in Global 
ICT Firms: The Emerging Global Innovation Ecosystems” see 
innovation occurring within an ecosystem as the result of the 
“symbiotic” interplay of actors, including models in which telecom 
operators partner with different actors in the ecosystem.25   
It appears that the “ecosystem” view of innovation in which actors 
work together symbiotically is the antithesis to the “net neutrality” 
view in which one player needs to be controlled. While thousands of 
articles have described and debated net neutrality, almost none have 
tested it empirically within the context of national policymaking. This 
thesis tests the theory on apps in mobile networks and thus offers an 
important addition to address the gap in the literature.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is to investigate whether and to what degree the 
introduction of net neutrality in a given country stimulates that 
country's third party application and service innovation on mobile 
networks. As net neutrality is promulgated on a national basis, 
presumably to benefit the country, its citizens and enterprises, the 
research question tests whether the introduction of rules stimulates 
apps from publishers based in that country, and whether these apps 
show a relevant number of downloads, usage and revenues.   
The investigation reports the results for different types of net 
neutrality regimes, whether soft rules, hard rules, or no specific rules. 
The investigation then compares countries with relevant socio-
economic factors but with different policy regimes to indicate the 
relative impacts of the policies over the period 2010-2016. There are 
53 countries in the study. Nine countries in the study made rules with 
soft or voluntary measures.  Thirteen countries used hard or 
mandatory measures. Thirty countries have no specific rules but 
manage conflicts with existing competition and communications laws. 
                                                          
25 Martin Fransman, “Models of Innovation in Global ICT Firms: The Emerging 
Global Innovation Ecosystems,” European Commission, (2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc90726.pdf. 
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Two countries, Denmark and Netherlands, are selected for further 
focus because they are similar socio-economic countries with 
advanced broadband development but have opposing regimes for net 
neutrality. Denmark opted for self-regulation in 2011, but Netherlands 
imposed a net neutrality law in 2012.  The mobile app markets of the 
two countries are studied in detail to see where apps originate and 
whether the choice of net neutrality regime is associated with an 
change mobile app innovation. 
The countries Denmark and Netherlands are similar in many market 
respects, but they differ in their paths on net neutrality. Both countries 
score well on the EU’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard26 and the ITU 
Digital Society Index27. Both have competitive broadband markets 
with multiple broadband networks. The people of both countries are 
multilingual, well-educated, and generally adoptive of digital 
technologies.  Both have populations of internet entrepreneurs, 
computer engineers, app developers, and startup companies. 
Smartphones have been available for at least 5 years in both countries.   
The first phase of analysis looks at the free apps downloaded in the 
countries at a point in 2011/2012 and then again in 2016. While not a 
complete of the entire app market for both countries, it does 
characterize some important trends in local and global app 
development and how it changes for the respective countries over 
time.  
 The second phase is a detailed investigation into the most popular 
apps in both countries over a 90 day period with reference to 
downloads, usage, revenues, and publisher’s location. 
Finally an inquiry is made to the sophistication, penetration, and 
competition of mobile networks in the various countries to see 
                                                          
26 “Digital Scoreboard - Digital Single Market - European Commission,” Digital 
Single Market, accessed April 14, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/digital-scoreboard.   
27 “The Digital Economy & Society Index (DESI),” Digital Single Market, accessed 
November 10, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi.   
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whether any infrastructure or network factors characterize the level of 
app innovation.  
Measurements are taken with two competing enterprise level mobile 
app market research platforms and supplemented with data from the 
GSM Association. 
As rulemaking has taken place for more than a decade in some 50 
countries, it is an appropriate moment to review the results of the 
policy and the degree to which the goals are achieved. By 
understanding how the rules impact mobile app innovation, the paper 
hopes to provide valuable knowledge for policy makers to evaluate 
their net neutrality/Open Internet policies.  
It bears mention that some may object to the idea of “measuring” the 
effectiveness of net neutrality, as if one wanted to measure the value 
of human rights or freedom.  The author recognizes this view and 
acknowledges her own bias, that of valuing measurement and a 
preference for evidenced-based policymaking.  At the same point, 
measurement can be a way to provide additional support and 
justification for desired policies. For example there are indices of 
freedom28 and human rights,29 and these are valuable to make policy 
comparisons across countries. With regard to net neutrality, it is 
surprising that empirical tests have not been performed as it would 
seem to give support for policies which have been deemed to be 
obvious given the speed of rulemaking. This thesis represents only 
one kind of measurement; there are others.  
Another approach to policymaking is that of the randomized 
controlled trial (RCT).30 This inductive approach takes a neutral view 
                                                          
28 “List of Freedom Indices,” Wikipedia, September 16, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_freedom_indices&oldid=739693
467. 
29 “Universal Human Rights Index,” accessed November 1, 2016, 
http://uhri.ohchr.org/en. 
30 Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin, “Randomizing Law,” 
University of Pennsylvania  Law Review, March 2011, 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=penn_l
aw_review. 
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to any policy and instead looks for the desired outcomes as an ex post 
indicator the policies which work. Such an approach embodies the 
spirit of this study which brings an open mind to the question. Indeed 
if net neutrality is so effective to promote mobile app innovation, it 
could possibility substitute for many other activities nations undertake 
to promote innovation. 
Some assume that nations follow a rational approach to policymaking. 
Such an approach entails that  policymakers observe a problem, weigh 
the critical variables, review possible solutions (and their costs and 
benefits), and then  apply the appropriate action (or inaction, no harm 
is shown). Majone suggests a counter view31 that policymakers use 
theory selectively after the fact to justify their pre-ordained and 
favored policies. Regardless of the actual process used in the country 
to make net neutrality, the research question and methodology assume 
that the impact of net neutrality can be observed and measured. It 
takes the rules at “face value”, that they do what they claim to do, e.g. 
create a neutral platform for application innovation.  
It is not known whether another has attempted such as study as this 
project proposes; it could not be found in the literature.  Moreover 
policymakers when implementing net neutrality rules rarely offer any 
metrics or framework to measure the expected outcome.  There is no 
template on which to base this research, at least within the field of 
internet policy, as least as far as the author can ascertain.  Indeed it 
seems that measurements of the Internet itself leave something to be 
desired,32 let alone the policies attempting to regulate it. However the 
research uses methods from data science and policy research to create 
a preliminary method to test the relationship between net neutrality 
and mobile app innovation. In any case, I am not the first to observe 
                                                          
31 Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy 
Process. Yale University Press, 1989. 
32 Robert Faris, Heacock Jones, and Rebekah, “Measuring Internet Activity: A 
(Selective) Review of Methods and Metrics,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, November 12, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2353457. 
31 
that the theoretical discussion of net neutrality is limited because of a 
lack of measurement.33  
The research hypothesizes that in countries with net neutrality rules, 
especially hard rules, that there should be a higher degree of mobile 
app innovation as measured by the number of apps, the number of 
application makers or publisher, the rate that new apps emerge, and 
their performance (downloads, revenue, rank, usage etc). That is to 
say, the hypothesis is that in the countries with hard rules, the “neutral 
platform” or “net neutrality” should work better to enable mobile app 
innovation than countries with either soft rules or no rules (only 
existing laws).  
The paper proceeds by describing the key ideas in the net neutrality 
and innovation literature. It presents the research design and 
methodology for investigation, including the limitations. It describes 
the data collection and analysis and then present the results. These 
results are juxtaposed against the expectation. Explanations for the 
discrepancies are offered.  The paper concludes with policy 
recommendations based upon the findings.  
  
                                                          
33 Liebenau, Jonathan, S. Elaluf-Calderwood, and P. Karrberg. “Strategic Challenges 
for the European Telecom Sector: The Consequences of Imbalances in Internet 
Traffic.” Journal of Information Policy 2 (2012): 248–72, 2016 and  Elaluf-
Calderwood S and Liebenau S, Measuring Internet - The need for relevant data for 
economic & policy analysis. Brookings Institution Report - The Idea Must Die - It 
and the Public Sector. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2016/03/02-
internet-without-policy-metrics-elaluf-calderwood-liebenau 
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2 NET NEUTRALITY AND INNOVATION: THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
The literature on net neutrality, though the term is a little more than a 
decade old, is considerable. There are authoritative reviews of the 
academic literature by Schuett  (2010)34, Kramer (2013)35, and 
Møinichen (2014).36 The author undertook an additional review 
through a number of databases including Google Scholar, Web of 
Science, and a variety of library tools, but did not find that results 
differed from the aforementioned literature reviews.  However the 
process of conducting the review yielded some valuable points.  
Two preliminary searches using the terms “net neutrality” and 
“network neutrality” were performed.  The searches were conducted 
in English and did not reveal results for papers in other languages 
where net neutrality is discussed.  There are papers on net neutrality in 
other languages (notably Spanish), however it appears that the number 
of academics who study net neutrality is a relatively delimited group 
(perhaps one thousand persons globally), and even those who are not 
native speakers, will present their papers in English at some point or 
another. 
A Google Scholar query was conducted on June 9, 2015. It provided a 
broad overview, resulting in some 8460 articles comprising 
government sources, the popular press, think tanks, advocacy 
organizations, as well as academic results.  Google Scholar has limited 
functionality to sort and segment results, so additional analysis was 
                                                          
34 Florian Schuett, “Network Neutrality: A Survey of the Economic Literature,” 
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, March 
17, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1573420. 
35 Jan Kraemer, Lukas Wiewiorra, and Christof Weinhardt, “Net Neutrality: A 
Progress Report,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network, October 24, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2344623. 
36 Jørgen Møinichen, “The Net Neutrality Debate: Analysis of Economic 
Implications of Net Neutrality on Internet Service Providers, Content Providers and 
Internet Users,” 193, 2014, 
https://daim.idi.ntnu.no/masteroppgaver/011/11462/masteroppgave.pdf. 
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conducted with Harzing.com’s Publish or Perish bibliometric tool.  It 
produced a total of 945 articles with 10,381 citations.  This query was 
downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet and was further refined by hand 
to produce a list that included only articles in academic journals, 
refining the list further to 523 results with 7945 citations.  Thereafter 
the list was refined further to focus on the articles that comprised the 
top 80 percent of citations.  That resulted in some 129 articles and 
6294 citations. Significantly this amount includes about 100 authors, 
each with at least 5 citations for their articles on net neutrality.   
New articles appear daily, so an alert system was set up so that any 
new articles in Google Scholar would be brought to the author’s 
attention. The process demonstrates that while the topic of net 
neutrality is widely discussed in the media and the public debate, the 
share of the academic conversation is small and concentrated with a 
few academics.   
A review of the conclusions of the top 100 academic articles by 
numbers of citations shows vigorous debate about the merits of the 
policy, and at least half suggest ambiguous,37 if not negative 
outcomes, 383940 for the policy.  These articles conclude largely that 
differentiation in price, service, and quality is beneficial for content 
providers (e.g. innovation), consumers, and network investment. This 
conclusion is the opposite of net neutrality, the notion that all data 
should be treated equally and that there is an essential internet 
architecture that must be preserved through regulation to ensure 
innovation.  While the rulemaking process may entertain some of the 
dissenting views, national rules are largely justified with reference to 
Lessig & Lemley, Wu, and van Schewick. Moreover the vigorous 
                                                          
37 Peha, Jon. ”The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the 
Quest for a Balanced Policy”. Carnegie Mellon University Research Showcase, 1 
Sept 2006. 
38 Hahn, Robert and Scott Wallsten. Economics of Net Neutrality. Economists’ 
Voice, June 2006. 
39 Hazlett, Thomas W. The Fallacy of Net Neutrality. Encounter Broadsides, 2011. 
40 Hazlett, Thomas W. and Joshua D. Wright. ”The Law and Economics of Network 
Neutrality.” Indiana Law Review, 2012. 
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academic debate is not necessarily reflected in popular reporting about 
the issue.  
An additional review was conducted in Web of Science on June 19, 
2015.  The Web of Science query produced 131 results for “network 
neutrality” and 125 results for “net neutrality”.  Slightly different 
results were produced for the term “network neutrality” versus “net 
neutrality.” A query in Google Trends shows that beginning in 2006, 
“net neutrality” is the more frequently used term.41  Web of Science 
results were more relevant and easily segmented by type of journal, 
and the the number of citations were far smaller.  A few results 
included chemistry articles, so those were discarded. 
The authors with most citations include Christopher Yoo, 817, who 
also had the most papers on the topic. Wu had 813 citations; 
Economides, 500; and van Schewick, 416. Lemley & Lessig had 
roughly 500 citations for their end to end paper. 
The literature review proceeds by reviewing the leading net neutrality 
theories, some additional papers on the topic of net neutrality by other 
authors, and a review of the general literature on innovation. This 
expansive review is offered because the net neutrality literature 
emerges largely from the fields of law and communication whereas 
the literature of innovation is its own field.  
2.2 LEADING THEORISTS OF NET NEUTRALITY 
2.2.1 FREE CULTURE 
Lawrence Lessig, legal scholar, attorney and former Presidential 
candidate, is a leading thinker of the digital age. His books have been 
extremely influential in shaping the Open Internet agenda as well as 
his protégés Jonathan Zittrain,42 Tim Wu, Barbara van Schewick, and 
the deceased Aaron Schwartz.  While Tim Wu is credited with coining 
                                                          
41 “Google Trends ” Accessed June 20, 2016, 
https://www.google.com/trends/explore. 
42 “Future of the Internet - And How to Stop It.,” Future of the Internet - And How 
to Stop It., accessed November 1, 2016, http://futureoftheinternet.org/. 
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the term “network neutrality”, it is arguably Lessig who is the more 
important—and certainly more prolific—author. Lessig with his books 
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace  (updated in Code: Version 2.0); 
The Future of Ideas; and  Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in 
the Hybrid Economy has been instrumental to promote the ideas of 
“free culture” and associated policies to realize it. Indeed net 
neutrality is just one of a number of polices for which Lessig 
advocates in addition to campaign finance reform, reducing the 
restrictions on copyright and trademark, and sharing spectrum under 
the notion or free or “open” spectrum.43  Lessig has distinguished 
legal career, teaches at leading universities, has argued a case in front 
of the Supreme Court, and has run for President. In the Microsoft 
antitrust case, he was appointed as a “special master” to Judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson, but was later removed by a protest from 
Microsoft.44 
Lessig makes a number of critical observations about digital 
technologies.45 For example computer code has become the legal and 
social code, effectively “code is law” and constitutes a form of 
control. He notes that American copyright rules made in the analog 
era are unfit for the digital age in which any use of a work in a digital 
form constitutes a “copy.” This increase of length, scope, reach, and 
control of copyright has led to the concentration and integration of the 
media industry and  such an overbearing copyright regime (“laws that 
choke creativity”) threaten to turn the “read-write” (creativity 
controlled by people) culture to “read only” culture (creativity 
controlled by corporations). To combat this, Lessig calls for the 
acceptance and legalization of  a “remix” culture in which users 
appropriate existing works, “for the love, not the money”.  
                                                          
43 “Spectrum Policy: Property or Commons?,” Cyberlaw, March 1, 2003, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/spectrum/. 
44 An Interactive Journal News, “Appeals Court Halts Work of Lessig; States Also 
Investigating Microsoft,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1998, sec. Tech Center, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB886464121622380000. 
45 Some of these observations he summarizes in a Ted Talk. Lessig, Larry"Laws 
That Choke Creativity." TED 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Q25-
S7jzgs.   
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Lessig provides the example of how the American Society for 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), the exclusive licensing 
regime on most popular content was ultimately “broken” in 1941 by 
Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) which made public domain 
works available for free. He distinguishes remix (using digital 
technologies to re-interpret to say things differently) from piracy 
(works are taken wholesale and distributed without the permission of 
the owner). He says copyright needs “common sense” reform (e.g. 
going into public domain after 5 years) instead of “extremism on both 
sides”, whether automatic takedown of works on the Internet or the 
abolition of copyright.  Lessig likens the importance of copyright 
deregulation as a question of whether a society is “free or feudal.” 
Lessig founded the Creative Commons in part to realize two goals, 
that artists make their work more freely available (for example, 
making it free for non-commercial users whereas commercial uses 
would be licensed) and that companies embrace the read-write culture. 
In so doing, free content will have the opportunity to grow on a 
“neutral platform” and thus compete with paid content and ultimately 
prevail. Wu extends the idea of the neutral platform in his article, 
which is ostensibly an important step to realizing the free content 
commons which Lessig envisions. “Artists’ choice is the key for new 
technology having an opportunity to be open for business,” says 
Lessig.  
Lessig founded the Center for Internet and Society (CIS) at Stanford 
University in 2000,46 and van Schewick was an early non-resident 
fellow. The CIS received47 a $2 million gift from Google for “a 
collaboration of Google and CIS which seeks to establish a balance 
between the right to access and use information and the ownership of 
                                                          
46 “About Us,” The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, 
accessed November 1, 2016, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about-us. 
47 Stanford Law School, “Google Inc. Pledges $2M to Stanford Law School Center 
for Internet and Society,” Stanford Law School, accessed November 9, 2016, 
https://law.stanford.edu/press/google-inc-pledges-2m-to-stanford-law-school-center-
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information”48 and which helped to found the Fair Use project.49 The 
magazine Pro Publica, for "Journalism in the Public Interest" 
observed, CIS "was best known in its early days for work that 
benefitted Google's cause, including research on net-neutrality issues, 
which Google has pushed for, and research on fair use, which allows 
some use of copyrighted material without permission from the 
author."50 
Lessig has also been a board member of the Public Knowledge, Free 
Press, and Electronic Frontier Foundation, leading advocacy 
organizations for net neutrality. Lessig’s books on copyright describes 
broadcasters as greedy monopolists, and he has similar ideas about the 
cable and telecom companies.  In the midst of writing these books, he 
also co-authored a paper re-interpreting the end-to-end principle with 
Mark Lumley.  
2.2.2 REINVENTING THE END TO END PRINCIPLE 
David Isenberg, a disgruntled AT&T Labs employee published “The 
Rise of the Stupid Network”51 in 1997. The idea is that “intelligent” 
devices and applications reside at the edge of the network while the 
“dumb” core of the network facilitates transmission. Isenberg felt that 
AT&T’s leaders were not evolving fast enough. He criticized their 
old-fashioned views, specifically that infrastructure is expensive and 
scarce and must therefore offered at a premium price; that voice is the 
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50 Angwin, Julia and Robert Faturechi. “Stanford promises not to use Google money 
for privacy research.” ProPublica, Sep. 23, 2014 
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51 David Isenberg, “Rise of the Stupid Network,” Hyperorg, accessed November 1, 
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dominant form of traffic; that communications services on the circuit 
switched network are the most important; and that the operator is in 
control. Isenberg points to a number of shifts that necessitated a new 
way of thinking about networks including a decline in the cost of 
traditional telephony infrastructure, unprecedented growth in data 
traffic, the diversity in the type of traffic (and the fact that the network 
was not optimized for this heterogeneity), the diversity of 
communications technologies; and shift of control to the end user.  He 
concluded that the role of the telecom operator should be to "Deliver 
the Bits, Stupid.” 
In 2000 Stanford Law professors Lemley and Lessig built upon the 
stupid network idea when presenting a manifesto52 for preserving 
innovation on the Internet, calling it the “end to end principle”, 
appropriating the term from a 1984 paper53 by network engineers Jerry 
Saltzer, David P. Reed & David Clark. The original proposition 
follows: 
The principle, called the end-to-end argument, suggests that 
functions placed at low levels of a system may be redundant or 
of little value when compared with the cost of providing them 
at that low level. 
 
While this could be read as an obvious observation that the 
functionality in a network should be placed where it’s efficient to do 
so,  to Lemley and Lessig the  end to end argument explained the 
virtue of Internet architecture itself, its “openness”, how the “ends” of 
the network where users and applications reside are “intelligent”, and 
that the protocols and pipes must be as simple and general as possible. 
They celebrate this “default design” of the Internet, and insist that any 
deviation in architecture should place burden on the deviating party to 
                                                          
52 Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,” SSRN Scholarly Paper 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 1, 2000), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=247737. 
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justify such action. They suggest an End-to-End Argument to guide 
Internet regulation, evaluate any architectural changes, and disallow 
any service not in agreement with end to end. “The structure of the 
Internet itself is at stake”, they say, and they warn that if the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission does not consider the End-to-
End principle in its analysis of a proposed merger of Time Warner and 
America Online, that innovation will be harmed.  
While Lemley and Lessig observe that there are other important 
features of the network’s design beyond the end-to-end principle and 
“… no one fully understands the dynamics that have made the 
innovation of the Internet possible,” they insist that their definition of 
the end to end principle to be the sine qua non for innovation and a 
requirement of mandated access to networks and unbundling.   
Moreover they decried what they consider an injustice in that 
telephone companies were regulated differently from cable, that 
unbundling requirements were applied to the former but not the latter. 
They predicted that unless similar restrictions were placed on cable, 
that prices and innovation would be harmed. They assert that the end 
to end principle which “governed the Internet since inception” would 
be compromised.   
2.2.3 NETWORK NEUTRALITY, THE NEUTRAL 
PLATFORM 
If the Creative Commons is the “neutral platform” for content, then 
net neutrality is the neutral platform for internet innovation. Like his 
mentor Lessig, under whom he studied at Harvard Law School, Wu is 
concerned about third party innovation being controlled by the 
network owner. Wu alludes to Edmund Kitch’s The Nature and 
Function of Patent System54 and suggests that the network owner 
behaves like a quasi-patent holder. Given that the path of innovation is 
not known in advance, the network owner, suffering his own biases 
and preconditions to continue its way of doing things, will slow or 
deter innovation, whether from itself or competing parties.  As the 
                                                          
54 Edmund W. Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System,” The Journal 
of Law & Economics 20, no. 2 (1977): 265–90. 
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communications network is a “platform for a competition among 
application developers”, the platform must be neutral to ensure that 
competition is “meritocratic”.   
In Wu’s paradigm, broadband networks should be operated to deliver 
a “neutral platform” for third party applications and services.  Wu 
asserts that “network neutrality must be understood as a concrete 
expression of a system of belief about innovation.” His premise is that 
there is an inherent conflict between “private interests of broadband 
providers and the public’s interest in a competitive innovation 
environment centered on the Internet”, and thus telecom regulators 
must therefore enforce a “non-discrimination” regime on broadband 
providers. His non-discrimination principle can be summarized as, 
“Absent evidence of harm to the local network or the interests of other 
users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in how they treat 
traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network 
criteria.” 
Wu’s premise is that there is an inherent conflict between “private 
interests of broadband providers and the public’s interest in a 
competitive innovation environment centered on the Internet.”  He 
mentions the debate between proponents of “open access” who want 
structural remedies to prohibit the vertical integration of content and 
broadband provision to ensure the “neutrality” of the network versus 
those who believe that such remedies will slow broadband 
development.  In Wu’s conception, net neutrality is necessary to 
ensure “fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned 
environment” and states that regulation “tries to help ensure that the 
short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or 
applications becoming available to end-users.” He states that net 
neutrality is necessary to preserve “a Darwinian competition among 
every conceivable use of the Internet so that the only the best 
survive.” 
Wu examines 3 types of remedies: structural remedies, a non-
discrimination regime, and self or non-regulation. Structural remedies 
or open access is not sufficient because it may favor data applications 
(websites) over latency-sensitive applications (voice, video).  Wu 
prefers a non-discrimination regime achieved through “direct scrutiny 
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of broadband discrimination”, which he evidences with the regulations 
applied in the Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone decisions, which Wu 
describes were about ensuring that users have the right to “use non-
harmful network attachments or applications, and give innovators the 
corresponding freedom to supply them.”   
With regard to self-regulatory regimes to achieve this outcome, Wu 
acknowledges that in the long term, private broadband providers and 
the public have the same interest interest, “both should want a neutral 
platform that supports the emergence of the very best applications.” In 
the short term, however, he notes that broadband providers do not 
support a neutral platform, which he evidences with a survey of 
contract restrictions for 16 American broadband providers. 
Restrictions are place on the misuse of IP addresses; using a personal 
internet connection to conduct a business; overuse of bandwidth; 
reselling of bandwidth; spam; hacking; and offensive, immoral 
purposes. Wu also cites filings to the FCC by application providers’ 
complaining that certain broadband providers had limited the use of 
WiFi networks and virtual private networks (VPN).  Wu called these 
actions as broadband providers favoring their short term interests, but 
he notes that the situation improved somewhat in 2003 with FCC 
oversight.  Wu declares, “Network neutrality, as shorthand for a 
system of belief about innovation policy, is the end, while open access 
and broadband discrimination are the means.” 
Wu likens net neutrality as an “evolutionary model” of innovation, 
one of survival of the fittest. Wu and Internet Darwinians hold an 
interpretation of the “end-to-end” design argument, that networks 
should be neutral to applications. That the Internet is the fastest 
growing communications network in history is the proof that its “end-
to-end” design is superior to other networks, according to Wu and 
Lessig.  Wu recognizes that the merits of evolutionary innovation are 
not settled, nor the debates over neutral platforms, but that many have 
come to hold this view and see it as goal for telecom policy.  
In a section on “open access”, which Wu acknowledges has different 
meanings, he describes how proponents advocate structural separation 
on cable networks and that cable operators should not be allowed to 
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sell cable TV and internet access in the same package because it 
forecloses the content in the Internet package.55  
Wu recognizes that a best efforts regime tends to support applications 
that are latency-insensitive (e.g. email, website etc), but that’s 
unfortunate for the latency sensitive applications such as voice and 
video which need a quality of service.  He recognizes that this requires 
some contract from the broadband provider.  Wu says that only 
networks can control the quality of service.  
Separately, it has been shown that application providers can control 
their quality of service, for example by purchasing caching and 
prioritized delivery through content delivery networks (CDNs). In 
2015, it was  revealed with Netflix secretly degraded mobile video 
streams sent to AT&T and Verizon while Sprint and T-Mobile 
received quality streams.56 Indeed Netflix now allows users to set the 
quality of their own streams. Van Schewick, as described in the next 
section, suggests that users should be able to set priority.  In any case, 
Wu ultimately believes that a non-discrimination regime is a better 
choice than structural remedies such as open access. 
Wu opens the section on net neutrality with an allusion to the Hush-a-
Phone case, an attachment on the phone to keep conversations private 
and reduce ambient noise, a case in which the Hush-a-Phone company 
prevailed against AT&T for the ability for end users to attach non-
harmful devices to the network. Wu acknowledges that there are both 
justified and suspect examples of discrimination by a network 
provider.  He likens discrimination to the work place, buttressed by 
the Civil Rights Act, where employers are allowed to hire and fire 
based on skill, but they can’t make these decision based on race or 
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sex.  Wu observes, “Overall, there is a need to strike a balance 
between legitimate interests in discriminating against certain uses, and 
reasons that are suspect either due to irrationality or because of costs 
not internalized by the broadband operator.”  Blocking viruses would 
be one form of acceptable discrimination, but a blanket ban on IP 
chatting would not. 
While Wu acknowledges that price discrimination is understood as a 
defendable and legal concept, he laments that its presence can have 
negative implications for innovation and competition among 
applications and says that applications that demand a VPN are put at a 
disadvantage.  He does not give specific evidence for this, but it could 
be deduced that VPN activity is used to access content illegally. Wu 
discusses restrictions on VPN uses, noting that these are used by 
employees on companies and that such restrictions make them less 
productive.  
Wu discusses a separate but related concept of bandwidth 
management. Wu recognizes that some broadband providers have 
limited capacity and need management to ensure that the many 
services and applications are delivered in the necessary quality so that 
users can consume them. But Wu is still concerned that the need for 
the broadband provider to earn a profit by managing the network will 
harm consumers and innovation.  
Wu suggests that regulation, or even the threat of it, can create 
behavioral change in broadband providers, what he calls “education”.  
He notes that a number of cable providers have removed restrictions 
on VPNs voluntarily. He also says that broadband providers are 
irrational about their networks, overstating concerns about security 
and liability. He suggests that regulations are necessary to teach 
companies the values of certain practices, for example anti-age 
discrimination to force companies to hire older workers. 
Regarding of broadband usage restrictions, Wu observes that different 
kinds of networks can be different in their practices, showing the 
categories with cable and DSL. Wu says that in the 1990s, networks 
favored the web and client server applications while disfavoring home 
networking, peer-to-peer, and home telecommuting. One the principle 
45 
problems is the design of networks which offer asymmetric plans with 
greater download than upload capacity.57  
Wu admits that cable broadband providers do not ban streaming 
video, which would be the main threat to their business.  Wu also 
admits that contract disclosure is one thing, but enforcement another. 
Even though the restrictions on are on the books doesn’t mean that 
broadband providers enforce them. In fact, he concludes that even 
with the contract restrictions, “broadband access is not substantially 
limited.” 
Wu offers an anti-discrimination principle, “a rule, only if necessary”, 
he writes. “The effort is to strike a balance: to forbid  broadband 
operators, absent a showing of harm, from restricting what users do 
with their Internet connection, while giving the operator general 
freedom to manage bandwidth consumption and other matters of local 
concern.”  This means that broadband operators should have “full 
freedom to ‘police what they own’ (the local network)” but not restrict 
the inter-networking. The principle would define forbidden and 
permissible grounds for discrimination in broadband usage 
restrictions. 
In Wu’s net neutrality law forbidding broadband discrimination, 
“Users have the right reasonably to use their Internet connection in 
ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly 
detrimental.”  Accordingly, no restrictions are allowed except (1) 
comply with any existing law or governmental directive; (2) prevent 
physical harm to the network; (3) prevent users’ that limits others’ 
connection to the network, including but not limited to neutral limits 
on bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission of unsolicited email, 
and limits on the distribution of computer viruses, worms, and limits 
on denial-of service-or other attacks on others; (4) ensure the quality 
of the Broadband service, by eliminating delay, jitter or other 
technical aberrations; (5) prevent security violations; (6) “serve any 
other purpose specifically authorized by the Federal Communications 
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Commission, based on a weighing of the specific costs and benefit of 
the restriction.” 
With regards to the bandwidth intensive application of games, Wu 
says broadband providers should not manage bandwidth either by 
blocking or rationing the application.  Instead the user should upgrade 
to higher speed in order to access the game.58  Wu says that the onus 
should be on the gaming developer if the game needs a higher speed 
in order to be optimized. It should be the market choice, not the 
broadband provider’s choice, he says. 
Importantly, Wu’s discussion is focused on user’s rights and the 
management of traffic. Such notions are generally codified in net 
neutrality rules with provisions about the users’ rights to connect to 
the data of their choice. It bears mention that while Wu may have had 
opinions about the commercial offers of broadband providers, his 
article offers only a limited discussion of the pricing of the neutral 
platform. For example he sees nothing wrong with broadband 
providers charging a higher price for a higher speed or for more 
bandwidth. Thus to deduce that the presence of a data cap is a net 
neutrality violation does not seem supported by Wu’s article. 
Moreover, restrictions on zero rating cannot necessarily be deduced as 
there are no network restrictions going on (e.g. no blocking or 
throttling). 
Moreover Wu declares that broadband providers can “police what 
they own”, meaning how they conduct their proprietary traffic on the 
proprietary facilities, provided that it does not detract from the neutral 
platform.  This would seem to contradict the tough stance by BEREC 
on limiting what broadband providers can do on their own facilities 
under the specialized services provisions.59 
                                                          
58 It’s not clear that more speed is what will make the game work, as there can be 
other technical aspects which could deliver a better gaming experience. 
59 “What Is Traffic Management and What Is ‘equal Treatment’?,” BEREC, 
accessed November 4, 2016, 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/netneutrality/traffic_management/. 
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Wu’s original “neutrality principle” (interchangeably described 
throughout the paper as a “non-discrimination” and anti-
discrimination” principle) was not primarily intended to enshrine 
“end-to-end” principles into the fabric of the Internet.  Rather, the 
principle proposed a set of guidelines for the allocation of specific 
control rights between ISPs and their consumers.60  
Wu intimates that delivering a neutral network is in the long term 
interest of a broadband provider, and that the telecom regulator can 
play an “educational” role to encourage the broadband provider in this 
respect.  While Wu provides an example of an anti-discrimination 
rule, he hesitates to say that net neutrality should be law. He prefers 
that broadband providers simply follow the principle, which should be 
made a rule only “if necessary.”  Wu does not stipulate at what point a 
hard rule is necessary. 
Many incorrectly ascribe Wu to saying that the Internet is inherently 
neutral. In point of fact, he said the opposite. Wu states that the 
Internet was not neutral, as it tended to favor latency-insensitive 
applications (email, websites) over latency-sensitive apps (VOIP, 
video). He explains, 
First, the concept of network neutrality is not as simple as 
some IP partisans have suggested. Neutrality, as a concept, is 
finicky, and depends entirely on what set of subjects you 
choose to be neutral among. 
A policy that appears neutral in a certain time period, like 
“all men may vote”, may lose its neutrality in a later time 
period, when the range of subjects is enlarged. This problem 
afflicts the network neutrality embodied in the IP protocols. 
As the universe of applications has grown, the original 
conception of IP neutrality has dated: for IP was only neutral 
among data applications. Internet networks tend to favor, as 
a class, applications insensitive to latency (delay) or jitter 
(signal distortion). Consider that it doesn’t matter whether an 
                                                          
60 Howell, Bronwyn and Roslyn Layton. “An Economic History of Net Neutrality.” 
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email arrives now or a few milliseconds later. But it certainly 
matters for applications that want to carry voice or video. In 
a universe of applications, that includes both latency-
sensitive and insensitive applications, it is difficult to regard 
the IP suite as truly neutral as among all applications.61   
Lessig, Lemley and Wu claim that the Internet is the fastest growing 
network in history and that this is the proof that the end-to-end design 
is superior to others. But in point of fact, Internet is only the second 
fastest network. The mobile network grew faster.62  If the standard of 
the best network is how fast people adopt it, then unquestionably the 
mobile network will be the winner. However there is no pretense that 
the mobile network was designed to be “neutral.”  This brings  to 
mind the earlier point about the stupid network and suggests that the 
mobile network, which was designed by the telephone companies, is 
not so stupid at all.  In any event, it is hardly a point of disagreement 
that both networks are important and valuable, but it is hard to 
reconcile why the Internet is supposed to get separate rules which 
prioritize it over other networks. 
Indeed the idea of preserving the “original” Internet sounds like a 
museum project, like keeping copies of the old telegraph, phonograph, 
ENIAC, and so on. It would seem that engineers would want to try 
new things, to make them better, even to invent new and different 
protocol designs. The next section reviews Barbara van Schewick’s 
case of why the original IP suite is superior to other designs and why 
regulation is necessary to preserve it.  
 
                                                          
61 Tim Wu, “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,” SSRN Scholarly 
Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, June 5, 2003), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=388863.  
62 “How Americans Spend Their Money,” Washington Times, February 10, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/02/10/opinion/10op.graphic.ready.html. 
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2.2.4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF INNOVATION 
Lemley and Lessig presented an argument for end-to-end; Wu 
described the neutral platform; and Barbara van Schewick melds these 
ideas together. Van Schewick was inspired by Lessig’s books 
including Code and subsequently, her 2004 doctoral dissertation at the 
Technical University of Berlin Architecture and Innovation: The Role 
of the End-to-End Arguments in the Original Internet63 explores this 
idea. Van Schewick was a resident fellow at the Stanford Center for 
Internet & Society for part of the time she was writing her doctorate, 
and Lessig served on her PhD defense committee. Van Schewick won 
a prestigious German legal prize for her thesis among other academic 
commendations in both law and computer science, joined Lessig at the 
Stanford CIS in the 2006, where she a professor both of law and 
computer science. 
The thesis she presents in her doctorate--that there is an original 
internet based upon the end to end principle--she expands in her 2010 
book Internet Architecture and Innovation.64 Van Schewick asserts 
that the "architecture" of the internet, above all, is responsible for 
innovation in Internet services and applications. She expounds on two 
versions of end-to-end network design principle. Van Schewick 
clearly prefers one of the versions, using it to draw conclusions about 
the original intent of Internet design. She has denoted this as the 
“broad” version of the end-to-end arguments and further concludes 
“only the broad version affects the environment for innovation.” 
According to van Schewick, internet innovation is special for two 
reasons. There is a (1) large group of diverse innovators and (2) user 
choice among the competing applications. “Applying the broad 
version of the end-to-end arguments creates an environment that is 
more conducive to application innovation than architectures that 
                                                          
63 “Fakultät IV Elektrotechnik Und Informatik: Promotionen 2004,” accessed 
November 4, 2016, https://www.eecs.tu-
berlin.de/menue/forschung/promotionen/archiv/promotionen_2004/. 
64 Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation,  MIT Press, 
accessed June 20, 2016, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/internet-architecture-and-
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WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
50 
deviate from this design principle,” (381) she writes. Specifically she 
notes that the mechanism that produces innovation in applications 
under an end-to-end architecture has two components: widespread 
experimentation by a large and diverse group of innovators who 
independently select whether to realize their innovative ideas, and user 
choice among the resulting applications. Under uncertainty or user 
heterogeneity, this mechanism will produce more and better 
applications than innovation in network architectures that concentrate 
control over innovation or deployment in the hands of a few network 
providers.” (382) 
Van Schewick exhibits Skype, Ebay, Amazon, Facebook, and Google 
as proof that the end-to-end principle leads to innovation but many of 
these companies competitors may have had similar origins but did not 
become successes. So it is not clear whether there is a dividing line 
between inherent features of the internet and other factors such as 
market, technology, management expertise etc which are at play. 
Van Schewick also discusses differential treatment of Internet traffic 
or  prioritization. She notes that application-specific differential 
treatment and application-class based differentiation should be 
forbidden65 but that user-chosen differential treatment66 is okay.  She 
describes the former as harmful discrimination while the latter is not.  
However in the scenario the user is allowed to use prioritization but it 
cannot be application-specific; it must be application agnostic, as she 
notes in a filing67 to the FCC on the “General Conduct Rule.” She 
notes, 
In particular, to determine whether a practice is likely to 
reduce innovation and free speech, the FCC should evaluate 
                                                          
65 Barbara Van Schewick, “Analysis of Proposed Network Neutrality Rules,” 
Stanford, February 18, 2015, /publications/analysis-proposed-network-neutrality-
rules. 
66 Barbara Schewick, “Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-
Discrimination Rule Should Look Like,” June 26, 2014, /publications/network-
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67 Barbara Schewick, “Analysis of Proposed Network Neutrality Rules,” Stanford, 
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the practice based on whether it preserves the following three 
factors: User choice; Application-agnosticism; and Low 
costs of application innovation and free speech. This 
approach would allow complainants to show that a practice 
is likely to reduce innovation and free speech and should 
therefore be prohibited by demonstrating that it violates at 
least one of these three factors, without requiring them to 
engage in a detailed analysis of the impact of the practice on 
application innovation, free speech and broadband 
deployment.” 
However if the user cannot differentiate on applications, it is hard to 
see on which parameters they are making the decision to apply the 
prioritization. Van Schewick has been a key proponent of bans on 
what she calls “fast lanes” or “paid prioritization”, which is now part 
of the US and EU net neutrality rules. 
2.2.5 ZERO RATING 
Van Schewick is also a leading critic of zero rating and free data and 
has called for outrights bans on the practice.68 She observed in January 
2016, “Zero-rating is harmful discrimination. Zero-rating is the 
practice of not counting certain applications against users’ monthly 
bandwidth caps. Like fast lanes or other technical discrimination, 
zero-rating allows ISPs to discriminate against content that users want 
to see. Zero-rated applications are more attractive to users than 
applications that are not.”  
Van Schewick reviews69 T-Mobile’s popular free music and video 
programs. Her claims justifying the harm of the programs are based on 
                                                          
68 Van Schewick (2016) Personal blog: Barbara van Schewick, “Europe Is About to 
Adopt Bad Net Neutrality Rules. Here’s How to Fix Them,” Medium, October 22, 
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69 Van Schewick, Barbara. “T-Mobile’s Binge On Violates Key Net Neutrality 
Principles.” Stanford. CA: Cyberlaw at Stanford University, 2016. 
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two sources: first, the results of a market research survey70  from 
American wireless provider trade association CTIA and second, an 
article71 from the Wall Street Journal describing an interview with 
Slate magazine’s vice president of technology. Neither of these are 
academic research or regulatory investigations and neither mention the 
term “zero rating”, but they are worthy of review and actually suggest 
support for zero rating. 
It is interesting that van Schewick would use the CTIA study to 
bolster her claim that T-Mobile’s BingeOn is distorting competition, 
as the CTIA study appears to have been conducted to provide 
evidence that mobile providers are creating competition. Van 
Schewick only mentions one of the nine conclusions of the study,  that 
74% of those surveyed would prefer to see video from start-up 
providers if it did not count toward the data cap.  
The CTIA study also concludes that 57% the respondents believe they 
have more choice when it comes to wireless providers than wireline. 
Two-thirds (67%) said they are more likely to choose a provider that 
offered content that did not count against the data cap.  In defiance of 
the call for regulation, only 6% of the survey respondents thought the 
federal government should decide which options and services mobile 
providers make available, and 73% said the government should be less 
involved in the regulation of mobile wireless. Even if the government 
adopted rules, 66% said that the rules should be flexible to reflect the 
reality of the mobile market. Only 29% were supportive of using the 
monopoly telephone era rules (Title II) to regulate wireless. In fact 
78% favored that the government recognize that wireless is different 
and treat it distinctly. Two-thirds said they favored quality of service 
on their mobile subscription over treating all of the data equally, with 
64% saying that mobile providers should be able to manage their 
networks to ensure the best experience for their customers. Moreover 
                                                          
70 CTIA The Wireless Association (2014) CTIA Mobile Wireless Service Survey. 
TechoMetrica. 22 pp. Ramsey NJ. Accessible at: http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-
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71 Knutson, Ryan, 2014, Will Free Data Become the Next Free Shipping? Wall 
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42% of the respondents believed wireless carriers to “most 
innovative”, compared to cable TV at 17% ; electricity utilities at 
13%; and 9% for the federal government.  
Perhaps in the greatest contrast to van Schewick’s view, 63% of 
respondents favored prioritization on mobile networks, and 39%  said 
those applications requiring more quality or more real time 
functionality should be prioritized. Twenty four percent agreed that 
users wanting prioritization should pay additional fees. 
The second of van Schewick’s sources is a Wall Street Journal article 
describing how Slate magazine wanted to increase the listeners to its 
podcast and experimented with a service by DataMi that gave some 
users the chance to listen to the podcast without it counting toward the 
mobile data plan. It found that 61% were more likely to listen when 
the data was free. The article describes how a range of edge providers, 
large, small and startup, were taking advantage of free data programs 
to win new users. 
Van Schewick asserts, “BingeOn allows some providers to join easily 
and creates lasting barriers for others, especially small players, non-
commercial providers, and start-ups. As such, the program harms 
competition, user choice, free expression, and innovation…”72 She 
notes that Google is not able to join because it used User Data 
Protocol (UDP), however YouTube is now the program.73 More than 
100 video services are available in the package.74   
Van Schewick claims that zero rating distorts competition because 
consumers prefer things to be free and that T-Mobile is automatically 
more attractive because it offers free video. She suggests that video 
                                                          
72 Van Schewick, Barbara. “T-Mobile’s Binge On Violates Key Net Neutrality 
Principles.” Stanford. CA: Cyberlaw at Stanford University, 2016. 
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providers in BingeOn are getting a reward they don’t deserve; one 
they have not earned on merit but just the mere fact that they’re part of 
T-Mobile’s program. She says that the free program will likely bring 
more video providers to BingeOn, further distorting competition. 
Because T-Mobile has only added a subset of competitors from each 
category, this itself is distorting competition, says van Schewick. She 
also asserts that zero rating limits user choice because users can only 
watch the amount of video allotted for the data cap, saying “it’s a not 
a meaningful choice.”  
Van  Schewick claims T-Mobile limits free expression because the 42 
providers only provide commercial video entertainment, not user 
generated, educational or non-profit content. She claims that 
commercial entertainment is coming at the expense of all other 
speakers which “undermines the potential of the Internet as a 
democratic space for free expression.”  However a review of BingeOn 
conducted in August 201675 shows that among more than 100 
providers, there are 3 religious video services, 4 in the Spanish 
language,  4 user generated services, PBS, Arts & Entertainment, 
History Channel, National Geographic, and Discovery in addition to 
categories for news, sports, anime, Asian, music, kids and premium 
content general entertainment. Verizon’s Go90, a service from a 
competing ISP, is also available. 
2.2.6 NET NEUTRALITY RULEMAKING 
Van Schewick has been prolific in the rule making process.  She is 
reported to have had 150 meetings76 with US government officials in 
support of Open Internet rulemaking. She also has the record for ex 
parte disclosures for the FCC’s rulemaking process for the 2015 Open 
Internet order,77 some 18 disclosures, one of which notes 10 separate 
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meetings in a single week.  Van Schewick’s comments are referenced 
at least 9 times in the FCC’s 2010 Open Internet Report and Order 
(related to 4 of her submissions78) and 6 times in the 2015 rules (based 
on 4 supplemental submissions.79 In the 2010 rules, the FCC cites van 
Schewick’s comment, “gatekeeper control and pay-for-prioritization 
would have prevented Skype and YouTube from surviving because of 
the threats they presented to the legacy business of telephone-based 
network providers and Google Video, respectively)”80 — to support 
its view that its rules are necessary to ensure Internet openness norms.  
The FCC also references Van Schewick to support the statement, 
“Broadband providers would be expected to set inefficiently high fees 
to edge providers because they receive the benefits of those fees but 
are unlikely to fully account for the detrimental impact on edge 
providers’ ability and incentive to innovate and invest, including the 
possibility that some edge providers might exit or decline to enter the 
                                                          
78 The four submissions include Letter from Barbara van Schewick to Marlene 
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191 (filed Jan. 19, 2010); Barbara van 
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2015)  
80 See footnote 61. FCC Open Internet Report & Order, December 21, 2010. 
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market.”81 She is referenced as well on the assertion that prioritized 
access fees would “could further raise the costs of introducing new 
products and might chill entry and expansion.”82 
The FCC references van Schewick further in their rules of taking a 
more light touch approach, for example. “The record does not 
convince us that a transparency requirement by itself will adequately 
constrain problematic conduct.”83  In paragraph 71 of the rules, the 
FCC quotes van Schewick directly as justification for rules, “. . . 
letting users choose how they want to use the network enables them to 
use the Internet in a way that creates more value for them (and for 
society) than if network providers made this choice.”84 Her 
submission is the sole justification for a provision on “Use Agnostic 
Discrimination”85 and for the need of the FCC to act in the “public 
interest”86 on net neutrality. The 2015 rules make reference to van 
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86 Ibid. Paragraph 78, footnote 242 and 243. See, e.g., Letter from Barbara van 
Schewick, Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket 
No. 09-191, at 1–2 (filed Dec. 10, 2010) (noting that concerns about discrimination 
go beyond “anticompetitive” behavior or harms to competition, as those terms are 
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Schewick in 6 footnotes: on no blocking rules;87 the no throttling rule 
and ban on discrimination against applications and classes of 
applications;88 the claim that that users, not network providers,  make 
the right choices for innovation,89 on application agnostic traffic 
management;90 and the need for forbearance under Title II.91 
                                                                                                                                        
understood in antitrust law); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(“The agency’s determination about the proper role of competitive forces in an 
industry must therefore be based, not exclusively on the letter of the antitrust laws, 
but also on the ‘special considerations’ of the particular industry. As the Supreme 
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Commission . . . .” (quoting McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 
(1944)) Letter from Prof. Barbara van Schewick, Professor, Stanford Law School, to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, 
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(observing that such a rule would “make[] it impossible to consider the potential 
impact of discriminatory conduct on the Internet’s ability to realize its social, 
cultural and political potential—important aspects that the open Internet rules are 
intended to protect”). 
87 Federal Communications Commission. “Open Internet Order”, February 25, 2015. 
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88 Ibid. Footnote 272. See, e.g., Letter from Barbara van Schewick, Professor of Law 
and (by courtesy) Electrical Engineering, Stanford Law School, et al., to Marlene 
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket Nos. 14-28, 10-127 Attach. at 4 (filed Feb. 18, 
2015) (van Schewick Feb. 18, 2015 Ex Parte Letter) (“[T]he no-throttling rule 
should explicitly ban discrimination against applications AND classes of 
applications (so-called ‘application-specific’ discrimination).”). 
89 Ibid. Footnote 335. van Schewick Feb. 18, 2015 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 14 
“Letting users, not network providers, choose which applications will be successful 
is an important part of the mechanism that produces innovation under uncertainty. 
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90 Ibid. Footnote 344 See van Schewick Sept. 19, 2014 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 24 
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Curiously, a cursory review of the FCC footnotes suggests that the 
agency fulsomely restates and quotes the pro net neutrality arguments 
in text and footnotes and while submissions that run counter to the 
rules are not explicated. A more thorough analysis of this observation 
see Hurwitz92 and Lyons.93 
Van Schewick’s influence is also felt in the European net neutrality 
rules. Frode Sørensen, Senior Advisor at the Norwegian Telecom 
Authority (Nkom) describes van Schewick’s “deep analysis”94 of  her 
concept of “user-controlled”, “application-agnostic” QoS architecture 
with is compatible with net neutrality. Her suggestions were 
subsequently adopted in the BEREC’s Net Neutrality QoS Guidelines 
in 2012.95 
Van Schewick criticized the EU net neutrality law passed in October 
2015 and suggested a number of amendments. “The future of the 
Internet in Europe is on the line. It’s up to all of us to save it,” she 
writes and calls for amendments that ban “fast lanes”, “zero rating” 
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“application-based discrimination” and congestion management.96 
However he European Parliament rejected the amendments,97 but 
variations reappeared in the 2016 draft BEREC guidelines98 for 
implementation of the EU net neutrality law. These included 
significant restrictions on zero rating (a term not mentioned in the EU 
law); traffic management, and specialised services.  
During the question and answer period of the June 2016 launch of the 
consultation of the guidelines, Henk Don of the Authority on 
Consumers and Markets (the Dutch telecom regulator) explained that 
he and Frode Sorensen invited van Schewick and 3 other proponents 
to inform the guidelines.99 The session,100 which was attended by over 
100 BEREC representatives, was closed to the public. BEREC denied 
a request to provide notes of the meeting.  
Together with Lessig and Tim Berners-Lee, van Schewick penned an 
open letter101  on July 14, 2016 to “European citizens, lawmakers and 
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regulators” to ban “fast lanes”, “zero rating”, “discrimination”, and 
“specialised services.” The letter included calls to action with Save the 
Internet, a global net neutrality coalition, and was syndicated to the 
press and a number of related coalitions. BEREC released the final 
guidelines in a press conference on August 30, noting the 
unprecedented level of comments. BEREC Administrative Manager 
Laszlo Igneczi explained the various IT and technical investments that 
were needed to facilitate receiving an avalanche of emails. He 
presented a chart102 showing the explosion of comments from 132,956 
to 481,547 in the last week of the consultation, 640 per minute on July 
17, 2016, 3 days after van Schewick’s letter was released. He 
observed that the lion’s share of the submissions came from the net 
neutrality coalitions Save The Internet, Avaaz, OpenMedia and 
AccessNow.103  
As part of the consultation on net neutrality guidelines, van Schewick 
penned another open letter104 which was signed by 126 academics “led 
by the belief that neutral access to the Internet in its entirety is a 
necessary precondition for the full enjoyment of human rights.” In 
introducing the letter, van Schewick warns of the “negative impact 
that fast lanes would have on our ability to research, collaborate, and 
educate”105 and urges strict BEREC guidelines. Apart from van 
Schewick’s papers, of the publications by the 126 academics, only 7 
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papers on net neutrality could be identified, none of which appeared in 
peer-reviewed journals.106  
There is no doubt that van Schewick’s work is instrumental in the 
study, if not the rulemaking, of net neutrality. This is also a reason 
why critical appraisals are necessary. Bauer in his review of van 
Schewick’s book observes, “To make researchers and policy-makers 
keenly aware of the effects of architectures on economic decisions and 
innovation in the Internet ecosystem is an outstanding contribution of 
the book.” However notes a shortcoming of the book being a lack of 
empirical evidence, which leaves room for improvement and an 
opportunity for more research. Therefore he concludes that van 
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Milton Mueller et al., “Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance,” 
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Schewick’s findings “while relevant to the continuing policy 
discourse, should be applied with caution.”107 
2.3 OTHER PAPERS ON NET NEUTRALITY  
This section mentions a few of the key theoretical but quantitative 
papers on net neutrality using game theory and econometrics. The 
only empirical paper that could be found is Laura Nurski’s “Net 
Neutrality, Foreclosure and the Fast Lane: An Empirical Study of the 
UK”108 from 2012. Nurski concludes that offering differentiated 
services benefits consumers, telecom operators, and content providers 
(specifically with advertising revenue).  She says that there is little 
incentive for foreclosure because it reduces a broadband provider’s 
profits. This outcome is supported by the intuition of two-sided 
markets; that blocking content or services, a telecom operator attracts 
fewer customers and therefore suffers reduced revenue. 
Nicholas Economides et al109 offer econometric models for net net 
neutrality with two-sided markets. They posit ISPs in the middle, 
consumers on one side and content providers on the other. Their 
models suggest ambiguous results for net neutrality rules.110  They 
posit arguments both for and against network neutrality, showing that 
consumers benefit with maximum content, but also that ISPs, if they 
are able to charge content providers fees, will invest in infrastructure 
and eliminate congestion.  It is a conundrum to both allow and forbid 
network neutrality at the same time, so they advocate government 
rather than private network investment.  These models assume 
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homogeneous users and content, so results might be different under 
different conditions. 
Cheng, Bandyopadhyay and Guo111 use game theory to model 
network neutrality. Both they, and Choi and Kim,112 conclude that 
operators have more incentive to invest under network neutrality 
because consumers demand more content and therefore operators need 
to provide more network capacity. However, they note that content 
providers will be worse off if they pay for content delivery than the 
free regime today. Supplementary work113 in 2012 by the authors 
concluded that departures from net neutrality can increase consumer 
surplus and broadband market coverage. 
Mussachio, Schwartz and Walrand114 model the complexity of the 
problem by allowing operators to charge content providers termination 
fees (delivery fees) depending on a number of factors such as the 
content provider’s strength in earning advertising revenue, the 
concentration of ISPs in a given market, and the entry costs for ISPs. 
Kramer and Wiewiorra115 model the effect of tiered pricing to data-
heavy content providers for Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees.  
They conclude that flexible pricing for content providers is the best 
option for infrastructure investment by ISPs in the short and long run. 
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Faulhaber notes in a number of papers116 117 118 119 120 121 that 
competition and technology evolution have negated the need for 
network neutrality legislation. He expands upon the two-sided market 
model, saying that it is not in the interest for an ISP to block content 
or favor one provider over another, as having as many content 
providers as possible is profit maximizing for an ISP.  He gives the 
example of a retailer that will offer its own house brand along with 
competing products in order to appeal to many customers’ tastes. 
He suggests that transparency, not neutrality, is what is needed to 
ensure an open internet, and he provides detailed suggestions on how 
all internet players, content and application providers as well as ISPs, 
should disclose information to help customers make decisions.  He 
asks regulators to provide uniform standards for disclosure. To 
address monopoly behavior, regulators should use antitrust. 
A complex model by Gupta et al122 considers the service-based logical 
architecture for overlay networks in mobile devices, which makes 
locating content and routing more efficient.  The authors are 
concerned about inevitable congestion with flat-rate pricing (the one 
size fits all internet price) versus differentiated pricing which can 
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alleviate congestion. They find that benefits are optimized to all 
parties under a situation of differentiated pricing and that the 
assumptions of net neutrality have not considered the incentives for 
private investment in infrastructure.  
In contrast to concerns about vertical integration in content and 
communication networks, Owen counters123 that virtually every 
production process in the economy is vertically integrated, and the 
evidence is strong in favor of its consumer enhancing benefits.  
Antitrust policy that relies on ex post evidence of harm is preferable to 
the prophylactic net neutrality rules which amount to restrictions on 
the private property of operators. 
Kramer and Wiewiorra124 found that quality of service tiering may be 
more efficient in the short run because it better allocates the existing 
network capacity and in the long run because it provides higher 
investment incentives due to the increased demand for priority 
services by the entry of new congestion sensitive content providers. 
The regime that provides higher incentives for infrastructure 
investments is more efficient in the long run. 
Alexandrov and Deb125 found that under both monopoly and duopoly, 
if a firm cannot offer different prices for quality, then it invests less. 
Society suffers overall with reduced investment, they conclude.  
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Baranes126 finds that a non-neutral regime gives advantages both for 
high quality content and upgrades in infrastructure from copper to 
fiber. 
Bourreau et al127 found that investments in broadband capacity and 
content innovation are both higher in the non-neutral regime.  
Gans & Katz128 note that net neutrality may harm efficiency by 
distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-
quality choices. 
Greenstein et al129 find “little support for the bold and simplistic 
claims of the most vociferous supporters and detractors of net 
neutrality.” Similar to this paper, they note the importance legal 
instrument (“precise policy choice”) and how it is implemented. The 
say the outcome a question of long-run economic trade-offs for which 
there is no experience or consensus expectation. 
2.4 THEORIES OF INNOVATION 
Given the conflicting views of net neutrality in the academic 
literature, it is helpful to review the theories of innovation. A review 
of key concepts in the innovation literature can shed light on the net 
neutrality discussion and inform ICT policymaking. The discussion 
begins with an overview of the leading scholars of innovation in the 
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20th and 21st century.  It touches upon Joseph Schumpeter and the 
“gale of creative destruction.” Everett Rogers, a sociologist, 
emphasized the role of people in adopting and diffusing innovation; 
his theories have been used frequently to explain the adoption of 
smartphones, mobile apps, social networks, and many digital 
phenomena. Christiansen’s “disruptive innovation” explains why 
disruptive internet innovation itself has succeeded to unseat telecom 
operators in providing communications services, regardless of the 
regulatory regime. 
Lundvall developed the National Innovation System to explain the 
interplay of factors that make a country innovative. His view 
conforms to that of the Internet as a symbiotic ecosystem in which 
parts work together, rather than sectors to be singled out for 
regulation.   
David Teece is relevant for the topic, as he is the one scholar of 
innovation who has investigated the topic of net neutrality in depth.  
He is not in favor of net neutrality and called it an” intellectual 
bankruptcy”. In Teece’s world, net neutrality rules constrain the 
ability of actors to make partnerships, or to “share complementary 
assets.” If actors are prohibited from getting the complement to their 
asset, there will be no innovation. This is particularly the case for 
certain kinds of applications which need quality of service in order to 
operate. Moreover, the very introduction of new products and service 
is delivered by the complementary assets of marketing. As such, the 
ability for startups to use zero rating to improve their marketing and 
distribution could be helpful to make their innovation known. 
Jean Tirole and his two-sided markets concept is perhaps the most 
referenced explanation in the economics literature about net neutrality.  
Two-sided markets thinking holds that platforms, the ISPs in this case, 
have an incentive to get both sides of the market on board. Any 
blocking or throttling that a telecom operator does will lessen its 
profits. Moreover differential pricing supports the efficient 
distribution of services, versus a price control such as net neutrality, 
which forces all data to be valued the same. Hence net neutrality 
regulation will not be optimal for all participants, including users. 
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Christopher Yoo offers a cogent and compelling alternative to net 
neutrality, that of the Dynamic Internet.  He suggests that allowing the 
dynamic emergence of new technologies is preferable to net 
neutrality, which is a conservative argument to keep the Internet the 
same. 
Brief reviews of the ecosystem model and circle model of innovation 
are offered.  
Innovation is a broad and popular term and is the subject of millions 
of articles in the academic press, and even more in the mainstream 
press.  Fagerberg and Sapprasert have charted the literature of 
innovation and its salient concepts.130 They conclude that there is a 
global community of innovation scholars organized in small sub-
groups based on geography and professional discipline. They note the 
emergence of specific academic and professionals journals and 
associations devoted specifically to the topic of innovation. They 
updated the analysis in 2011 and define the most important papers 
published on innovation before and after 1985. 131  
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Figure 1: Top publications on innovation before and after 1985, 
complied by Fagerberg et al 
 
 
Wu, Lessig and van Schewick are not listed as leading scholars of 
innovation, nor is net neutrality a salient theme in the innovation 
literature.  Of all of these authors, only Von Hippel and Teece discuss 
net neutrality. Eric von Hippel132 mentions net neutrality in passing in 
his paper discussing open innovation models. In a concluding line, the 
paper notes that net neutrality “might” have implications for 
innovation, and that “ownership of content and ownership of channel 
be separate” (quoting Lessig). Hippel also signed a letter in support of 
the FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking along with a group of 
                                                          
132 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Eric von Hippel, “Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From 
Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation,” 2009, 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-038.pdf. 
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academics.133 However dozens of academics have questioned net 
neutrality and have also written the FCC in similar crowdsourced 
style.134 Teece spends 74 pages addressing the charges of net 
neutrality proponents and concludes,  
The proposed “nondiscrimination” rule would have the ironic 
effect of actively discriminating against any kind of content or 
application that is differentiated by its need for greater assurance 
of higher quality transmission across the Internet (known as 
quality of service, or QoS) than undifferentiated best-effort 
delivery can offer. This result not only would reduce static 
efficiency by encouraging higher consumer prices, but also would 
reduce dynamic efficiency by retarding innovation. The proposed 
rule manifests an inverse relationship between means and ends, for 
it would actively thwart the Commission’s stated purpose of 
promoting innovation both in and at the edges of the network.135   
In any case, a number of these authors are helpful to review in 
defining innovation and helping to inform innovation policy, whether 
with net neutrality or not. Here are some of the key concepts of 
innovation discussed in light of the Internet. 
 
2.4.1 SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 
Joseph Schumpeter re-interpreted Marx in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy.136  Giving the example of the dearth of wood forcing a 
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need to find energy substitutes, Schumpeter promoted the idea that 
necessity creates invention.  Rather than see the business cycle as a 
Marxist process of accumulation and annihilation of wealth, 
Schumpeter proposed “creative destruction” as an engine of renewable 
economic growth, a force “that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one”.  Schumpeter saw entrepreneurs as 
creating economic growth and destroying established industries and 
monopolies.  He would have likely celebrated the emergence of over 
the top technologies (OTTs) such as Skype and WhatsApp which offer 
a competitive challenge to traditional operators’ communications 
services.  
In addition “creative destruction.” Schumpeter advanced other 
concepts of technical change into neoclassical economic theory.  He is 
also known for his discussion of the trilogy of invention, innovation, 
and diffusion. He distinguishes between invention (generation of new 
ideas), innovation (development of new ideas into a marketable 
products and process), and diffusion (spread of these products and 
processes across potential markets). 
Search engines provide an example of Schumpeter’s concepts.  While 
the computer inputs of today’s search engine can be traced to 
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 concept of the “memex” which inspired the 
development of hypertext137, the first modern search engine was was 
“Archie”, a tool used to search webservers by scientists at McGill 
University in Canada in the early 1990s.  Seven years later, Google 
created the innovation of pairing search results with advertising, an 
idea they appropriated from competitor Goto.com.138  Diffusion could 
be described as the process by which users adopt Google’s services. In 
any case, the idea of innovation simply being a function of network 
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“openness” ignores decades of science and subsequent tinkering to 
create new and novel things. 
Some additional learnings from Schumpeter include the important 
distinction between adoption (the decision to incorporate a new 
technology into activities, typically a firm) and diffusion (how market 
share changes over time).  Schumpeter believed adoption is driven by 
costs and benefits and prior investment decisions, e.g. replacement 
versus new goods.  
Net neutrality advocates are concerned that telecom operators block 
competing applications such as Skype and WhatsApp, but these two 
apps have succeeded to disrupt effectively the revenue of telecom 
operators worldwide. Already in 2013 one-third of the world’s long 
distance calling took place over Skype.139 The company was 
purchased by Microsoft in 2011, and is one of the world’s top apps.  
As of 2016 WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, two apps owned by 
Facebook, delivered 30 billion messages per day, exceeding by 10 
billion the total amount of proprietary the world’s mobile operators 
delivered at their height, 20 billion SMS daily.140  WhatsApp has 
succeeded to become one the world’s single most successful mobile 
applications, regardless of whether net neutrality rules are present or 
not.  
In the US, the case of Madison River, a rural operator in North 
Carolina which blocked voice of Internet Protocol provider Vonage, is 
the example proffered by net neutrality advocates as justifying ex ante 
rules. However the FCC addressed the issue promptly with a cease 
and desist letter to the carrier and a $15,000 fine,141 suggesting that the 
FCC could police bad behavior effectively without new net neutrality 
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rules. Faulhaber suggests that blocking is not profitable for the serious 
telecom operator, for reasons of transaction costs, public opinion, and 
distraction from core business activities.142    
In Schumpeter’s view, regulation is not needed as innovators overtake 
incumbents though natural, economic forces.  The “creative 
destructive” concept has been evolved to one of “creative 
cooperation” by Rothaermelin.143 That telecom operators need not be 
destroyed but rather they can partner with competitors is also implicit 
in the notion of co-opetition,144 that dynamic organizations both 
cooperate and compete. 
2.4.2 ROGERS AND THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 
Net neutrality proponents suggest that end-to-end design of the 
network itself is what leads to innovation. This may be a simplistic 
notion as all networks are end-to-end systems by definition. 
Sociologist Everett Rogers suggested that more complex social 
process underlie the process of adoption of innovation and his bell-
curve of the diffusion of innovation is a touchstone in the literature.145  
Rogers defined diffusion as a process in which innovation is shared 
over communication channels over time among the members of a 
social system.  An innovation (also called technology) is an idea, 
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practice, or object that is perceived as new.  It can include a hardware 
and/or software aspect.  It may or may not be a part of a technology 
cluster. Rogers outlined re-invention as a change or modification of an 
innovation.  
Rogers discussed the perceived attributes of the innovation including 
relative advantage (improvement over the status quo), compatibility 
(how it fits into the person’s life), complexity (degree of difficulty of 
adoption), “trialability” (how much one can experiment before 
adoption), and observability (degree to which benefits are visible to 
others). 
Rogers defined the communication channels as mass media (creates 
knowledge and awareness), interpersonal (persuading individuals), 
heterophly (experts), and homophily (peers). Rogers discussed time as 
steps in the innovation process: knowledge, persuasion, decision, 
implementation, and confirmation. Decision are made either 
optionally, collectively or by authority.  Rogers emphasized that the 
diffusion of innovation as a social, not economic process.  He 
described the norms, degree of networks, and interconnectedness in 
social systems.  In Rogers’ model, opinion leaders and change agents 
are important.   
Rogers’ model and its attendant bell curve have been used to explain 
numerous innovations, especially the growth in smartphones. Net 
neutrality as an autonomous principle would likely be too general for 
Rogers, who would have probably emphasized the role of social actors 
in technology adoption, for example how viral adoption is facilitated 
by both online and offline social networks.  
In Rogers’ world, simply having an innovation is not in itself enough 
to drive adoption.  He was particularly interested in laggards, the 
people who don’t adopt technology regardless of the benefits it brings. 
Rogers suggest that people have to be introduced to innovation 
through peers.   
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2.4.3 CHRISTIANSEN AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
Disruption is a another term frequently used with innovation. It comes 
from Clay Christiansen’s The Innovator's Dilemma: When New 
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail.146 Christiansen describes 
how well-managed companies addressing their best customers fail to 
see opportunities created by low-cost competitors focusing on an 
unprofitable market segment or “disruptive innovation”.  
Christiansen describes the difference between sustaining and 
disruptive technologies and notes that most technological advances are 
sustaining technologies; they improve the performance of existing 
products.  Occasionally technologies are disruptive. They 
underperform existing products at first, but then emerge to be simpler, 
better, faster, and cheaper than existing products.  
One characteristic of disruption Christiansen observes is that it 
provides firms lower margins, not higher profits.  This can be 
observed with Skype and WhatsApp. Skype may be the single most 
powerful disruptor in the history of telephony.  For the year ended 
2010 Skype’s revenue was $860 million, its last published revenue 
before it was purchased by Microsoft for $8.5 billion.  Skype had 668 
million users, 18 percent of which were active users, and 8.8 million 
paying users.147  With 124 million active users, Skype made less 
revenue than the annual operating profit of many mobile operators.  It 
is worth noting that an operator with 124 million subscribers would 
earn many billions of dollars, but Skype made less than $1 billion.   
Microsoft purchased Skype as a sustaining innovation.  Microsoft 
does not provide individual financials for Skype, but it is bundled in 
the same business line with Microsoft Lync, an enterprise 
communications platform.  Of the world’s largest 100 companies, 90 
                                                          
146 Clay Christiansen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail. (Harvard Business Review, 1997). 
147 “Microsoft Advertising International Skype Media Overview.” (Microsoft, July 
2013), http://advertising.microsoft.com/en-
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purchase the Lync platform for enterprise communications.148 Indeed 
Skype may well be a “loss leader”149 for Microsoft, a flagship service 
brand that increases the value of the overall platform. 
Most of Skype’s users are individuals who do not pay for the service. 
Like many Internet companies, Microsoft offers Skype both in free 
and premium versions, with the paying customers subsidizing the non-
pay users.  Microsoft earns fees on the enterprise sales of Lync and 
from off-net communications revenue from Skype.  Connecting to 
Skype.com may be governed by the end to end principle, but any 
enhancement or features in the service are now ensured by Microsoft, 
so it cannot be that the end to end principle alone is responsible for 
Skype’s innovation.  
The online messaging service WhatsApp is similar example of 
disruptive and sustaining innovation. Millions of users substitute free 
WhatsApp for the proprietary SMS solutions offered by operators.  
Facebook found that some of its users were defecting to WhatsApp, so 
it acquired the startup for $19 billion.150  
2.4.4  LUNDVALL AND NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
The National System of Innovation (NIS)151 emerged as a critique of 
neo-classical economics with its focus on scarcity, allocation, and 
exchange in a static context.  The NIS attempts a more dynamic 
understanding of innovation and the role of learning in a system.  Its 
key assumption is that the most important resource in an economy is 
knowledge, and the most important process is learning.  It also notes 
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that learning is embedded in a social context and can’t be understood 
without reference to institutions and culture. Globalization both 
strengthens and weakens the NIS.  
The NIS posits the notion of learning and industrialization predicated 
on the classic idea of a nation state with its particular endowments. 
The nation state has two key dimensions, national-cultural (the 
individuals belonging to a nation with their linguistic, ethnic and 
cultural characteristics) and the political state (the geographic area 
belonging to a single authority). The paradigm of a nation state is that 
it is an “engine of growth” which has experienced a process of 
economic transformation from the agricultural to the industrial age 
and now to the information age.  
The NIS is first a social system.  Systems can have both virtuous and 
vicious circles that both support and well as hinder innovation, a 
dynamic system that includes positive feedback and reproduction (of 
knowledge, i.e. remembering).  As such, the borders of national 
innovation system may be loose.  
Lundvall and many of his collaborators in the Innovation, Knowledge 
and Economic Dynamics (IKE) school at Aalborg University focused 
their study on the Nordic countries, which they recognize to be 
culturally homogenous and economically coherent, as well as “small” 
nations in the sense of geography and population. They believed their 
work to be relevant for the European Union, a supra-structure for 28 
European nations, where there are both national and regional 
innovation systems, with indistinct borders at times. They note that 
national innovation systems are evolving and heterogeneous, 
reflecting how countries have been open to trade. 
A key issue today is that corporations can weaken their tie to a nation 
state as they source innovation and inputs from other nations, creating 
both the challenge that firms are less connected to their native country, 
but on the other hand, globalization may bring new firms to the 
country.  
Lundvall notes a number of issues and concerns of the NIS from a 
public policy perspective including 
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• The level at which the government intervenes. This is 
important because a government could reproduce weaknesses 
at the national level or induce a dynamic that is illogical to the 
system. 
• The interplay between countries and conflict about who “pays” 
for innovation and who benefits 
• That countries differ in their ability to exploit innovation 
• That the classic measure of R&D expenditure as a portion of 
GDP, could also be described as patents, new products, high 
technology in trade. There is problem in that discrete measures 
don’t necessarily take into account the diffusion process. 
• That progress itself is not the goal, but an outcome that can be 
measured in economic growth , e.g. income or consumption, 
but these measures are not necessarily related to innovation. 
For example innovations in vaccines could reduce income and 
consumption in certain kind of health services. People would 
be better off because a vaccine obviates the need for less 
effective treatment. 
• The recognition that some global problems do not lend 
themselves to be addressed at the nation state level 
• That solution is not necessarily to dismantle national 
institutions (though that could be one outcome), but rather to 
see how an institution must learn and evolve. 
 
The NIS also critiques the neoclassical view of innovation that 
assumes innovation as something that happens from the outside, a 
defined event that upsets the equilibrium and the sets a new 
equilibrium.  Lundvall observes,  
 
In modern capitalism, however, innovation is a fundamental 
and inherent phenomenon; the long-term competitiveness of 
firms, and of national economies, reflect their innovative 
capability and, moreover, firms must engage in activities 
which aim at innovation just in order to hold their ground. 
 
National innovation systems assume innovation not as an event, but as 
a ubiquitous and cumulative process.  Innovations may be as 
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Schumpeter described, simply new and obvious “combinations” but 
also “creative destruction”. Fundamental to the innovation process are 
interactive learning and collective entrepreneurship, both of which 
Schumpeter described. However his first discussion of innovation 
focusing on the lone entrepreneur (1934) evolved into collective R&D 
laboratory (1942).  Perhaps the defining scientific advancement in the 
20th century was innovation as a collective activity, as a result of 
interdependence between many actors. 
To be sure, the institutional set up matters. Institutions, which are the 
set of organizations, establishments, laws, and norms, play an 
important role to reduce uncertainty as well as to support innovation. 
The NIS also distinguishes between incremental and fundamental 
innovation.  Innovation is not wholly accidental or wholly 
predetermined, but there is a strong element of randomness. 
Lundvall describes a few of the actors the innovation system including 
firms, the public sector, the financial sector, R&D organizations, and 
the educational system. To that list, one could include entrepreneurs 
and users. 
 
These actors are constituted differently across countries.  The 
importance of how the market is organized in terms of firms as well as 
the organization of the firm itself seems obvious.  The Public sector is 
important not just for the rules and regulations it creates, but as a user 
of innovation.  How innovations are financed is also an aspect of the 
national innovation system as is the research and development 
function in the various places it resides.  Finally the various elements 
of learning and education will comprise an NIS, as well as the degree 
of its egalitarian or elitist dimensions.  It would seem that now in the 
age of information and Internet, one could add the set of users, 
whether human or machine, to the list of actors. 
 
Lundvall recognizes the influence of Friedrich List who argued about 
the need for nations to support nascent industries.152  List offered a 
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critique of Adam Smith’s “cosmopolitan” approach, focusing on 
resource allocation among countries and the notion that nations were 
engaged in producing and exchanging a finite set of goods.  
 
2.4.5 DAVID TEECE AND COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS 
When thinking about Internet innovation, David Teece’s 1986 paper 
“Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy”153is essential. Teece 
observed that most innovations are not products themselves. They 
have to be combined with complementary assets before they can be 
marketable products. Such partnerships lower barriers to entry for the 
innovator and can provide rewards to an innovator upfront.   
Teece discusses a number of assets that must be in place before an 
innovation can take root. They include marketing, specialized 
manufacturing, and/or after-sales support.  He distinguishes the assets 
into generic, specialized, and co-specialized categories.  In the context 
of the Internet, HTML may be a generic asset, a language that allows 
innovators to create websites.  Just as a factory is needed to make 
shoes, a mobile application needs a network.  Thus a specialized asset 
may be an operating system that runs on a mobile phone, such as 
Apple iOS or Android.  A co-specialized asset may be a 4G mobile 
network for the Apple iPhone, its complementary asset. Many iPhone 
features can’t be realized unless the phone is connected to the 
appropriate 4G mobile network.  
Marketing is a type of complementary asset.  For many firms the cost 
on getting online is nominal: fees of hosting, storage, and servers. 
Where they face major barriers may be competition from other 
content, applications, and services, not to mention being findable on 
platforms such as search engines, social platforms, and app stores.  
The practices of SEO (search engine optimization) and ASO (app 
store optimization) are designed to help companies and innovative 
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applications overcome these intermediaries.  It seem that if there was a 
“neutral” internet, there would be no need for such marketing 
practices. Consumers would blithely traverse the network without the 
intermediation of search engines or social networks.  
The Teece thesis contradicts Lemley and Lessig’s end to end 
principle. Teece says that different parties have to make partnerships 
or “join complementary assets” (e.g. content provider and broadband 
provider) in order to make applications known.  Applications on their 
own have no value, or will almost never be found, unless they are 
joined with their complementary asset. Net neutrality rules in some 
instances are prohibitions against telecom operators creating 
partnerships with content providers.  
Further, Teece’s paper attempts to predict when the innovator will 
succeed or the follower. To determines who wins, one needs to 
examine (1)  appropriability, how easy is it to leverage knowledge, 
ease of imitation, intellectual property etc; and (2) complementary 
assets, who owns what (generic, co-specialized, specialized). 
Teece also distinguishes between invention and innovation (ability to 
do something better than the state of the art), the latter of which adds 
value to users and economy. It bears mention that net neutrality 
implicitly values the innovation at the “edge” of the network, greater 
that of the core or the network. In this way, the value of an edge 
application or service, whether Wikipedia or Conservapedia is greater 
than any fundamental innovation in the network itself, such as 5G. 
Teece observes that innovating firm frequently fail to win the profits 
of their innovation, that the owner of the intellectual property doesn’t 
necessarily get the benefit. It goes instead to customers, suppliers, or 
competitors—that actor which has the complementary assets.  He 
gives the examples of EMI having developed the CAT scanner but 
competitors succeeding to commercialize it (EMI dropped out of the 
market seven years later); RC Cola having developed diet soda but 
both Coca-Cola and Pepsi succeeding; Bowmar introducing the 
calculator but HP and Texas Instruments commercializing it; and 
Xerox developing the fundamental innovations that Apple managed to 
commercialize.  
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To overcome this, incumbent firms would be wise to get a position in 
the complementary asset market. Frequently it is not the firm that is 
first to market that wins, but rather that which is third, fourth and so 
on. This may explain the rising success of Chinese apps that is 
discovered in the analysis. In any case, the need to work with 
complementary firms is reflected in the presence of joint ventures, co-
production agreements, cross-distribution arrangements, and 
technology licensing. 
Teece also describes two stages of scientific evolution, the pre-
paradigm stage and the paradigm stage. In the pre-paradigm stage 
there are generally accepted designs. There are competing ideas, and 
designs are fluid. In the paradigm stage, designs become accepted, 
codified, and standardized. One design emerges as best, e.g. Model T, 
IBM 360, Douglas DC-3. Once design emerges, competition shifts to 
price away from design. Scale and capital then become important.  
Innovation can still occur, but may be in niches. This model tends to 
characterize large consumer markets with homogenous tastes.  
Few industries have the benefit of strong appropriabilities.  Most of 
the time the appropriability is weak, so the innovator needs a business 
model to make its innovation known.  In the pre-paradigm stage, 
innovators need to allow their designs to “float” to get enough of a 
market test to see whether they can work.  In the pre-paradigm stage, 
the focus in on the winning design. Production is low (few users), so 
doesn’t yet make sense to deploy specialized assets. There are no scale 
economies, and price is not necessarily an issue With the move to the 
paradigm stage, investment become irreversible. Once the design 
becomes standardized, then the importance of complementary assets 
takes over. 
Marketing/distribution is a key complementary asset. This was 
demonstrated with PC market. Many companies made computers but 
few succeeded because the scale required to sell to companies in the 
US (need a large sales force, get on retail shelves etc). So the strategy 
is to sell to the big provider, .e.g IBM. 
In any case, Teece concludes that strategic partnerships frequently 
don’t work for the reasons he cites. This should assuage net neutrality 
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proponents which are concerned that if a telecom operators provides 
access to some destinations for free, that those destinations and that 
operator will gain market share. Separate analysis on this question 
shows that such partnerships actually result in little to no benefit for 
the parties, as the markets they operate are so competitive that even 
offering free access is not a sufficient inducement154. 
IBM’s success in PC market was related to its joining the 
complementary assets, many of them generic. It made more sense for 
IBM to find them in the market than to develop them in house. IBM’s 
asset relative to the generic inputs was its strong brand which, 
engendered credibility with customers, plus its formidable marketing 
and distribution network. 
For a detailed discussion of complementary assets applied to mobile 
app development in emerging countries, see the research conducted by 
Layton and Elaluf-Calderwood.155 
2.4.6 JEAN TIROLE AND TWO SIDED MARKETS 
Tirole won the 2014 Swedish Royal Bank Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel for “his analysis of market power and 
regulation"156. At 61, Tirole was among the youngest among winners 
of the Economics Noble Prize, however there is no doubt that his 
work in industrial economics and game theory has revolutionized the 
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understanding of many industries including internet-based businesses, 
telecommunications, advertising, banking, and finance.  
Key amongst his contribution is the notion of two-sided markets or 
platforms, first presented with Jean-Charles Rochet157 in 2003. This 
theory offers a robust counterpoint to network neutrality.  The 
literature of two-sized markets comprises over more than 70,000 
articles covering a variety of industries. 
The theory of two-sided platforms observes that there is an inherent 
incentive to price efficiently, meaning that market failures are unlikely 
to occur. Platforms want to get both sides of the market “on board” so 
they tend to maximize—not foreclose—the participation of the other 
parties. Anything that a broadband provider does to foreclose one side 
or the other, reduces its profits. This suggests that there is not an 
incentive for operators to behave in a warm that harms content 
providers or users. But vitally the companies reinforce each other.  A 
recent release from the companies shows that Comcast and Netflix 
have integrated their offerings into a single user interface so that users 
can sort through all the options in the same place.158  
Two-sided markets could explain why Netflix has grown to be the 
world’s leading streaming video service with over 81 million 
members159, even though it competes against Comcast, a cable 
company that delivers its services.  Anything that Comcast would do 
to threaten the popular service would risk it losing customers.  Two-
sided markets might also suggest that Netflix could become so popular 
that it could withhold its content from Comcast and demand a 
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payment from Comcast for the right to deliver to Comcast customers. 
All of these relationships are based on supply and demand. 
There are millions of sources of content, services, and applications on 
the internet.  End users buy a subscription to access them under best 
efforts conditions. In general it is not in the broadband providers’ 
interest to make a contract with every possible information source on 
its network.  The transactions costs are simply too high.   
It is the case, however, that a handful of applications and services are 
particularly popular and highly demanded above others.  It becomes 
the case that the operator must deliver these services or the end users 
won’t subscribe to the network.  The debate has emerged as to how to 
pay for the access to the network and its various sides.   
 
Netflix offers a streaming video service that consumes more than half 
of the network’s capacity and frequently impinges on other, non-
Netflix users’ ability to enjoy the network.  Frequently broadband 
providers need to provision additional capacity to deliver Netflix.  
Because the Netflix subscribers are a small portion of any one 
network’s user base, the ISP would like Netflix to participate in the 
cost of delivering the service, so it does not have to impose the cost 
across all its subscribers, especially those that do not desire Netflix. 
The Netflix perspective, following the net neutrality argument, is that 
the broadband providers’ choice of technology is its responsibility, 
and it is incumbent on the broadband provider to deliver Netflix data 
regardless of the cost. Netflix’s desired outcome is for the broadband 
provider to invest in excess network capacity and raise the 
subscription price on all network users, rather than the cost be borne 
by Netflix and its subscribers. 
 
In other instances, a content provider may want to subsidize the 
delivery of its content to maximize viewing. A health care provider 
would be willing to subsidize the cost of mobile subscriptions to its 
members to encourage adoption of preventative health care and 
monitoring tools.  The cost of avoiding an adverse health event is well 
worth the price of a broadband subscription. The health care member 
benefits with better health outcome and the health care provider 
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reduces costs. This is clearly a win-win for the parties, but such 
arrangements are also verboten in the net neutrality notion. 
 
Two-sided markets explains much of how participation by advertisers 
and content providers drove the expansion of the media industries in 
the US. One of the key benefits of this model is that viewers didn’t 
need to bear all the costs themselves; it was shared by the participants 
on the other side of platform, namely advertisers who funded radio 
and television programs so consumers didn’t have to pay out of 
pocket. With regard to newspaper and magazines, people have availed 
themselves to a variety of models whether by subscription, advertising 
subsidized, publisher-underwritten, or a combination thereof. 
 
Tirole and the highly developed theory and practice of two-sided 
markets demonstrates that outright bans on internet business models 
do not support consumer welfare. Furthermore the concerns raised by 
net neutrality supporters, that operators have incentives to foreclose 
content, services, and applications are not justified.  In any case, two-
sided markets would say that it is inconsistent to allow content and 
service providers (for example how Google’s AdWords platforms 
serves both users and advertisers) to enjoy the benefits of two-sided 
markets, but not broadband providers.   
Two-sided markets exist in media, credit cards, insurance, video 
games, internet platforms, nightclubs, and so on. Disputes in these 
markets are generally managed with competition law, which can also 
work for broadband providers. It’s not evident that a special set of 
rules are needed for net neutrality as the concerns recapitulate classic 
competition law issues bundling, tying, refusal to supply, predatory 
pricing etc. 
 
Tirole observes, “Successful regulation is built on an intellectual 
consensus about the existence of clearly identified and sizeable market 
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failure.”160  He adds, “Public policy should be guided by social 
interest, not special interest.”161  
2.4.7 CHRISTOPHER YOO AND THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 
Professor of Law and Computer Science Christopher Yoo is in fact the 
author with the most citations for net neutrality using the 
aforementioned Google Scholar search.  Yoo’s Dynamic Internet162 
provides the most cogent arguments countering the neutral platform 
paradigm of Tim Wu.  
Yoo asserts that the needs of users, services, and applications demand 
that the Internet’s architecture become more dynamic and is thus ill-
suited to a one-size-fits-all “neutral platform.” Wu describes network 
engineering as a ”pragmatic, context-sensitive discipline that is an 
exercise in tradeoffs and is not susceptible to broad, theoretical 
generalizations.” Diversification provides users with more services 
that fit their needs while simultaneously making the network more 
competitive. The network must evolve to meet new demands required 
by a constantly-changing environment 
Wu suggests that regulators and network engineers need to be open 
for experimentation.  The benefits of solutions may be ambiguous 
before they are tried, but if possible approaches are foreclosed by ex 
ante rules, engineers are denied valuable real world experience they 
need to design and innovate. As such, policymakers should not try to 
predict which solution will prevail. Rather they should allow change 
as a natural part of the internet’s evolution.  
                                                          
160 Jean Tirole, “Review of Network Economics,” March 2011, 
idei.fr/doc/by/tirole/tsenotes4.pdf. 
161 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-Sided 
Markets,” IDEI Working Paper (Institut d’Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, 
2003), http://ideas.repec.org/p/ide/wpaper/654.html. 
162 J. Gregory Sidak, David Teece “Innovation Spillovers and the ‘Dirt Road’ 
Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optional Transactions for 
Enhanced Delivery Over the Internet." SSRN,” accessed June 20, 2016, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1593761. 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
88 
Wu summarizes the major changes in the Internet since 1995 when it 
became a commercial phenomenon, suggesting that these changes 
demand a dynamic, not neutral, approach. The changes include  
1. Increase in the number and diversity of end users, while 
moving away from this close-knit engineer/academic 
community.  The Internet has grown beyond just the World 
Wide Web. 
 
2. Increase in the diversity and intensity of applications such as 
peer-to-peer technologies and and cloud computing which 
create different traffic patterns compared to early applications. 
There are profound differences as users select technologies 
with a range of requirement and capabilities such as unicasting 
to multicasting models; client-server to peer-to-peer setups; 
applications which demand symmetrical vs. asymmetrical 
traffic; the interplay between app store and platform; browsers 
and operating systems; and the requirements of cloud 
computing such as increased bandwidth, ubiquity, privacy, and 
security.  
 
3. Increase in the variety of technologies, including the shift from 
dial up to cable, DSL, fiber and mobile. New networks vary 
with bandwidth, reliability, mobility, susceptibility to 
congestion, and new kinds of devices: laptops, tablets, 
smartphones, e-readers, RFID readers etc.  Pervasive 
computing and sensor networks may require a different 
network architecture. Smartphones have special challenges. A 
modern smartphone has nearly the same computing power as a 
mainframe computer, and it pressures the network’s capacity, 
increases the intensity of network utilization.  Some varieties 
of phones and applications take vastly greater network 
consumption than others the rate of other users, constraining 
the network. Hence one-size-fits-all solutions don’t work with 
such a heterogeneous mix of networks, devices, applications 
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4. Emergence of complex business relationships. The original 
topology of the Internet was backbone, regional operator,  and 
last mile providers. That has evolved to accommodate new 
relationships through private peering, multihoming, secondary 
peering, CDNs, and server farms. 
Yoo concludes that the founding principles of the Internet, if there 
even was such a thing, are no longer appropriate and gives the 
following reasons: 
1. Changes in the optimal level of standardization. Not all goods 
in every market are standardized, and customers often benefit 
from purchasing customized products and services. There is a 
tradeoff between providing all connections on a best efforts 
basis versus allowing consumers and providers to contract for 
quality guarantees for specific services.   
 
2. The focus on one price to entire internet tends to commodify 
services, forces networks to compete on price and volume, 
reinforcing the power of the dominant players. Increasing the 
dimensions on which networks compete can allow new players 
to emerge.  The increasing heterogeneity in the network should 
allow flexibility both in pricing and management. There is no 
one network paradigm that does it all. Different networks and 
practices are suited to different services and applications.  
 
3. The migration of functions into the core of the network is 
desirable, such as security and congestions management. 
 
4. Internet pricing needs to flexible to reflect heterogeneous 
bandwidth consumption, congestion management, and the 
increasing diversity of applications each with different 
demands on the network.  Financing as a flat fee across the 
board is both unfair and uneconomical. In fact the diversity of 
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business relationships and pricing regimes serves to weaken 
rather than strengthen market power 
 
5. There has been significant maturation of the industry 
necessitating modernization of regulation. Moreover 
innovation depends on consumers ability to absorb pace of 
product innovation. Yoo alludes to Teece in noting that 
“Partnerships are not attempts to stifle competition but 
mechanisms for lowering entry requirements for innovators.” 
Yoo describes the implications for net neutrality as one of tradeoffs, 
that while many users can enjoy the same product at lowered cost, this 
reduces product variety and forces some users to forego alternative 
versions better suited to their preferences.  It If everyone wants the 
same thing, then a reduction in variety is ok.  But if end user 
preferences become heterogeneous, networks should be allowed to 
provide different things. There is no such thing as the perfect 
architecture. It depends on the nature of data flows and the costs. 
Rather than ex ante rules, Yoo suggests that policymakers focus on 
reducing switching costs for consumers, lowering entry barriers for 
producers, and increase transparency in business relationships 
Yoo would observe that the Internet has become even more complex 
with the emergence of mobile and wireless, an important 
technological reality that was not a part of Wu’s paradigm. Emergence 
of diversity is less of a problem and more of a precondition for 
meeting users’ needs 
2.4.8 THE ECOSYSTEM THEORY OF INNOVATION 
Innovation is frequently described in terms of an ecosystem, a term 
from biology related to the complexion of living organisms and 
physical environments functioning together.163 A biological ecosystem 
                                                          
163 Deborah J. Jackson, “What is an Innovation Ecosystem?”, accessed November 
10, 2016. http://erc-
assoc.org/sites/default/files/topics/policy_studies/DJackson_Innovation%20Ecosyste
m_03-15-11.pdf  
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is also characterized by a state of equilibrium in which nutrients can 
be exchanged at a sustainable level.  Whereas a biological ecosystem 
is a model of the energy dynamics by organisms and their 
environment, an innovation ecosystem is the model of economic 
exchange between a complex set of actors to enable technological 
development. The inputs include materials resources, human capital, 
and institutions. Innovation ecosystems bridge the knowledge 
economy based on fundamental research and the commercial economy 
based on the marketplace, both of which are mediated by government. 
The belief that innovation leads to wealth creation undergirds the 
focus on innovation policy both by national leaders and national 
science foundations, and particularly the fact that high-tech industries 
have productive capacity to increase jobs and salaries.164  
An innovation ecosystem is said to be thriving and healthy when the 
resources invested in the knowledge economy are subsequently 
replenished by innovation induced profit increases in the commercial 
economy. When profits exceed the investment, the economy is said to 
be growing. A feedback loop or “virtuous circle” is said to result when 
profits are invested back into fundamental research. Jackson offers a 
circular diagram noting fundamental technology breakthroughs; 
leading to new products, processes and features; increased sales and 
profits (whereby the commercial and knowledge economies meet); 
and subsequent investment in R&D, which replenishes the cycle in 
fundamental breakthroughs. 
 
2.4.9 THE CIRCLE THEORY OF INNOVATION 
The idea of a virtuous circle is a powerful one, a subsequent cycle of 
events in which each brings benefits to the next.  The notion was first 
noted by the British Vernon Lee, the late 19th century novelist and 
aesthete in her appraisal of John Ruskin and his “virtuous circle of 
virtuous efficacy.”165  Just as the Internet drives themes of the 
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165 Vernon Lee, Gospels of Anarchy, and Other Contemporary Studies, vol. 1908 
(New York: Brentano’s, n.d.), https://archive.org/details/gospelsofanarchy00leev. 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
92 
interconnected world today, Ruskin was interested in the intersection 
of nature, art, and society.   
However the virtuous circle was preceded by the “vicious circle”, 
noted in 1792 by the Encyclopedia Britannica, “He runs into what is 
termed by logicians a vicious circle.”166 In 1908 Mathematician Henri 
Poincare introduced the vicious circle principle167 stating that no 
object or property may be introduced by a definition that depends on 
itself.  Such measures are taken to avoid circular reasoning and logical 
fallacy. However compelling these ideas may be, they may be difficult 
to prove mathematically and lead to reverse causality. As such, having 
solid data with instrumental variables may be necessary to evidence 
such relationships as proposed by the virtuous circle.168 
Professor of Law and Computer Science Christopher Yoo criticizes 
the FCC’s virtuous circle, saying that it assumes that adding more 
users to the network always creates additional benefits and 
inexhaustible demand-side returns to scale. His assessment of the 
network effects literature suggests that users may value some end-
points more than others. That is to say that some users may value 
having reliable quality access to a subset of applications (for example 
Netflix, Twitter, Google, Facebook and Wikipedia) over accessing 
any and all possible points on the Internet.  He suggests that the 
tradeoffs are the similar for content and application providers which 
prefer a set of users with preferences suited for their advertising-
funded applications versus the set of all possible users.169 
                                                          
166 Oxford English Dictionary, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/223850?redirectedFrom=virtuous+circle#eid27655
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167 Stephen C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, (Amsterdam, NY: North-
Holland Publishing Company, 1952). 
168 Roslyn Layton, "Testing the Virtuous Circle of Innovation: Does It Increase 
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169 Christopher Yoo, “Internet Policy Going Forward: Does One Size Still Fit All?,” 
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While feedback loops and circles are common illustrations of 
innovation, the FCC asserts that it can identify the specific sector, if 
not the very firms, which are in position either to create or deter 
innovation. It thus proposes regulation which will control, if not 
maximize, the innovation process. The FCC first mentioned the 
“Virtuous Circle” in its  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on its 
Preserving the Open Internet and Inquiry to Broadband Industry 
Practice on October 22, 2009 which it describes as follows170 
The Internet’s accessibility has empowered individuals and 
companies at the edge of the network to develop and 
contribute an immense variety of content, applications, and 
services that have improved the lives of Americans. Such 
innovation has dramatically increased the value of the 
network, spurring—in a virtuous circle—investment by 
network operators, who have improved the Internet’s reach 
and its performance in many areas. (Paragraph 4) 
In the FCC model, it designates parts of the circle in need of 
regulation (broadband providers) and those in need of protection (edge 
providers). The language was further incorporated with the word 
“openness” and appeared in the 2010 Open Internet Report & Order, 
the FCC presented the “virtuous circle of innovation”171 as an 
argument in support of network neutrality in paragraph 14 page 6 of 
the rules, 
The Internet’s openness is critical to these outcomes, because 
it enables a virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of 
the network—including new content, applications, services, 
and devices—lead to increased end-user demand for 
broadband, which drives network improvements, which in turn 
lead to further innovative network uses. 
                                                          
170 Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C.  20554, October 22, 
2009, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.pdf  
171 FCC Open Internet Report & Order 10-201, December 21, 2010. Paragragh 14. 
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While the notion of a virtuous cycle seems intuitive, some consider it 
a stretch to codify it in regulation. It is understandable that different 
actors in the view the FCC’s interpretation of the virtuous circle 
differently. Debate about the FCC’s definition of a virtuous circle 
have figured in the agency’s second and third attempt to make Open 
Internet rules and subsequent litigation.172 
 
2.4.9.1 Virtuous Circle in FCC 2010 Open Internet 
Report & Order 
Upon release of its 2nd net neutrality order, the FCC was sued by 
Verizon and thereafter MetroPCS. In defense of the FCC an amicus 
brief173 citing the “virtuous circle” notion was filed by the Open 
Internet Coalition, 174 a group representing Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Twitter, along with advocacy Public Knowledge, Vonage, 
and the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates.  
 
The brief observes that Verizon did not invest in its 4G network 
because it wanted to give its customers more “talk time” but rather 
because “these new networks are necessitated by the explosive 
demand for high-speed data services required to allow users to enjoy 
Internet content and services, particularly online video.” The brief 
                                                          
172ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED No. 11-1355, FCC, January 2, 2012. 
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describes that Coalition members including Netflix have benefitted 
from investment in infrastructure.  
It could be observed that if Open Internet Coalition companies benefit 
from such infrastructure investment that it would behoove them to see 
if continue, and as such, they would find common ground with 
operators to ensure the conditions that facilitate continued investment, 
for example finding efficient payments on both sides of the two-sided 
market. The court ultimately established that broadband is a two-sided 
service, one to end users and another to content providers such as the 
companies in the Open Internet Coalition.  
Open Internet Coalition equates “openness” with what appears to be 
free carriage for Internet companies but a higher price for end user 
versus “closedness” which a two-sided model with a variety of 
flexible payments depending on supply and demand. Netflix calls a 
model in which a broadband provider collects payments from both 
sides of the market as “double-dipping.”175 
It is interesting to note that following the January 2014 court decision, 
Netflix began a campaign for “strong net neutrality”.  In a blog post 
titled, “Internet Tolls and the Case for Strong Net Neutrality.”176  CEO 
Reed Hastings declares,  
The Internet is improving lives everywhere – democratizing 
access to ideas, services and goods. To ensure the Internet 
remains humanity's most important platform for progress, net 
neutrality must be defended and strengthened. The essence of 
net neutrality is that ISPs such as AT&T and Comcast don't 
restrict, influence or otherwise meddle with the choices 
consumers make. The traditional form of net neutrality which 
was recently overturned by a Verizon lawsuit is important, but 
insufficient. This weak net neutrality isn't enough to protect an 
                                                          
175 “The Case Against ISP Tolls,” Netflix Media Center, April 24, 2014, 
https://media.netflix.com/en/company-blog/the-case-against-isp-tolls. 
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open, competitive Internet; a stronger form of net neutrality is 
required. Strong net neutrality additionally prevents ISPs from 
charging a toll for interconnection to services like Netflix, 
YouTube, or Skype, or intermediaries such as Cogent, Akamai 
or Level 3, to deliver the services and data requested by ISP 
residential subscribers. Instead, they must provide sufficient 
access to their network without charge. 
Hastings acknowledges that the system has worked well to date. 
While Hastings is pleased that Comcast has at least supported “weak 
net neutrality,”177  he does not believe that this this is not enough.  
Hastings concedes that broadband providers want Netflix, which takes 
up 30% of network capacity, to share in the costs, but he says that 
Netflix should also be able to share some of the revenues, especially 
when broadband providers are selling packages of 10-50 Mbps.  
The following month Netflix released a blog post the following 
month, “The Case Against ISP Tolls” in which it described that it’s ok 
for Netflix to pay Level 3, XO, Cogent and Tata to transmit data, but 
if Netflix peers directly with Comcast using its own “Open Connect” 
content delivery network, then it’s “double-dipping.”178  The blog 
concludes with a complaint about the proposed Comcast-Time Warner 
merger and link to its financial statement in which it notes that, “As 
DSL fades in favor of cable Internet, Comcast could control high-
speed broadband to the majority of American homes. Comcast is 
already dominant enough to be able to capture unprecedented fees 
from transit providers and services such as Netflix.”179 Netflix’s 
financial statement for the quarter notes it reaching 50 million 
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customers and 18.5 percent contribution margin, far more customers 
and better profitability than Comcast.   
 
Over the ensuing year, Netflix emerged as a key opponent of the cable 
merger which was ultimately rejected by the FCC and Department of 
Justice.  Bloomberg reported the decision being good for Netflix’s 
future to provide content over the Internet.180 
It is interesting to review the events and statements more than a year 
later.  While the $45 billion merger of Comcast-TimeWarner was not 
allowed, the $48 billion AT&T-Direct TV merger was. Net neutrality 
advocates’ charge against the Comcast merger was that it would have 
held customers captive and keep speeds from increasing,181 but the 
FCC’s recent broadband report notes that both DSL and Cable speeds 
have increased. Comcast was not allowed by buy TimeWarner but 
Charter was by agreeing to significant “Open Internet” concessions 
such as not to add data caps or usage-based pricing to subscriptions.182  
The $66 billion deal was enabled by former leading net neutrality 
lawyer Marvin Ammori who explained how his new employment at 
Charter would make the pending merger an acceptable network 
provider for the Open Internet.183 
As might be expected the BIAS providers take a different view of the 
FCC’s virtuous circle. In addition to noting that the FCC failed to 
supply any evidence that broadband providers have harmed the 
ecosystem and base regulation on theoretical harms, Verizon suggests 
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that the market is more competitive, integrated, and dynamic than the 
FCC’s rules suggest.  Responding to the FCC’s NPRM in January 
2010 Verizon notes, 184 
 
Consumers have more choices online than they have ever had. 
Innovation and investment are occurring in all parts of the 
broadband ecosystem, whether networks (both backbone and 
access), applications and content, or devices. Moreover, the 
lines between these categories are blurring, and the distinction 
between “edge” and “network” providers is rapidly becoming 
outmoded and artificial. The result is that all members of the 
ecosystem increasingly collaborate and compete with one 
another, leading to a virtuous cycle of innovation and 
competition that benefits consumers. The increasing overlap 
within the Internet ecosystem is apparent. For example, many 
“edge” players have their own extensive broadband networks 
or take advantage of content delivery networks – which store 
copies of content on servers at multiple locations so as to 
circumvent points of congestion on the Internet in order to 
prioritize delivery of that content. Google, for example, now 
has one of the largest networks in the country that is the third-
largest source of and destination for Internet traffic in the 
world. Google’s network not only carries its own content, but 
also enables applications such as Google Voice which, from 
the consumer’s perspective, provides many of the functions 
traditionally performed by network operators. Akamai, an 
operator of a content delivery network, claims to deliver 
upward of 15% of all Web traffic.   
 
Other examples abound. Offerings such as the iPhone and 
Kindle are a combination of network functions, applications, 
and devices. For example, the Kindle is pre-loaded with 
certain applications, is obviously a “device,” and comes with 
built-in wireless connectivity for which Amazon pays rather 
than the user. Apple makes both devices and applications and 
also operates an App Store that acts in ways traditionally 
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associated with networks by providing a means for other 
application providers to distribute their services to consumers. 
The development of “cloud computing” amounts to the 
provision of applications, connectivity, and related services in 
an integrated fashion. This innovation and convergence is 
driven by customer demand and clearly has benefited 
consumers by providing them more choices, new services, 
lower prices, and many other benefits. And the combination of 
technological change and innovation, investment, and 
competition will ensure that this evolution will continue, all 
with the aim of meeting consumers’ needs and desires. 
Creating artificial “regulatory silos” – as the proposed rules 
would do by defining separate categories of “devices,” 
“applications,” “content,” and “networks” that are subject to 
different obligations – would obstruct the current of Internet 
innovation for no good reason.  
 
Verizon also disputes what they consider a simplistic view that 
demand for consumer broadband alone delivers sufficient revenue to 
provision infrastructure. They note that ability to earn revenue and 
provision network is more complex than FCC rules suggest. 
 
A key question for the Commission is how to ensure that it 
maintains and increases incentives for investment. Like any 
other firm, a network provider’s decision to invest depends on 
whether the business case can justify a particular level of 
investment given the risks entailed. As noted above, revenues 
from the fees that consumers pay to use traditional Internet 
access services that enable consumers to go where they want 
and do what they want online are a critical component of the 
business case for broadband investments. The revenues from 
these fees paid by consumers for Internet access services 
alone, however, are not sufficient to justify the required 
ongoing investment. Network providers must be able to 
develop and offer additional innovative services – whether 
private network offerings or those that may be integrated with 
Internet content – that help differentiate themselves in the 
market and provide an opportunity to compete for additional 
revenue streams to support the business case for broadband 
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deployment. The flexibility to offer such new services is 
critical to justify continued investment to deploy and to expand 
capacity.  
 
Verizon further explains that their decision to invest in a fiber to the 
premises network was predicated on their ability to offer  FiosTV, a 
proprietary content service for which they would acquire content and 
provide it to users. Similarly with  mobile networks, Verizon observes 
that both Verizon and AT&T have developed their own mobile TV 
platforms. Verizon also offers a range of “private IP” services to 
companies that offer different levels of security and priority. 
Additionally Verizon also offers backbone, storage and CDN services 
to edge providers that compete with Akamai, Level 3, and others.  
From Verizon’s perspective consumer Internet subscriptions are 
important for revenue, but in themselves not sufficient to justify their 
investment in broadband infrastructure. 
  
The view of MetroPCS, at the time, a small wireless provider with 3 
percent market share in the US, is different and shows that not all ISPs 
are the same. At the time of the 2010 order, MetroPCS was primarily 
engaged in provision of voice and SMS with its own network in a few 
discrete location (using roaming for the rest of the US).  It wanted to 
transition to offer data, but faced a challenge in acquiring spectrum.   
 
While Verizon is interested to serve both consumers and corporate 
markets with both wireline and wireless technologies, as well as range 
of related technologies such as storage, transit, and interconnection, 
MetroPCS was more concerned with getting critical mass of spectrum 
and customers.  For MetroPCS the ability to compete through its 
marketing (“unlimited plans”) is paramount. On page 16 of its January 
2010 comment to the FCC as part of the rulemaking MetroPCS 
observes, 
 
The number of available Internet applications and services has 
exploded exponentially in recent times, showing that the 
current Internet marketplace is a grand success.  The 
remarkable upshot of all of this is that the Internet is 
flourishing for everyone – and it is becoming more 
competitive, rather than less so.  It is the model of the virtuous 
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cycle: innovators are creating content and application products 
that consumers desire, which drives consumers to purchase 
from service and equipment providers, which in turn drives 
investment in infrastructure and new technology in response to 
consumer demand.  This competition will cease if the 
Commission allows some applications to hog and consume the 
entire network capacity to the detriment of all others.  
Although the Commission has been focused on service 
providers discriminating between competing applications, the 
Commission must understand that, if an application consumes 
a disproportionate amount of capacity, it will discriminate 
against other applications which may not gain access to the 
capacity they need to compete.  The only effective way to 
ensure nondiscriminatory access to all applications is to allow 
the service providers to control the nature and extent of 
services they will offer on the networks they have designed 
and built.185 
MetroPCS sees the virtuous circle as the very reason that regulation is 
not needed (Indeed such an assertion would seem to support the two-
sided markets view).  For MetroPCS the very incentives that exist in 
the marketplace drive actors to transact in a virtuous way. Edge 
providers want to serve end users, and broadband providers want to 
sell subscriptions. Indeed the vast majority of the Internet’s growth 
occurred without net neutrality rules in place.    
 
But the FCC sees it differently and appropriated the the notion of a 
virtuous circle as an argument for regulation. Indeed they believed in 
2010 that adopting net neutrality rules would in fact “accelerate the 
cycle of investment and innovation”. 
 
This process has made clear that the Internet has thrived 
because of its freedom and openness—the absence of any 
gatekeeper blocking lawful uses of the network or picking 
winners and losers online. Consumers and innovators do not 
have to seek permission before they use the Internet to launch 
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new technologies, start businesses, connect with friends, or 
share their views. The Internet is a level playing field. 
Consumers can make their own choices about what 
applications and services to use and are free to decide what 
content they want to access, create, or share with others. This 
openness promotes competition. It also enables a self-
reinforcing cycle  of investment and innovation in which new 
uses of the network lead to increased adoption of broadband, 
which drives investment and improvements in the network 
itself, which in turn lead to further innovative uses of the 
network and further investment in content, applications, 
services, and devices. A core goal of this Order is to foster and 
accelerate this cycle of investment and innovation.186 
 
The FCC says that broadband providers have the ability and incentive 
to deter the activities from which they earn revenue.  Broadband 
providers disagree, noting that anything they do to limit users, 
services, or applications reduces their revenue, so it is not in their 
interest to deter such openness.  
 
Shortly after the adoption of the 2010 rules in January 2011, 
MetroPCS was accused of violating the net neutrality rules with its 
unlimited plan of talk, text, Web browsing, and YouTube for $40, 
according to a complaint by group of advocacy organizations.187  
 
In 2011 MetroPCS was a regional a carrier in the US with a CDMA 
network that wanted to transition to offering 4G services.  It had only 
10-20 MHz of spectrum capacity and focused on a budget-conscious 
market segment with a set of pre-paid, no contract, “all you can eat” 
offerings. With the Samsung Craft phone, it was the first carrier to 
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December 23, 2010, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-
201A1.pdf 
187 Free Press. Notice of Ex Parte Presentation: GN Docket No. 09-191 (Preserving 
the Open Internet); WC Docket No. 07 -52 (Broadband Industry Practices), January 
10, 2011, 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/resources/MetroPCS_Letter_1_10_11.pd
f  
103 
offer a service with CDMA and 4G capability, but this required some 
engineering and data compression. Because it had only a limited 
network and low band frequency, it attempted to differentiate on its 
assets, and its analytics revealed that its customers overwhelmingly 
visited only YouTube.  Without any money changing hands, 
MetroPCS engineers worked with YouTube to develop a format for 
the video service that would produce better fidelity under the 
constraints.188 According to the legal counsel of MetroPCS at the time 
of the complaint, the offer to optimize the video streams was made 
available to other content providers, but none were interested.189 
 
Following the publication of the Open Internet rules in the Federal 
Register some months later, Verizon sued the FCC, and MetroPCS 
followed suit.  Free Press also sued FCC saying that there were fewer 
net neutrality restrictions on wireless.  
 
MetroPCS wanted to be acquired by T-Mobile so it dropped its 
lawsuit against the FCC.  The FCC ultimately did not pursue action 
against MetroPCS for the 4G plan. In January 2014, three years after 
the petition was filed, the FCC’s rules were struck down. 
 
It is interesting that there should be such competing and opposite 
views of the “virtuous circle.”  It is perhaps emblematic of the net 
neutrality debate itself which has pitted telecom and cable operators 
against Internet companies.  
 
2.4.9.2 Virtuous Circle in FCC 2014 Open Internet 
Order 
During oral arguments in US Telecom v. FCC at the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, FCC Counsel Jonathan Sallet defended the 
agency’s rules saying that a world without the FCC’s rules “disrupts 
the Virtuous Circle.” Senior Judge Stephen Williams replied, “The 
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plausibility of that depends on the proposition of there being a 
significant, non-trivial group of potential edge providers out there who 
are thwarted under an arrangement which does not involve the various 
bans imposed by the Order.”190  The judge was referring to the 
prohibitions against blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. 
However Sallet had earlier developed a different view of innovation 
called the Broadband Value Circle,191 which he presented at the 
prestigious Silicon Flatirons conference in 2011, a leading institute for 
the study of telecom regulation.  Whereas the Virtuous Circle has a 
defined set of actors and directional relationships, the Broadband 
Value Circle is a new form of economic organization in which 
“broadband connectivity is the glue that permits multiple firms, once 
walled off from one another in distinct product‐market categories, to 
compete, cooperate, buy, and supply products and services from one 
another in order to satisfy customers that are able to buy from any one 
of them.“   
However in the Broadband Value Circle, broadband providers, rather 
than being proverbial “dumb pipes” intimated Virtuous Circle, are 
integral parts of a swift and dynamic marketplace with competing 
combinations of value changing in rapid succession.  In Sallet’s model 
broadband providers both combine, cooperate and compete with edge 
providers. Moreover all of the actors are shifting in their offerings in 
an attempt to provide value to customer who is in the center of the 
circle, and the customer, incidentally, is also a co-creator of content.  
The notion is reminiscent of co-opetition, the idea that firms both 
cooperate and compete in the marketplace and suggests that firms and 
industries converge, develop, and create value in unexpected ways.  
                                                          
190 Sound record, US courts, 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2016.nsf/4FBB1C7586B8BB7
185257F1100698E46/$file/15-1063IssueI.mp3  
191 Jonathan Sallet, “The Creation of Value: The Broadband Value Circle and 
Evolving Market Structures.” O'Melveny & Myers LLP; Silicon Flatirons April 4, 
2011 
The Creation of Value: The Broadband Value Circle and Evolving Market 
Structures,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1821267. 
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Sallet describes how broadband in a positive, transformative force in 
driving new value in wireless services and video distribution. He 
provides three evolutionary diagrams to illustrate his point.  He begins 
with the traditional vertically integrated value chain. With the 
emergence of broadband, the dominant mode of economic activity 
becomes the Broadband Value Circle. The circle then evolves to an 
ecosystem with a series of interdependent, and multidirectional 
relationships. 
 
Sallet describes the rise and fall of various actors depending on their 
value proposition.  However he observes that companies such as 
Apple, Google, and Netflix profit disproportionately from the 
Broadband Value Circle, to a greater degree than device 
manufacturers or broadband providers.   
 
However in 2011 when Sallet was in private law practice, he 
observed, “For policymakers, the dynamic nature of the Broadband 
Value Circle means that competition and regulatory analysis must 
comprehend the true nature of competitive entry and market 
discipline.  Rapid change creates uncertainty, which puts a premium 
on governmental oversight that is flexible and responsive, not rigid 
and preemptive.”192 
  
                                                          
192 Ibid 
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2.4.10 OPEN INNOVATION 
The term “open innovation” was popularized by Henry Chesbrough in 
2003 in a book193 by the same name.  Chesbrough argued that in the 
information age firms need to look beyond their own walls for the 
paths to new products and markets. He was particularly concerned 
how traditional hardware and computing firms, e.g. IBM and Xerox, 
could reinvent themselves by being more attune to external ideas. 
Chesbrough’s ideas today are largely internalized and practiced by 
many firms through market research, business intelligence, and shared 
risk-reward partnerships.  
Hurwitz and Layton194 explain the downside of mandating openness, 
While it is true that openness can facilitate some types of 
innovation, it both precludes other forms of innovation and 
imposes costs of its own.195 The key takeaway from the 
relevant technical and economic literatures is that 
“openness,” in whatever forms it may take, is rarely 
unambiguously good or bad. It is unquestionably the case 
that open access can facilitate certain types of innovation. It 
reduces R&D and other transaction costs (especially search 
and negotiation costs to get permission or access to use 
existing infrastructure) and reduces opportunities for rent 
extraction by those who otherwise control an infrastructure. 
On the other hand, it makes some forms of innovation more 
expensive or difficult to implement.  
                                                          
193 William Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating 
and Profiting from Technology (Harvard Business Review, 2005). 
194 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz & Roslyn Layton, Debatable Premises in Telecom Policy, 
31 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 453 (2015) 
195 Timothy Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies“ 
Engines of Growth?”, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 94–96 (1995).  
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There are substantial literatures showing the benefits of 
vertical integration196 and the importance of defining proper 
modular boundaries.197 Nowadays, however, this point can 
be made more simply by analogy: Apple’s hardware and 
software designs are part of a tightly-controlled, vertically 
integrated, closed product ecosystem. Apple would not exist 
if we had the equivalent of network neutrality for computer 
hardware or software. This does not mean that either an open 
or a closed model is necessarily better in any given case; it 
does mean that a more nuanced approach than one that 
mandates either approach in every situation.  
It should be noted that engineers employed by the 
Department of Defense to develop the then top secret project 
of the ARPANET, the forerunner of today’s internet, did not 
work in an “open” environment.  The assertion that the 
internet was “always open and neutral” isn’t necessarily the 
characterizations of its founding engineers.    
Historical perspectives on the Internet architecture make 
clear that, while it has long had an “open” character, this 
character is at least in part accidental, does not equate with 
“neutrality,” and in any even 
may be undesirable.198 199 200 201 202 203 In practice, a network 
neutrality rule amounts to little more than a subsidy from the 
                                                          
196 See also Brent Skorup & Adam Theirer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided 
War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy, 65FED.COMMS. L.J., no. 2, 
Apr. 2013, available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2162623. 
197 Ibid.  
198 For a sampling of technical literature explaining that mandated network 
neutrality is not desirable, see the following 6 foot notes 
Richard T.B. Ma et al., On Cooperative Settlement Between Content, Transit and 
Eyeball Internet Service Providers,19 IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 802, 
812-813 (June 2011) 
http://dnapubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/194/ToN_InternetEco2.pdf 
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consumer side of the market to the content provider side of 
the market.204 Some, but not all, content providers benefit 
from this rule. Other content providers may be harmed by 
such a rule – especially those who offer, or would like to 
develop, services that would benefit from enhanced quality 
of service features or other features that may require some 
integration with Internet service providers. 
Even more problematic, a network neutrality rule can harm 
consumers. It prevents ISPs and content providers from 
                                                                                                                                        
199   David Clark, Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-Pound Gorillas, 1 
INT’L J. COMM. 701, 705-706 (2007), 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/Network-Neutrality-
Words%20of%20Power%20and%20800-Pound%20Gorillas.pdf  
200 Thomas Hazlett & Joshua Wright, The Law and Economics of Network 
Neutrality, 45 IND. L. REV. 767, 785 (2011), available at 
http://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ILR/pdf/vol45p767.pdf 
201 Jon Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate, 1 INT’L J. 
COMM. 567, 567 (2007), available at 
http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/159/84  
202 Douglas A. Hass, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed End Users Can 
End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565 (2007), 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1717&context=btlj;  
203 S. Blake et al., An Architecture for Differentiated Services, REQUEST FOR 
COMMENTS 2475, at 2 (Dec. 1998), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2475  
K. Nichols et al., A Two-Bit Differentiated Services Architecture for the Internet, 
REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 2638, at 3 (July 1999),  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2638  
R. Braden et al., Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: An Overview, (July 
1994), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1633  
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, An unfounded principle: Ammori’s non-neutral network 
history, TECH POLICY DAILY (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:00AM), 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/unfounded-principle-ammoris-non-neutral-
network-history/ (explaining that network neutrality is not “a foundational principle” 
of the Internet). 
204 See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Let Them Eat Cake and Watch Netflix, 8 FREE 
STATE FOUND. PERSPECTIVES, no. 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Let_Them_Eat_Cake_and_Watch_Netfli
x_090413.pdf. 
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working together to offer innovative new products that 
consumers want. More tragic, it prevents these providers 
from developing lower-cost service packages – packages that 
could expand opportunities for access to currently 
underserved and disadvantaged communities.205 These rules 
likely increase cost of access and limit the development of 
potentially cheaper offerings that are more responsive to 
consumer demands – this is exactly the opposite of good 
telecom policy. 
That a regulator would mandate one kind of business model or another 
would seem to constrain potential innovation. An Yariv, Boer and 
Lindgren offer a typology of business model innovation.206  The 
observe that competing just on products alone is not enough to sustain 
competitive advantage, as products can be copied and competitors can 
easily capture markets. Therefore business model innovation has 
become even more important. 
The issue of business model innovation could be important to address 
the cost of broadband.  For online access in the developed world, the 
amount advertising mattered less on a broadband subscription as 
people connected primarily to the Internet via a desktop computer 
with a wireline connection. But that situation is different on mobile 
networks where bandwidth is constrained.  Online advertising can 
consume up to 50% of a user’s mobile subscription207, and some 
reports put the number as high as 80 percent.208 Users effectively to 
                                                          
205 Supra Layton and Calderwood, 2016. 
206 Taran, Yariv, Harry Boer, and Peter Lindgren. "A Business Model Innovation 
Typology." Decision Sciences 46.2 (2015): 301-331. Web. 
207 Arvind Parmar et al., “Adblock Plus  Efficacy Study,” SFU, (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.sfu.ca/content/dam/sfu/snfchs/pdfs/Adblock.Plus.Study.pdf. 
208 Lara O’Reilly, “Ads on News Sites Gobble up as Much as 79% of Users’ Mobile 
Data,” Business Insider, March 16, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/enders-
analysis-ad-blocker-study-finds-ads-take-up-79-of-mobile-data-transfer-2016-3. 
Suggests between 18% to 79% of mobile broadband data go to advertising. Lara 
O’Reilly, “This Ad Blocking Company Has the Potential to Tear a Hole Right 
through the Mobile Web — and It Has the Support of Carriers,” Business Insider, 
May 13, 2015, http://uk.businessinsider.com/israeli-ad-blocker-shine-could-
threaten-mobile-advertising-2015-5. Suggests 10% and 50%. 
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subsidize the delivery of advertising to their mobile device, which, as 
code, indistinguishable from the actual content the user wants.  
Broadband providers have limited ability to address this issue given 
net neutrality.  For example asking content providers to pay for the 
traffic through advertising is common place in radio, television, and 
print, but it is considered a tenet of net neutrality that the user should 
be the cost of broadband. Having the cost of one’s broadband 
subscription subsidized by a third party could be a welcome 
development for many consumers, but in the US this is being curtailed 
by the FCC’s new online privacy rules. This was implemented as a 
result of FCC’s reclassification of broadband to a Title II service, a 
change enable to facilitate its 2015 Open Internet rules. One 
interpretation is that the FCC’s effort is conducted as a means to 
protect the online advertising industry from market entry by 
broadband providers.209 
Given limited options of business models in the marketplace to reduce 
the cost of unwanted data, consumers are increasingly turning to ad 
blocking.  Globally in 2016 more than 400 million210 users employ ad 
blocking on mobile phones, twice the rate of desktop ad blocking. 
Users employ ad blockers for other reasons including privacy, 
security, energy efficiency, and  usability to speed the running of 
mobile apps and websites. Browser-based ad blockers are common but 
have limited functionality. Cloud-based ad blockers allow users more 
control to define settings across a larger range of parameters. Mobile 
operators have started to deploy ad blockers, but groups such as the 
                                                          
209Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554, May 27, 2016,  
http://roslynlayton.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Roslyn-Layton-FCC-NPRM-
16-106-May-27-2016.pdf 
210 “Adblocking Goes Mobile” (Page Fair, 2016), 
https://pagefair.com/downloads/2016/05/Adblocking-Goes-Mobile.pdf. 
“2016 Mobile Adblocking Report,” PageFair, May 30, 2016, 
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Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) Europe say that they violate the 
EU’s net neutrality rules and demand that they are banned.211  
Now with the literature review complete, the thesis proceeds to the 
empirical investigation. 
  
                                                          
211 “BEREC Says Network-Wide Ad Blocking Illegal | IAB Europe,” Iab Europe, 
(September 1, 2016), http://www.iabeurope.eu/all-news/news/eu-outlaws-network-
wide-ad-blocking/. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology incorporates techniques from data science 
and policy research.  Data science is an interdisciplinary field 
incorporating analytics and statistics to extract knowledge from data. 
More specifically analytics is the discovery, interpretation, and 
communication of meaningful patterns in data. It is a multidisciplinary 
field incorporating mathematics, statistics, and business. Observed 
patterns of data are used to inform action and decision making. 
Statistics generally has a starting point of a wanting to solve a 
scientific, industrial, or social problem. In this case, the starting point 
is a policy question which has scientific, industrial, and social 
implications.  
The author developed these skills over years working in the software 
analytics industry as well as an apprentice of Andreas Ramos, one of 
the first practitioners of Google paid search and author of more than a 
dozen books on digital marketing and analysis. Together the author 
and Ramos wrote KPIs for Search Engine Marketing212 with the goal 
to help small and medium sized enterprises promote themselves 
online. Analytics (also called online or web analytics) is a professional 
discipline which emerged following the technical study of log files on 
the Internet. 
Policy research is the methodical enquiry of the efficacy of political 
decisions over a period of time. Such analyses are concerned with the 
effects and implementation of a policy. Performance measure could 
include effectiveness (how does the policy address the targeted 
problem),  unintended effects, and equity (what are the effects on 
different groups). The implementation considers issues such as the 
cost, feasibility, and acceptability.   
The objective is to inquire to what degree is net neutrality policy 
effective to achieve the stated goal of “innovation”, or “guaranteeing 
the Internet as an engine of innovation” as legislated in the EU or as 
                                                          
212 Ramos, Andreas and Roslyn Layton. KPIs for Search Engine Marketing. 
McGraw-Hill, 2009.  
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the US rules assert, to “Preserve the Internet as a Platform for 
Innovation, Free Expression and Economic Growth.” 
3.1 THE RCT PERSPECTIVE 
The author could not find other attempts to measure the efficacy of net 
neutrality rules for innovation.  There is, in fact, an ideal methodology 
to investigate such a question called the randomized controlled trial 
(RCT), though in nascent stages in innovation policy. The idea of 
randomized trials is that subjects are placed by lottery into “treatment” 
and “control” groups. The impact of the program is estimated by 
comparing the behavior and outcomes of the two. 
To be sure, the study of innovation is one of the most fertile areas of 
academic inquiry. There are dozens, if not not hundreds, of 
conferences on innovation globally, but fewer on innovation policy, 
and fewer still on the measurement of innovation policy. In May 2016 
there was the first gathering213 of academics attempting to study 
innovation policy with RCT.214 The conference proceedings noted that 
little is known about what makes innovation policy work. Indeed there 
is little evidence, little measurement of new policy instruments, and 
reluctance by policymakers to implement RCT.215 
                                                          
213 Making Innovation and Growth Policy Work: IGL Global Conference, May 25, 
2015, http://www.nesta.org.uk/event/making-innovation-and-growth-policy-work-
igl-global-conference#sthash.kHnBY0et.dpuf and  
Making Innovation and Growth Policy Work: IGL Global Conference, May 25, 
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An estimated €150 billion is spent annually by European governments 
in initiatives to support innovation and economic growth.216 The UK’s 
Innovation Growth Lab (IGL) observes that that there limited study of 
the efficacy of governments’ innovation policies. Moreover, even if 
innovation evolves, whether radical or incremental, it is difficult to tell 
whether it was the result of a specific policy.  IGL notes the report of 
the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth which reviewed 
15,000 policy evaluations and found that only 2.5 percent had a 
concrete conclusion about the effectiveness of the policy, and of those, 
1 in 4 had a positive impact (about 0.06 percent of the total).  The 
implication is clear; without evidence about what works, it’s difficult, 
if not impossible, to allocate resources to successful programs.   
This is not to say that innovation policy is not a useful effort; the point 
is that it can be improved with research about its effectiveness. For 
example, if innovation for small and medium enterprises is the goal, it 
would be helpful to know which policy or intervention is more 
effective.  A nation could make a net neutrality law to support 
“innovation” for example, or it could offer innovation vouchers to 
SMEs based upon a lottery.217 
The goal of RCT is to reduce selection bias.  A perfect study RCT for 
net neutrality would involve randomly assigning policies across 
countries and then measuring the effects. However in this 
investigation, the set of countries with net neutrality rules is given, not 
random.  However there is a significantly large and varied group of 
                                                          
216 Firpo and Beevers (2016) ‘As much as €152 billion is spent across Europe 
supporting businesses: but does it work?’ Available at 
www.innovationgrowthlab.org/blog/much-%E2%82%AC152-billion-spent-across-
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countries without rules. This itself is worthy of study and provides a 
de facto control group. This investigation is not an RCT, but it 
attempts to capture the essence of RCT, which is study scientifically 
and to reduce bias. 
The (IGL) offers some suggestions for how a nation could proceed to 
bring a scientific approach to innovation policy. Before introducing 
large scale programs, policymakers could conduct small-scale testing 
and pilot programs, and then scale up accordingly should evidence of 
effectiveness emerge.  Moreover governments themselves could 
conduct R&D on their own initiatives.  
But doing pilots projects is not sufficient, notes the report.  A real 
culture of innovation must embrace experimentation.  As such 
policymakers should be looking to conduct experiments to see what 
works with a rigorous framework for evaluation. RCT is one method 
of experimentation.  
While RCT is best known for health and pharmaceutical research, it 
has been tried to some extent in public policy.  For example the MIT 
Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) has conducted some 700 RCT on poverty 
reduction interventions.218 The Education Endowment Foundation has 
conducted over 100 RCT on different means to improve educational 
outcomes.219 The French government also runs an experimentation 
fund that focuses on interventions for disadvantaged youth based upon 
projects that are crowdsourced from around the country.220  
Moreover RCT could be utilized in different parts of the policy 
development process.  For example, RCT can be used to test different 
                                                          
218 “Policy Lessons | The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab,” accessed January 
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provisions of the existing policy programs. With net neutrality, there 
are many provisions and the understanding efficacy of the various 
provisions could be improved using this technique versus on the entire 
policy itself. 
There is no doubt that RCT is imperfect. The Pearce and Raman 
critique takes issue with what they believe is tacit acceptance that 
RCT investigations constitutes “neutral evidence.”221 However peer 
review is the quality control for bias. In any event, it does not seem 
unreasonable that some amount of RCT, or some amount of empirical 
evaluation for that matter, could be adopted for net neutrality policy. 
Though a direct RCT method could not be employed, the project 
attempts to measure the countries with two independent measurement 
tools. This is done to improve the scientific basis for the study as well 
as to guard against bias and overconfidence in the results.  
3.2 THE POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 
The Science Policy and Research Unit (SPRU) of University of 
Sussex is a leading university for ICT policy research. Reflecting on 
SPRU’s 40th annual conference in 2006, Morlacchi and Martin222 
observed that that policy research on science, technology and 
innovation continues to be a “somewhat heterogeneous set of 
activities undertaken by a community of diverse actors, each with 
rather different roles and aims.”  
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To be sure, the central goal of activities is “helping to construct more 
effective policies for science, technology and innovation, which in 
turn will yield greater benefits for society.” The authors suggest that 
innovation policy researchers should be concerned with the means and 
ends for society. They note a trend to instrumental and entrepreneurial 
activities at the individual and organizational level which need to be 
balanced with critical and independent scholarship as well as 
“reflexivity.” Importantly they define innovation policy research as 
the application of social science to the study of innovation policy. It is 
not theory or paradigm driven, but rather problem-oriented by 
focusing on practical issues with specific policies and the taking 
account of the central role of firms in the evolution of technology and 
innovation.  
They note that the policy research field has a multidisciplinary, 
empirical orientation and motivation, and when there is theory, it is 
generally inductive. This contrasts to the traditional social science 
approach in which theory comes first followed by the empirical work.  
Innovation policy research comes out primarily of the field of 
economics with a preference for the study at the firm industrial and 
national levels of analysis, viewing the Market and the State at its role 
to regulate or facilitate market interactions. Sociology, on the other 
hand, comes from the history and philosophy of science. The research 
function grew out of discussion of a variety of intellectual actors, with 
governments, international institutions, and research institutions 
starting to produce data about innovation (patent statistics, R&D 
expenditures etc). They summarize Ball223 in describing the four roles 
of policy researchers.  
The policy engineer who uses a set of procedures to determine best 
course of action to achieve a goal; the policy scientist who seeks the 
technically correct answer to the political problem with the available 
scientific knowledge; the policy entrepreneur who provides technical 
solutions or organizations and contexts and searches for opportunities 
to apply his or her favored solutions. The policy scholar seeks to 
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shape the way we think about society’s problems. The roles may have 
blended or take one part of the approach or another, and there is 
debate to what degree the roles are influenced by politics or vice 
versa.  Critical policy research should reflect upon these various roles 
and seek to find the optimal balance of the various approaches. 
They use the 1970s Limits to Growth224 debate to describe how the 
application of the assumptions of each of the roles can help produce 
more effective polices. The Limits to Growth view was evidenced 
through a set of computer models for population growth, resource 
depletion, food supply, capital investment and pollution. In particular, 
they examined the effects of continued economic and demographic 
growth in a world of finite resources, and derived various policy 
implications, such as the need for birth control to limit population 
growth. SPRU’s response, called “technological optimism” was not 
necessarily to reject the empirical findings of the model but to 
highlight that the model did not account for social change and 
technological advances which could change the expected outcomes.   
For example population growth, is desired, not deterred and now 
expected to reach 10 billion by 2050.225 Crucial resources have not 
depleted; innovative technologies have found substitutes and new and 
better means of extraction; food is so plentiful that one-third of it goes 
to waste globally; capital investment has seen unprecedented heights; 
and pollution, while not totally eliminated, has much better 
management. Moreover mobility and internet has benefitted the 
people of the world tremendously. This is not to say that progress will 
always proceed in a linear fashion. Growth and sustainability are still 
key issues in the policy research field. Failing to incorporate the views 
of the different actors (engineer, scientist, entrepreneur, ands scholar),  
predictions can fall short. Indeed relying on data alone can lead to 
false conclusions.  
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The Limits to Growth allegory is instructive for today’s net neutrality 
debate in which on the side, proponents suggest that the internet will 
essentially come to an end without net neutrality and  must therefore 
be “preserved” versus a more holistic view that does not reject 
concerns but sees change and advancement as a net positive 
development that can address concerns and solve problems, though 
maybe in  different way that is not yet known.  
Flanagan, Uyarra and Laranja226 attempt to foster the needed “critical 
reflexivity” by devising an approach that helps policy researchers 
conceptualize the innovation policy complexity and its various actors, 
levels and dynamics. Their problematization consists of policy 
agendas, rationales, actors, processes, instruments, and interactions. 
The literature on agenda setting and advocacy critiques the view that 
policymaking proceeds in a linear fashion, as if there is a scientific 
identification of the problem followed by the proper intellectual 
exchange of ideas and rationales to remedy the problem, the 
evaluation of various options with appropriate cost benefit analysis, 
and selection of instrument followed by measurement and 
optimization. Instead agenda setting227 is the process of creating 
awareness and concern on selected issues. This is achieved by 
leveraging the press and media (which does not reflect reality but 
rather shapes and filters the news) as well as the media concentration 
on a few issues which leads the public to believe that some issues are 
more important than others.  
Kingdon228 described the “policy primeval soup” as the policy process 
as an evolutionary one that favors “policy entrepreneurs” which can 
                                                          
226 Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra, and Manuel Laranja, “Reconceptualising the 
‘policy Mix’ for Innovation,” Research Policy 40, no. 5 (June 2011): 702–13, 
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.02.005. 
227 Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of 
Mass Media,” Public Opinion. Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 20, 1972): 176–87, 
doi:10.1086/267990. 
228 John Kingdon, “How do issues get on public policy agendas? Ch. 3Sociology and 
the Public Agenda, William Julius Wilson, ed. Sage Publications, 1993. 
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exploit “windows of opportunity.” Majone229 describes how 
policymakers use theory selectively after the fact to justify favored 
policies; he rejects the difference between policy analysis and 
advocacy, simply calling the combined a “policy innovation”, as all 
policies are a mix of objective analysis, advocacy, and persuasion. 
Borras and Edquist230 explore the selection of innovation policy 
instruments across three dimensions including (1) selection of the 
suitable instruments; (2) design and customization of the instrument; 
and (3) the design or mix in which the instrument is to work. They 
observe that while countries may have the same innovation goals, the 
micro-level policies may differ significantly. They cite how ICT 
policy in Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan manifested itself in different 
ways in the 1990s. Ireland focused on foreign direct investment; Israel 
supported R&D through government grants; and Taiwan instructed the 
a national institution to lead R&D efforts and diffuse them through the 
country. They define the key instruments as (1) regulatory; (2) 
economic and financial; (3) soft which are collectively the “sticks, 
carrots, and sermons” of public policy. 
With regard to this analysis, the identification of hard and soft rules 
conforms to this typology in that hard rules such as bans, prohibition, 
and legislation such belong the the regulatory category (1) and soft 
rules (voluntary agreements, code of conduct, multistakeholder etc) 
belong to the soft instruments category (3). Using the Borras and 
Edquist formulation, it may be possible to see net neutrality both as 
regulation on one set of actors (telecom operators) and an economic 
transfer in the form of an “artificial subsidy” to another (internet 
companies or “edge providers”). 
The authors stress that policy instruments are not “neutral” and hence 
it is important to select and customize the instrument which is 
appropriate to address the actual problem. The highlight this as a 
means to identify which activity of the innovation system that the 
instrument is supposed to address. The key activities include (1) 
                                                          
229 Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy 
Process (Yale University Press, 1989). 
230 The choice of innovation policy instruments 
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provision of knowledge inputs to the  innovation process; (2) demand-
side activities; (3) provision of constituents; and (4) support services 
for innovating firms. 
They note that it is common for actors to disagree on the type of 
policy instrument and how it should be designed. They note that when 
contestation is fierce and widespread, that public governments and 
agencies should reconsider the specific contents of the instrument or 
even the entire instrument. They describe that instruments are 
frequently used to address a problem of low performance in the 
innovation system.  This conclusion could be important for the 
selection of hard instruments for net neutrality, which are highly 
contested and litigated.   
3.3 USING ANALYTICS TO STUDY MOBILE APPS 
The research question investigates whether the introduction of net 
neutrality in a given country stimulates that country's third party 
application innovation in mobile apps on the internet. As net neutrality 
is promulgated on a national basis, the research question tests whether 
the introduction of net neutrality in a given country stimulates the 
production of apps from publishers based in that country, as measured 
by the number of downloads, and to what degree do apps used in that 
country come from other countries with net neutrality rules or not. 
The investigation also characterizes the results for different types of 
net neutrality regimes, whether soft rules, hard rules, or no rules. The 
investigation compares countries with relevant socio-economic factors 
but with different policy regimes. 
Data was collected from two enterprise market research platforms for 
mobile applications for activity in Apple’s App Store and Google 
Play, the two prevailing app stores in the set of countries to be studies. 
These data sets are provided by AppAnnie and Apptopia.  AppAnnie 
has been available for some time and has good historic data on rank of 
top downloads by country, category, and app store, but on the other 
hand, it provides only ranking data, not the actual number of 
downloads.  
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Apptopia offers data on downloads, usage and revenues. Its historical 
record of apps is shorter, but it has better aggregation ability, so 
reports can be made to cover longer periods of time. AppAnnie offers 
only a daily view, whereas Apptopia’s offers an aggregate view of the 
last 90 days.  Neither dataset is perfect, and each some deficiencies 
which are highlighted when relevant. However offering the results of 
the observations from both tools provides a more fulsome review of 
the mobile app market in the relevant countries.  
The data is then viewed in light of variables for mobile network 
competition, sophistication, and penetration. 
The statistical calculations have been performed in partnership with 
data scientist Simone Celant231 in Rome, Italy. Celant has Ph.D. and 
postdoctoral degree in statistics, with a focus on the social sciences.  
The research is structured on multiple analytical steps.   
1. First, the data is reviewed at national level among single 
countries having similar socio-economic features but different net 
neutrality rules, in order to verify whether the presence of hard or soft 
rules encourages the development of internal apps and the subsequent 
performance in the rankings. This is reviewed both across countries 
and time periods.   
 
2. The second step investigates the overall data to verify whether 
the development and success of apps published in single countries is 
influenced by their net neutrality status. This is reviewed both across 
countries and time periods.   
 
Both of these analytical approaches are based on the comparisons 
between proportions in the distributions. The key instrument to verify 
the statistical significance of the observed differences between values 
is the test on proportions, which evaluates the null that two 
proportions are equal against the alternative that the observed 
difference between them is statistically significant. The test statistic is 
equal to: 
                                                          
231 “Simone Celant | LinkedIn,” https://it.linkedin.com/in/simone-celant-
4a4a4637/en accessed June 20, 2016,  
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T =
p̂1− p̂2
p̂1+ p̂2
2 (1−
p̂1+ p̂2
2 )√1n1 + 1n2  
where p̂1 and p̂2 are the observed sample proportions; and n1 and n2 are 
the respective sample sizes. This statistic, under the null of 
equivalence, follows a normal distribution. 
The second step is to perform a further comparison on categories of 
apps in order to verify whether there is statistical evidence that 
categories are not randomly distributed between different net 
neutrality statuses. This is accomplished with cross tabulation and the 
Chi-squared test. This test, on two-sized tables, verifies the null that 
there is no association between couples of categorical factors, against 
the null that they are dependent on each other. Note that being based 
on the comparison between couple of variable of all kinds, no 
information on the “direction” of the dependency (for instance, in the 
case of the correlation coefficient) is provided by the Chi-squared 
index. The formulation of the index is the following: 
χ 2=∑
r= 1
R
∑
s= 1
S (nrs−
nr.× n. s
n )
2
nr.× n.s
n  
where nrs represents the number of units showing level r of the first 
categorical factors and the level s in the second categorical factors in 
the joint distribution, nr. the overall number of units showing level r in 
the first categorical factors and ns the overall number of units showing 
the level s in the second categorical factors. This statistic, under the 
null of no association, follows the χ2 distribution with (R-1)(S-1) 
degrees of freedom, being R the number of levels in the first factors 
and S the number of levels in the second factor. 
A second analytical step is be based on rank analysis. This will 
attempt to determine the number of internal apps and apps from 
countries with or without net neutrality rules that appear among the 
most downloaded, used, or highest grossing mobile applications for 
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that country as well as a report on their performance overall. As in the 
previous analytical steps, two approaches are followed. 
1. For the comparison between single countries, a limited number 
of different countries with similar socio-economic features but 
different net neutrality statuses are selected. The data is collected on 
the the significant level of apps by download, revenue and usage 
(generally the top 250 apps overall for each country is sufficient to 
characterize the market) from the publishers from different countries 
in specific groups. The groups include internal/local publishers for the 
relevant country, publishers from the USA, publishers from countries 
with soft rules, publishers from countries with hard rules, and 
publisher from countries with no rules. This will be reviewed both 
across countries and time periods.   
 
2. The overall data set will be analyzed by selecting the top apps 
(by downloads, revenues and usage) from publishers in the same 
groups as in the previous case, and the compare how different groups 
perform, especially over time. 
 
The comparison between the ranking structures is performed using the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. This test verifies the null that two ordered 
structures come from the same population, against the alternative that 
populations are statistically different; the alternative hypothesis can be 
both unilateral and bilateral. In other words, the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test verifies the hypothesis that rank differences between pairs 
follow a random symmetric distribution around 0, against the 
alternative that they are not symmetrical around 0. The test is based on 
the computation of signed differences between rankings which is 
expressed as follows 
W=∑ i= 1
n
[sgn( x2i− x1i )Ri]  
where sgn() indicates the sign function and Ri the i-th rank. Under 
the null hypothesis, the Wilcoxon test's mean is equal to 0 and its 
variance is equal to: 
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n(n+1)(n+2)
6  
The value of the test statistic must be compared to the critical values 
from the appropriate tables. In practice, this test allows one to verify 
whether two sets of rankings come from the same population – hence 
if their differences are statistically significant, which, in the case on 
cross-country comparisons, would imply that the distribution of, say, 
apps coming from local publishers perform better or worse in a 
country than in another. 
The research design focuses on a set of countries, coded for their type 
of net neutrality rules and the relevant year. The prevailing top mobile 
applications of each of these countries are studied using the 
measurement platforms of Apptopia and AppAnnie over various time 
periods. A list of the countries studies, the type of net neutrality rule 
and year of implementation follows 
The analysis focuses further on two similar EU countries, Netherlands 
and Denmark in which Netherlands has a hard net neutrality rule 
(legislation) and Denmark has a soft rule (self-regulation). It is 
understandable that comparing some 50 nations on net neutrality rules 
gives rise to some measurement challenges given their heterogeneity; 
that is why the analysis focuses more closely on two similar nations 
with different policies. The Netherlands and Denmark are both highly 
ranked in measures for broadband and digitization, but they have 
chosen diametrically different approaches to net neutrality. The test 
observes to what degree the countries produce their own apps as a 
function of their net neutrality rules. 
Following is a general table to compare the differences between hard 
and soft rules. Across the many countries, there is variation with some 
countries having aspects of both sets of provisions. However the key 
difference is that hard rules focus more on defining the forbidden 
activities of broadband providers whereas soft rules focus more on 
supporting the rights of users.   
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3.4 COUNTRIES AND RULES 
There are 54 nations in the study. The top 250 apps for each country 
represent over 90 percent of the app activity for that country.   
Figure 2: Provisions of hard rules vs. soft rules for net neutrality 
 
Hard Rules Soft Rules 
• Legally-binding rules 
made by legislation 
or regulation 
• Voluntary or non-binding 
rules made by multi-
stakeholder model, codes of 
conduct, and principles  
• No blocking 
• No throttling 
• No paid prioritization 
• Restrictions on 
pricing and zero 
rating 
• Transparency to 
traffic management 
and contracts 
• Regulators monitor, 
enforce, and report on 
violations 
• Specific fines and 
punishments 
• User’s right to access the 
content, application, and 
services of their choice. 
• Right to attach the devices of 
their choice 
• Right to connection with 
declared quality and capacity 
• Transparency to traffic 
management and contract 
• Freedom to offer 
differentiated services 
provided they do not degrade 
the quality of best efforts 
Internet access 
• Regulators monitor the 
quality of networks 
 
Soft rules have been used primarily in the Nordic countries, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan and South Korea.  These rules align 
most closely to Wu’s prescription for users’ rights, and as Wu 
describes, the threat of regulation is effective to change behavior.  
While soft rules are voluntary and non-binding, they may employ a 
“carrot and stick dynamic”.  ISPs have an incentive not be further 
regulated, and regulators  have leverage to nudge ISPs toward desired 
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goals, whether spectrum purchase, infrastructure investment, network 
sharing, universal service contributions etc. However the regulator 
retains the power to impose hard rules if harmful behavior emerged. 
Soft rules are delivered through multistakeholder models, codes of 
conduct, and self-regulation. Their provisions tend to focus on the 
user’s rights with some traffic management provisions.  
It’s important to underscore that soft rules are voluntary but they are 
backed up by the shared understanding that hard rules can follow if 
the soft rules are violated. At the same point, it should be noted that 
litigation has not emerged in soft rule countries. Moreover there is a 
significant record of net neutrality or complaint in soft rule countries. 
Whereas soft rule regimes may suggest constructive, cooperative 
relationships between regulators and broadband providers, the 
introduction of hard rules signals a change in the relationship between 
regulator and ISP, from cooperative to adversarial. Hard rules are 
delivered through legislation or regulation and are binding and 
punitive. Rather than focusing on user rights, they focus on industrial 
regulation and controlling and restricting broadband providers’ 
management of networks and commercial arrangements. Perhaps 
unsurprising, litigation has become a feature of hard rule 
environments, where “neutrality” can frequently be a malleable 
concept. Practices not considered harmful at one point become 
“violations” at a later stage. Consequently broadband providers have 
sued telecom regulators for overstepping their authority, and have won 
in a number of cases.  Hard rules have been in place in Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Chile, and have been promulgated more recently in the 
US and EU.   
The discussion section suggests some reasons why hard rules have 
become more prevalent, even when countries with soft rules had a 
successful record with significant mobile app innovation and  network 
investment.  
Following are the countries with hard rules, either legislation or 
telecom regulation, pre April 2016. There are 14 countries. 
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Figure 3: Countries with Hard Net Neutrality Rules 
 
Chile 2010 Argentina 2013 
Canada 2010 Israel 2013 
Netherlands 2012 Ecuador 2013 
Colombia 2011 Brazil 2014 
Peru 2012 Mexico 2014 
Slovenia 2012 
United 
States* 
2015 
Turkey 2012 Italy 2015 
 
There are 9 countries with soft rules. The instruments for soft rules 
comprise self-regulation, codes of conduct, principles, and 
multistakeholder models. Note that as of April 30, 2016, the net 
neutrality law took effect in the 28 nations of the EU. Given the UK’s 
vote to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016, it is not clear 
which regime will predominate in the UK going forward.  The 
decision could be significant for the country, as it is a leading mobile 
app publisher and home to such publishers as  Badoo, King Digital 
Entertainment (maker of Candy Crush), the BBC, and Mubaloo.  
Figure 4:Countries with soft net neutrality rules 
Sweden 2009 
Norway 2009 
Japan 2010 
France 2010 
Denmark 2011 
United Kingdom 2011 
South Korea 2011 
Austria 2013 
Switzerland 2014 
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Thirty countries in the study had no net neutrality rules on mobile 
networks during the period of investigation. They include 
Figure 5: Countries with no net neutrality rules 
 
Finland* Pakistan 
India* Ireland 
Russia Saudi Arabia 
Australia Indonesia 
Germany Poland 
China Czech Republic 
Spain 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Singapore Kuwait 
Taiwan Croatia 
Hong Kong Egypt 
Thailand Vietnam 
New Zealand Hungary 
Belgium Greece 
Malaysia Romania 
 Portugal 
 
The * denotes some distinctions which need to be made for certain 
countries in the analysis. Attempts to make rules in the USA have 
been tried since 2005, but it is difficult to determine their effect as 
they have been litigated, twice turned down, and while a third attempt 
was upheld in appeals court, there may be a rehearing of the case. 
Under such a litigious environment it is not clear to what degree rules 
are either respected and/or enforced.   
The provisions to wireless only came into effect in 2015, so relevant 
rules were not applicable for the time period studied in the US. One of 
the net neutrality flashpoints, zero rating, is handled on a case-by-case 
basis. On fixed networks, some companies have agreed to uphold 
certain types of net neutrality rules under merger conditions, e.g. 
Comcast agreed to a set of neutrality rules through 2017 as part of its 
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acquisition of NBC Universal.232 The American results are listed in a 
separate column in the analysis because they account for an 
overwhelming share of the world’s mobile app innovation and are thus 
not counted in the separate category for hard net neutrality rule 
countries, as the US apps would be counted twice.  
Finland accounts for a large share of the world’s video game 
publishers with the average year of founding being 2003.  The country 
created a net neutrality law at the end of 2015, and measurements 
were taken in March 2016. This three month period is generally too 
short for a net neutrality regime to be implemented, when looking at 
the length of time taken in other countries.  
India outlawed differential pricing and zero rating in February 2016, 
but does not have a net neutrality rule. Telecom Regulatory Authority 
of India (TRAI) conducted a consultation233 on differential pricing in 
December 2015 and subsequently imposed a blanket ban234 on the 
practice, reviewable in two years. However, there is no net neutrality 
law as such in India. Further, a “Pre-Consultation” on net neutrality 
only took place in May of 2016, after the differential pricing ruling. 
As such, it cannot be deduced that TRAI made its decision based upon 
incompatibility with a net neutrality law. On October 25, 2016 TRAI 
is reported235 to have held an open house on free data architecture, 
                                                          
232 John Eggerton, “FCC Approves Comcast/NBCU Deal”, “Broadcasting Cable.” 
January 18, 2011, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/fcc-
approves-comcastnbcu-deal/58397 
233 Consultation Paper on Differential Pricing for Data Services, September 12, 
2015, http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/ConDis/20761_0.aspx 
234 “Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs for Data Services Regulations,” Trai, 
February 8, 2016, 
http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/WhatsNew/Documents/Regulation_Data_Ser
vice.pdf. 
235 Recommendations on Free Data Architecture Soon: TRAI, October 26, 2016, 
News 18, http://www.news18.com/news/tech/recommendations-on-free-data-
architecture-soon-trai-1305232.html  
Trai to come out with recommendation for Free Data Architecture soon, October 26, 
2016, http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/trai-to-come-out-with-
recommendation-for-free-data-architecture-soon-343449.html  
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with the idea to develop a regime in which free data can be employed 
for a range of actors in the Internet ecosystem. This would suggest 
that the regulator is attempting to facilitate a pro-consumer and pro-
innovation solution for zero rating and free data. 
The rules for the European Union officially came into effect on April 
30, 2016 but their practical implementation was not decided until 
August 2016, and even then the implementation rules are not binding. 
Thus the rules from before April 30, 2016 are used for this study, and 
measures are taken before this date to be consistent.  
In the case of AppAnnie the reported information is based primarily 
on algorithms and statistical projections. AppAnnie explains, 
AppAnnie analyzes app ranks across all countries and 
categories by day and combines this with anonymized and 
aggregated transactional data from our free product App 
Analytics. Our advanced statistical modeling and rigorous 
benchmarking extrapolate the samples properly, creating 
accurate revenue and download estimates. Please note that we 
always provide estimates, we never sell actual data from a 
publisher!”236 
AppAnnie has a globally comprehensive dataset for countries on a 
national level, is constantly refreshed, has a relatively long history 
(2010), and has significant depth measuring about 500 apps for each 
store (though the company says that only the top 200 apps are 
statistically significant).  Note that the free, public version of 
AppAnnie was used for this study.  
The number of downloads per app is not given in AppAnnie.com, but 
appearance in the top ten of the app store indicates a high level of 
downloads, approximately 10,000 to 25,000 per day depending on the 
country and app. The top 100-200 apps are significant for the market, 
assuming the depth of the particular category. After position 200 in 
AppAnnie.com, the significance falls precipitously, and below rank 
number 300, it ceases to matter. One can understand the phenomena 
                                                          
236 “AppAnnie,” AppAnnie.com, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.appannie.com. 
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from Google’s search engine in that the first three results get the lion’s 
share of clicks, followed by the remaining 7 results on the first page, 
but generally users never go past the first page.237  Thus appearing in 
the top 10 for the category is important for adoption in app stores as it 
is in search engines. 
In the case of Apptopia, 180,000 publishers report their data to the 
company which then aggregate the information into an interface.238 A 
series of algorithmic predictions are applied to estimate the 
performance of apps not included among those which directly report 
to Apptopia. Thereafter the company verifies its results against 
publicly available information for which the app providers themselves 
report. Apptopia notes 75 percent accuracy in its measurements.   
Both Apptopia and AppAnnie are considered enterprise-level, 
commercial grade software tools. The selection of these tools was the 
appropriate, if not the only choice, to perform the analysis. While this 
information may not be perfect, the author believes it to be the best 
available information, 
The overall method, developed over 2 years of review and testing of 
various data sets, represents the author’s best attempt to create the 
relevant framework to test Wu’s paradigm in light of net neutrality 
rules around the world. It would have been desirable to have analyzed 
a set of impact assessments or cost benefit analyses undertaken by 
telecom regulatory authorities before implementing net neutrality 
policies, but those investigations have not been conducted. As such, 
this approach represents a preliminary way to test net neutrality policy 
with the best available information. 
Following are important assumptions, limitations, definitions for the 
analysis. 
                                                          
237 Andreas Ramos and Stephanie Cota, Search Engine Marketing, 1 edition (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2008). 
238 “How accurate are Apptopia's estimations?“ Apptopia.com 
https://apptopia.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/610773-how-accurate-are-
apptopia-s-estimations  
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3.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
1. The effects of net neutrality rules can be measured by 
studying the mobile app environment 
This departure point of the analysis is that the regulation is accepted at 
face value, that is to say, it assumes that rules perform in the way that 
regulators and advocates describe and deliver the purported policy 
goals. It also assumes that rules have a measureable impact over time. 
To be sure, there are pitfalls in any measurement. Decisions on how to 
ensure controls and validity can have material impacts. As such, the 
analysis attempts to be as neutral and objective as possible, but it 
recognizes that the quality of measurement may be somewhat 
dependent on the assumptions.239 
It may be the case that net neutrality has an impact that cannot be 
measured with this methodology. Given rational expectations, firms 
may adjust behavior under regulation either to conform with rules, to 
appear to conform with rules while not conforming to rules, or to 
change strategy to avoid or minimize the effect of regulation. 
The author does not preclude that this method is the best; it was the 
best that could be done under the circumstances.  
2. There is a set of directional relationships related to 
innovation which is supported by net neutrality 
In addition to the ability to measure the effects of rules, the study 
assumes that there is a set of relationships that drive innovation which 
are supported by net neutrality rules. That is to say, according to net 
neutrality, the BIAS, ISP, or telecom provider must be restrained from 
interfering in the ecosystem so that the edge provider can flourish. As 
such the expectation is that the promoted policy can be applied and a 
positive effect can be observed. 
                                                          
239 Pedhazur, Elazar J.; Schmelkin, Liora Pedhazur. Measurement, Design, and 
Analysis: An Integrated Approach (1st ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates., 1991 pp. 15–29. ISBN 0-8058-1063-3. 
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3. Countries have a similar capability to produce apps 
The study assumes that countries each have a similar capacity to 
produce mobile apps and the main differentiating factor is the degree 
to which they implement a  “neutral platform” by creating net 
neutrality rules. Some attempt is made later in the analysis to account 
for important differences in countries such as the install base of 
devices and the number and types of mobile networks, but networks 
and devices are not are not theorized as such in net neutrality 
literature. 
4. All apps are equal 
The notion that al data is considered equal under net neutrality is 
extended to all apps being considered equal. Thus having more apps is 
better than less, without any qualitative judgement about the value of 
any one app. To be sure, users will make judgements about apps, for 
example game A may be better than game B, or a society may say that 
it prefers a health care app over a gaming app, but such distinctions 
are not part of the net neutrality theory, as all applications, whether 
fundamental or derivative, are considered equal. To be sure, an 
innovator may create an app for a niche audience which will only 
garner a small number of downloads but have a relatively high value 
for that particular audience. To account for locally developed apps 
that may appear in the “long tail” of distribution, measurements were 
taken with Apptopia which cover up to 2000 apps downloaded over a 
90 day period.  However the author recognizes that there may be apps 
in the marketplace, which because of limited downloads, were not 
included in the measurement.  
5. Focus on downloads, not revenue 
The focuses on app downloads, not revenue, was chosen as the 
preferable way to account for both for profit and non-profit apps. 
However this does skew the analysis in favor of advertising-supported 
over fee-based apps. The Apptopia measurements allow some analysis 
based on revenue. 
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6. Does not account for role of intellectual property rights 
The analysis does not account for the particular rules for intellectual 
property in the given country. It could be that governments restrict 
apps because they violate the copyright rules of the country, however 
the author is not aware of instance of this. 
7. Other issues not mentioned 
The author recognizes that there could be a number of conditions 
which could impact the ability to access and run mobile apps from the 
user perspective which have not been included in the analysis, e.g. 
device type, friction, transaction cost, taxation and other conditions 
3.6 LIMITATIONS 
This method of analysis has a number of limitations. As will be 
described, there is limited data to measure Internet innovation. 
Moreover there is not a dataset that conforms directly to Wu’s 
conception of the Internet, that of “edge providers” creating 
innovation. Though there are firm and sector level datasets, prevailing 
theories of innovation suggest that an ecosystem creates innovation, in 
other words that the parts of a system work together in symbiotic 
ways.  Net neutrality contradicts that view in that it suggests that one 
actor (broadband internet access providers) need to be controlled so 
that another (edge providers) can flourish. As such, the ability to 
measure only the edge providers required finding such a dataset. A 
number of adjustments were made, and data has been taken from two 
data sets from competing vendors to avoid selection bias. 
Moreover it is recognized that simply counting the number of apps as 
a proxy is an imperfect measure of innovation. The author could 
hypothesize that some set of social benefit apps may be more 
important than entertainment apps for example, but that would be 
introducing the author’s bias rather than focusing on what net 
neutrality suggests should be the outcome:  “the best innovations”.  
It is also recognized that users may download apps via wifi networks 
and then use them on mobile networks. There was not systematic way 
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to account for wifi, so it is assumed that wifi is a constant and 
countries are instead noted for the type and number of mobile 
networks present.  
The measurement tools while powerful still had limitations in their 
flexibility and specificity.  
It is also not clear to what degree actors know about net neutrality and 
whether the presence or absence of rules changes behavior. For 
example, would app developers move to markets with hard net 
neutrality rules? Do users download more apps because they know net 
neutrality rules are in place? This could be important questions but 
were outside the scope of this study. 
Teece suggests that the level of mobile network infrastructure has 
something to do with the level of innovation, for example the Siri App 
on the iPhone can’t work unless the phone runs on a 4G network. For 
example, the FCC’s virtuous circle theory posits that the level of 
innovation (and associated traffic) will increase the level of 
investment.240 It believes that a state of neutrality will lead to 
innovation and then to investment. That particular theory was not 
modeled for this study.  However, a cursory investigation was made to 
the level of mobile infrastructure by looking at a set of indicators241 
prepared by the GSM Association in the global mobile connectivity 
report.242 This data set was used because it covered the largest 
numbers of countries with a number of relevant indicators for mobile 
infrastructure which were  normalized so that meaningful comparisons 
could be made across countries.   
  
                                                          
240 See later discussion of FCC’s Virtuous Circle. 
241 “Mobile Connectivity Index”, accessed November 16, 2016, 
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3.7 DEFINITIONS 
Following are the definitions used for study. 
3.7.1 APPLICATION 
An application, or app, is a specialized software program downloaded 
to a mobile device. An app generally offers a key feature, 
functionality or use case. The use of mobile apps on the internet is 
different from web browsing in which browsed the web to find pages 
of information. With an app, a developer creates an app to focus on a 
use case, uploads the app to the app marketplace, and then the users 
download the app. The process of placement and discovery for apps is 
different than for websites. The emergence of mobile applications is a 
paradigm shift from web browsing; forcing companies to change their 
formats and allowing the emergence of “mobile-first” companies. 
Consider the app Uber, an online transportation network with 
competes with traditional taxis. Users submit a trip request via mobile 
phone. Using the phone’s geolocation abilities, the driver and user are 
informed of each other’s location. The app is integrated with a 
payment system so when the ride is complete, the payment is 
automatically added to the user’s account. Both user and driver can 
rate the experience which is then displayed within the app’s interface. 
Having a mobile app offers the user flexibility of requesting a ride 
regardless of location and does not require that the use sit a computer 
with a fixed line network connection, the earlier paradigm of the 
Internet.  
3.7.2 INNOVATION 
Innovation is generalized in Wu’s article to a set applications from 
edge providers, so for the purposes of the research, innovation needs 
to be defined in order to be measured. In this research, innovation is 
any kind of content, application, or service created by a third party 
edge provider. For the purpose of this analysis, the presence of an app 
is counted as a single observation. While innovation could 
theoretically emerge from a broadband provider or user, this is not 
part of the analysis per the priorities defined by Wu. By his definition 
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and Lessig’s, innovation happens at the edge of the network by edge 
providers. Innovation does not occur in the network itself. 
3.7.3 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS USED FOR NET NEUTRALITY 
RULES 
The author has collected links to the net neutrality rules for a set of 
countries. The rules of each country were categorized in one of three 
ways: no rules, soft rules, or hard rules.  Countries with no rules may 
have net neutrality debates and proposals, but the relevant authorities 
have not created an official regime. The 28 nations of the EU must 
conform to the net neutrality law as of April 30, 2016, but 
implementation guidelines are pending. As much as possible, 
measurements are taken prior to April 30, 2016 to avoid confusion.  
Countries with soft rules use a variety of measures such as multi-
stakeholder models, principles, codes of conduct, and self-regulation.  
Multistakeholder models are common in internet governance to allow 
for the participation of many actors in emergent ecosystems. They are 
proven to be effective means to address conflicts through dialogue.243 
Principles, codes of conduct and self-regulation are initiated either by 
regulators, operators, or other actor, or in cooperation as a proactive 
means to protect users rights. Countries with soft rules take a carrot 
and stick approach, a reward to operators for avoiding hard regulation 
at the outset, but at the same time, the understanding that hard rules 
can follow if abuse occurs. It’s important to note that this group of 
rules represents the longest running regime for net neutrality. Some of 
the leading countries with this approach are Denmark, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland.  According to Luca Belli, head of the 
Dynamic Coalition on Net Neutrality and author of the Model 
                                                          
243 Layton, Roslyn. “Test of the FCC’s Virtuous Circle: Preliminary Results for 
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See also 
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Framework on Net Neutrality,244 hard rules are not a requirement for 
net neutrality. In his opinion, the soft rules of the Danish and 
Norwegian regimes have been successful.245 
Given that mobile contract complaints is a common consumer issue, it 
begs the question why the regulator does not focus more on 
transparency requirements.  Such an approach was taken by the 
Swedish regulator (PTS) in 2009, establishing guidelines in 2009246 in 
lieu of making a net neutrality law. In the Swedish perspective, net 
neutrality is about ensuring transparency in pricing, service offerings, 
network quality, as well as upstream and downstream capacity so that 
consumers are clear in what they purchase and can easily switch 
providers. PTS claims its consumer-centric, transparency-focused 
approach is successful and has improved operating norms so much 
that adopting to the EU’s new solution is a step backward. 247 
Whereas soft rule regimes focus on promoting users rights (right to 
access content, applications and services of one’s choice and the right 
to use devices of one’s choice), the rules in countries with hard 
regimes have a starting point of the prohibitions on operators, for 
example, no blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization. Countries with 
hard rules use either legislation or regulation to create binding, 
punitive regimes. Countries with legislation on net neutrality include 
Netherlands, Slovenia, and countries in Latin America such as Chile, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.  The US and Canada are two countries 
which take the unique approach in which telecom regulators 
unilaterally create rules. Rules in both countries have been litigated. 
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June 2016. Brussels. EuroDIG  
246 Post-och Telestyrelsen (PTS), “Nätneutralitet”, 
http://www.pts.se/sv/Bransch/Internet/Oppenhet-till-internet/ 
247 ETNO, “Ola Bergström, Director at Swedish Post and Telecom Authority - PTS, 
Gives an Interview at ETNO-MLex Summit 2014,” viEUws, July 7, 2014, 
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Countries with no rules may be in process of making rules but such 
promulgations were not concluded by the time of this writing. To be 
sure, there has been heated debate on the topic in India. Policymakers 
in Russia and China have had deliberations but no formal policies 
have been issued.248 
3.7.4 ACTORS 
For the purpose of this analysis some general categories are created. 
Broadband providers are the operators of networks, whether they are 
owners or resellers.  In this analysis they are the mobile network 
operators, whether incumbents or challengers. They build and run 
networks and deliver broadband service. Telecom regulatory 
authorities are a single entity within each country which oversees net 
neutrality rules.  Edge providers offer third party content, services and 
applications, for example Google, Netflix, or Wikipedia. End users are 
people who buy internet subscriptions to access third party data.  App 
developers, whether an individual working in a garage or a publicly 
traded company that makes mobile games, are “publishers.”  
It bears mention that with regard to the data, two actors have 
enormous influence. Google develops the lion’s share of the world’s 
mobile operating systems, Android and its platform Google Play are 
dominant systems. Apple is second with its proprietary iPhone, iOS 
operating system, and AppStore marketplace. The market power and 
concentration of “edge providers” is evident when studying the data, 
but that seems of limited concern to most net neutrality advocates. To 
be sure, Wu wrote his article before the emergence of the mobile 
Internet, but he did not discuss how edge providers would come to 
                                                          
248 Rob Powell, “The Curious Case of WeChat and Net Neutrality in China,” April 
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dominate the ecosystem.  Wu has since written a paper about Google’s 
search dominance.249 
3.7.5 TYPES OF NETWORKS 
While the author would have preferred to study both wireline and 
wireless, this method was abandoned because no appropriate data set 
could be found to cover both networks. Thus the study instead focuses 
on 2G-4G mobile wireless networks where mobile devices are 
deployed. While tablets are used on these networks, this study only 
focuses on the app innovation related to traffic on handsets, primarily 
smartphones. This decision to focus on mobile networks is important 
for a number of reasons.   
Broadband connections are growing on mobile networks both in 
developed and developing countries, whereas wireline subscriptions 
are essentially flat.250  The current flashpoints on the debate on net 
neutrality frequently have to do with mobile pricing models.  Going 
forward the growth of the Internet will largely be through mobile 
broadband in developing countries, as most developed countries are 
saturated on broadband subscriptions, Many people have multiple 
mobile broadband subscriptions. Wu’s concept was predicated in a 
world of just two networks: DSL and cable, where speeds of 3-6 Mbps 
prevailed.  However today in developed countries, multiple 4G mobile 
broadband networks exceed the 2003 speed threshold 2-3 times. Even 
developing countries have 4G networks. In addition there are a range 
of fixed wireless options. 
Mobile broadband was not commercially available in 2003 when Wu 
wrote his article. Today’s mobile broadband subscriptions are faster 
than the cable subscriptions Wu described in his article and offer more 
bandwidth.  An investigation of the types of Apple and Android 
smartphones deployed, while important, has not been included in this 
                                                          
249 Michael Luca et al., “Does Google Content Degrade Google Search? 
Experimental Evidence,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
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analysis, as the data set did not offer this information.  However an 
interesting topic for future research could be to what degree pre-
loaded apps on smartphones get an advantage over downloaded apps 
which are ostensibly found in a “neutral” fashion, at least in the Wu 
paradigm.251  It is suggested that preloaded apps on smartphones are 
four times more likely to be used than the corresponding app one 
downloads from the Internet in what is called “default bias” or 
“consumer inertia” toward preloaded apps. 
Importantly there is a dynamic in that mobile users may also have 
access to fixed networks.252 They may download apps on fixed 
networks such as wifi and then use them on mobile networks.  Such 
behavior was not modeled for this research as the author is not aware 
of data that reports whether an app is downloaded via wifi or mobile 
network. In any case, the net neutrality rules would likely apply 
equally to both networks.  
3.8 SOME BACKGROUND ON THE GLOBAL APP 
MARKET 
AppAnnie develops some helpful reports based on its data. Some 
points are helpful to characterize the global app market. 253 This 
section briefly reviews the mobile app maturity model, app stores, and 
the market shares of different regions for mobile apps. 
The life cycle of innovation is not discussed in Tim Wu’s article, but it 
may have bearing on the situation experienced today.  AppAnnie 
offers the following diagram of an App Market Maturity Model. For a 
typical free mobile app, the goal is maximize downloads at the time of 
launch. Once downloaded, the goal is maximize revenue and usage. 
                                                          
251 Vitaly Dianov, “Russia: Google Abused Android Dominance,” September 17, 
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Once an app is in the marketplace, its level of downloads becomes 
less important than its level of usage and revenue. The investigation in 
this project tries to capture all of these measures for a holistic view of 
the app market, but recognizing that different apps will be different 
stages in their life cycle, and some apps may not be revenue 
generators, but rather apps designed for customer service, 
egovernment, and so on. But most important for testing net neutrality 
should be the level of new apps and their associated downloads. 
Following the logic of net neutrality, the goal of delivering rules is 
that net new innovation should emerge 
Separately, there is an industry observation that the world of mobile 
apps is saturated.  Observers say that few developers are interested to 
create apps because the market is already dominated by the American 
players, and even if apps emerge, the developer’s goal is to sell the 
app to an established player rather than to create a new entity.  
Figure 6: App Market Maturity Model (AppAnnie) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another point that is evident from this study but it rarely mentioned in 
net neutrality debates is the market power of the Apple and Android 
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app stores. Each store has a process and criteria for an app to be 
considered. Moreover there can be a certain degree of curation by the 
app store owner to make certain apps available. In practice on a set 
number of apps may be visible at one time.  The store also takes a 
percentage of the revenue earned by the app.  
iOS and Android differ in their install base. Apple mobile operating 
system has about 463 million installations with Google’s having more 
than three times that at 1.8 billion. AppAnnie offers some further 
statistics about the two mobile app stores on July 5, 2016.254 
Figure 7: Comparisons of Apple and Google App stores, July 2016 
(AppAnnie) 
 
 Apple iOS Google Play 
Total Apps 2,544,368 3,054,046 
Percentage of Non-Games 
and Games 
76.2 % non-games 
23.8% games 
80.1 % non-games 
19.9% games 
Submissions to app 
store/week (previous 
week) 
39,642 21,711 
Number of publishers 
1,015,149 
(2.51 apps per 
publisher) 
1,164,204 
(2.62 apps per 
publisher) 
New Publishers added 
(previous week) 
3065 5065 
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A number of industry practitioners suggest that the greatest barrier for 
mobile application adoption is app discovery,255 not the threat that a 
telecom operator would block an app. Net neutrality holds that that 
consumers and edge providers blithely traverse the Internet without 
the need of marketing strategies or platforms to find what they are 
looking for.256  On a more prosaic level, that edge providers must 
invest significant resources in the practices of SEO (search engine 
optimization) and ASO (app store optimization) to be findable calls 
into question the neutrality of intermediaries and suggests that users 
are not engaging in purely neutral platforms. However intermediaries 
provide the benefit of an interface in which to organize information. 
Without such tools, users might be required to have significant 
computer science skills to find information. As such, apps stores 
provide a valuable clearinghouse for apps.  For example, to be 
preloaded on a phone, app makers generally need to pay a fee to the 
device maker. 
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Figure 8: Mobile App Forecast 2020, Downloads (AppAnnie) 
 
AppAnnie describes the current and projected downloads and revenue 
for mobile applications, a market of just over USD $50 billion. 
Publishers in the Asia Pacific region account for approximately 54 
percent of all revenue, with that share projected through 2020. It 
reports that already in 2016, Chinese apps alone have surpassed the 
USA in revenue and downloads. 
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Figure 9: Mobile App Forecast 2020 Revenue (AppAnnie) 
 
AppAnnie also provide the 2015 breakdown for the location of the 
publishers for most downloaded apps. Asia Pacific accounts for 28 of 
the top 52; the USA 17; and Europe, 7. 
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Figure 10: Where most downloaded apps come from, 2015 
(AppAnnie) 
 
It’s important to recognize the distinction between game and non-
game apps. The vast majority of revenue in the app market comes 
from games. However downloads are higher for non-game apps.  
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Figure 11: Mobile App Forecast 2020, Downloads, Games vs. Non-
Games (AppAnnie) 
 
Figure 12: Mobile App Forecast 2020, Revenue, Games vs. Non-
Games (AppAnnie) 
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AppAnnie also reports the top 10 app for revenue and downloads for 
the last 4-5 years for both Apple iOS and Google Play. 
Figure 13: Top Apps Worldwide, iOS, Downloads, all time 
(AppAnnie) 
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Figure 14: Top Apps Worldwide, iOS, Revenue, all time (AppAnnie) 
 
On iOS from 2010-2015, the top downloaded apps come from 
Facebook (three messaging apps), Google (YouTube in  the 
entertainment category and Maps), Microsoft (Skype, a 
communications app), Apple, (Find my Phone utility and iTunes U), 
and Twitter, the social media app. All of the release dates are from 
2012 or earlier. As for revenue, the only top performers that excel in 
both downloads and revenue are Skype (Microsoft) and Apple (Pages 
app).  Other top revenue earners are Pandora (music), Line (music and 
games), Zoosk (dating), Badoo (dating), Spotify (music), Major 
League Baseball (sports), and Grindr (dating).  All of the apps are US 
based except Line (Japan), Badoo (UK), and Spotify (Sweden) 
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Looking at Google Play from 2012-2016,257 Facebook, Skype and 
Twitter are top-rated as they are in iOS but other top downloaded apps 
include Instagram, the Japanese LINE, the Chinese Clean Master 
utility, the Japanese Viber (LINE competitor), and Flashlight by 
Surpax, an American publisher. 
For top earners in revenue, a different set of players emerge. Line 
takes the top three spots with messaging and games followed by 
Pandora; then the South Korean, KakaoTalk messenger tool; the 
Japanese GREE (social mobile game company based on “degrees” of 
separation among connected mobile users); the Japanese Pokémon 
game app; the Japanese Dragon Quest game; LOVOO, the German 
dating app, and Tinder, an American dating app.  
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Figure 15: Top Apps all time, Downloads, Google Play (AppAnnie) 
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Figure 16: Top Apps, All Time, Revenue, Google Play (AppAnnie) 
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AppAnnie also offers a summary of the top downloaded and grossing 
categories of all time, after games.  The top categories among both 
downloads and revenue are communication, social networking, and 
tools.  
Figure 17: Top Non-Game Categories, Downloads, Revenue, Google 
Play (AppAnnie) 
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When looking at time spent on an Android device, social network and 
communication are the primary activities, followed by games. 
Figure 18: Time Spent by App Store Category, Android (AppAnnie) 
 
While US apps may have historically dominated downloads and 
revenue, that is already changing. China has already become the 
world’s largest app market by downloads 2016, with a projected 50 
billion downloads.258 App revenue for China in 2015 was close to 
USD $9 billion.259  While revenue on Apple devices is strong and 
growing (also significantly high per device), comprising USD$3.4 
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billion in 2015, Android is proliferating as ever better quality 
smartphones come to market at lower prices.  
As described by Mary Meeker in her annual Internet Trends report,260 
the Chinese app market is also significant in that an individual app 
performs multiple functions. For example the Ctrip travel app offers 
users the ability to buy accommodation, airfare, local transport, tours, 
attraction tickets in addition to providing information on sightseeing, 
shopping, restaurants, travel insurance, visa, and wifi. The Priceline 
app by comparison only offers hotel, airfare, and rental cars. The 
Chinese Tencent offers instant messaging, ecommerce, and games in a 
single app.  Tencent recently acquired the world’s largest game 
company, Finland’s Supercell for USD$8.6 billion.261 Going forward, 
Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean app makers will be able to use 
prioritization technologies in their game apps, technologies banned by 
Open Internet rules in the US and EU.  
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Figure 19: Comparing US and Chinese app, Priceline vs. Ctrip (Mary 
Meeker, KPCB) 
 
AppAnnie data on the 500 top-ranked apps in both the “Top 
Grossing” and “Top Downloads” categories in 2015 for both the iOS 
and Android was used in a research project on mobile apps published 
in 2016 by Mozilla Foundation and Caribou Digital. Called “Winners 
& Losers in the Global App Economy”,262 the study investigated 37 
national markets, app developers, and their revenue. The goal was to 
identify which countries produced apps and to where apps are 
exported. A simplified power law curve was employed to estimate 
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value capture across all developers.  Though the study did not focus 
on net neutrality policy, it critiqued the notion that the Internet is an 
inherently neutral network observing, “. . . the app market, like all 
markets, is a socially constructed system with policies, architectures, 
and intrinsic biases that govern participation and outcomes. That this 
governance is largely defined by two firms, Apple and Google, whose 
platforms control the vast majority of the global market, further 
concentrates power in the industry and amplifies the effects of those 
policies and biases on app developers.”  
The study notes the pre-eminence of the US, Japan, and China and 
that 95% of the estimated industry value is being captured by just the 
top 10 producing countries. Of the top ten countries ranked for their 
number of app developers (US, China, UK, South Korea, Japan, 
Russia, Germany, India, Taiwan, and Spain),263 none had hard net 
neutrality rules. The US rules were adopted in February 2015 but not 
yet published in the Federal Register in June 2015, when the 
measurements were taken. 
3.9 DATA COLLECTION AND ORGANIZATION 
Before settling on the Apptopia and AppAnnie measurements, the 
author has attempted to find measures of innovation across countries, 
but it was difficult.  For example she investigated the patent database 
at the World Intellectual Property Organization. There is no Internet 
category as such, and the patents in the categories of electronic 
communications and computer science don’t necessary cohere to 
Internet edge providers.  This data does not include the significant 
open source innovations, as there is not an owner as such.  Another 
attempt involved reviewing the innovation index studies such as the 
Global Innovation Index (INSEAD, Cornell),264 Bloomberg 
Innovation Index,265 and the OECD Innovation Indicators266, which 
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are composite scores related to general economy, level of education, 
overall regulatory regime government policies, investment in research 
and development and so on. While these inputs could be important, 
they do not figure into Wu’s paradigm.   
As such, Apptopia and AppAnnie emerged as the best, if not only, 
choice for data.  They provide data about mobile apps (rank, category, 
revenue) for the leading app stores Google Play and Apple’s 
AppStore. 
A glance at the top mobile apps for a set of countries shows—perhaps 
counterintuitively—a similar picture across countries. One might 
assume that net neutrality would drive more diversity in the kinds of 
apps people choose across countries, but instead the same few set of 
apps dominate the ranking in almost all countries. Internet traffic is 
highly disproportionate to the same location.  While on hand Wu says 
that a neutral internet give users the “best applications”, one might 
predict that neutrality would at least provide a more differentiated 
picture. One might expect the more neutral environment to have more 
diverse apps, for example. Instead a few publishers account for the 
lion’s share of traffic.  
Amongst online analytics practitioners, this concentration is called the 
99/1 rule;267 99 percent of traffic goes to the 1 percent of the websites.  
It’s a variation on Pareto’s 80/20 rule, also called the law of the vital 
few or the principle of factor sparsity in network engineering.268 
  
                                                                                                                                        
266 “Innovation Statistics and Indicators,” OECD, accessed June 20, 2016 
267 Ramos, Andreas. “Can We Just Build It and They Will Come?” Andreas.com. 
http://andreas.com/can-we-just-build-it-and-they-will-come/ Accessed November 
16, 2016. 
268 Kiremire, Ankunda R. The Application of the Pareto Principle in Software 
Engineering. October 19, 2011 
http://www2.latech.edu/~box/ase/papers2011/Ankunda_termpaper.PDF 
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Figure 20: Screenshot AppAnnie.com, top grossing apps overall in 
Netherlands for 1 day on May 12, 2016 
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Figure 21: Screenshot from Apptopia, custom report for top grossing 
apps in Denmark in Apple AppStore for last 30 days from June 12, 
2016. 
 
The data collection consists of transcribing the results for the apps for 
the set of countries along with their relevant characteristics (rank, app 
name, publisher, publisher location, category of app, revenue etc), 
assembling them in a spreadsheet, and then analyzing hem.  
Specifically the analysis attempts to measure the diversity of 
applications, where the apps creator (publisher) is based, how well the 
app ranks, how many downloads it earns, and if available, what 
amount of revenue it earns. The analysis also attempts to characterize 
to what degree a particular nation can produce its own unique apps 
and export those apps. Essentially it investigates whether net 
neutrality rules in a country is a factor for creating “the next Google”. 
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Two sets of measurements were made, one in AppAnnie and another 
in Apptopia. 
3.10 APPANNIE MEASUREMENTS 
The measurements come from software platforms that measure  iOS 
and Google Play stores. Two data sets have been used, AppAnnie and 
Apptopia.  AppAnnie has been in the marketplace for a few years, is 
considered the leading enterprise tool, and has good historic data 
about app downloads by country, category and app store, but on the 
other hand it mainly produces rankings rather than the actual amounts.  
Moreover its premium version is cost-prohibitive, so this project only 
uses the free, public version. AppAnnie does produce regular reports 
summarizing its data on regional and global levels. These are helpful 
for a macro perspective, and those discussions have been included 
where relevant. However this data is not directly downloadable.  All 
of the data from AppAnnie was transcribed by hand into statistical 
tools and spreadsheets for further analysis.   
Given the time consuming and cumbersome nature of data collection 
from AppAnnie, the measurements only cover two points in time for 
both app stores for a single day, 5 years apart. Thus data has been 
downloaded from March 1, 2016 and March 1, 2011 for Netherlands, 
and March 1, 2016 and March 1, 2012 for Denmark. The 2012 date is 
used for Denmark because it is the first year that Google Play data is 
available for the country.  
The competing platform Apptopia is newer and offers 90 days of of 
historic data, but offers better data for downloads, usage and revenues, 
in addition to chronological aggregation capability. AppAnnie’s 
numbers are based on statistical extrapolations whereas Apptopia’s are 
based upon reports on downloads, revenue, and advertising from 
180,000 app providers in addition to estimation models, checks with 
the publicly available information in app stores every hour of the day 
across 35 parameters (rank, ratings, reviews, price, version history 
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etc).269 This information creates 40 billion data points to characterize 
the respective app marketplaces.270Apptopia is competitively priced to 
win new customers.  Apptopia reports 70-90 percent average accuracy 
in its reporting, with accuracy higher for top performing apps than 
lower performing ones, which tend to be more volatile.271  
For both countries, the top 100 downloaded free apps and the top 25 
downloaded paid apps have been observed with reference to the iOS 
system and to Google Play on March 1, 2011 and March 1, 2016. 
When the data was not available for the selected date (because not all 
data sets cover the same time period on AppAnnie), data collection 
has been switched to one year later. For each app, the publisher’s 
location needed to be verified and noted, as this information was not 
available in AppAnnie. In a few cases, the location of the publisher 
could not be verified. 
Some 1000 records were collected from AppAnnie and then computed 
separately for past and present observations, as well as jointly to have 
an overall idea of how app features are distributed across time and 
space. Following are the quantities collected and compared in the 
analysis for the two countries and two time periods. 
1. Number of apps (all recorded entries); 
2. Number of distinct apps (as identified by the same ID – note 
that the same app on the same store in different years has the 
same ID, while the same app in different stores has different 
IDs). For example WhatsApp for Google Play and WhatsApp 
for iOS are each distinct apps; 
3. Number of unified apps (this is the grouping of the different 
version of the same app from the same publisher, for example 
WhatsApp for Play and WhatsApp for iOS are distinct apps 
                                                          
269 “Where does Apptopia get its data from?” Apptopia.com. Accessed November 
16, 2016 https://apptopia.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/610779-where-
does-apptopia-get-its-data-from 
270 Ibid 
271 “How accurate are Apptopia’s estimations.” Apptopia.com. Accessed November 
16, 2016 https://apptopia.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/610773-how-
accurate-are-apptopia-s-estimations 
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but together they are a “unified” app offered by the publisher 
Facebook); 
4. Number of publishers. 
 
The total number of entries equals 1000 (500 in 2011-12 and 500 in 
2016; 500 for Denmark and 500 for the Netherlands; 500 downloaded  
from the iOS store and 500 from Google Play; 800 entries are free 
apps, 200 are paid apps). The total number of distinct apps is equal to 
737; the total number of unified apps is equal to 637; the total number 
of publishers is equal to 589. 
The number of distinct apps is equal to 449 in 2011-12 and to 367 in 
2016 (-18.26%; the difference is 99% statistically significant); the 
number of unified apps is equal to 402 in 2011-12 and to 296 in 2016 
(-26.37%; the difference is 99% significant); the number of publishers 
is equal to 371 in 2011-12 and to 276 in 2016 (-25.61%, the difference 
is 99% significant). Therefore, over the last 4-5 years, in Denmark and 
in the Netherlands the variety among the top downloaded apps has 
significantly dropped. This is true at both the national and aggregated 
level: in Denmark a significant decrease in the number of distinct apps 
(-1.2%, 90% significant), of unified apps (-7.8%, 95% significant) and 
publishers (-10.2%, 95% significant) has been observed; in the 
Netherlands, a significant decrease has been observed only in the 
number of unified apps (-8.3%, 95% significant). The differences 
between the amount of the decrease in the variety in the single 
countries and in the two markets combined imply that over the last 4-5 
years a relevant overlapping between the top downloaded apps has 
taken place: the markets tend to become more standardized across 
countries.  Note that this first cut does not yet address the location of 
the publisher. That will follow. 
The P-values and Z-values of each table were then calculated. The p-
value is a statistical measure of the extremity of the observed data. 
The z-value or standard score is the number of standard deviations an 
observation appears above the mean. For example, it was needed to be 
determined that the increase or decrease of a line item over the period 
was significant.  These measures are provided to guard against over-
interpreting nominal results.  
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Statistical tests on proportions have been run, in order to verify 
whether the observed distributional differences across time and space 
are statistically significant or not. For instance, tests have been run to 
verify whether the observed differences in the percentages of 
downloaded apps developed from publishers based within the 
considered country (specifically, Denmark and Netherlands) are 
significant or not. Furthermore, the same tests have been run to verify 
whether the observed differences in the percentages of downloaded 
apps developed by publishers based in countries with soft net 
neutrality rules across time are statistically significant. 
The tests are presented by displaying three numerical outputs: the 
observed proportions, the Z-statistics (which are the numbers resulting 
from the practical formulations of the tests) and the P-values, which 
are a measurement of the statistical support awarded by the test's null 
hypothesis – in this case, that proportions are equal. Typically, a null 
hypothesis is rejected if the associated P-value is less than 0.05 (95% 
significance). 
In this case, the null hypothesis is thus rejected. 
3.10.1 METHODS FOR UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The first step focuses on distributional features.  After downloading 
ranking data on downloads, usage and revenues, the presence of apps 
published by countries with net neutrality rules was noted according to 
the two subsequent approaches: 
First, the presence of locally made apps in the relevant rankings for 
the respective countries was analyzed.  The date and type of net 
neutrality rule was noted for the country. These evaluations have been 
done on both cross-country and time-related comparisons. 
 
Second the overall data was studied to verify whether the development 
and success of apps published in single countries is influenced by their 
net neutrality status. These evaluations have been done on the overall 
data set and through time comparisons. 
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Both these analytical approaches are based on the comparisons 
between proportions in the distributions. The key instrument to verify 
the statistical significance of the observed differences between values 
is the test on proportions, which evaluates the null that two 
proportions are equal in two populations against the alternative that 
the observed difference between them is statistically significant. The 
test statistic is equal to: 
T=
̂ − ̂
̂1 − ̂	 1
 +
1

 
Where 
T equals the test statistic, 
p equals the proportion, and 
n equals the respective sample size. 
̂ = ̂ + ̂2  
In this formula, ̂and̂are the observed sample proportions,̂is their 
average, n1 and n2 are the respective sample sizes. This statistic, under 
the null of equivalence, follows a normal distribution. 
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3.10.2 RESULTS FOR UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The total number of apps from publishers with known headquarter 
location is equal to 912 (742 free apps and 170 paid apps); the number 
of distinct apps is equal to 661 (540 free apps and 122 paid apps); the 
number of unified apps is equal to 548 (452 free apps and 110 paid 
apps); the number of publishers is equal to 471 (396 related to free 
apps, 97 related to paid apps); a total of 390 apps (307 free apps, 83 
paid apps) allow for in-app purchases. The geographical distributions 
of the countries in which the publishers of these apps are based, 
according to six different levels (Denmark, Netherlands, USA, 
countries with soft net neutrality rules, countries with hard net 
neutrality rules, countries with no net neutrality rules) are displayed in 
the following figure. 
Figure 22: App distributions across countries and groups of countries 
 
Country Apps Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
All apps DK 13.60% 15.13% 15.51% 15.07%
NL 13.05% 14.83% 14.05% 17.62%
USA 36.40% 32.83% 32.12% 29.51%
Soft Rules 18.53% 18.31% 18.61% 17.41%
Hard Rules 1.54% 1.82% 2.01% 2.12%
No Rules 16.89% 17.10% 17.70% 18.26%
Free apps DK 15.09% 16.48% 16.81% 15.91%
NL 14.69% 16.85% 15.71% 19.44%
USA 36.52% 31.85% 30.97% 28.54%
Soft Rules 16.17% 16.48% 17.04% 16.67%
Hard Rules 0.94% 1.11% 1.33% 1.52%
No Rules 16.58% 17.22% 18.14% 17.93%
Paid apps DK 7.06% 9.02% 8.18% 9.28%
NL 5.88% 8.20% 5.45% 6.19%
USA 35.88% 37.70% 38.18% 35.05%
Soft Rules 27.65% 24.59% 24.55% 24.74%
Hard Rules 4.12% 4.92% 5.45% 5.15%
No Rules 19.41% 18.03% 18.18% 19.59%
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In general the relative majority of apps are published in the US, that 
there is a slight difference between the percentage of apps published 
in Denmark and those published in the Netherlands, and that the 
number of apps published in countries with hard net neutrality rules is 
virtually insignificant. It has to be stressed that the difference between 
Denmark and the Netherlands does prove to be statistically relevant 
according to the test on proportions. The differences observed 
between 2011-2012 and 2016 in the distributions of all apps are 
displayed in the following figure.  
Figure 23:  App distributions across time and groups of countries, 
2011-12, 2016 
 
Country Apps Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
2011-12 DK 12.30% 13.53% 14.24% 14.80%
NL 13.20% 14.29% 14.53% 17.76%
USA 38.03% 35.84% 34.30% 31.58%
Soft Rules 18.34% 18.55% 18.60% 17.76%
Hard Rules 1.12% 1.25% 1.45% 1.64%
No Rules 17.00% 16.54% 16.86% 16.45%
2016 DK 14.84% 19.41% 19.56% 18.73%
NL 12.90% 16.47% 15.50% 18.73%
USA 34.84% 29.41% 28.41% 25.50%
Soft Rules 18.71% 17.35% 18.08% 17.53%
Hard Rules 1.94% 2.06% 2.21% 1.99%
No Rules 16.77% 15.29% 16.24% 17.53%  
In the two previous tables there are two specific types of time 
differences: first, the share of apps released in USA is decreasing 
(differences range from -0.5% to -6%); second, the share of apps 
released in Denmark tend to increase (differences range from +2.5% 
to +6%) while that of apps released in the Netherlands tends to remain 
approximately constant (differences range from -2.2% to +1%). The 
differences in the shares of apps from USA and Denmark are more 
evident in the distributions related to the whole app market than in that 
related only to free apps. 
It has to be stressed that the only statistically significant differences as 
measured using the test on proportions are observed in the distinct 
apps (95% significance) and in the unified apps (90% significance) 
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from publishes based in Denmark both in the general distributions and 
in the free apps distributions.  
In other words, the observed variations across time seem suggest that 
Danish publishers are increasing their market shares, publishers from 
USA are losing market shares, and publishers from the rest of the 
world do not show substantial variations. However, from a statistical 
point of view, the Danish publishers have been gaining market shares 
over the last 4-5 years with reference to distinct apps and unified apps. 
It has to be noticed that the analysis on the global market has shown 
that the overall number of apps in the top rankings has declined over 
the last years, which implies that the absolute number of apps released 
by publishers from USA, Netherlands and the rest of the world has 
definitively declined.  In absolute terms, the largest platforms have 
become bigger and more consolidated. For example, Google as a 
publisher has some 70 apps in the 2016 observation. Facebook the 
publisher has 25 apps. 
In the following figure that analysis is performed just for free apps. 
Figure 24:  Distribution of free apps across time and groups of 
countries 
 
Country Apps Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
2011-12 DK 13.37% 14.72% 15.28% 15.95%
NL 15.32% 16.56% 16.32% 19.84%
USA 36.77% 34.05% 32.64% 29.96%
Soft Rules 16.43% 16.87% 17.01% 16.34%
Hard Rules 1.11% 1.12% 1.39% 1.56%
No Rules 16.99% 15.17% 17.36% 16.34%
2016 DK 16.71% 21.40% 21.97% 20.28%
NL 14.10% 17.89% 17.04% 20.28%
USA 36.29% 30.18% 28.70% 26.42%
Soft Rules 15.93% 15.09% 15.70% 15.57%
Hard Rules 0.78% 0.70% 0.90% 0.94%
No Rules 16.19% 14.74% 15.70% 16.51%  
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The results are then reviewed within the single markets. The results of 
the computations related to the rankings observed in Denmark and in 
the Netherlands separately are presented in the figure below.  
The apps released by Danish publishers observed in the top rankings 
of the Netherlands are included in the Other Soft rules category, since 
Denmark has introduced soft net neutrality rules in 2011. Conversely, 
the apps released by publishers based in the Netherlands observed in 
the top ranking of Denmark are included in the Other Hard Rule 
category since the Netherlands have introduced hard net neutrality 
rules in 2012. This is simply to say that the Dutch use Danish-made 
apps. By contrast there are limited Dutch-made apps in Denmark. 
There are some interesting things that can be observed. The first (and 
quite obvious) one is that the rankings of the most downloaded apps 
have very similar profile in Denmark and in the Netherlands, in terms 
of composition with reference to the publishers' headquarters. With 
reference to Distinct apps and Unified apps, the presence of apps 
developed by internal publishers ranges from 24% to 28%; the internal 
publishers in the Netherlands have a slightly higher percentage. It 
bears mention that Netflix chose the Netherlands as it European 
headquarters, and the app features at the top of the ranking for 
entertainment for the app.  
Figure 25: Comparisons between Netherlands' and Denmark's app 
distributions across time and groups of countries 
 
Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
2011-12 2016 2011-12 2016 2011-12 2016
Netherlands Internal 25.11% 24.78% 25.65% 23.73% 30.46% 28.48%
USA 37.22% 35.84% 36.65% 34.46% 33.33% 28.48%
Soft Rules 19.73% 19.03% 20.42% 19.21% 18.97% 18.79%
Hard Rules 1.35% 1.77% 1.57% 2.26% 1.72% 1.82%
No Rules 16.59% 18.58% 19.37% 20.34% 15.52% 22.42%
Denmark Internal 24.22% 27.54% 25.65% 27.60% 26.16% 27.98%
USA 39.01% 34.32% 37.17% 32.81% 36.63% 30.36%
Soft Rules 17.49% 19.49% 17.28% 20.31% 16.86% 20.24%
Hard Rules 1.79% 3.81% 2.09% 3.65% 2.33% 4.76%
No Rules 17.49% 14.83% 17.80% 15.62% 18.02% 16.67%  
173 
 
The following figure is a graphical representation of the results of the 
prior figure. 
Figure 26: Comparisons between app distributions across groups of 
countries and time 
 
Apps developed by publishers from the rest of the world also appear 
to have similar distributions: USA shows percentages ranging from 
33% to 39%, countries with soft net neutrality rules show percentages 
ranging from 17% to 20%, countries with no net neutrality rules range 
from 15% to 20%, while the countries with hard rules are residual. 
The similarities in the profiles of Denmark and Netherlands are more 
evident at the beginning of the period (2011-12) than at the end 
(2016). It has to be stressed that in both countries net neutrality rules 
have been introduced around 2011-2012 – soft rules in Denmark, hard 
rules in the Netherlands. After that, some differences have started to 
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become visible: over the last 4-5 years, an increasing tendency is 
visible in the presence of internal apps among the top downloaded 
apps in Denmark, while a decreasing tendency can be observed in the 
Netherlands. Simultaneously, the presence of apps released in 
countries with no net neutrality rules has declined in Denmark and 
increased in the Netherlands, while the opposite has happened with 
countries with soft net neutrality rules. 
Note however that none of these differences is significant from a 
statistical point of view. The test on proportion has shown the no 
presence of structural differences between countries and between time 
periods. This means that in order to check for these differences more 
thoroughly, there must be focus on development over time for a longer 
period and analysis to bigger, more complete, and less “noisy” data – 
for instance monthly, or even yearly, data on downloads and usage – 
to reach more stable conclusions. 
Another interesting aspect is the distribution of the dismissed apps 
across countries and group of countries. The results of this 
computation are displayed in Table 5 and shown in Figure 4.  
Dismissed apps are those that may have appeared in 2011 or 2012 but 
are no longer found in 2016.  
The dismissal rate is much higher for apps from the Netherlands than 
for apps from Denmark. This difference is 90% statistically significant 
for all apps and 95% statistically significant for free apps: apps from 
Netherlands are actually more likely to be dismissed over a period of 5 
years. It has to be stressed that the overall number of dismissed apps is 
equal to 92 (91 of which before March 2016), which means that these 
computations and tests are run on a very limited number of units. 
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Figure 27: Dismissed apps 
 
All apps Free apps
DK 9.78% 8.97%
NL 18.48% 21.79%
USA 31.52% 29.49%
Soft Rules 21.74% 21.79%
Hard Rules 1.09% 1.28%
No Rules 17.39% 16.67%
 
 
Figure 28: Dismissed apps by country (internal circle: Free apps; 
external circle: All apps) 
 
 
3.11 RESULTS ON CATEGORIES 
It is also interesting to review the categories of apps as reported by 
iOS and Google Play, with the latter providing more detail. As a 
consequence, the apps form both stores were studied using the Google 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
176 
Play taxonomy. Sixteen categories were collapsed into 12 categories 
(including a residual one named “Other”) to assure more significance 
to the analysis. The 12 categories are the following: 
• Games 
• Entertainment 
• Music 
• Photo and Video 
• Travel, Shopping 
• Lifestyle, Health and Fitness 
• Social Networking 
• Utilities 
• Productivity, Business 
• Finance 
• News and Weather 
• Other 
 
In the secondary analysis, the categories were collapsed into 6 main 
groups (including a residual one named “Other”). The groups are the 
following: 
• Games 
• Leisure 
• Social Networking 
• Finance (including Shopping), Health 
• Info, Utilities 
• Other 
 
The overall number of apps sorted into a category is 889 (The 
dismissed apps category is not indicated on AppAnnie), of which 708 
are free apps and 151 are paid apps. The number of distinct apps 
sorted into categories is equal to 628 (505 free apps and 124 paid 
apps). The number of unified apps sorted into categories is equal to 
530 (430 free apps and 113 paid apps). The total number of publishers 
involved in this analysis is 495. 
The distribution of apps in the considered top rankings is displayed in 
the following figure. The majority of the top downloaded apps are 
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games. Other significant categories are represented by Utilities (which 
includes the tools to expand the phone's functions, such as ringtones, 
maps and so on), that involves more than 10% of top downloads, and 
Social Networking apps, which represent over 9% of all apps' top 
downloads, but it only sums app to 5.3% of distinct apps, suggesting 
that there is a strong degree of overlap between different countries, 
years and operating system – social networking is a category where 
Internet giants like Facebook, Whatsapp and Instagram represent a 
relevant percentage of total downloads. 
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Figure 29: Distribution of apps by category 
 
Apps Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
Games 34.42% 37.58% 37.36% 33.54%
Entertainment 6.30% 7.32% 7.92% 8.28%
Music 4.50% 3.50% 3.21% 3.84%
Photo and Video 6.30% 6.37% 6.98% 6.67%
Travel, Shopping 8.55% 8.28% 7.74% 8.48%
Lifestyle, Health and Fitness 6.41% 7.32% 6.98% 7.47%
Social Networking 9.34% 5.25% 4.34% 4.85%
Utilities 10.57% 11.15% 11.89% 12.73%
Productivity, Business 6.19% 5.10% 5.09% 4.85%
Finance 2.70% 2.39% 2.45% 2.22%
News and Weather 2.47% 3.18% 3.40% 4.04%
Other 2.25% 2.55% 2.64% 3.03%  
Given that many categories show very low percentages (which might 
be problematic for statistical tests), the comparisons across time and 
countries have been performed on the 6 collapsed categories. The 
following figure presents a summary of time comparisons between the 
distribution across the collapsed categories.  
Figure 30: Distribution of apps by collapsed categories compared over 
time 
 
Apps Distinct apps Unified apps Publishers
2011-12 Games 42.46% 44.44% 43.77% 40.14%
Leisure 14.83% 15.50% 15.82% 16.49%
Social Networking 8.95% 6.14% 4.71% 5.02%
Finance, Health 11.76% 13.16% 13.47% 13.98%
Info, Utilities 20.72% 19.59% 20.88% 22.94%
Other 1.28% 1.17% 1.35% 1.43%
2016 Games 28.11% 26.63% 27.06% 24.83%
Leisure 18.88% 18.48% 19.14% 19.13%
Social Networking 9.64% 7.88% 6.27% 6.71%
Finance, Health 22.29% 25.00% 24.42% 25.84%
Info, Utilities 18.07% 18.48% 19.80% 19.46%
Other 3.01% 3.53% 3.30% 4.03%  
When considering the markets of Denmark and Netherlands combined 
over the last 4-5 years, there has been a strong decrease in the share of 
games, while the shares of apps related to finance (banking and 
shopping) and health (including fitness) have increased (the 
differences are 99% statistically significant in all four considered 
distributions). A statistically significant increase is observable in the 
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residual category as well, but this category involves an irrelevant 
amount of traffic. A slight increased values in the categories Social 
Networking and Leisure (photo, video, music and entertainment) is 
observable in tables and charts, but is not statistically significant, as 
well as the slight decrease of Info (including news and weather) and 
Utilities. 
A graphical summary of the figure from the prior page appears here. 
Figure 31: Distributions of apps by collapsed categories, compared 
over time 
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In the following displays the distributions of apps in the collapsed 
categories is reported by time and country. 
Figure 32: Distribution of apps by collapsed categories compared by 
time and country 
 
Distinct Apps Unified Apps Publishers
2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016
Netherlands Games 40.76% 28.23% 40.51% 29.35% 37.09% 27.64%
Leisure 16.30% 19.35% 17.09% 20.40% 17.22% 19.10%
Social Networking 8.15% 11.29% 5.70% 9.45% 5.96% 10.05%
Finance, Health 10.33% 20.97% 10.76% 18.91% 11.92% 22.11%
Info, Utilities 22.28% 17.74% 23.42% 19.90% 24.50% 18.59%
Other 2.17% 2.42% 2.53% 1.99% 3.31% 2.51%
2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016
Denmark Games 43.69% 28.16% 42.70% 28.16% 40.00% 25.64%
Leisure 13.59% 18.78% 14.04% 18.93% 14.71% 20.00%
Social Networking 9.71% 8.16% 7.30% 6.31% 7.65% 6.67%
Finance, Health 12.14% 23.27% 13.48% 23.30% 12.94% 25.13%
Info, Utilities 19.90% 18.78% 21.35% 19.90% 23.53% 18.97%
Other 0.97% 2.86% 1.12% 3.40% 1.18% 3.59%  
Figure 33: Distributions of apps by collapsed categories, compared 
over time and country 
The distributional features are pretty similar across countries. There 
are some minor differences, especially in the case of Games (the 
market quota of games was higher in 2011-12 in Denmark than in the 
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Netherlands, which was followed by a stronger decrease) and of 
Social Networking (the presence of apps belonging to this category 
among the most downloaded apps has experience a slight drop in 
Denmark and an increase in the Netherlands). A quite interesting 
feature is that the category Finance, Health (which includes banking, 
shopping and fitness) shows an increasing trend both in Denmark and 
in the Netherlands. 
3.11.1 METHODS FOR BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In the second step involved further comparison on the apps' 
categories, in order to verify whether there is statistical evidence that 
categories are not randomly distributed between countries with 
different statuses of net neutrality. This was performed with cross-
tabulations and the Chi-squared test. This test verifies the null that 
there is no association between couples of categorical factors, against 
the alternative that they are dependent on each other. Note that, being 
based on the comparison between couples of variable of all kinds, no 
information on the “direction” of the dependency (for instance, in the 
case of the correlation coefficient) is provided by the Chi-squared 
index. Assuming that there are two categorical factors, A and B, 
having R and S categories respectively, observed on a total of n 
statistical units, the formulation of the index is the following: 
 =
rs − 
̂rs


̂rs  
where 

̂rs = 
.×
.
  
In this formula, nrs represents the number of units showing category r 
of A and category s of B, nr. the overall number of units showing level 
r of A and ns the overall number of units showing the level s of B. 
This statistic, under the null of no association, follows the χ2 
distribution with (R-1)(S-1) degrees of freedom. The 
quantity
̂rsrepresents the theoretical frequencies of the joint 
distribution that would be observed if the null of no association is true; 
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the value of χ2 index increases when the differences between the 
observed and the theoretical frequencies increase. 
3.11.2 RESULTS FOR BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The results of the cross-tabulation of the 819 apps for which are 
available information on both category and country in which the 
publisher is based are reported in the figure below. As a reminder, this 
data reflects the apps consumed by users in Denmark and Netherlands. 
To put the numbers in perspective, consider that 8 countries with soft 
rules (not including Denmark) produced 150 apps (approximately 16 
apps per country); the 12 countries with hard rules (not including 
Netherlands) produced 20 apps (approximately 1.7 app per country, 
several have produced no apps in the observed data set); and the 24 
observed countries with no rules produced 137 apps (approximately 
5.7 apps per country).  However we can see that not all country 
produce apps equally. 
Figure 34: Cross-tabulation of the most downloaded apps in Denmark 
and the Netherlands in March 2011-12 and March 2016 by category 
and by country 
 
Denmark Netherlands No NN Hard Rules Soft Rules USA Total
Entertainment 15 8 5 0 5 13 46
Finance 10 11 0 0 1 2 24
Games 10 7 80 14 83 87 281
Health, Lifestyle 21 21 5 1 12 6 66
Music 7 0 3 0 13 10 33
News, Weather 5 15 1 0 1 0 22
Photo and Video 1 4 5 4 3 36 53
Productivity 5 5 3 0 3 37 53
Social Networking 0 1 6 0 9 65 81
Tools 14 9 14 1 11 28 77
Travel, Shopping 25 21 8 0 8 12 74
Other 2 0 0 0 1 6 9
Total 115 102 130 20 150 302 819  
While some distributional features are immediately evident (for 
instance almost 63% of apps published in countries with no net 
neutrality rules are games, that 80% of apps belonging to the Social 
Networking category are published in USA and that there are some 
categories that mainly include apps developed by local publishers, 
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such as Entertainment, Finance, Health and Lifestyle, Travel and 
Shopping), we can also see some potential problems: first, only 20 
apps out of 819 have been developed in countries with hard rules (8 of 
them are games); second, there are many cells with null or irrelevant 
values.   
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Figure 35: Breakdown of apps by country from cross-tabulation of the 
most downloaded apps in Denmark and the Netherlands in March 
2011-12 and March 2016 
 
Soft Rules Apps No Rules Apps 
Austria 6 Australia 22 
France 21 Belgium 3 
Japan 7 Belarus 2 
Norway 11 Bulgaria 1 
South Korea 5 China 21 
Switzerland 11 Czech Republic 4 
Sweden 37 Egypt 1 
United 
Kingdom 52 Finland 21 
Total 150 Germany 26 
Average 18.75 Hong Kong 2 
Denmark 115 India 3 
Ireland 2 
Hard Rules Apps Croatia 2 
Argentina 4 Lebanon 3 
Brazil 1 Liberia 1 
Canada 7 Lithuania 2 
Israel 6 New Zealand 4 
Italy 1 Russia 5 
Turkey 1 South Africa 1 
Total 20 Spain 1 
Average 3.33 
United Arab 
Emirates 1 
Netherlands 102 Vietnam 2 
USA 302 Total 130 
Ave  5.91 
Total apps 819 
 
These have been collapsed into the categories of both factors: as for 
countries, the modality Hard Rules has been integrated to “No NN”, 
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thus forming the Other modality; as for categories, we have 
considered the collapsed levels introduced above. 
• Games 
• Leisure 
• Social Networking 
• Finance (including Shopping), Health 
• Info, Utilities 
• Other 
 
Since only 9 apps belong to the residual category “Other”, these apps 
have not been considered in the following analysis. The results of the 
same cross-tabulation presented in Table 10 on collapsed categories 
and countries are displayed in Table 35. The χ2 computed on this table 
is equal to 329.8. The χ2 test, with the corresponding 16 degrees of 
freedom, has a p-value less than 0.001. This implies that the null of no 
association is rejected at any level of significance: apps sorted into 
different categories are developed in different countries or groups of 
countries. 
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Figure 36: Cross-tabulation of the most downloaded apps in Denmark 
and the Netherlands in March 2011-12 and March 2019 by collapsed 
categories and by country 
 
Many interesting aspects can be observed in this table. We can see 
that social networking apps are virtually entirely developed in the 
United States, as well as the majority of leisure apps, which include 
Entertainment, Photo and Video and Music apps. The proliferation of 
certain categories from the US may suggest some features about the 
US, for example presence of a global entertainment industry, property 
rights, presence of existing Internet companies etc.  
Soft rules countries do not appear to be specialize in producing apps 
for any particular category: around 56% of the apps released by 
publishers based in countries with soft rules are games; on the other 
hand, less than 30% of the overall number of games come from soft-
rules countries, while more than 33% comes from countries with hard 
or no rules. Given that the market shares of soft-rules countries and of 
other countries are virtually identical (18.4% against 18.5%), there is 
no evidence that games are a specific feature of any of the two.  
Conversely, there is one category in which the demand seems to be 
specifically satisfied by internal apps: this category is Finance, Health 
– where Finance includes both banking and shopping and Health 
includes fitness. Publishers based in Denmark and in the Netherlands 
cover 66.5% of the whole amount of top downloads for this category. 
Moreover, around 50% of apps belonging to this general category 
downloaded in Denmark and the Netherlands in March 2011 and in 
March 2016 is developed in Denmark and almost 52% is developed in 
the Netherlands. This can probably be explained by  the fact that 
banks which are chartered to serve the residents of a particular country 
Denmark Netherlands Soft Rules USA Other Total
Finance, Health 56 53 21 20 14 164
Games 10 7 83 87 94 281
Info and Utilities 24 29 15 65 19 152
Leisure 23 12 21 59 17 132
Social Networking 0 1 9 65 6 81
Total 113 102 149 296 150 810
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have a monopoly of sorts on the users of that country. Similarly with 
health, in that some health app providers may be associated with 
nationally chartered entities, or at least that some health information 
may be linked to national records and institutes. This is an interesting 
result that did not figure into Wu’s analysis, that of national 
institutions making apps for the local population, perhaps to the 
exclusion of better apps from other countries.  
As shown in the previous section, over the last 4-5 years there has 
been an increasing demand for apps belonging to this group of 
categories, which has been primarily satisfied by internal publishers. 
However, no evidence can be provided that this has happened as a 
result of the introduction of net neutrality rules. 
3.11.3 METHODS FOR RANK ANALYSIS  
Another analytical approach is rank analysis. Indeed, it is not only of 
great interest to know how many internal apps and apps coming from 
countries with or without net neutrality rules appear among the most 
downloaded or used mobile applications, but also how they perform in 
the rankings. 
As in the previous analytical steps, two approaches have been 
followed. 
The first one is a comparison between single countries: based on the 
data downloaded from AppAnnie on Denmark and the Netherlands, 
the rank analysis is performed on the single data sets, after sorting the 
apps into different categories according to the country in which the 
publisher's headquarter is based according to the countries' net 
neutrality status; as in the previous analysis, the categories are –
Denmark and the Netherlands, USA, countries with soft net neutrality 
rules, countries with hard net neutrality rules, and countries with no 
net neutrality rules. 
The second one is a set of comparisons on the basis of the overall data 
set: based on the subdivision of the countries according to their net 
neutrality status, time comparisons were performed on the combined 
data set of Denmark and  Netherlands. 
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Future interesting developments of these analytical approaches will be 
based on the use of different data sets, involving a higher number of 
markets, characterized by different types of net neutrality statuses, 
possibly on the basis of time-aggregated data (for instance, monthly or 
even yearly observation), in order to account for the inevitable noise 
that affects data based on single days, and for the disturbing effects of 
seasonality. 
The comparison between the ranking structures has been performed 
using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. This test verifies the null that 
two ordered structures come from the same population, against the 
alternative that populations are statistically different; the alternative 
hypothesis can be both unilateral and bilateral. In other words, the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test verifies the hypothesis that rank 
differences between pairs follow a random symmetric distribution 
around 0, against the alternative that they are not symmetrical around 
0. The test is based on the computation of signed differences between 
rankings: 
W=sgn2i − 1i 
Where W equals the test; sgn() indicates the sign function and Ri the i-
th rank. Under the null hypothesis, the Wilcoxon test's mean is equal 
to 0 and its variance is equal to: 
 = 
n+1n+26  
The value of the test statistic must be compared to the critical values 
from the appropriate tables. In practice, this test allows the verification 
of whether two sets of rankings come from the same population – 
hence if their differences are statistically significant, which, in the 
case on cross-country comparisons, would imply that the distribution 
of, say, apps coming from local publishers perform better or worse in 
a country than in another. 
Note that, even though the Wilcoxon test does not require that the 
samples are paired, it still requires that they are of the same size. 
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3.11.4 RESULTS FOR RANK ANALYSIS 
There are two reasons why the rankings to compare using Wilcoxon 
test must be of equal size: first, because the formulation of the test 
requires it; second, because if one had to compare the positions of a 
number of elements in a ranking, there would be no sense in including 
more elements in just one ranking out of two, because the extra 
element would obviously be added below the last recorded element, 
thus making the summary statistics of the ranking worsen – the 
average, median and quantile values would increase. 
Rank analysis has been performed on the countries where publishers 
are based. In the first analysis, where disaggregation by time and 
country (Denmark and Netherlands) has been taken into account, the 
top 30 elements have been considered. It has to be stressed, though, 
that the number of apps coming from publishers based in countries 
with hard net neutrality rules is never greater than 5 – not enough to 
allow for any specific analysis. 
Figure 37: Rank comparisons across time and country 
 
Denmark Netherlands
2011 2016 2011 2016
Means Internal 41.97 26.50 31.17 42.57
USA 21.37 20.03 18.37 14.43
Soft Rules 42.29 53.20 47.80 43.13
Hard Rules - - - -
No Rules 37.80 53.93 51.86 41.97
Medians Internal 43.50 27.00 34.00 46.00
USA 23.00 21.00 16.50 13.50
Soft Rules 40.00 59.00 48.50 38.50
Hard Rules - - - -
No Rules 42.00 53.00 49.00 45.50  
The average and median rankings of the top 30 downloaded apps 
developed by publishers based in each considered country or groups 
of countries and downloaded in each considered year are reported in 
the figure. A graphical summary follows on the next page. 
The time evolutions in Denmark and Netherlands are symmetrical: in 
Denmark the average and median ranks of the top 30 local apps 
increase, while the top 30 apps from the Netherlands decrease. Apps 
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from countries with soft and no net neutrality rules decrease.  Apps 
from USA hold steady.  
The time variations in rankings of internal apps are 99% significant in 
both Denmark and Netherlands; in Denmark, the decrease in the 
rankings of apps from countries with soft and no net neutrality rules 
are statistically significant, respectively at 90% and 95% level. All 
other comparisons show no statistical significance. 
Figure 38: Rank comparisons across time and country 
A further analysis has been run on the overall data set of Denmark and 
the Netherlands combined. In this case, the analysis has been run on 
the top 60 downloaded apps for each year. The results are displayed in 
the figure below; a graphical summary follows on the next page. 
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Figure 39: Rank comparisons of the overall data set across time and 
country 
 
    
2011 2016
Means Internal 35.33 32.42
USA 19.80 17.20
Other SR 46.05 50.07
Other HR - -
Other No NN 45.57 48.58
Medians Internal 37.00 34.00
USA 20.00 16.50
Other SR 43.00 54.00
Other HR - -
Other No NN 46.50 47.50  
Looking at the analyses of data aggregated over countries (hence, 
where the rankings of Denmark and Netherlands are considered 
together), there is virtually no statistical significance observable in any 
of the comparisons. The lines in the charts summarizing time 
comparisons are virtually horizontal. The symmetry of the situations 
observed in the disaggregated data leads to virtually no observed 
difference when analyses on aggregated data is run. This is the 
specific reason why this kind of analysis requires to have access to 
even more disaggregated data: for instance, it is possible that similar 
symmetries between regional data, or between municipality-based 
data, will not allow us to identify significant relationships between the 
same variables at the, say, country level. 
Figure 40: Rank comparisons of the overall data set across time and 
country 
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This symmetry is also interesting for a different, and very practical, 
reason: the country where local companies seem to show poorer 
performances in the rankings is the same country where a decline in 
the number of total apps has been observed. This country is the 
Netherlands, where hard net neutrality measure have been introduced 
in 2012; however, the Netherlands may have other factors which 
could reduce local app development, for example that American 
companies such as Netflix establish European headquarters in 
Netherlands. The presence of an American giant in the country could 
either support or deter the emergence of video streaming app 
competitors.  But this question can’t be answered by looking at the 
AppAnnie data. 
3.11.5 RESULTS FOR SOFT RULE AND NO RULE 
COUNTRIES  
While the analysis is consistent for Denmark and Netherlands, the 
performance of countries with soft rules, show a decline in rank over 
time. However countries with no rules, show an increase in rank over 
time. These results shed doubt the premise that net neutrality has an 
observable impact.  It is clear that the set of countries with hard rules 
do no better, but the set of countries with no rules at all, do, in fact, do 
better over time. It could be that net neutrality is not related to 
innovation, or is not an observable driver. This suggests that other 
factors may be more important drivers for innovation. 
3.12 APPTOPIA MEASUREMENTS 
3.12.1 TOP LOCALLY-MADE APPS FOR 90 DAYS ENDED 
JUNE 14, 2016 
This measurement reviews the apps developed in the respective 
countries of Denmark and Netherlands. The report was built in the 
Apptopia platform to focus on top ranking free apps for the Apple 
AppStore on June 14, 2016 with a lookback of three months. The 
Apptopia measurements are helpful to find a pure, rather than relative, 
number of downloads and to gather financial information about the 
app (revenue, monetization etc). Unfortunately the Apptopia 
measurements cannot be matched for 2011-2012 period from 
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AppAnnie, but they are applicable for the 2016 measurements. 
Apptopia shows information an app globally and for a given country.  
The Apptopia data for Denmark and Netherlands shows many more 
locally made apps being issues on Apple’s AppStore rather than 
Google Play. For example, there are may be more than 100 local apps 
for each country in Apple’s AppStore, but just 1 for the respective 
country in Google. This is a strange outcome, and it’s not clear 
whether this is just a reflection of Apptopia’s reporting or that in fact 
local country innovators don’t use Google Play, or their apps can’t be 
found in it.   
So the analysis proceeds only with measurements based on Apple’s 
AppStore. 
Denmark  
The Denmark reports that in the top grossing free apps there are 10 
apps in the game category produced by 6 publishers. There are 4 apps 
in the health category produced by 2 publishers. There are 3 apps in 
the kids category produced by 1 publisher. There is 1 app in the 
lifestyle category produced by 1 publisher. The average year of launch 
for the app is 2013, two years after the country’s soft net neutrality 
rule took effect.  
Denmark has produced 18 apps which have delivered globally 
8,215,943 downloads and $5,583,680 revenue for the period which 
delivers an average monetization of $1.47. 
It is not surprising that games count for a large portion of downloads 
and revenue. Games makes us almost 87 percent of downloads and 
revenue for all of the top grossing apps.  
Kiloo is one of the world’s leading game companies, and it is based in 
Denmark. It’s Subway Surfers game registered 4.5 million downloads 
in the prior 90 days. It’s revenue for the period is $3.6 million, 
significantly 75 percent of the revenue for the category. As a related 
point, in Google Play, the Kiloo Subway Surfers was downloaded 15 
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million times worldwide in the prior 90 days, earning $3 million in 
revenue.  
In addition to games, Denmark has another global leader in apps, 
Endomondo in the Health category.  Endomondo is a mobile digital 
personal trainer. The Running and Walking app from Endomondo 
earned over 1 million downloads in the prior 90 days and $704,760 in 
revenue. That is to say that monetization happens once the app is 
downloaded. Endomondo accounts for almost 99 percent of the 
revenue and downloads for the category.  
Egmont, based in Denmark, is a company offering Nordic content 
across a number of countries.  It has 4 apps in the report, 3 for 
children and 1 for women.  This company leverages its content 
holdings in a variety of digital formats and succeeds to produce 
modest revenue and downloads by marketing in a variety of channels. 
Egmont also partners with Danish mobile operators for bundled 
content offers.  
  
195 
Figure 41: Top Danish-Made Apps for 90 Day Ended June 14, 2016 
(Apptopia) 
 
 
Netherlands 
The Dutch report shows 7 apps by 5 publishers in the game category; 
4 apps by 3 publishers in the kids category; 3 apps by 2 publishers in 
the news category; 3 apps by 3 publishers in the Productivity 
category; and 1 app in the Utilities category. The average year of 
launch for the app is 2012, the same year that the Dutch net neutrality 
law was passed. 
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The Netherlands has 18 apps in the report, producing 2,699,763 
downloads and $3,641,002 for the period for an average monetization 
of $0.47 per app. Significantly the Dutch downloads equal just one-
third of that of Denmark while the revenue equals two-thirds. The 
Dutch monetization is half that of Denmark. 
Like Denmark, Games is the largest category for downloads (45.76%) 
and revenue (40.28%).  In the kids category, one app My Dolphin 
show by the Spil Games publisher accounts for more than 90 percent 
of the downloads and revenue for the category. De Telegraaf app 
accounts for the lion’s share of downloads and revenue, perhaps the 
leading Dutch newspaper. Interestingly calendars are a downloadable 
app in Netherlands with 2 publishers, but WeekCal accounting for the 
majority of downloads and revenue. 
Some Dutch apps do stand out for high monetization, the LetterSchool 
app by Sanoma Medical in the kids category garners almost $7 per 
download and the EQu sound equalizer app by elephantcandy earns 
almost $6; and two of the Youda Games which delivered over $4 per 
download.  
  
197 
Figure 42: Top Dutch-Made Apps for 90 Day Ended June 14, 2016 
(Apptopia) 
 
 
3.12.2 TOP LOCALLY-MADE APPS FOR 90 DAYS ENDED 
NOVEMBER 7, 2016 
The Apptopia functionality to identify apps by country headquarters 
was not available until November 2016, so there was limited time to 
perform additional analysis on the supplementary dataset. In addition 
there was incomplete information on the location of the publishers. As 
such the results are provided advisedly.  However the report is 
interesting in that is gives a greater depth of information over a longer 
period of time.  
Reports for the top overall free apps were run for Denmark and 
Netherlands for the Apple AppStore and Google Play for the last last 
90 days ended November 7, 2016. The report for Denmark noted 1461 
apps downloaded in the country; Netherlands, 1466 apps. As for 
locally made apps, Denmark reported 298; Netherlands, 205. 
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The reports were scrutinized to ensure that all Dutch and Danish apps 
were included. In the results in which Apptopia did not include the 
location of the publisher’s headquarters, an attempt was made to 
identify the location of the app’s publisher, and the sheets were 
subsequently updated. This still left a many apps without a 
headquarters location, so those apps were added to their own category. 
It is unfortunate that these apps could not be identified (and also 
speaks to the issue that analytics platforms can have gaps in data, 
making assessment difficult). I expect that many of the unidentified 
apps are game companies and/or publishers based in Russia and 
China, as these are typically the apps and locations which can be hard 
to identify.  
Following are some observations for iOS for the last 90 days. For 
Denmark, locally made apps account for 24.8% of all of the apps 
downloaded. That the Danish apps for the top 250 apps appear at a 
slightly higher rate, shows that Danish apps tend to perform well 
among other publisher countries when it comes to top downloads.  
American apps account for a significant portion of the downloads, 
slightly more than a third of the top 250 apps in the country for the 
period.  Apps from soft rule countries account for about 16-18% of all 
downloads. Apps from no rule countries are about 10% of the top 250 
apps. Apps from hard rule countries are the minatory at roughly 5%.  
The Netherlands has a lower level of locally made aps for the relevant 
period, 14.2%. The origin of the apps from the other publishers is 
lower than what is observed in Denmark, but follow a similar 
distribution. Given the high level unidentified apps, it is expected that 
many of these would come from China, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.   
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Figure 43: Top free apps overall by downloads, Denmark and 
Netherlands, 90 days ended November 7, 2016 (Apptopia) 
 
Denmark iOS   Play   
 All entries 
Top 250 last 
90 days All entries 
Top 250 last 
90 days 
Denmark 20.41% 24.80% 1.67% 2.80% 
USA 22.45% 34.40% 18.59% 22.00% 
Soft rule countries 18.16% 16.80% 9.85% 12.40% 
Hard rule countries 5.65% 6.00% 2.23% 0.80% 
No rule countries 14.15% 11.60% 8.55% 9.20% 
No publisher info 19.18% 6.40% 59.11% 52.80% 
Netherlands iOS   Play   
 All entries 
Top 250 last 
90 days All entries 
Top 250 last 
90 days 
Netherlands 10.21% 14.20% 1.49% 1.20% 
USA 22.89% 34.40% 18.22% 24.00% 
Soft rule countries 14.74% 12.40% 10.41% 11.60% 
Hard rule countries 3.26% 3.60% 1.86% 1.20% 
No rule countries 9.44% 9.60% 8.36% 9.60% 
No publisher info  39.46% 25.60% 59.67% 52.40% 
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The particular Apptopia report does not provide category information 
in this particular report. However the Danish apps were individually 
reviewed and organized in categories based on similar types of apps. 
There was not time to conduct the analysis for the Dutch apps.  
Figure 44: Categories of Danish apps from Apptopia report, author’s 
grouping 
 
39 Games 
34 Ecommerce 
30 
Banking and 
finance 
27 
Health and 
lifestyle 
26 News 
25 Travel 
24 Food 
24 Egovernment 
21 Entertainment 
17 
Productivity and 
utility 
9 Education 
7 Sports 
3 Dating 
3 Employment 
9 Other 
298 
 
 
3.13 MOBILE BROADBAND PENETRATION IN DENMARK 
AND NETHERLANDS 
There is one other factor which might explain the observed differences 
in Denmark and Netherlands, that of penetration of mobile broadband.  
Though Netherlands has four mobile networks and Denmark has 
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three, the Danes have a higher overall percentage of mobile broadband 
(3G and 4G networks). Moreover the Danes have a higher rate of 
postpaid subscriptions, suggesting higher data purchase and use.  
Netherlands has a higher percentage of prepaid subscriptions, 
suggesting that users tend to buy smaller data packages.  In general a 
smartphone and 3G subscription is necessary to access most apps, so 
the fact that Netherlands has a higher proportion of 2G users than 
Denmark is significant.  To be sure, the Netherlands has a larger 
overall population than Denmark, but the fact that Denmark is a 
concentrated market for smartphones with postpaid contracts on 3G 
and 4G appears to be important for Danish app developers when 
creating apps and for mobile operators in marketing subscriptions. 
Note that the figures for 2013-2015 are actual while 2016 and after are 
projected. Table is prepared on data by Ovum.272 
  
                                                          
272 Mobile Subscription Revenue and Forecast 2016-21. Ovum. August 2016 
https://www.ovum.com/research/mobile-subscription-and-revenue-forecast-2016-
21/  
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Figure 45: Denmark and Netherlands, Mobile Broadband Penetration 
by subscription and Prepaid and postpaid subscriptions (Ovum) 
Denmark 2013 2014 2015 2016 
2G % of Total 
Subscriptions 
26.3% 22.0% 17.9% 14.3% 
3G or 4G % of Total 
Subscriptions 73.7% 78% 82.2% 85.6% 
 
Netherlands 
2G % of Total 
Subscriptions 
41.4% 32.8% 23.8% 16.8% 
3G or 4G % of Total 
Subscriptions 58.7% 67.2% 76.3% 83.2% 
     
Denmark     
Prepaid % of 
Subscriptions 
17.2% 17.7% 17.6% 17.1% 
Postpaid % of 
Subscriptions 
82.8% 82.3% 82.4% 82.9% 
     
Netherlands     
Prepaid % of 
Subscriptions 
37.3% 39.1% 38.8% 37.6% 
Postpaid % of 
Subscriptions 
62.7% 60.9% 61.2% 62.4% 
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3.14 ROLE OF FLAT RATE PRICING FOR VOICE AND 
DATA IN DENMARK AND NETHERLANDS 
An important and related point is that the Danes were early to use flat 
rate pricing or free voice/SMS in mobile data packages. Telia started a 
flat rate program for SMS as early as 2003273 (a DKK 120 package 
generally purchased by parents who wanted a flat rate product for 
youth who messaged a lot with their friends). This was not the case in 
Netherlands, where voice and SMS were still sold individually, even 
as late as 2010. It is not surprising that there was a financial incentive 
to switch to free messaging substitute WhatsApp when it came on the 
Dutch market.  
But while Dutch mobile operators are painted as sinister actors in the 
net neutrality debate, the banal reality is that they were delayed to 
update their business models. This  also suggests that what is 
perceived as a net neutrality violation may just be the question of the 
speed of marketplace evolution.  Dutch operators cannot change their 
tariff without pre-approval from regulators, a condition not required of 
Danish operators which have long enjoyed the ability to experiment 
with different offers as a means to promote adoption of mobile 
broadband.  
But it bears mention that WhatsApp usage in Denmark is significantly 
less than Netherlands. Ironically some apps may enjoy higher 
adoption is countries with outdated pricing models. Even today use of 
WhatsApp in Denmark is significantly lower than in Netherlands, and 
notably WhatsApp use is lower in US where mobile operators were 
also early sellers of voice/SMS inclusive packages.274  
                                                          
268 Engels, Ryming. “Telia lancerer gratis SMS.” Computerworld 21 March, 2003. 
http://www.computerworld.dk/art/125139/telia-lancerer-gratis-sms and NPInvestor, 
21 March 2003 http://npinvestor.dk/nyheder/telia-lancerer-sms-til-0-kr  
274 “WhatsApp: mobile usage penetration in selected countries 2014.” Statistica.com 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/291540/mobile-internet-user-whatsapp/  
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3.15 ANALYSIS OF MOBILE INFRASTRUCTURE 
INDICATORS 
The GSMA’s Mobile Connectivity Index looks at four key inputs to 
connectivity: Infrastructure, Affordability, Consumer Readiness and 
Content. This study focused on the indicators associated with 
Infrastructure, which itself as a category makes up 25 percent of the 
country’s score on the connectivity index. The following image 
displays the 13 indicators, their grouping, and their weight in the 
overall index.   
Figure 46: Mobile Connectivity Index Indicators (GSMA) 
 
GSMA compiled the information for the world’s countries in 2015 
and normalized each measure on a 1-10 scale or with a logarithmic 
transformation so that it would be consistent with the other measures. 
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While the numbers are static, they are indicative of infrastructure 
policy and investment over time, particularly in the area of mobile 
network coverage, level of network innovation (2G, 3G, 4G) and 
spectrum allocation.  These indicators where then analyzed for each of 
the countries in the study and their type of net neutrality rule to see 
whether any relationships emerged. 
The variable which proved significant was the “Number of Internet 
Servers per Million Inhabitants”, so this variable was investigated 
further. The company Netcraft275 measures the number of servers 
globally and provides its figure to the World Bank, which GSMA used 
in the study.  Netcraft has a set of measurement tools in place across 
nearly 6 million computers and 1.1 billion Internet locations. It does 
not provide information on the level of sophistication of the server. 
While these measurement locations are not confined to mobile 
applications, they include traffic to mobile devices and locations. 
There is not a separate measure of servers associated with mobile 
apps.  Moreover all mobile networks have some amount of fixed 
infrastructure, e.g. wires from the mobile tower to a backhaul location. 
The measure of servers reflects any server at all, whether deployed in 
an individual home, at a developers work location, or within the 
operators network.  
To be sure, this variable will be influenced by Internet penetration. In 
fact, the correlation coefficient between this variable recorded in 2015 
and the contemporary variable measuring the percentage of people 
having access to the Internet is equal to 0.709. As a consequence, by 
the definition of the squared correlation coefficient, which is equal to 
0.503, the percentage of people having access to the Internet 
determines about 50% of the number of server’s variability. 
The conditional mean of Number of Internet Servers per Million 
Inhabitants based on the contemporary country net neutrality status is 
the following: 
                                                          
275 October 2016 Web Server, Netcraft, 2016,  
Surveyhttps://news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-server-survey/ 
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Figure 47: Country type of net neutrality rule and servers per million 
inhabitants 
Net Neutrality 
Rules 
Servers per million 
inh. 
Soft Rules 1760.5 
Hard Rules 529.7 
No Rules 491.2 
 
The Servers per Million Inhabitants in the countries with Soft Rules 
are in average more than three times those in the countries with Hard 
Rules and with no Net Neutrality rules; moreover the difference 
between countries with Hard Rules and countries with no rules is 
almost irrelevant. An ANOVA assures that the differences determined 
by the Net Neutrality status account for around 35% of the differences 
observed in the target variable, and that these differences are 
statistically significant at any level of significance. 
Figure 48: ANOVA calculation of significance of a net neutrality rule 
  
Sum of Squares 
(DoF) 
Net Neutrality Rule 
2015 11460279 (2) *** 
Residuals 21235127 (48) 
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Computing a linear regression model on the target variable using 
Internet Usage and Net Neutrality Status in 2015, gives the following 
results. 
Figure 49: Regression on target variable using Internet Usage and Net 
Neutrality Status for 2015 
Coefficient Estimate (Std. Error) 
Intercept -1001.43 (306.55) ** 
Internet Usage 2015 2257.16 (427.74) *** 
Net Neutrality 2015 – 
soft rules 716.55 (225.40) ** 
Net Neutrality 2015 – 
Hard rules 43.03 (178.46) 
 
Fit Statistic Value 
Residual Standard Error 532.7 (47 DoF) 
Multiple R-Squared 0.592 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.566 
F-Statistic 22.75 (3 and 47 DoF) *** 
 
The model explains almost 60% of the outcome, and both employed 
regressors have a significant impact. This suggests that the model with 
the selection of the number of servers variable is appropriate, and that 
is it effective to explain the outcome. However, the presence of Hard 
Rules by itself is not statistically relevant. Therefore, only a binary 
variable indicating the presence of Soft Rules – hence, that is equal to 
1 when Soft Rules in 2015 are observed, 0 otherwise. 
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Updating the model for the binary variable yields the following 
results.  
Figure 50: Updated regression with binary variable 
 
Coefficient Estimate (Std. Error) 
Intercept -982.2 (293.0) ** 
Internet Usage 2015 2248.2 (421.9) *** 
Net Neutrality 2015 – 
S.R. 705.4 (218.4) ** 
 
Fit Statistic Value 
Residual Standard 
Error 527.4 (48 DoF) 
Multiple R-Squared 0.592 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.575 
F-Statistic 34.77 (2 and 48 DoF) *** 
 
The observed slopes suggest that in the observed countries there are 
22.48 Internet servers per million inhabitants more for each extra 1% 
of people having access to the Internet and that countries with Soft 
Net Neutrality Rules have in average 705 Internet servers per million 
inhabitants more than countries with other net neutrality regulation. 
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A comparison between the presented model and a simpler model 
where the indicator on Soft Rules is not included has been performed 
using the Likelihood Ratio Test. The results are the following. 
Figure 51: Likelihood Ratio Test 
  Model Base model 
Degrees of Freedom 4 3 
LogLik -390.49 -395.5 
Difference DoF   -1 
Chisq   10.029 ** 
 
This implies that the models are not equivalent, thus that the one with 
Soft Rules indicator performs better than the simpler one. This means 
that Net Neutrality status includes significant information in the model 
matrix. It has to be stressed that the inclusion of a variable measuring 
the country economic dimensions – such as per capita GDP in 2015 –
does not change the overall result. Per Capita GDP is not a significant 
regressor. 
Figure 52: Calculation adjusted for per capita GDP 
Coefficient Estimate (Std. Error) 
Intercept -853.5 (316.5) ** 
Internet Usage 2015 2257.0 (645.2) *** 
Per Capita GDP 2015 0.0065 (0.0064) 
Net Neutrality 2015 – 
S.R. 716.0 (220.3) ** 
 
Fit Statistic Value 
Residual Standard 
Error 527.3 (45 DoF) 
Multiple R-Squared 0.603 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.577 
F-Statistic 23.31 (3 and 46 DoF) *** 
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It would seem that the number of Internet servers per million 
inhabitants would depend more on the number of Internet 
subscriptions than merely on a person’s ability to access the Internet. 
As a matter of fact, the correlation coefficient between the target 
outcome and the Number of Broadband Connection per Inhabitant in 
2015 is equal to 0.818, which means that the number of broadband 
connections explains 66.9% of Number of Internet Servers per Million 
Inhabitants variability. 
Computing a linear regression model on the target variable using 
Broadband Connections per Inhabitants and the indicator of Soft Net 
Neutrality Rules in 2015, gives the following results. 
Figure 53: Regression with Broadband Connections per Inhabitants 
and the indicator of Soft Net Neutrality Rules in 2015 
Coefficient Estimate (Std. Error) 
Intercept -386.5 (140.0) ** 
Broadband Connections 2015 4530.9 (607.7) *** 
Net Neutrality 2015 – Soft 
Rules 431.8 (198.8) * 
 
Fit Statistic Value 
Residual Standard Error 452.9 (48 DoF) 
Multiple R-Squared 0.699 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.686 
F-Statistic 55.69 (2 and 48 DoF) *** 
 
The Soft Rule indicator is still 95% significant in the model, which 
means that it still has an impact on the number of servers. In this 
model, slopes tell us that there are 45.31 servers per million 
inhabitants more for each extra 1% in the number of broadband 
connections per inhabitants and that countries with Soft Rules have on 
average 431.8 servers per million inhabitants more than countries with 
other approaches to net neutrality. This model explains almost 70% of 
the response variable’s variabilities across countries. 
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The Likelihood Ratio Test comparing this model to a simpler one 
where the indicator for Soft Rules is not included but provides the 
following results. 
Figure 54: Updated Likelihood Ratio Test 
Model Base model 
Degrees of 
Freedom 4 3 
LogLik -382.72 -385.11 
Difference DoF   -1 
Chisq   4.784 * 
 
This suggests that the model with Soft rules provides a better fit, 
which in turn implies that the presence of Soft Net Neutrality Rules 
has a significant impact on the number of Internet servers per million 
inhabitants. In other words, Soft Rules seem to have a significant 
impact on investments on network infrastructure such as servers. From 
a network provider perspective, this is intuitive. Soft net neutrality 
rules are the ideal combination of carrot and stick. Network providers 
have incentives to continue investing in their network without rules 
that unduly constrain their ability to manage the network, earn 
revenue by offering innovative services, and maximize the users and 
apps on the network. 
As shown by the models, the number of servers is not determined only 
by the number of persons who access the Internet (and not directly by 
side variables like per capita GDP). It bears mention that Soft Rules 
have been mainly introduced in richer countries with better network 
infrastructures.  To be clear, the number of servers does not explain 
everything, and there may be some anomalous countries, but the 
average number of servers per inhabitants for each given set of 
countries (soft rules, hard rules, and no rules) proved to be statistically 
significant.  
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3.16 RELATED FINANCIAL INFORMATION  
Leading internet innovation and capital markets journalist Om Malik 
described276 the Nordic ecosystem for its preponderance of high value 
startups and exits, proportionately higher than any region in the world.  
It bears mention that these countries all enjoyed soft net neutrality 
rules during the period under study. It remains to be seen whether the 
results will change going forward. While there is a European law, 
member states have some leeway to implement the rules and the 
BEREC guidelines are non-binding. Outside of Norway’s Frode 
Sorensen,277 one of the world’s most activist regulators on net 
neutrality, the Nordic regulators do not want to pursue more net 
neutrality monitoring and adjudication.278  Malik observes,  
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland account for 2% 
of the world’s GDP but 9% of global billion dollar exits. 
2015 was the best year yet for the Nordic region as it 
saw three $1B exits and more than $13B in total exit 
value. Past 5 years have seen more than one billion 
dollar exit per year. Sweden accounts for over 50% of 
the Nordic Region’s number of exits and exit value. Our 
analysis showed that the Nordic Region was greatly 
outperforming the rest of Europe and China, with a 
multiple of 4.78x compared to 2.39x for China, 1.89x for 
the UK Region, and 1.33x for the Germanic Region. 
  
                                                          
276Malik, Om. ”Where the Great Startups Are. The Nordics.” September 9, 2016. 
http://om.co/2016/09/14/where-great-startups-are-the-nordics/ 
277 Sorensen, Frode. ”The Norwegian Model for Net Neutrality.” Nkom.no March 5, 
2013. http://eng.nkom.no/topical-issues/news/the-norwegian-model-for-net-
neutrality 
278 Supra Winding 
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Another report279 by Startup Europe notes similarly of Denmark, 
Collectively, the 96 Danish scaleups raised $1.3B 
(capital raised since inception), specifically$1.1B (85%) 
through venture capital funds, while an additional $0.2B 
(15%) was raised on the stock market through the IPO 
channel. This is about one fifth (20%) of the total capital 
raised by scaleups in the Nordic countries and the 0.49% 
of the GDP of Denmark, in line with the average in the 
Nordic region (0.5%), slightly higher than in the UK 
(0.42%), 3 times higher than Continental Europe and 8 
times higher than Southern Europe. 
  
                                                          
279 “Startup Forge in the Nordics: Denmark2. StartUp Partnership Europe. SEP 
Monitor. September 2016.  http://startupeuropepartnership.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/SEPMonitor_Denmark_A-Scaleup-Forge-in-the-
Nordics_DIGITAL.pdf 
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4 RESULTS SUMMARY 
The investigation offered a preliminary view of mobile apps from 
countries with different net neutrality regimes, with particular 
attention to Denmark and Netherlands. The data offers snapshots from 
Denmark and Netherlands in 2011, 2012, and 2016, with two 90 day 
overviews in 2016.  The data was then supplemented with information 
about mobile networks. It is by no means comprehensive. However 
some important trends and changes were observed. 
4.1 COUNTRIES WITH HARD NET NEUTRALITY RULES 
DID NOT REPORT A HIGHER INCIDENCE OF 
MOBILE APPS THAN OTHER COUNTRIES  
One of the key findings of this investigation is that no country which 
has adopted hard rules for the period (US excluded) experienced an 
increase in mobile app innovation. As a group the countries with hard 
rules produced just 20 mobile apps. The results are definitive when 
looking at Netherlands and Slovenia, countries which have declined in 
mobile app production since the rules were implemented.  
At the same point, there is nothing in Tim Wu’s article which suggests 
“hard” net neutrality regulation.  The provisions of hard net neutrality 
rules, such as bans on zero rating, limits on the ability of telecom 
operators to provide specialized services, and price controls on 
interconnection, were not items discussed in Tim Wu’s article. Rather 
they form a growing miscellany of regulatory actions justified under 
the rubric of “net neutrality”, most recently privacy regulation in the 
USA.280 Indeed Tim Wu wrote that operator’s should “police what 
they own” so the current EU attempts281 to limit the ability of 
operators to develop specialized services on the non-Internet portions 
                                                          
280 FCC Releases Proposed Rules to Protect Broadband Consumer Privacy, April 1, 
2016, https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-proposed-rules-protect-
broadband-consumer-privacy 
281 Specialised Services, accessed November 16, 2016, 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/net/specialised_services/ 
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of their networks also seems inappropriate under the rubric of Tim 
Wu’s net neutrality. 
4.2 COUNTRIES WITH SOFT RULES PRODUCED MORE 
APPS THAN COUNTRIES WITH HARD RULES 
Countries with soft net neutrality rules have provisions more closely 
aligned with with the user rights that Tim Wu described in his article, 
users having the right to access the content, application, and services 
of their choice with the device of the their choice.  The investigation 
showed clear support for the self-regulatory regime of Denmark, at 
least in comparison to the hard regime of Netherlands. Other countries 
with soft rules have also produced new mobile app innovation, 
notably Sweden, UK, South Korea, and Japan. In fact, if indexed for 
population, the soft rule countries have produced more apps per capita 
than the USA. 
4.3 COUNTRIES WITH NO NET NEUTRALITY RULES 
PRODUCED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF APPS 
When looking at the many countries with no rules, there is a divergent 
mix of countries. A significant amount of new mobile app innovation 
comes from Russia, China, Hong Kong, and Germany whereas many 
of the small European countries which did not adopt formal rules 
during the period did not produce significant mobile app innovation. It 
may be that countries with large populations have a propensity to 
develop more mobile apps, but that does not explain Denmark, a 
country with just 5.5 million which increased its app production 
significantly during the period.  
While not advocating the path of China, the fact of the matter is that 
China’s internet policy, which might be termed a “closed” approach, 
has resulted in significant economic development and innovation for 
the country. China blocks many American applications and content 
providers, while it nurtures its own home grown and government-
approved versions of Google (Baidu), Facebook (Renren), Twitter 
(Sina Weibo, QQ Weibo), WhatsApp (Weixin, also known as 
WeChat), and Amazon and Ebay (Taobao, Aliaba), not to mention 
YouTube (Sohu.com and Youku).   
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The Chinese internet is formidable, including four of the world’s 
largest internet companies. In fact the revenues of Alibaba are higher 
than eBay and Amazon combined. According to a Boston Consulting 
Group282 report, the Chinese internet accounted for 5.5% of the 
country’s gross domestic product in 2012, even higher than the US at 
5%.   
The study of the Chinese internet is worthy of a dissertation in itself, 
but it can be observed that China has developed its own set of apps for 
its own economy. While many of these appeared to be “knock-offs” of 
American apps at the start, that is no longer the case today. Chinese 
apps are forces in their own right and are increasingly adopted outside 
China.  While it is worthy of empirical investigation, one anecdotal 
observation is that China pursued a strategy of “blocking” American 
apps as a means to protect is local app economy and foster local 
innovations. This is not a statement of support for such a practice, but 
it does show that innovation can occur in “closed” environments.  
“Openness” does not appear to be prerequisite for innovation in this 
case. Indeed from the perspective of China, pursuing a “closed” 
strategy to develop the local internet economy appears to have 
worked. 
4.4 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE USA IS HARD TO 
EXPLAIN  
The US was measured separately because it accounts for an 
overwhelming portion of the world’s mobile app innovation and its 
net neutrality litigation is ongoing. The level of mobile app innovation 
from the US has always been high and has not experienced a 
significant change over the period studied.  Moreover the rules on 
wireless networks only came into effect in 2015, though are still being 
challenged in court  
                                                          
282 David Dean et al., “The Internet Economy in the G-20,” The Boston Consulting 
Group Perspectives, March 19, 2012, 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/The_Internet_Economy_G-20_tcm80-
100409.pdf. 
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Van Schewick asserts that net neutrality has been the norm since 2005 
in the US and is responsible for innovation on the Internet.283 
However if in fact net neutrality is the norm, then it suggests that the 
market anomie is working without specific FCC rules. Each 
successive FCC attempt at rules has proposed more strict rules, but 
there is no correlation of stricter rules with higher app innovation. 
Moreover the more strict the rule, the more likelihood of litigation, 
which has the potential to strike down rules all together. The soft rule 
countries evidence that an awareness and voluntary agreement to the 
rules, backed up by a regulator to intervene if and when violations 
occur, is sufficient to maintain openness.’ 
An important point is that net neutrality provisions have been imposed 
on Comcast from 2009-2017 as part of the conditions to approve its 
purchase of NBC. Comcast has had to adhere to rules even when 
courts struck down rules on its competitors. This raises a number of 
questions, for example whether net neutrality rules are needed on all 
ISPs or just those with market power; whether the imposition of rules 
on Comcast, a cable provider, has any impact to the mobile app 
industry; the efficacy of rules imposed as part of merger condition 
(whether they are justified in the economic analysis or simply a means 
for political expediency); and whether net neutrality is a subterfuge to 
facilitate  rent extraction from mergers. On the other hand, agreeing to 
rules as part of a merger condition could be preferable for a company. 
This quid pro quo, as it were, ensures that the party can complete its 
transaction. When rules are imposed on the industry as a whole all at 
once, ISPs are not in a position to negotiate a win for themselves. It is 
interesting to observe that net neutrality has no become an additional 
lever which American regulators in the merger process whereas edge 
providers which seek similar mergers do not have to satisfy neutrality 
or Open Internet conditions.  
The American rules, voted 3-2 partisan lines, are precarious in that 
they could be reversed with one member of the commission. A new 
President could possibly vacate the rules with an executive order, if 
they are not turned down on a rehearing.  This goes to heart of the 
question of which legal instrument is appropriate. To have a lasting 
                                                          
283 Supra van Schewick, personal interview. 
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“hard” net neutrality regime, a county needs to promulgate legislation. 
In the US, net neutrality have been proposed and turned down more 
than two dozen times. While this has frustrated advocates and driven 
them to make rules via the FCC, this also suggests that there may not 
be popular support for such Internet regulation. This also impugns the 
political process; if advocates can pressure the regulator to make rules, 
what does it mean to be an expert, independent agency? 
It may be that net neutrality does not explain why innovation happens 
on mobile networks.  Given the results of the investigation, it appears 
that Wu’s prescription for innovation is too simple and monolithic to 
explain the actors and forces of innovation.   
4.5 THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
While it is not the focus on the paper, it is possible that the intellectual 
property rights regime has a relationship to Internet innovation.  For 
example, one interpretation is that apps are developed in the US 
because it is a country which affords strong intellectual property 
protections. While the conventional wisdom is that China does not 
protect intellectual property, the success of companies such as Baidu, 
Tencent, and Aliaba clearly show that intellectual property rights exist 
in China.    
It bears mention that the net neutrality movement has some 
philosophical foundations in Lawrence Lessig’s “Free Culture”284, a 
movement critical of copyright and seeks to promote the free 
modification and distribution of works over the Internet.  This view is 
consistent with the requirement of “no blocking”, that users can get 
access to whatever content they want regardless of the rights regime.  
It may also be significant that a number of the early disputes about net 
neutrality had to do with peer to peer file sharing for pirated works. It 
was not that the telecom operators had a problem with the illegal 
transfer of works, but rather that the peer to peer programs used took 
                                                          
284 Lessig, Larry. Free Culture, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.free-
culture.cc/   
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up a large amount of bandwidth, e.g. BitTorrent degraded the 
experience for other network users.  
While many associate net neutrality with rules to ensure that content is 
delivered unimpeded, a number of governments see this as an 
opportunity to block content, not just that which is illegal but that 
which violates copyright.285  Governments in a number of countries 
summarily block child pornography; websites of illegal activities such 
as gambling and firearms; as well as political or cultural content.  
Interestingly that some net neutrality rules countries are frequently 
written in such a way that only “legal” content is protected from being 
blocked, implying that illegal services can be blocked and throttled.286  
Indeed net neutrality can double as a backstop to ensure that only 
copyrighted materials can enjoy unblocked access.  A number of 
organizations have pointed out this issue, called the copyright 
loophole”287288289, but support net neutrality nonetheless.  Yet Lessig’s 
prophesy may be self-defeating with increased monitoring and 
inspection of packets to enforce copyright undertaken to instrument 
net neutrality.  
In any case, Wu’s view is informed by his interpretation of Edmund 
Kitch in which Wu finds abuse by patent holders in not sharing their 
                                                          
285 Thomas Newton, “EU net neutrality crusade could roll back the UK’s internet 
porn filters,” July 14, 2015, https://recombu.com/digital/article/eu-net-neutraility-
cancel-uk-porn-filters 
286 Ibid 
287 Ernesto Van der Sar, “U.S. Net Neutrality has a Massive Copyright Loophole,” 
TorrentFreak, March 15, 2015 https://torrentfreak.com/u-s-net-neutrality-has-a-
massive-copyright-loophole-150315/  
288 Fred Von Lohmann, “MPAA and RIAA Seek Net Neutrality Copyright 
Loophole,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, January 20, 2010, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/mpaa-and-riaa-seek-net-neutrality-copyright-
loopho 
289 Joint Comments of Computer and Communications Industry Association, 
Consumer Electronics Association, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home 
Recording Rights Coalition, NetCoalition, and Public Knowledge on the Matter of 
Copyright Infringement in the Open Internet Rules, January 14, 2010, 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/joint-comments-copyright-nn-20100113.pdf 
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innovations with others. There is no doubt that patent debates 
continues in many fields.  Wu’s view is that patent holders are 
network resources of sorts that need to free open to any innovator. The 
counter view is that if innovators cannot capture some amount of 
wealth from their invention, they will cease to invent, or invent less.  
4.6 THE ROLE OF PRICING FLEXIBILITY FOR MOBILE 
SUBSCRIPTIONS 
An important difference between Denmark and Netherlands which 
may explain why Denmark produces more apps is that Danish mobile 
operators enjoy more pricing and marketing flexibility for mobile 
subscriptions. Denmark’s net neutrality rules do not restrict mobile 
operators in their ability to partner with content and application 
providers whereas strict rules in the Netherlands make such 
partnerships and pricing flexibility more difficult.  
For example zero rating has long been used in Denmark as an 
incentive to users to try data packages for their smartphone. At least as 
early as 2012 Telenor used offers for free and zero rated Facebook as 
an incentive for users to purchase mobile subscriptions. All of the 
Danish mobile network operators have their own proprietary music 
service and incumbent TDC zero rates its service. Hutchinson 3 
offered a smartphone training page early on to support users in trying 
new devices.   
Danish newspapers and content companies, which have experienced 
digital disruption, embrace working with Danish mobile operators. A 
leading example is Telmore,290 the world’s first MVNO (now owned 
by Danish incumbent TDC). One of its typical packages offers 
unlimited calling, SMS, and MMS; 12 GB of data, and unlimited 
access to content services including HBO Nordic (Netflix competitor),  
TV2/Play (local TV), C More (local film), MinBio (kids),Telmore 
Musik (Musik), Mofibo (Danish books), Premium News sites 
                                                          
290 “The mother of no frill MVNOs, Denmark’s Telmore, sets a new standard for 
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(Politiken, Ekstra Bladet), and premium magazines (Euroman, 
Eurowoman, Fit Living, Rum, and Gastro). 
This kind of partnership is welfare enhancing for all parties, and 
naturally it is allowed—indeed encouraged--under Denmark’s soft net 
neutrality rules.  No content is throttled or blocked, and offers are 
fully transparent in a competitive marketplace. Consumers get a 
variety of local content at a competitive price.  Content companies 
earn revenue on advertisements and pay royalties to creators. Mobile 
operators are forced to bring more competitive and compelling offers 
to their customers. Additionally the Danish government earns much 
needed tax revenue which it would otherwise not be realized, as many 
firms practice tax arbitrage in Ireland to avoid the local 25 percent 
VAT. 
Another important feature is that Denmark stimulates its public sector 
to produce apps and make data and tools available which app develops 
can freely use to produce apps. Both Denmark and Netherlands are top 
nations for egovernment according the European Commission,291 but 
Denmark has a slight edge which may be significant for this analysis. 
A forthcoming section on the digital policy of Denmark describes how 
the egovernment services helped to drive adoption of 3G mobile 
broadband.  Denmark has a number of apps developed by the public 
sector in addition to private sector apps that build upon public sector 
tools.  
Some assert that bans on zero rating are implicit in net neutrality, even 
though Wu never talked about that. On the other hand zero rating 
would seem to produce a demand subsidy for apps, so there could be 
app growth, especially for home grown apps. The internet is an 
experience good, that is the value cannot be ascertained until it is 
consumed.292 In markets with heterogeneous products, consumers 
with different preferences and information make it costly, if not 
                                                          
291 “eGovernment - Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2015” (EU, 2015), 
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impossible, for consumers to identify the attributes of the products or 
the fit with their preferences before they have been consumed. 
Similarly the provider cannot accurately match the offer to the 
consumer without some amount of trial and error. This process of the 
user switching, learning and adjusting comprise a user’s “search 
costs”. The larger are the search costs, and the smaller is the expected 
benefit of the second product over the first, the less likely it is that the 
consumer will try to find a better match, even though there is 
definitely a better one out there. Thus, high search costs lead to 
suppliers having some market power over their existing customers – 
akin to monopoly – even though there are many different variants of 
the product -competitors – available.  Zero rating may be helpful to 
reduce the user’s search costs to find alternative applications and to 
lower entrance barriers for entrant applications. 
The markets for internet application adoption and usage are 
monopolistically competitive. Customers make investments in using 
specific applications (learning costs, emotional investments etc) that 
make them reluctant to try new variants. When a new application 
enters a market where customer preferences are already well-
established, overcoming these high search costs is likely one of the 
most significant barriers to be faced. The more mature is the 
application market, the more established are these preferences and the 
harder it will be to overcome them. Even if the new product is 
superior to all others in the market, customers will be reluctant to try 
it, because they do not know that it is better for them until they have 
tried it. If the same price is charged for the new and existing products, 
the new product will not attract any new customers, because of the 
high search costs customers face. In this case, the only way that the 
new product will attract new customers is by charging less than the 
existing products – that is, undertaking to meet the search costs 
incurred by the customers. For this reason, new products in this 
market are typically introduced with free trials. 
However, if a new internet application is offered free of charge to 
consumers, because the costs are recovered from advertising or other 
sponsored revenues (e.g. donations, tax funding), it is not possible to 
discount the application cost to encourage switching. The only way 
that potential customers’ search and switching costs can be reduced is 
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by reducing the internet access charge. Hence, zero-rating may be the 
only viable way of inducing existing consumers to try a new product. 
Not being able to offer zero-rating thus constitutes an entry barrier to 
new applications seeking to compete with established ones. In these 
instances, it will be existing applications providers, and not new 
entrants, who would prefer that zero rating not be allowed.  
Net neutrality puts an implicit value on the edge in favor of the core, 
but it is not clear that this should be the case. Also one can argue 
about the relative value of different innovation, the latest game might 
not be so important as the health care app. On the other hand, if there 
are social benefits to such games as PokemonGo (users interacting, 
travelling to new locations etc), then zero rating, if in fact it 
encourages socially beneficial behaviors, should not be banned, as 
some net neutrality advocates desire.  
In general this data does not lend itself to bright line rules against a 
single actor but an updated, informed perspective of how different 
actors come together in dynamic networks.  
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5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 BACKGROUND ON COUNTRIES 
Some discussion293 to the political context of  net neutrality 
rulemaking is helpful, particularly to find whether there are common 
trends and features with drive rulemaking. For example in both Chile 
and Slovenia restrictions on zero rating were driven by a single actor 
and dissatisfaction by activists that regulator were not doing enough to 
enforce net neutrality. In Netherlands, the advocacy Bits of Freedom 
was instrumental in rulemaking and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
has been the authority to drive the strengthening of rules. In Denmark, 
however, there has been a long process to deregulate 
telecommunications, even to dismantle the regulator itself. In the 
Danish case operators took the imitative to propose a self-regulatory 
regime on net neutrality which was in place for 5 years until the EU 
rules were implemented. 
5.1.1 CHILE 
In 2010 Chile was the first country in the world to make a net 
neutrality law.294  The effort was an outcome of five years of 
regulation and subsequent litigation between operators and the 
telecom regulator Subtel.  To make rules, the country’s 
communications laws needed to be updated to vest the proper 
authority within the telecom regulator, a situation which parallels the 
US in which ISPs claim that the FCC does not have the authority to 
create net neutrality rules. The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s third 
                                                          
293 Layton, Roslyn, and Silvia Elaluf-Calderwood. “Zero Rating: Do Hard Rules 
Protect or Harm Consumers and Competition?  Evidence from Chile, Netherlands 
and Slovenia.” Arlington, Virginia, USA, 2015. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587542. 
294 Consagra el Principio de Neutralided en la Red Para Los Consumidores y 
Usuarios de Internet, General de Telecomunicaciones Ley 18.168 (August 26, 
2010), 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1016570&buscar=NEUTRALIDAD+DE
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attempt to make rules, but the decision has been appealed and awaits 
an en banc review by the full court. 
Virgin Mobile launched an MVNO on Movistar network’s in Chile in 
April 2012. Because virtual operators resell network access, they 
cannot differentiate on speeds or quality, so they must differentiate on 
marketing, customer service, and other non-network parameters. As 
such zero rating can be an important tool for MNVOs. 
Virgin Mobile Chile used a common marketing strategy employed by 
MNVOs:  paint the established operators as dinosaurs and celebrate 
customers as “rock stars”.  “Chileans can now get fair flat rate calling 
and great Data bundles and "Anti-Plans"295 with everything they need. 
And Virgin Mobile Chile throws in extra goodies like Unlimited 
Whatsapp when you buy data. The Rock Star customer support team 
has brought a new level of care to the Chile market, and customers are 
the most satisfied in the market,” notes the operator’s Chilean 
website.296 
A year after launch, the company had 200,000 customers which the 
CEO owes to "a simple offer, without asterisks, flat rate data, 
convenient bags of minutes, and a call center.”297  Over three years, 
the company earned 1% of the Chilean market and is on track to have 
400,000 customers by the end of 2015, half of which are post-paid.298 
Other explanations for its success include laws in 2012 that allow 
                                                          
295 Anti-plan was the idea of an offer that is not constrained to the traditional 
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296 “Virgin Mobile Chile,” Virgin.com, accessed August 5, 2015, 
http://www.virgin.com/company/virgin-mobile-chile. 
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Standard IT, April 17, 2013, http://www.cioal.com/2013/04/17/virgin-mobile-
cuenta-en-su-primer-ano-en-chile-con-mas-de-200-000-clientes/. 
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2015,” MVNO Dynamics, April 22, 2015, 
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number portability and unlocking of phones.299  Virgin Mobile has 
extended its concept to Mexico and Colombia and has a goal of 
winning 5% of the Chilean market.300 
To be sure, with 70 percent of its customers aged 15-35, of which 
70% have data plans and 85% have smartphones, WhatsApp would 
likely be a popular app. In response to Subtel’s decision to ban zero 
rating, the CEO explained, 
Well, certainly it had an impact because we had to revise our 
offer. We have not eliminated the promotion, but we had to 
change it. Back when you bought a package of data, we gave free 
Whatsapp for the 30 day duration of the package, and if a 
customer left without any balance, the customer could continue 
using WhatsApp to the end of the period. Now we continue 
offering this service for free, that is, that the use of data 
Whatsapp not count toward the package, but the moment in 
which the client runs out of contract data, he cannot continue 
using WhatsApp. That is, customers have Whatsapp free while 
having data package.301 
However the CEO asserts that zero rating has less importance in light 
of other activities, which include its distribution strategy through the 
large retail chains Ripley and Falabella and wholesaling with small 
shops. Virgin Mobile operates its own distribution channels with 
kiosks in subway stations and its website. The country also adopted a 
framework to support MVNOs302 and made a law to ensure number 
                                                          
299 “Virgin Mobile Chile’s MVNO Signs up 36,000 Subscribers,” MVNO 
Dynamics, July 24, 2012, http://www.mvnodynamics.com/2012/07/24/virgin-
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300 Leticia Pautasio, “‘Queremos Alcanzar 300.000 Clientes Al Cierre de 2014,’” 
Telesemana, April 13, 2014, 
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portability. The success of Virgin Mobile cannot be attributed directly 
to its zero rated offer. 
Two net neutrality advocacies Neutralidad Sí! and CivicoONG 
complained to the regulator that Virgin Mobile’s offer of free 
WhatsApp was an attack on the law of net neutrality. They asserted 
that Virgin Mobile is creating a disincentive to use competing 
messaging services such as Line and Telegram.  Correspondence 
between Neutralidad Sí and the regulator was reviewed.  The original 
complaint, No. 324923 posted on January 29, 2013, has been 
removed, 303 but the rest of the exchange remains. 
In the correspondence, the regulator reiterated that the Chilean rules 
state that operators cannot arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, 
hinder or restrict the right of any Internet user to use, send, receive or 
offer any content, application, or legal service. Offers cannot 
arbitrarily distinguish content, applications, or service based on source 
or owner. The legislation still allows operators to manage traffic 
within a set of constraints, provided that the actions do not impact 
competition.  The purpose of the law is to ensure that services, 
applications, and content are offered without discrimination to the 
time the user access is allowed without arbitrary restrictions and that 
access be provided in a competitive way. 
The offer by Virgin Mobile and WhatsApp did not prevent access to 
other applications, according to the regulator. It only releases metering 
for the one application for the period of the offer, and therefore does 
not constitute a breach of net neutrality.  The user can also access the 
application even when he has no balance. 
Neutralidad Sí! responded the same day.  They extrapolate that it will 
lead to situations in which users are coerced with rebates and 
discounts to use “search engine X” or “video provider Y”. Secondly 
they object to the idea that “traffic management and network 
management” do not harm competition. They note that if access to 
                                                          
303 Civico ONG, “Denuncia Por ‘Whatsapp Gratis’ En SUBTEL,” Storify, accessed 
August 5, 2015, http://storify.com/ongCivico/denuncia-por-whatsapp-gratis-en-
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WhatsApp is free then it effectively harms other competitors because 
to access to them must be paid. 
The regulator replies that it has revisited the net neutrality law and 
reiterates the points. As for the threat described, that an operator is 
favoring one application over another, this is not case because the 
offer is not restricting the right of users to access the Internet, which is 
the point of the law. 
Neutralidad Sí! responds with a reference to Article 19 of the Civil 
Code: "When the meaning of the law is clear, its wording be 
disregarded under the pretext of consulting its spirit."  They reiterate 
the words “discriminate” and “offer” that exist in the net neutrality 
law and the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language definition of 
discrimination being “select excluding”. They suggest that if other 
services receive the same treatment as WhatsApp, the arbitrary nature 
of the discrimination will be eliminated. 
The complaint was brought to the Secretariat of the Regulator and 
then closed with the explanation that the regulator had provided an 
adequate explanation. The Neutralidad Sí! blog says that the 
regulator’s response was “awkward” and did not rule on the merits. 
It appears that the issue gets no further attention until a new chair 
comes to the telecom regulator. Pedro Huichalaf, former head of 
related net neutrality advocacy organization ONGMeta, took office in 
March 2014.304  The marketing of “free social networks” is 
pronounced illegal the following month.305 However this is not a ban 
on zero rating or price discrimination as some conclude.  Some free 
access is offered though it is not marketed as such. 
                                                          
304 “Renuncia de Pedro Huichalaf Por Nominación Como Subsecretario de 
Telecomunicaciones,” ONG META, accessed August 5, 2015, 
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The official decision notes that companies are not punished for 
offering zero rating, but are invited to end the practice, or to provide 
the benefits to all traffic of the same class.  Some confusion emerged 
once the decision was released as to nature of the word “arbitrary”, 
whether traffic is treated an an “arbitrary” or deliberate way.  At the 
time of the ruling, Wikipedia Zero was not yet available, but the rule 
ostensibly outlawed it.  Wikipedia noted the Chilean decision is 
“example of when net neutrality — which is an important principle for 
the free and open internet — is poorly implemented to prevent free 
dissemination of knowledge.”306  The regulator relented and allow 
Wikipedia to be an exclusive zero rated service, noting that there is a 
clear difference between Wikipedia Zero and unlimited social 
messaging. 307 Neutralidad Sí called the exception for Wikipedia, the 
“last unicorn of the ‘good Internet’”, a double standard. 
Neutralidad Sí appeared to be dissatisfied because the regulator while 
pronouncing the offer illegal, does not do enough to prosecute or 
punish telecom providers for the practice. The organization says that 
the situation is contradictory and calls on the regulator to clarify.  The 
comments under the blog blame Neutralidad Sí for making the zero 
rating complaint in in the first place.  The commenter notes that the 
ban hurts poor people who can’t communicate with their family 
through WhatsApp. Another comment refers to the slippery slope of 
ill-defined rules such as the ban on zero rating, what may be legal 
today will not be tomorrow and vice versa. Additionally he faults the 
organization for not recognizing how internet companies (Facebook) 
take advantage of users’ information with free services. Another 
commenter criticizes the net neutrality rhetoric of “free Internet” 
because technically a zero rated offer is free access. 
Earlier heads of the Chilean regulator criticized the ruling. On Twitter, 
one called it “populist idiocy from a small group of activists. A new 
                                                          
306 Yana Welinder, “[Wikimedia Announcements] [PRESS RELEASE] Airtel Offers 
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form of regulatory capture.”308  Another penned an opinion piece in 
the leading newspaper titled “positively discriminatory, but not 
arbitrary, in favor of the poor.”309 
However definitive proof to whether harm to consumers of 
competition could be determined by examining the traffic data. As 
AppAnnie analysis shows, WhatsApp has always been a popular 
service in Chile.  Once zero rating began, WhatsApp actually lost a 
modest amount of traffic on Apple devices while on Android it stayed 
relatively constant.  Meanwhile competing messaging applications 
such as Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Skype, Badoo, Google 
Hangouts, Emoji, LINE, Telegram, imo, Talking Tom and Viber  
remained popular and did not experience a change in traffic as a result 
of zero rating in 2012-2014. Each one of these apps has a different 
value proposition and appeals to a different market segment. 
Therefore the zero rating of one does not cause a decrease in another. 
The apps are not substitutable.  
The Chilean Consumer Authority publishes an annual report of 
complaints related to telecommunications. The report310 for 2012-
2013 is telling in what consumers complain about; which companies; 
and how complaints are resolved. Complaints about mobile 
communications make up about half of all the complaints in the 
country for the period.  About 2 of every 200 mobile subscribers 
complain. For mobile communications, the single largest set of 
complaints is about phones (13%) and problems with phones 
connecting with networks leading to slow speeds (11%).  Thereafter 
the bulk of complaints (56%) have to do with the contracts 
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themselves, issues  of customer care information is faulty, wrong or 
inadequate; disputes on charges for additional services; charges made 
for services not used; contract termination; term of warranty for 
phone; lack of accurate and timely information; and billing cycle 
change. In fact the largest single complaint across all 
telecommunications networks is incorrect charges, 27%. The report 
notes that complaints were resolved at least two-thirds of the time for 
all but one mobile operator. The report notes that total complaints 
declined 3.6% from 2012 to 2013. 
Importantly the report does not list specific net neutrality, zero rating, 
or free data complaints, and if they exist, they do not amount any 
more than 1.8% of complaints, the smallest category of any collected 
complaint.  Moreover, if the zero rated version of WhatsApp was 
hurting competition, it would be expected that its competitors, Line, 
Telegraph, and so on  would have complained.  So such complaints 
could be found on either the regulator’s or competitor authority’s 
website.  
It appears that speed and quality are the more important issues, not net 
neutrality and zero rating. Chilean consumers increasingly demand 
content that is not Chilean.  It is housed in far locations and takes time 
to reach Chile.  This can also be observed that when one is in Europe 
accessing a Chilean website, one may experience latency. Sandvine 
notes, 
In Latin American mobile networks, two companies, Facebook 
and Google, now control over 60% of total traffic in the region. 
This dominance is driven by the popularity of low cost Android 
smartphones in the region as well as  
Facebook’s decision to embrace social networking and 
messaging through their acquisitions of Instagram and 
WhatsApp. With such concentration, corporate decisions by 
these major players, like Facebook’s decision to auto-play videos 
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uploaded to its site, can instantly and dramatically impact 
subscribers and network operators. 311 
The issue could be resolved with intermediaries such as content 
delivery services, video encoding, and content formatting.  Generally 
content owners purchase these services to ensure the fidelity of their 
content, as well as to lower their operating costs (better formatting 
reduces storage cost and energy consumption). However it is not 
necessarily clear that all content owners will have a strategy for Chile, 
especially if they don’t license their content for the country. 
In a 2015 presentation312 to the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC), Subtel chair Huichalaf 
declared that zero rating is attractive from the point of view of users. 
However he believes that the regulator still has a role to decide 
whether such offers should be allowed. In October 2015 Huichalaf 
was removed by the Chilean President,313 indicating dissatisfaction on 
his leadership to facilitate increased market share of entrants and 
MVNOs.314   
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5.1.2 NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands could be considered the world’s most competitive 
broadband market for the number of multiple broadband facilities 
available.315  On account being the world’s flattest and most densely 
populated country, there are nearly two wired infrastructures (copper 
and cable) to every residence, three mobile networks (and a fourth 
under construction), resellers on top of the copper infrastructure; and 
dozens of virtual mobile providers.  Fiber is available in some cities as 
well.  It is counterintuitive that net neutrality laws should be so strict, 
for if ever a market existed where consumers could switch if they 
didn’t like their provider, it is the Netherlands. 
Since adopting the net neutrality law, a number of financial indicators 
reveal a worsening situation for Dutch telecoms, though a number of 
trends were already in play well before the law, including declining 
voice revenue and service revenue growth.  The Netherlands is a 
saturated market in both fixed and mobile. Growth of subscribers is 
flat in fixed.  In mobile, it has been declining since 2011 when it had a 
high of 105% and has fallen below 100%. There are no new customers 
for operators; the only possibility is to poach each other’s customers.  
Frequently this can mean a race to the bottom.  The monthly churn 
rate for the industry is 2.5%, relatively high for a postpaid market. 
This indicates that customers can and do change providers. 
Nevertheless financial results reveal that costs are managed prudently.  
To maintain profitability in a strict regulatory environment where new 
business models are not allowed, the only recourse is to lay off 
workers. In 2014, KPN laid off 2000 in the consumer branch and 
another 500 in the corporate.316  This follows other cuts in recent years 
across the industry. 
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Net neutrality advocacy organization Bits of Freedom has been 
instrumental to bring attention to net neutrality.317 Though they had 
conducted campaigns for a number of years on the topic, they found 
little interest with the general public.  However a statement from a 
KPN executive, suggesting that the company would charge users to 
access WhatsApp, catapulted Bits of Freedom (BoF)’s efforts to 
center stage.  In addition to viral take-up of the issue in the media, the 
stakeholders BoF had cultivated, including key parliamentary 
sponsors, allowed the organization, in just two months, to push 
through the legislation it had created.  There was no hearing of mobile 
operators or investigation of traffic management. The Law was 
promulgated in 2012 and came into force the following year. 
The Dutch Parliament had been revising its Telecommunication Act 
during this period, and BoF found support among a number of 
Parliamentarians  It also provided the lawmakers with a proposed text 
for the law318 as well as position papers developed under the support 
of the Council of Europe (an agency empowered to protect human 
rights) to support the legislation.319  Encouraging Dutch innovation in 
internet services and applications was a reason given to support net 
neutrality. 
From the operators’ side, the uptake of the free SMS applications in 
lieu of proprietary services materially affected revenue. KPN, for one, 
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was not prepared for the shift. For the first time in many quarters, the 
company issued a profit warning.  
In its quarterly announcement, it noted a large drop in SMS revenue in 
Q1 of 2011 and lowered EBITA projections by €200 million euros 
from the prior year. KPN also noted that to lower costs, it would lay 
off 25% of its Dutch workforce, about 4000-5000 employees.320  
Before making the suggestion of charging for WhatsApp, KPN 
obtained permission from the Dutch telecom regulator OPTA.321  The 
regulator approved the offer and noted, "This means more choice for 
consumers, which allows subscriptions can take better suited to use. 
We therefore welcome such a development, on condition that the 
provider is transparent about the cost."322 
What is frequently described as a predatory situation between 
operators and third party applications, might also be viewed as 
operators having the wrong business model in a time of change.  Until 
2010, data consumption on mobile devices was limited in the 
Netherlands, and the price reflected that users did not demand it very 
much.  But with smartphones and emerging online services, 
consumers started to shift their consumption. This came at a time 
where the prevailing terminating regime in the caller pays, both 
increased the price of voice and SMS, but also created an incentive for 
off-net termination.323 
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It is important to note that WhatsApp has remained in the top position 
as the most popular messaging app in the Netherlands for years. No 
operator or competitor has succeeded to impact its position. 
Once the law came into effect, there were no reports of net neutrality 
violations for some time.324 One view is that the law was working to 
deter violations.  On the other hand, it be embarrassing politically if 
no violations occur, for it may appear that the law was made too 
hastily.  As such, there could be political pressure to find a problem to 
justify the law ex post. 
In January 2013 the new telecom regulator, now rationalized in the 
Dutch Consumer and Market Authority (ACM) commissioned a 
study325 of over-the-top (OTT) services.  Rather than prohibiting the 
development of third party applications and services, operators 
facilitate OTT services through their provision of mobile broadband.  
Increasingly consumers use these services.  It also noted the declining 
power of mobile operators, specifically, “On sales level we see a shift 
from KPN to cable and a parallel of shifting market shares. Mobile 
data market is the engine of growth, with WiFi as a substitute for 
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mobile or mobile data. The mobile service revenue and ARPU show a 
slight downward trend.”326 
Meanwhile in Brussels, the European Parliament passed a net 
neutrality resolution on April 3, 2014. The Alliance for Liberal 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) drove its passage with Dutch Member 
of Parliament Marietje Schaake.327 She celebrated the passage on the 
website of D66, the Dutch Democratic Party, noting “Conversely, 
Europe must also ensure that Internet and communication 
technologies are regulated too. More and more countries and the UN 
are working on laws and regulations to enhance the control of 
governments.”328 Though the Parliament’s resolution requires the 
agreement of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers 
(head of state of the EU member nations) to become law,329 the 
resolution triggered the Dutch to strengthen the interpretation of their 
net neutrality law, specifically to eliminate exceptions for zero rating. 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs started a process to discuss 
how the net neutrality law should be interpreted, how strict it should 
be, and what to do about the practice zero rating, called “loose” or 
stand-alone services. A consultation was held in May 2014.330  Among 
the 30 respondents was Netflix,331 which just a few months before, 
                                                          
326 Ibid 
327 Marietje Schaake, “Europees Parlement Steunt Voorstel Schaake Voor 
Netneutraliteit in Europese Wet,” D66, April 3, 2014, https://d66.nl/europees-
parlement-steunt-voorstel-schaake-voor-netneutraliteit-europese-wet/. 
328 “Digitale Vrijheid Prioriteit in EU-Buitenlandbeleid - Doe Mee, Word Lid!,” 
D66, November 7, 2014, https://d66.nl/ep-commissie-steunt-d66-digitale-vrijheid-
prioriteit-in-eu-buitenlandbeleid/. 
329 This was ultimately resolved on June 30, 2015 with rules coming into force on 
April 30, 2016. “Commission Welcomes Agreement to End Roaming Charges and 
to Guarantee an Open Internet,” European Commission, June 30, 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5265_en.htm.  
330 “Consultatie Beleidsregel netneutraliteit,” consultatie, (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/netneutraliteit. 
331 “Consultatie Beleidsregel netneutraliteit, reactie,” webpagina, (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/netneutraliteit/reactie/71331718-03d9-43be-9d87-
43d2cdff1355. 
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signed on as the first customer in the New York office of the 
Amsterdam Internet Exchange332 (The company has since moved its 
European headquarters to Amsterdam and plans to use the location to 
help grow its business in the Middle East and Africa.333)  Netflix 
commended the Ministry’s efforts, supported a strict policy against 
zero rating, noted that net neutrality stimulates innovation, and 
suggested a broad interpretation of net neutrality, effectively ensuring 
that consumers increasingly choose flat rate packages. The outcome of 
the consultation is strict version of net neutrality with a strict 
interpretation which the regulator must enforce.334  Interestingly 
Netflix is zero rated in Australia as part of its partnership with fixed 
lined operator iiNet.335 The company calls the introduction of Netflix 
to the Australian market a game changer.336 
On June 5, 2014 in “Net neutrality the work in progress”337 Bits of 
Freedom described the process conducted by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to clarify ambiguities in the Dutch net neutrality 
                                                          
332 “Netflix Signs On To New York Open Internet Exchange,” Amsterdam Internet 
Exchange, December 2, 2013, https://ams-ix.net/newsitems/124. 
333 http://www.iamsterdam.com/en/business/invest/business-news/netflix-officially-
opens-european-headquarters-in-amsterdam  
334 “Besluit van de Minister van Economische Zaken van 11 mei 2015, nr. 
WJZ/15062267, houdende beleidsregel inzake de toepassing door de Autoriteit 
Consument en Markt van artikel 7.4a van de Telecommunicatiewet (Beleidsregel 
netneutraliteit),” officiële publicatie, officielebekendmakingen, (May 15, 2015), 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2015-13478.html. 
335 Janko Roettgers, “Netflix won’t count against iiNet broadband caps in Australia”, 
March 2, 2015, https://gigaom.com/2015/03/02/netflix-wont-count-against-iinet-
broadband-caps-in-australia/ 
336 iiNet to flick on quota-free Netflix, March 3, 2015, 
http://www.iinet.net.au/about/mediacentre/releases/2015-03-03-quota-free-
netflix.html 
337 Door Kreiken, “Netneutraliteit Blijft Work-in-Progress,” Bits Og Freedom, June 
5, 2014, https://www.bof.nl/2014/06/05/netneutraliteit-blijft-work-in-progress/. 
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law.  It criticized Facebook, Vodafone, RTL, and Endless Spotify338, a 
zero rated program offered by Hi, a virtual mobile provider (owned by 
KPN) offering discount services focused on the youth market.  The 
blog refers to an article339 mentioning the Vodafone’s Sizz340 and T-
Mobile’s Deezer.  The article includes a quotation from the Dutch 
regulator, calling Endless Spotify a “stand alone service”, meaning 
that purchase of the subscription is not tied to the purchase of a data 
package, therefore it does not violate net neutrality.341   
It notes that such stand-alone services are by “allowed by the letter of 
the law, but runs counter to the intent of the law. Positive 
discrimination is discrimination. The ACM sees no problem.”  BoF 
continues, “We thought about whether other Internet areas must meet 
the same kind of neutrality values. Some claim that ‘soft neutrality’ is 
not enough and that efforts should be made for ‘hard neutrality’, 
including peering and transit. And what about search? Or application 
stores? Another response to the consultation argued that the rules 
should also apply to the provision of IPv4 and IPv6.” 
For the week of September 20, 2014 BoF notes on its blog,342 “We 
were visiting the ACM to discuss net neutrality and its enforcement. 
We began our analysis of the law in the Netherlands; very interesting 
                                                          
338 “Hi Introduceert Eindeloos Spotify: Onbeperkt Muziek Streamen Op Je Mobiel 
Zonder Dat Dit MB’s Kost,” KPN, (January 6, 2014), 
http://corporate.kpn.com/pers/persberichten/hi-introduceert-eindeloos-spotify-
onbeperkt-muziek-streamen-op-je-mobiel-zonder-dat-dit-mbs-kost.htm. 
339 Door Arnoud Wokke, “Hi Haalt Verbruik Spotify-App Niet Meer van 
Databundel Af,” Tweakers, January 6, 2014, http://tweakers.net/nieuws/93502/hi-
haalt-verbruik-spotify-app-niet-meer-van-databundel-af.html. 
340 Andreas Udo de Haes, “Vodafone En T-Mobile Schenden Netneutraliteit,” 
Webwereld, June 17, 2013, http://webwereld.nl/netwerken/78147-vodafone-en-t-
mobile-schenden-netneutraliteit.  
341 The price to the user is the same whether he buys the subscription from Spotify 
or Hi, but in the latter, the data use is not charged to the subscription.  
342 Door Tim Toornvliet, “De Week in 417 Woorden,” Bits of Freedom, September 
20, 2014, https://www.bof.nl/2014/09/20/de-week-in-417-woorden/.  
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in light of the upcoming European law343 and the current debate in the 
US.”344  
Some two years after the Dutch net neutrality law took effect, ACM 
fined two operators for violations. Vodafone had only 3200 customers 
on its HBO Go app, was fined €200,000, and was ordered to end the 
offer. It is likely that the fine is more than the company earned on the 
service. 
KPN was fined €250,000 for what amounted to blocking on a free wifi 
network. The company admitted its mistake, a setting that had been on 
place its wifi networks, which it forgot to update once the net 
neutrality rules came into effect.  About one third of the wifi traffic 
was at Schiphol Airport and the free service was designed as a 
convenience for travelers for a short and quick internet connection 
upon landing, for example to check messages and email.  BitTorrent, 
FTP, SSHA, Telnet and VoIP were blocked to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the free service. The blocks are now removed but 
presumably the free basic internet service doesn’t run as well.  
Interestingly a number of comments under the BoF blog mention that 
they have 4G services so wifi not important to them anyway. 
In May 2015 KPN was ordered to end zero rated Spotify contracts, 
though the traffic generated by Spotify traffic is negligible on KPN 
networks.  It is interesting to note that while zero rated offers of 
Spotify may be maligned by net neutrality advocates, for Spotify, one 
of only a handful of successful European startups, the partnership with 
telecom operators has proven important for its growth.345  Not only 
can Spotify leverage an operator’s billing system (avoid the cost of 
using its own system and give customers the benefit of not having to 
                                                          
343 Link in article points to https://www.bof.nl/2014/04/03/persbericht-
netneutraliteit/ 
344 Link in article points to “ISPs Mislead Public, FCC About Protecting the Open 
Internet,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, September 15, 2014, 
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/isps-mislead-public-fcc-about-protecting-open-
internet. 
345 “Adventures in the Netherlands:” (Spotify, July 17, 2013), 
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enter payment credentials into a new system), Spotify earns valuable 
paying customer.  Most free users of Spotify never upgrade to the 
premium version, but in a telco partnership, subscribers who are 
already paying for a mobile subscription are more willing to take on 
an additional paid service because of the convenience of the bundle. 
Not only is the sale of premium subscriptions essential for Spotify’s 
survival, the revenue earned plays an important role to lessen music 
piracy and to help bring revenue to the music industry.  Sweden’s 
music industry was decimated by the rise of digital music on the 
Internet; revenues declined steadily from 2002 to 2009.  With the 
introduction of Spotify, however, the industry has managed a 20% 
gain in the last three years.346 
The Netherlands fared even worse with its traditional music industry 
than Sweden, but Spotify helped to reduce piracy in the country, with 
29% of the 1.8 million Dutch BitTorrent pirates taking just 1 music 
file in 2012.  The top 10% of the pirates account for half of the content 
obtained illegally, some 16 files each or more.347  Passive pirates don’t 
bother to pirate material when then can get a reliable, quality music 
experience for a good price. 
In Sweden, digital music revenues account for almost 60% of all 
music industry revenue.  In Netherlands the amount is just 27%, but if 
it could increase to the level of Sweden, ideally with more uptake of 
services such as Spotify, there would be an additional $124 million for 
the music industry and musicians. In any case, digital music sales 
grew by increased by 66% in the country in 2012, the highest of any 
country in Western Europe.348 
While music piracy may be on the wane as a number of viable music 
streaming alternatives have emerged, piracy of film is going strong.  
Having more Spotify-like solutions for film is preferable to 
                                                          
346 Ibid p. 9 
347 Ibid p. 1 
348 Ibid p. 24 
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criminalizing pirates. And yet HBO Go, one such solution, is 
maligned by net neutrality advocates. 
In a statement on June 1, 2015, the ACM praised the state of Dutch 
4G networks and increased mobile data consumption. They note,349 
After Mobile operators’ investment to roll out 4G is almost 
complete. After a peak of investment in 2013 of €2 billion, the 
investment in 2014 fell back to more than € 800 million.  Henk 
Don, board ACM: "With the introduction of 4G has paved the 
way for fast internet on your smartphone. And there are many 
uses. The consumption of mobile data is doubled. "This is 
attributable to approximately 4 million consumers who are 
relatively common and many Internet via their phone. For 
example, to stream movies or music. The number of customers 
using 4G also doubled in a year to about 40 percent. What is 
evident from the Telecom Monitor is that the rapid growth of 
data consumption is leveling off. 
 
Vodafone Netherlands, forced to end its 3 month zero rated offer of 
HBO Go and to pay a fine of €200,000, challenged the Dutch telecom 
authority’s ruling as unlawful and the fine as excessive, but was 
turned down in court. The decision notes that the Dutch law was 
initially concerned about users paying more for certain services,350 and 
that the idea that users paying less could be problematic was a new 
concept. However the court recognized that the EU law does not 
provide a categorical ban on zero rating.   
The net neutrality law that was supposed to be a “silver bullet” has 
created new problems.351  Instead of a flowering of local content and 
                                                          
349  “Investeringen uitrol 4G bijna voltooid, apps besparen op dataverbruik,” 
Nieuwsbericht, ACM, (June 1, 2015), 
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/14305/Investeringen-uitrol-4G-bijna-
voltooid-apps-besparen-op-dataverbruik/. 
350 Rechtbank Rotterdam, Accessed November 16, 2016, 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:810 
351 Ibid 
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services, the Netherlands experiences the “Netflix effect”352 in which 
a single American company consumes twenty percent of the country’s 
bandwidth with a small subset of users. Netflix is one of the most 
downloaded apps in the Dutch Google Play store.  
Even with the new EU law, the Ministry and the Dutch Parliament 
have updated their net neutrality law regarding zero rating.353 While 
the language restricts “loose” or “stand alone services and specifically 
states “tariffs for Internet services do not depend on the services,”354 
this is how many interpret bans on zero rating and price 
discrimination.   
However it appears that the Dutch regulator would prefer an approach 
harmonized with BEREC. ACM’s Henk Don was quite involved with 
the BEREC process to develop implementation guidelines. The Dutch 
regulator observes355 that its net neutrality rules are more strict than 
the EU and the associated BEREC guidelines: “The joint European 
telecoms regulators have guidelines in a less strict interpretation given 
to the Regulation than the Dutch legislature. According to the 
collaborating European regulators, certain services under strict 
conditions may be provided free or cheaply.” The Dutch discrepancy 
                                                          
352 Van Eijk and Nico, “The Proof of the Pudding Is in the Eating: Net Neutrality in 
Practice, the Dutch Example,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, August 2, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2417933. 
353 Beleidsregel netneutraliteit, May 11, 2015, 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036617/2015-05-16  
354 See 4.7a provision 3 Wijziging van de Telecommunicatiewet ter uitvoering van 
de netneutraliteitsverordening,, May 17, 2016, 
https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20160517/gewijzigd_voorstel_van_wet_2/
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355 ACM gaat nieuwe dienst T-Mobile onderzoeken, October 11, 2016, 
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/16438/ACM-gaat-nieuwe-dienst-T-
Mobile-onderzoeken/  
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could be challenged under EU competition rules and the free 
movement of services across member states. 356 
5.1.3 SLOVENIA 
Zero rating, called free data transfer in Slovenia, was a common 
practice among operators and existed in country since 2007. 
Consumers could choose from a number of zero rating programs, 
including free access to music, online storage, and customer service 
applications to manage their mobile subscriptions. The net neutrality 
law in Slovenia was created primarily about concerns of theoretical 
harms and was the culmination of more than a year of public 
proceedings357, but did not include an official investigation of traffic 
management practices.358  A line about price differentiation was 
removed in the final version of the law which was promulgated on 
December 31, 2012.359  This omission appears to be a linchpin for the 
legal battle on zero rating going forward. 
To understand the sequence of events, a personal interview360 was 
conducted with Dr. Dusan Caf, a leading net neutrality advocate who 
has been instrumental to effecting a ban on zero rating in Slovenia.361 
                                                          
356 European Parliament (2016) Freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.4.h
tml 
357 “Posvet v Zvezi Z Osnutkom Predloga Novega Zakona O Elektronskih 
Komunikacijah,” Ministrstvo Za Visoko Šolstvo, Znanost in Tehnologijo, 
November 10, 2011, 
http://www.arhiv.mvzt.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/informacijska_druzba/elektronsk
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net neutrality) prior to the adoption of the current electronic communications law 
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359 Article 203 of the Electronic Communications Act (Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia, Nr. 109/12, 110/13, 40/14 – ZIN-B and 54/14 – CC dec.) 
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Caf holds two key positions362 in telecommunications, one as Chair of 
the Electronic Communications Council (a body appointed by the 
National Assembly) and another as Chair of the Council of the 
Agency for Communications Networks and services of the Republic 
of Slovenia (AKOS, the telecom regulator).363 An engineer by 
training, Caf has been a consultant to a number of telecom and IT 
companies in Slovenia, though he assures that his honorary positions 
                                                                                                                                        
361 “Pripombe Na Osnutek Predlog Zakona O Elektronskih Komunikacij,” Svet ZA 
Elektronske Kommunikacije, July 5, 2012, http://www.sek-
rs.si/1/Aktualno/tabid/107/ID/3/Pripombe-na-osnutek-predlog-Zakona-o-
elektronskih-komunikacij-ZEKom-1.aspx#.Vc4MNa1J24B. 
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667 - VI > SEK,” Svet ZA Elektronske Kommunikacije, November 18, 2012, 
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2014, http://www.telecompaper.com/news/dusan-caf-to-head-slovenian-regulator-
report--993155. 
363 The Agency Council is authorised to give opinions to the programme of work, 
the financial plan and the annual report of AKOS; approve the statute adopted by the 
Agency Director; propose the appointment or dismissal of the Agency Director; 
propose a temporary prohibition on the performance of functions by the Director; 
propose the early dismissal of members of the Agency Council. The Members of the 
Agency Council or persons authorised by the Agency Council may inspect the 
business accounts as defined in the Slovenian Accounting Standards and the AKOS’ 
accounting documents. Upon every such request by the Agency, the Agency director 
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Agency Council may suggest improvements in the operation of the Agency to the 
Agency director, as well as point out to him any irregularities in the AKOS 
operations and notify the competent bodies of these irregularities. “Profile of 
AKOS,” February 6, 2014, http://epra3-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/organisations/documents/30/original/Profile_AKOS_
SI_02_2014_final.pdf?1391706889. 
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are not a conflict of interest, and if they were, he would exclude 
himself from voting.364 
In a blog365 on December 9, 2013 Caf decried the state of the 
Slovenian telecom market 15 years after liberalization. The media is a 
poor observer, and the debate as lacking depth, he wrote. 
“Professional analysis” is needed to explain the gap, and “Captured 
regulators” are the root of the problem, he declared. To address these 
problems, he proposed increasing the transparency of the regulatory 
process, strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, 
strengthening the development of electronic communications, and 
improving the wellbeing of citizens. 
Caf called Slovenia’s net neutrality law strict, but not being 
implemented prior to 2015. The problem with zero rating emerged 
with mobile broadband prices being too low. He cited the offer of €25 
for 1 GB of data and €30 for 100 GB. Caf called these offers “good 
for consumers in the short run, but not sustainable in the long run” and 
believed that they needed to be stopped. “This is not a two-sided 
market,” he said. 
Caf does not know whether consumers complained about the offers to 
the regulator. His organization is not privy to such complaints. They 
only learn what is published by the telecom regulator or the 
competition authority.  However one person did complain to the SEK, 
that he wanted to use his account balance to choose which sites should 
be zero rated. 
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On June 22, 2014 Caf published a blog366 titled “Free download 
mobile content jeopardizes the neutrality of the Internet” critiquing the 
zero rating offers of Telekom Slovenia and Si.mobil which “unduly 
encourage (users) to procure their services or applications and their 
partners, because of the high price of data transfer but they complicate 
the selection and use of competing products.“  Caf also notes, “Mere 
legal protection of net neutrality is not enough. It is important that 
AKOS enforce the regulatory principles” and that the SEK discusses 
the situation at its June meeting, he notes.  Caf said that he made a 
point to write in English to bring international attention to the issue in 
Slovenia 
On behalf of SEK on July 17, 2014, Caf made a formal complaint 
about zero rating to the telecom regulator, but did not receive a 
response. He believed that the regulator was reluctant to make a ruling 
on zero rating.  
Caf said he made a point to mention only Telekom Slovenia and 
Si.Mobil in his complaint.  He did not want to implicate the smaller 
providers Tusmobil and Amis because they need zero rating offers to 
differentiate themselves in the marketplace. The complaint describes 
that Telecom Slovenia’s unlimited data transfer offers the ability to 
view the matches of the UEFA Champions League, watch films HBO 
GO, and access proprietary online storage.  Telecom's own service“ 
discriminates against end users using competing products”, notes the 
complaint.  
The complaint is critical of Si.Mobil’s unrestricted offer to view the 
World Cup and unlimited access to the VOYO content over a two year 
period. It claims that free video data is problematic because it is a 
fastest growing category of service and makes up the bulk of internet 
traffic, and that offers with unmetered traffic exceed the amount of 
data used on basic packages.  Moreover operators are offering 
unmetered service to the exclusive content they have licensed but not 
                                                          
366 “Competitive Analysis & Foresight: Brezplačen Prenos Vsebine Ogroža 
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giving the same conditions to competing content. It is described as 
discriminatory to users because they have to use metered access to 
enjoy competing services on the same platform. The letter states that 
operators are violating Slovenia’s net neutrality rules and that 
Telecom Slovenia is abusing its dominant position in the marketplace. 
Caf regrets that, in the end, the regulator punished the smaller 
providers by ordering them to stop all their zero rated practices, while 
the incumbent received a lighter reprimand.  Telekom Slovenia was 
required only to end the zero rated music service for Deezer, but was 
allowed to keep zero rating its proprietary video application.  That the 
smaller operators received a tougher punishment supports Caf’s 
assertion that the telecom regulator favors the state-owned Telecom 
Slovenia.  
Concurrently Caf sent the complaint to the Slovenia Competition 
Protection Agency, which did reply on September 4, 2014.367  They 
recognized the concerns about discriminatory traffic management, but 
note that the risk is significantly lower in a transparent and 
competitive environment.  Net neutrality puts emphasis on the 
requirement that operators transparently disclose their practices 
regarding managing internet traffic. In a transparent environment, 
consumers, if unhappy with traffic management practices, can switch 
providers.  They observe that differentiated offerings are important 
because they are  
. . . the fruit of competitive advantages and therefore increase 
efficiency and bring consumers the benefits (i.e. cheaper 
cinema tickets for students). Thus price discrimination 
increases the availability of the product to more cost-sensitive 
consumers and ensures an overall increase in sales volume, 
thereby lowering average the overall costs and increasing 
                                                          
367 A copy of the reply is not available on the authority’s website, however it is 
referenced in the EU Scoreboard document on the link for Slovenia. “Scoreboard 
2015 - Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Package (per Country),” Digital Agenda for Europe, June 19, 2015, http:///digital-
agenda/en/news/scoreboard-2015-report-implementation-telecommunications-
regulatory-package-country.   
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efficiency. The boundary between pro-competitive and anti-
competitive conduct can be thin, so borderline cases should be 
assessed.  But intervention is necessary only in cases where 
economic analysis shows that the injury to the consumers 
outweigh the benefits to consumers. 
The competition authority notes that Telecom Slovenia has not abused 
its market power. It could be tested with an in-depth investigation that 
would begin with defining the relevant market, in this case the market 
for data transfer.  It notes that Slovenia is a market with at least three 
mobile providers which will evolve significantly in the coming years. 
It notes that the market for mobile services is primarily characterized 
by call services, and with the different prices for calls on and off net, 
the effect of data transfer services is negligible. Moreover, even 
though Telecom Slovenia has a 50 percent market share and falling, it 
does not have the power to control the market for Internet 
applications, even with its zero rated offer.  It notes,  
Vertical relationships can be bring benefits to consumers. For 
example, by offering free Internet encourages Telecom 
Slovenia to invest in expensive exclusive content such as 
UEFA Champions League. Si.Mobil might not have invested 
EUR 60 million in the acquisition of spectrum if it expected 
that it would be not be able to grow the market for newly built 
broadband ‘highways’ through various campaigns for free use 
of data transmission. 
It notes further that sports rights and copyrighted content when 
licensed to a buyer (e.g. Telecom Slovenia) and offered in a zero rated 
program do not constitute a violation of competition. Moreover the 
operator’s offer of Deezer and a proprietary cloud service does not 
harm the market for such services, as there are many choices 
worldwide from which users can access. 
As for the price of the offer, the competition authority notes that the 
operator does not engage in either improving the quality of the zero 
rated products or degrading other applications, but rather in a form of 
discount or positive discrimination. To assess this, it is necessary to 
examine the price and costs of the offer and the services contained 
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within.  It observes that the voice is the largest cost driver and that the 
use of Deezer is negligible, amounting to a few cents out of an offer of 
€26 per month. 
The competition authority notes that the emergence of zero 
rating reflects fierce competition in the mobile marketplace 
and even with current limits, consumers still have the freedom 
to decide what kind of content they want. 
It notes further that the net neutrality rules are designed to protect 
competition for the purpose of the benefit of consumers. It is therefore 
necessary to determine the effect of zero rating on consumers.  No 
intervention should be made if there is no evidence of consumer harm.  
The competition authority describes situations in which it considers 
extreme and necessary for intervention, for example the Microsoft 
browser case, but the zero rating issue in Slovenia is not one. The 
authority made a point as well that critics consider the Dutch net 
neutrality too extreme because operators are restricted from making 
offers. 
Caf rejected the competition authority’s conclusion, in particular 
because it made an analysis based on mobile prices from 2012.  
However if 2014 prices were used, the impact of zero rating would 
likely be even smaller because prices have fallen in the period. 
Caf worked with the country’s leading newspaper to bring attention to 
the issue. On November 12 an article368 appeared in the newspaper 
Delo (English: Labour) by Matjaž Ropret369 introducing the topic of 
zero rating as problematic and reporting on developments in the USA. 
The article concludes with a screen shot of Frank Underwood of 
Netflix’s “House of Cards” with the caption ”You need the 
gatekeeper.”  Underneath the photo is the caption “Providers such as 
Netflix in the US have paid operators for smooth transfer of content to 
subscribers.” 
                                                          
368 Matjaz Ropret, “Izmuzljiva Internetna Nevtralnost,” Infoteh, November 12, 2014, 
http://www.delo.si/mnenja/blogi/izmuzljiva-internetna-nevtralnost.html. 
369 Matjaz Ropret, “Tehnokamra − Internetna Nevtralnost,” Delo, November 14, 
2014, http://www.delo.si/multimedija/video/tehnokamra-internetna-nevtralnost.html. 
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The article links to another article that appeared in Delo from 
Slovenian correspondents in the US titled “Political cuisine on the 
future of the Internet:  White House asks independent telecom 
commission for the Internet be declared a public service, which is 
controlled by the state.” 370 The article describes President Obama’s 
net neutrality announcement and some political background in the US. 
In a sidebar it notes that after ratifying its own net neutrality law two 
years earlier, Slovenia experienced its first complaint under the 
concept of zero rating. 
On November 14, Delo published a short article371 embedded with a 
video372 highlighting Barack Obama’s previous net neutrality 
announcement373 followed by a presentation by Dusan Caf and Delo 
tech journalists Matjaž Ropret and Lenart J. Kučić374 discussing the 
situation of net neutrality in Slovenia.  During the discussion Caf 
produces a tablet where he points to a copy of the Slovenia net 
neutrality law and how the section on zero rating was removed as part 
of the final rulemaking. 
                                                          
370 Sebastijan Kopusar, “Politične Kuhinje O Prihodnosti Interneta,” Delo, 
November 12, 2014, http://www.delo.si/znanje/infoteh/politicne-kuhinje-o-
prihodnosti-interneta.html. 
371 Matjaz Ropret, “Tehnokamra − Internetna Nevtralnost,” Delo, (November 14, 
2014), http://www.delo.si/multimedija/video/tehnokamra-internetna-
nevtralnost.html. 
372 Tehnokamra - Internetna Nevtralnost, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=186&v=_PBaeuvDC_w. 
373 Ezra Mechaber, “President Obama Urges FCC to Implement Stronger Net 
Neutrality Rules,” The White House, November 10, 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/10/president-obama-urges-fcc-implement-
stronger-net-neutrality-rules. 
374 Lenart Kucic, “Lenart J. Kučić Blog,” accessed July 27, 2015, 
http://www.lenartkucic.net/about/. The journalist also writes books critiquing the 
media. Lenart Kucic, “Lenart J. Kučić’s Bibliography,” accessed July 27, 2015, 
http://www.lenartkucic.net/bibliography/. 
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A blog375 by Caf on December 5 characterizes Slovenia as a country 
that has net neutrality rules but does not enforce them. It describes a 
country where “Net neutrality (is) weakened by industry lobbying and 
inactive regulator” and recounts how zero rating, originally included 
in the Slovenia rules was removed by “lobbying from the industry”.  
Caf also warns about the “spreading of discriminatory practices” and 
refers to a study of zero rated offers in the EU.376  He notes that SEK 
sent a letter to AKOS describing the discriminatory practices of 
Telekom Slovenije but “based on the regulator’s strong pro-industry 
stance the outcome is uncertain.” 
It is not clear whether from media pressure or international influence, 
but AKOS relented and commenced a review on zero rating on 
December 18. Soon after Caf appeared in an interview377 in 
Europolitics in which the journalist questioned whether undue 
pressure has been put on the Slovenian telecom regulator.  Caf notes 
that even though authorities pronounce zero rating beneficial to 
consumers, the practice is still problematic. “An efficient regulator is 
required in order that legislation adopted should really be 
implemented. However, I think it is important to resolve the matter of 
zero rating, and not to tie competition law on neutrality, since 
procedures and market analyses take too long,”  he notes. 
On January 10, 2015 Delo published an article378 of some 2500 words 
explaining net neutrality by comparing the internet to the road 
network where all drivers have the same rights. Telecom operators are 
                                                          
375 “Competitive Analysis & Foresight: Zero-Rating Violates Slovenian Net 
Neutrality Law,” Competitive Analysis & Foresight, December 5, 2014, 
http://blog.caf.si/2014/12/zero-rating-violates-slovenian-net-neutrality-law.html. 
376 “List of 75 Zero-Rated, Potentially Anti-Competitive Mobile 
Applications/services, Violating Net Neutrality, in EU28,” DF Monitor, October 
2014, http://dfmonitor.eu/insights/2014_oct_zerorate/. 
377 Nathalie Steiwer, “Zero Rating: Slovenian Regulator Exposed to Excessive 
Pressure,” Europolitics, January 5, 2015, http://europolitics.info/tech/zero-rating-
slovenian-regulator-exposed-excessive-pressure. 
378 Lenart Kucic, “Internet Nevtralen Kot Javno Cestno Omrežje?,” Delo, January 
10, 2015, http://www.delo.si/sobotna/internet-nevtralen-kot-javno-cestno-
omrezje.html. See appendix for Google translated article 
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characterized as deploying sneaky business models such as zero 
rating. Dusan Caf’s efforts to end the practice are described. 
A blog379 from Caf appeared two days later in an attempt to increase 
the pressure on the telecom regulator to ban zero rating.  He refers to 
the complaint SEK made to the regulator in July 2014 followed by 
“nearly three months of analysis, in which we analyzed the 
controversial business practice of mobile operators.”  He notes that at 
the end of 2014 Telekom Slovenia had 50% market share and 
Si.Mobile 36%. 
On January 23, 2015 AKOS announced its decision,380 finding 
Telecom Slovenia’s zero rating of Deezer and Si.Mobil’s zero rated 
offering of the cloud platform Hangar Mapa to be net neutrality 
violations.  An announcement in English followed on January 26, the 
only news story on the English language section of its website.381  
Telekom Slovenia’s zero rating of UEFA Champions League, HBO 
GO, and the online storage TviN continues.  In neither case did the 
regulator mention any evidence for harm to consumers or competition 
because of the offers. 
On February 20, 2015 AKOS similarly found Amis Mobile with its 
proprietary TV service and Tusmobil with its customer service 
platform in violation of net neutrality. 382 The operators were required 
to end the banned practices in 60 days. 
                                                          
379 “Competitive Analysis & Foresight: Nevtralnost Interneta vse Bolj Vroča,” CAF, 
January 12, 2015, http://blog.caf.si/2015/01/nevtralnost-interneta-vse-bolj-
vroca.html. 
380 “Akos Ugotovil Kršitve Načela Nevtralnosti Interneta,” Akos, January 23, 2015, 
http://www.akos-rs.si/akos-ugotovil-krsitve-nacela-nevtralnosti-interneta. 
381 “AKOS Finds Violations of the Principle of Net Neutrality,” Akos, January 26, 
2015, http://www.akos-rs.si/akos-finds-violations-of-the-principle-of-net-neutrality. 
382 “Akos Ugotovil Kršitve Načela Nevtralnosti Interneta Tudi Pri Storitvah Amisa 
in Tušmobila,” Akos, February 20, 2015, http://www.akos-rs.si/akos-ugotovil-
krsitve-nacela-nevtralnosti-interneta-tudi-pri-storitvah-amisa-in-tusmobila. 
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In response Caf posted a blog383 celebrating the regulator’s decision 
banning offers from Telekom Slovenia and Si.Mobil. He notes that 
SEK conducted an examination of the practices and that telecom 
regulators attended its meetings. He notes that the competition 
authority “issued the opinion after a consultation with AKOS in which 
regulators exchanged and shared views and information on net 
neutrality issues.”  He describes the competition authority opinion as 
“based on dubious facts and presumptions.” He faults the competition 
protection authority for declining to begin an investigation. 
Caf recounts his efforts  to speed the regulatory process and enlighten 
senior officials whose views were “generalized and lacked thorough 
analysis”. He recounts the steps that made the ban possible: his blogs 
and articles, his analysis indicating a potential breach of competition 
law, and the support of leading technology journalists.  He reiterates 
his earlier blog of December 5 of why zero rating is a violation of the 
Slovenian net neutrality law. He notes that while the decisions only 
apply to music and cloud services, that they should also apply to video 
streaming.  He notes that, “Consumers may shortly expect new data 
plans and enjoy open and non-discriminatory access to the internet.” 
Following the announcement of the banning of the zero rated services 
of Tusmobil and Amis, Caf penned another blog.384  While he was 
pleased with the action against the other operators, he called the 
allowance of zero rating by Telekom Slovenia “unacceptable and 
AKOS shall intervene as soon as possible.  There is no legal ground in 
communications or media law for any exemption of internet streaming 
of sporting events or cloud storage traffic.” 
                                                          
383 “Competitive Analysis & Foresight: Telekom Slovenije and Si.mobil Found in 
Breach of Net Neutrality,” Competitive Analysis & Foresight, January 25, 2015, 
http://blog.caf.si/2015/01/telekom-slovenije-and-simobil-found-in-breach-of-net-
neutrality.html. 
384 “Competitive Analysis & Foresight: Another Win for Net Neutrality Advocates 
in Slovenia: AKOS Issues New Decisions Limiting Zero-Rating,” Competitive 
Analysis & Foresight, February 22, 2015, http://blog.caf.si/2015/02/another-win-for-
net-neutrality-advocates-in-slovenia-akos-issues-new-decisions-limiting-zero-
rating.html. 
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He notes that these “the decisions have already had a positive impact 
and, as we correctly predicted, consumers benefited from the 
regulator’s net neutrality decisions. Telecom Slovenia and Si.Mobile 
have both come up with special offers and packages with larger data 
caps or inexpensive data cap options. Consumers may shortly expect 
even more plans with larger data caps.” 
Caf describes the mobile market today as competitive, particularly 
because of price competition driven by American owned cable 
provider Telemach in their cross-selling of service from Tusmobil. 
On June 27, 2015 an article385 explores Caf’s evolution from professor 
and consultant to the telecom industry and Chamber of Commerce to 
his most recognizable position as the leader of the Council for 
Electronic Communications.  The same day two additional articles386 
387 appear on Caf and his accomplishments. 
On July 1, 2015, the day after the EU’s concluded agreement on net 
neutrality, Caf is interviewed388 by Slovenian Radio and TV saying 
that Slovenia users are less protected, as the new EU rules "override" 
Slovenia’s.  The article notes a tweet from a Ministry of Education 
official who sees it differently, Slovenia “is (was) alone in 
demonstrating the principle is the wrong approach,” he notes. 
 
The European Union is the midst of an effort to create a Digital Single 
Market. One of goals of which is to strengthen European based small 
                                                          
385 Ales Lednik, “Večer: Kršijo Zakon, Nihče Ne Trzne,” Vecer, June 27, 2015, 
http://www.vecer.com/clanek/201506276125307. 
386 “Dušan Caf : V Državni Lasti Bo Telekom Težko Konkurenčen,” Finance.si, 
June 27, 2015, http://www.finance.si/8824292/Du%C5%A1an-Caf-V-
dr%C5%BEavni-lasti-bo-Telekom-te%C5%BEko-konkuren%C4%8Den. 
387 “STA: Caf Za Večer: V Državni Lasti Bo Telekom Težko Konkurenčen,” Sta, 
June 27, 2015, https://www.sta.si/2150491/caf-za-vecer-v-drzavni-lasti-bo-telekom-
tezko-konkurencen. 
388 “Zvodeneli Kompromis Medmrežne Nevtralnosti Pustil Nezadovoljstvo,” Prvi 
Interaktivni Multimedijski Portal, MMC RTV Slovenija, July 1, 2015, 
http://www.rtvslo.si/znanost-in-tehnologija/zvodeneli-kompromis-medmrezne-
nevtralnosti-pustil-nezadovoljstvo/368779. 
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and medium enterprises (SME) on the Internet.389 Once it took effect, 
AKOS’s ban on zero rating caused traffic to certain Slovenian content 
and applications to fall by half. Operators’ customer support centers 
saw a five-fold increase in telephone calls because subscribers could 
no longer top up their account balance online for free.390 A Slovenian 
cloud provider experienced a marked, but not devastating, decline in 
traffic as a result of the ban.391 To be sure, no content provider’s 
marketing strategy relies entirely on zero rating. 
 
The Slovenian operators appealed the regulator’s and won.392 In July 
2016 the court ruled that a ban against price discrimination is not 
implicit in the law393 and cited the non-binding judgement from the 
Slovenia Competition Authority explaining how an economic analysis 
of zero rating could be performed and the positive value of price 
discrimination.   
That two different countries’ courts rule differently on the issue 
suggests that outright bans will likely be difficult to support.  
Moreover bans on zero rating may violate an EU tenet for the freedom 
of movement for services as well as general EU competition law.  If 
parties can demonstrate that they are materially harmed by bans, they 
may have a case to push against the new EU law. In the meantime, 
zero rated offers continue in the EU. 
                                                          
389 EU Digital Market, Accessed November 16, 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/  
390 Confidential interview 
391 Confidential interview 
392 Matjaž Ropret, ”Operaterji bi lahko spet uvedli ničelno tarifo”, July 25, 2016, 
http://www.delo.si/znanje/infoteh/operaterji-bi-lahko-spet-uvedli-nicelno-tarifo.html 
393 Layton, Roslyn (2016) Slovenia strikes down ban on zero rating, upholds rule of 
law.  Technopolicydaily.com blog: 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/slovenia-zero-rating-rule-law/ 
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5.1.4 DENMARK 
Denmark has been recognized by net neutrality advocates for its 
broadband competition, speed, and price.394  The country has been 
rated as one of the world’s top digital nations by the International 
Telecommunication Union’s Measuring the Information Society 
Report395 which has measured countries’ access, use, and skills of 
information communications technologies (ICT) since 2007. Denmark 
took first place in the ranking in 2014, unseating South Korea.  
Following Senator Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaign suggestion 
that that US should be like Denmark in its public provision of health 
and education,396 some may infer that Denmark’s broadband 
infrastructure is government subsidized and heavily regulated. But 
while the Danish government has a significant level of involvement in 
the health and education sectors, it has a relatively laissez faire 
approach to most other markets, including telecommunications, which 
culminated in the Center Left government dismantling the telecom 
regulator in 2011397 and accepting the telecom industry’s proposal for 
                                                          
394 Danielle Kehl, Robert Morgus, and Sarah Morris, “The Cost of Connectivity 
2014 - Data and Analysis on Broadband Offerings in 24 Cities across the World,” 
New America, October 30, 2014, http://www.newamerica.org/oti/the-cost-of-
connectivity-2014/. Note that most broadband price comparisons don’t not include 
the cost of compulsory media license fees. The 2017 fee is about $177 and is 
assessed on every internet access subscription. It covers the cost of content from the 
public broadcaster Danish Radio. The. http://www.dr.dk/om-dr/licens/licens-english  
For further discussion see p. 10 of Layton and Horney’s “Innovation, Investment 
and Competition in Broadband and the Impact of America’s Digital Economy” 
August 2014, Mercatus Center.  https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Layton-
Competitionin-Broadband.pdf  
395 Measuring the Information Society Report , 2015, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2015.aspx 
396 ABC News, Sen. Bernie Sanders Says U.S. Should Look More Like Scandinavia, 
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cz0u2FH5Bnk. 
397 Morten Falch and Anders Henten, “The future of telecom regulation: The case of 
Denmark.” Paper presented at ITS, Bruxelles, Belgium (2014). 
http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101404/1/795227221.pdf  
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self-regulation on net neutrality in lieu of heavy regulation.398 These 
measures are unthinkable to regulatory advocates in the U.S. who 
assert that a strong and punitive telecom authority needs to regulate 
the market in order to deliver good policy outcomes.399  The success 
of the Danish model for telecom policy suggests otherwise.   
Danish telecom policy has been encoded in in the 1999 “Teleforlig” 
(Telecommunications Agreement), a standing agreement across all 
political parties to pursue a no-subsidy, market-led, technologically 
neutral approach to telecommunications. The goal is to transition 
telecommunications away from sector-specific regulation to full 
competition under a general ex post competition regime. So far, 
Denmark has surpassed the U.S. in achieving this vision.  
This is not to say that Danish government has no involvement in the 
market.  Rather than regulate communications prices and 
                                                          
398 As of April 2016, EU law on net neutrality now supersedes the Danish model for 
self-regulation. 
399 "The FCC should use the legal authority it possesses to relabel [Internet] services 
as regulated ones. Our future depends on it." Susan 
Crawford http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/why-net-neutrality-matters-to-
you-susan-crawford-1.6807160 
"The development of the Internet and the explosion of broadband innovation was a 
direct result of strong regulation against discrimination. The Internet we know today 
exists because broadband networks have been regulated since their inception, and 
continued regulation will protect everyone’s ability to innovate and communicate 
online...Only regulation can prevent [the development of slow and fast lanes] from 
happening. " Michael Weinberg 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/06/23/the-fcc-should-regulate-
broadband-providers-to-protect-the-open-internet  
 “Now, as Chairman of the FCC, I do not intend to allow innovation to be strangled 
by the manipulation of the most important network of our time, the Internet.” 
Remarks of Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. 
National Cable & Telecommunications Association April 30, 2014. He states 
further, “I am proposing that the FCC use its Title II authority to implement and 
enforce open internet protections. Using this authority, I am submitting to my 
colleagues the strongest open internet protections ever proposed by the FCC.” 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-326852A1.pdf  April 30, 2014 
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technologies, the Danish government has had an important role by 
being a key buyer of information and communications technologies, 
digitizing government services, and providing a set of digital assets 
which individuals and enterprises can use to lower transaction costs. 
Other lessons such as the the self-regulatory regime for net neutrality, 
the framework to fast-track mobile infrastructure, the dismantling of 
the telecom regulator, and the continued efforts to removed outdated 
and obsolete regulation demonstrate the Danish approach.  
The so-called “Nordic Model”400 of free market capitalism with a 
social safety net is a helpful reference, but it does not fully explain 
Danish telecom policy. Indeed, Denmark’s telecom policy differs 
significantly from its Scandinavian neighbors.  For example Sweden 
has been known for its government-funded fiber projects and partially 
state-owned incumbent, while privatization and prohibitions against 
subsidies have been the rule for Denmark. Henten and Falch suggest it 
is the interplay of regulatory and developmental approaches that 
explain the Danish approach to telecom policy.401 and Layton and 
Kane suggest that it is Denmark’s preference for multi-party 
cooperation and facilitation that supports its success.402  
This approach has been further vindicated by the Danish Productivity 
Commission in 2014.403 The group of the nation’s top economists and 
industrial experts surveyed the country’s various infrastructures and 
concluded that the market-led, technology neutral approach, left no 
need for government targets for telecommunications.  
                                                          
400 Gøsta Esping-Anderson, “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,” Princeton 
University Press, 1990. 
Kristoffer Granov, “Velfærdsstaten,” Faktalink, November 2013, 
http://www.faktalink.dk/titelliste/velfaerdsstaten/hele-faktalinket-om-
velfaerdsstaten. 
401 Morten Falch and Anders Henten, “European broadband policy - regulation vs. 
facilitation,” Paper presented at ITS, El Ecorial, Spain. (2015). DOI: 
10.13140/RG.2.1.4728.0484 
402 Layton, Roslyn and Joseph Kane. Mercatus. Forthcoming 2017.  
403 Infrastructure Analysis Report 5, Danish Productivity Commission, (January 
2014). 
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Digitization as a national strategy beginning in 1994 
The World Economic Forum404 has observed that when it comes to 
ICT competitiveness, broadband infrastructure is but one factor. 
Competition is generated by government, businesses, and individuals 
utilizing the ICT infrastructure utilizing advanced infrastructure, not is 
not by the infrastructure itself. This partially explains that while 
Denmark and Japan may each have widespread broadband 
deployment, Japan falls short on competitiveness because many 
Japanese do not use broadband networks and technologies.405 
Similarly, South Korea experiences “jobless growth” as 
overinvestment in high speed broadband networks does not 
materialize into increased productivity.406 Moreover, some Koreans 
may overconsume broadband services (e.g. non-stop video games and 
Internet addiction) such that they do not function in productive roles 
in society. 
It may be the case that Denmark was less concerned about regulating 
telecommunications because it had a larger vision for a national ICT 
strategy already in 1994.407  Unlike the US which had a number of 
large companies and enterprises that drove the adoption of ICT, 
Denmark’s single largest buyer for ICT services was the Danish 
government. Danish political leaders concluded that by defining a 
national digital strategy and some common digital assets, the 
government could kick start ICT adoption by individuals and 
                                                          
404 “Networked Readiness Index,” World Economic Forum, The Global Information 
Technology Reports 2006–2012 (2007).  
405 Igari, Noriko. “How to successfully promote ICT usage: A comparative analysis 
of Denmark and Japan. Telematics and Informatics. Volume 31, Issue 1, February 
2014, Pages 115–125. 
406 Ju Jaeuk, and Jung Hyun-Joon, A Study on the impact of new ICT service and 
technology on employment,” KISDI Research Report (2012). 
https://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/publication/selectResearch.do?cmd=fpSelectRese
arch&sMenuType=5&controlNo=13006&langdiv=2 
407 Christian S. Friis, “A Critical Evaluation of the Danish National ICT Strategy,” 
Economic & Social Review (1997). http://www.tara.tcd.ie/handle/2262/64736. 
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enterprises.408  Henten and Falch describe this as Denmark being on 
the forefront of the shift from the regulatory to the developmental 
approach.  
ICT policies increasingly are part of a larger ‘package’ of 
policy initiatives for the development of e-health, smart cities, 
e-learning etc… The revival of the developmental mode of 
governance within the ICT area is related to ICT convergence 
and the growing importance of access to ICT services… The 
revival does not imply a return to Keynesian inspired policies 
practiced in the post-war period. Developmental initiatives 
must conform to a liberal market environment, and private 
enterprises are involved whenever it is possible. 
Denmark established a national digital strategy with a set of goals and 
objectives:  to reduce the resources consumed by the public sector, 
simplify the process in which the citizens interact with the public 
sector, improve citizens’ experience with public services, and help 
companies save on regulatory compliance costs so that they can 
devote more resources to their core activities.409 The expected benefits 
included effective communication with citizens, an easier path to 
growth for companies (using fewer resources), efficient collaboration 
with patients (as health care professionals have the right ICT tools to 
access data necessary for treatment), and enabling the use of 
technology for social services, particularly for the care of the elderly, 
children, the disabled, and disadvantaged youth.410 
                                                          
408 “Digitaliseringsstrategien 2011-2015,” Digitaliseringsstyrelsen, accessed May 
10, 2016, http://www.digst.dk/Digitaliseringsstrategi/Digitaliseringsstrategi-2011-
15. In English 
http://www.digst.dk/~/media/Files/Digitaliseringsstrategi/Engelsk_strategi_tilgaenge
lig.pdf 
409 “Baggrundsnotat: Digitalisering I Den Offentlige Sektor,” Statsministeriet, 
accessed May 9, 2016, 
http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/baggrundsnotat_om_digitalisering_i_den_offentlige_
sektor.pdf. 
410 Ibid 
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The strategy included creating a set of digital assets for all persons and 
enterprises in the country, including 
1. Personal ID number: given at birth at hospital (CPR, Det 
Centrale Personregister)  1968411 
2. Unique number for each business (CVR, Det Central 
Virksomhedregister) 
a. First implementation (SE-nummeret)1985412 
b. Current implementation 1999413  
3. Digital signature: single login for all government and financial 
services, as well as any business (NemID)  2003414 
4. Easy account: one account for personal payments to and from 
government (Nemkonto)2007415 
5. Mailbox: Digital inbox for all government and financial 
communications (Eboks) 2012416 
 
Taken in this perspective, Danes already recognize the value of the 
digitization and how it can make the government more efficient. That 
                                                          
411 “Www.cpr.dk,” accessed January 8, 2017, https://www.cpr.dk/cpr-
systemet/historie/. 
412 Uffe Rasmussen, “SE-nummer,” Gyldendal Den Store Danske (2014).  
http://denstoredanske.dk/Samfund%2c_jura_og_politik/Samfund/Samfund_og_statis
tik/SE-nummer  
413 “LBK nr 653 af 15/06/2006 Gældende” (2016). 
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414 “Historien Om NemID - NemID,” accessed January 8, 2017, 
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the telecom regulator would be dismantled is not necessarily radical to 
Danes because they accept that the government must continually 
improve the way it delivers processes and services. 
At the same time, government employees are respected and well-
compensated, but this comes with the understanding that they may be 
shifted to different roles over time, even being asked to move to new 
locations, as is the current government’s move to decentralize offices 
from Copenhagen to locations across Denmark. 
While the government was not interested in regulating telecom 
operators, it did see a role for itself in “facilitating” the digital society. 
1999 Multi-Party Agreement on Telecommunications 
“Cooperation across the middle” (“Samarbejde over midten”) is the 
hallmark of Danish politics.  This is an important distinction about 
Danish politics which differs from U.S. bi-partisanship and even the 
Swedish “consensus.”417 In practice, Danish political leadership is 
held by 2-3 major parties with 4-5 smaller parties. No party has won a 
majority in the Parliament for more than a century, so politicians are 
accustomed to crafting solutions that cut across party lines and 
perspectives. The work of getting so many parties on board for 
decision making tends to drive a desire for long-term planning and 
stability.  Danish society is also characterized by trust, 
transparency,418 and accountability,419 and this includes a set of 
political safeguards for citizens to check the activities of government.  
These safeguard mean that citizens have high trust in government, 
                                                          
417 John Alexander, Consensus: The Hidden Codes of Swedish Leadership (Inter 
Media Publications, 2008).  http://johnalexandersweden.com/pdf/CONSENSUS.pdf 
418 Denmark ranks #1 bu Transparency International in being the world’s least 
corrupt country. It has consistently scored at the top of this list. “Corruption 
Perceptions Index” Transparency International. 
http://www.transparency.org/country/DNK 
419 Paul Hegedahl and Gunnar Svendsen, “Tillid - Samfundets Fundament,” 
Syddansk Universitetsforlag (2011). 
http://syd.ungetalenter.dk/sites/default/files/aktiviteter/tillid_-
_samfundets_fundament_bog.pdf. 
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and, therefore, are willing to pay the high rate of tax in exchange for a 
range of government services.  Given the high cost of labor, there is 
also an openness to digital and self-regulatory solutions.420  
In 1999, a group of political parties made the Teleforlig421 (Telecom 
Agreement), the mission and vision for the national telecom policy in 
a mere 10 pages.  In practice all political parties have upheld the 
Telecom Settlement, even those parties which did not agree to it, and 
it remains in force even when some political parties later disband.  
Such a forlig, underpinned by cooperation, make it possible for the 
country to make long-term, stable policy which incidentally supports 
long-term investment, which is important for telecom operators. 
The teleforlig emphasizes the need for a market-based, technology 
neutral telecommunications policy. Though the government wants to 
ensure that consumers can access low cost, high quality 
telecommunications, it is not for the government to decide which 
technologies should be used nor the price points. The agreement 
accepts that convergence will create competition and new market 
realities. When markets become competitive, the regulation should be 
removed.   
2011 Net Neutrality Forum 
There is a tradition for self-regulation in Denmark and the recent 
history of the roll-out of premium SMS with an effective self-
regulatory regime such that the service is widely adopted with little to 
no consumer complaints.  The Danish telecom operators believe that 
they can deliver a net neutrality regime better than the regulators and 
offer it in such a way that it improves the brand and quality of their 
services.422  Therefore the Danish operators took the initiative to 
                                                          
420 Martin Vith Ankerstjerne, “Nej til lobbyregister – ja til selvregulering,” Debat, 
January 11, 2014. http://www.b.dk/kronikker/nej-til-lobbyregister-ja-til-
selvregulering 
421 ”Teleforlig fra september 1999,” Erhvervsstyrelsen, (1999). 
https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/file/teleforliget-fra-september-1999pdf 
422 Interview with Jakob Willer, Teleindustrien. November 26, 2015. 
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create the Net Neutrality Forum423, a set of net neutrality principles 
and a multistakeholder process, to which the telecom regulator 
attends. 
Denmark eschewed hard net neutrality rules, opting for self-
regulation. Adding new rules which require administration is not 
necessarily welcome in this country where there is high labor cost.  
There is a national digital plan with the expectation that the 
government bureaucracy should not grow in head count or budget, but 
must rather be more efficient through digitization. As such, digital and 
self-service solutions are preferred.  This means there is a notion that 
products and services should be well-designed from the beginning so 
that society need not bear the cost of regulation.  Moreover, there is a 
tradition for self-regulation and the recent history of the roll-out of 
premium SMS with an effective self-regulatory regime such that the 
service is widely adopted with little to no consumer complaints.424  
The Danish telecom operators believe that they can deliver a net 
neutrality regime better than the regulators and offer it in such a way 
that it improves the brand and quality of their services.  Therefore the 
Danish operators took the initiative to create the Net Neutrality 
Forum, a set of net neutrality principles and a multistakeholder 
process, to which the telecom regulator attends. 
Though participation is open to anyone, the forum generally includes 
the internet service providers, head of consumer organization, Google, 
and the telecom regulator.425  In the Danish regime, internet service 
providers agree to uphold a set of consumer-centric principles similar 
to the Four Freedoms with an additional commitment to the quality of 
the connection.  Should problems arise, the forum provides a means 
for quick and flexible resolutions.  According to the industry 
association, there has only been one issue.426 At one point, one 
                                                          
423 Tele Industrien, “Netneutralitet,” 
http://www.teleindu.dk/branchesamarbejde/netneutralitet/ (accessed April 8, 2016). 
424 Rammeaftalen, accessed January 8, 2017, http://www.rammeaftalen.dk/om/ 
425 Multistakeholder models can be direct and representative. In our study we find 
that while the processes are deemed open, in general, a set of self-selected experts 
tend to participate.. 
426 Supra Jacob Willer 
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operators wanted to make a surcharge for WhatsApp. The Forum 
advised against it. 
The Net Neutrality Forum describes its principles for a best-efforts, 
open internet as the following 
1. Users have the right to an internet connection with a declared 
quality and capacity.  
2. User have the right to access the legal content, applications, and 
services of their choice that don’t harm the network  
3. Users should have access to transparency, and the ability to 
inspect the relevant traffic management and operator practices 
4. Operators should not discriminate in relation to specific service 
providers, content or applications  
 
The key contrast between countries with soft rules such as Denmark 
and countries with hard rules is that the former emphasize user rights 
while the latter emphasize industry requirements. The Danish rules are 
similar to the 2005 Internet Policy Statement427 adopted by the FCC, 
consisting of four consumer-centric guiding principles, also referred to 
as the “Four Freedoms”428 “to ensure that broadband networks are 
widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers”: 
• Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of 
their choice. 
• Consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.  
                                                          
427 20 FCC Rcd 14986. 
428 “Remarks of Michael K. Powell Chairman, Federal Communications 
Commission At the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on ‘The Digital Broadband 
Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age,’” Preserving Internet 
Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, February 8, 2004, 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf. In these 
remarks, Chairman Powell referred to four freedoms: (1) Freedom to Access 
Content; (2) Freedom to Use Applications; (3) Freedom to Attach Personal Devices; 
and (4) Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information. These are nearly identical to 
the four principles adopted by the commission. 
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• Consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices 
that do not harm the network. 
• Consumers are entitled to competition among network 
providers, application and service providers, and content 
providers. 
It may be observed that the Danish model goes a step further in that 
the operators commit to delivering the stated speed and quality of the 
promised connection.   
2015 Updating telecom policy for the Internet 
Also update competition rules so that OTT are considered competitors 
to traditional telecom.  This is obvious to users, but bears mention that 
FCC would not deign to update its policies accordingly.  Unwittingly 
the FCC response to growing technological diversity is to add more 
regulation. 
In response to the European Commission’s Digital Single Market 
initiative, the telecom authorities of the Nordic countries conducted a 
dialogue about further improvements for telecom policy.429 Katrine 
Winding Deputy Director General of the telecom section within the 
Danish Business Authority wrote the position paper for the group. It 
notes that telecom regulation needs to be updated to reflect the 
competition from over the top technologies, the substitutability of 
OTT for traditional telecom services, the need to level the playing 
field, and the need to roll back sector specific regulation.  The 
submission to the European Commission explains.430 
                                                          
429 See the position papers of the Nordic telecom regulators. ”Nordisk samarbejde. 
De nordiske telemyndigheders positionspapir til Kommissionens meddelelse om Det 
digitale Indre Marked (DSM).” Erhvervsstyrelsen.dk Accessed November 16, 2016. 
https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/nordisk-samarbejde-0 
430 ”The Digital Single Market Strategy The Nordic NRAs' viewpoints.” 
Erhvervsstyrelsen.dk 25 August 2015  
https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/sites/default/files/media/nordisk_positionspapir_august_
2015.pdf  
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The Nordic regulators agree that there is a general need to 
evaluate and maybe revise the sector-specific competition 
regulation in the light of technological developments and 
development of telecommunications markets both in Europe 
and globally. It is crucial that the future regulation creates 
stable and favourable conditions for the development of new 
and innovative solutions and business models in the digital 
economy and that any changes of the regulation are based on 
thorough analyses.  
Any changes to the telecommunications regulation should take 
into account the new competitive environment in the digital 
economy due to CAPS (content and applications provision 
services)/OTT (Over-The-Top) players delivering content 
services like Netflix, Skype and YouTube or other type of 
services using existing broadband connections in the digital 
value chain. Some of these players act as service providers in 
direct competition with the traditional telecom operators either 
on the telecom market or within the audio-visual media service 
area.   
The European Commission, BEREC and several NRAs are in 
the process of analysing CAPS/OTT services and their impact 
on the telecommunication sector. The analyses should be 
focused on the OTT media services and OTT communication 
services as they increasingly act as substitutes to media and 
communication services that have generated revenues for 
traditional telecommunications companies through the usage 
of e.g. telephone calls, SMS or TV subscriptions packed with 
broadband subscription. Moreover, OTT media services 
require great stability and capacity in the network. Therefore, 
these services also demand special requirements of the 
infrastructure. 
With the purpose of assessing the impact on the 
telecommunication sectors, the analyses should describe 
developments and changes in the value chain and business 
models, including how and why some companies spread across 
the value chain, the strategy behind this and revenue source of 
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the business models for both OTT players and traditional 
telecommunications companies.  
The playing field for all actors in the digital economy needs to 
be levelled out. To promote innovation and new solutions in 
the European digital economy, the Nordic regulators agree that 
the starting point should be reducing the regulatory burden 
where possible, rather than extending the present sector-
specific regulation. 
It is important that any possible roll back of the current sector 
specific regulation also takes into account whether certain 
common requirements related to information security, data 
protection and privacy are still needed or if general consumer 
protection law and competition law should be applied. 
The position was further updated in 2016 to recognize that telecom 
operators are not “bottlenecks” to OTT, or edge providers in 
American parlance.431 
The OTT development has been intensive over the last couple 
of years. When the open Internet is used as distribution 
platform, the delivery of telecommunication and media 
services becomes global and consumers are no longer forced to 
buy these services together with the network service. This 
leads to a more competitive market situation at local level.   
Previously, the aggregator or distributor role was linked to the 
network ownership, giving these companies a unique position 
as owners of a bottleneck resource. Today, we see a 
development, where the link between the aggregator and 
network ownership is disintegrating. This development 
removes the high entry barriers on delivery of content services 
as aggregator and it opens up for many companies to position 
                                                          
431 ”The EU telecommunications legislation for the Digital Single Market The 
Nordic NRAs' viewpoints.” Erhvervsstyrelsen.dk. 4 July 2016. 
https://erhvervsstyrelsen.dk/sites/default/files/media/nordisk_positionspapir_juli_20
16.pdf  
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themselves in the role as aggregator/content service provider. 
So far, it is the experience in the Nordic countries that the 
reduced vertical integration has a positive effect on market 
dynamics, innovation and investment. 
This view sharply contrasts with the view that ISPs have the ability 
and incentive to harm openness. 
5.2 CRITIQUE OF NET NEUTRALITY  
This section attempts to account for why the preliminary results run 
contrary to policymakers’ and supporters stated expectations. This 
section critiques some of the assumptions and assertions of net 
neutrality. It reviews the various interpretations of the end to end 
principle; the notion of a neutrality platform; and the idea that there is 
an essential architecture in the original internet which is responsible 
for innovations. Some derivate assumptions related to these points are 
also discussed. 
5.2.1 END TO END PRINCIPLE 
The “End-to-End Argument” is an engineering statement often 
mentioned by network neutrality advocates as a founding design 
principle of the Internet. Many think that the papers proposing the 
principle are unquestionable founding documents. They believe that 
the opinions within these documents justify rulemaking. While 
regulation should be informed by science and research, creating laws 
from papers written on general design theories seems extreme. 
The network neutrality legalists misunderstand the end to end 
argument, transport it from the field of engineering to a concept of 
social justice, and ignore the authors’ commentary and delimitation. 
Even more confusing, the principle has been stated differently at 
different times. To address this foundation of network neutrality 
thinking, the discussion must start at the beginning. 
The original end-to-end argument is undoubtedly an important 
contribution to network engineering. The authors of the original paper 
(1984), in their wisdom, properly use careful language to allow for 
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other possibilities. They also state the requirement for a cost/benefit 
analysis. One needs only to look at the choice of words contained 
within the summary at the beginning of the paper to understand (bold 
emphasis added below): 
This paper presents a design principle that helps guide 
placement of functions among the modules of a 
distributed computer system. The principle, called the 
end-to-end-argument, suggests that functions placed at 
low levels of a system may be redundant or of little 
value when compared to the cost of providing them at 
that low level. 
While the summary is a good overall guide to the paper, it is not the 
actual End-To-End argument. Further in, the complete argument 
reads: 
The function in question can completely and correctly be 
implemented with the knowledge and help of the 
application standing at the endpoints of the 
communications system. Therefore, providing that the 
questioned function as a feature of the communications 
system itself is not possible. Sometimes an incomplete 
version of the function provided by the communication 
system may be useful as a performance enhancement. 
As can be seen, it is a suggested exception for performance 
enhancement. The paper also explains that application requirements 
provide the basis of the argument. The basis is important because 
application requirements are also the basis for offering separate 
categories of service. 
In the later paper, 1998,432, the same original End-to-End Argument 
authors assess a particular technology in relation to the End-to-End 
Argument. However, it has been noted that within this paper the 
                                                          
432 Reed, Saltzer, Clark. “Active Networking and End-to-End Arguments” 
(May/June 1998) IEEE Network 12, 3: pgs. 69-71. 
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/ANe2ecomment.html 
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authors state the Argument with different wording, thus changing its 
meaning.433 It is a detail worthy of mention, as some commentary on 
End-to-End design differs based on which version of the Argument a 
person chooses to consider. 
Much like the original paper the authors’ choice of words form careful 
language to summarize the principle and discuss trade-offs (Bold 
emphasis added): 
Some twenty years have elapsed since we identified and 
named end-to-end-arguments, a class of system design 
principles that organize and guide the placement of a 
function within a system. These arguments and the 
underlying principles have now been invoked in many 
contexts, becoming part of the vocabulary of network 
protocol and operating system designers. Like other 
general design principles, end-to-end arguments impose 
a structure on the design space, rather than solving the 
design problem. This structure provides a basis for 
discussion and analysis of trade-offs, and suggests a 
strong rationale to justify design choices.” 
Then in the third paragraph, they restate the principle in a new way: 
…the end-to-end principle that a function or service 
should be carried out within a network layer only if it is 
needed by all clients of that layer, and it can be 
completely implemented by that layer. 
The restatement is also annotated, further recognizing that the 
principle is not perfect: 
There are some situations where applying an end-to-end-
argument is counter-productive. 
The paper also provides additional context: 
                                                          
433 van Schewick, Barbara “Internet Architecture and Innovation” (2010): pg. 58. 
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Part of the context of an end-to-end argument is the idea 
that a lower layer of a system should support the widest 
possible variety of services and functions, so as to permit 
applications that cannot be anticipated. That is, minimize 
the lower-layer function, get out of the way, and let the 
higher layer do its thing. 
The paper further reads on the various risks of adding complexity to a 
system. Quite notably however, it specifically states that “the 
complexity added by priority mechanisms used in limiting congestion 
is modest.” 
The paper concludes that analysis of the particular technology should 
be on a case-by-case basis. 
Clearly, as shown, the authors have been careful to include the support 
for different types of applications and the possibility of exceptions to 
their design principle. Unfortunately, such details are often ignored by 
network neutrality advocates who insist on a rigid application of the 
End-to-End Principle, which is in fact an interpretation of an earlier 
argument. 
Lemley and Lessig, two lawyers, have developed a legal principle 
based upon an engineering concept, but their assertions demonstrate 
that they misunderstand what Saltzer, Reed and Clark and might not 
understand network engineering either. The assert that vertical 
integration of services by a network operator constitutes placing 
functionality within the Internet. One can suspect they are confused 
about the physical placement. In reality, while competing Internet 
services may be introduced by network operators, and be housed 
within the same buildings as network infrastructure, the actual 
equipment would have to be at addressable endpoints of the network, 
and not acting as a function in the middle. Such competitive services 
would be, in fact, completely in line with the End-to-End argument. 
Even a content-delivery network integrated within a network operator 
still must connect to the Internet at an addressable network endpoint, 
and does not add any network functionality within the Internet itself. 
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Lemley and Lessig suggest that the End-to-End Argument implies 
resources should not be “particular to or optimized for any single 
application”. However, the grouping of Internet applications into 
distinct categories is not addressed. What they do not understand is 
that the Internet, if it remains an un-categorized best-effort service 
only, is optimized for bursts of traffic that are not time-sensitive. 
Lemley and Lessig, to provide support for their rationale, quote the 
paper containing the alternate form of the End-to-End argument. 
However, they ignore the additional context and footnotes within the 
source paper and largely misinterpret the meaning of the quoted 
information. 
One statement of note from within the passage they quote: 
Lower-level layers, which support many independent 
applications, should provide only resources of broad 
utility across applications, while providing to 
applications useable means for effective sharing of 
resources and resolution of resource conflicts (network 
transparency). 
Expressed in this quotation, the original End-to-End authors have 
offered another good piece of network design guidance. It is the 
interpretation of Lemley and Lessig however, which warped the 
meaning. For allowing different categories of applications is providing 
broad resources. Otherwise, a singular best-effort Internet traffic 
handling rule provides only narrow utility. 
From this, one could imagine a worst-case scenario of government 
“End-to-End” compliance inspection and certification programs being 
a requirement of all Internet network design changes and builds. 
However, there is a major flaw when network neutrality advocates 
repeat Lemley and Lessig’s excitement over the “default design” of 
the Internet. For the networking protocol of the Internet (IP) has 
always had support for declaring alternate service categories. 
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5.2.2 DAVID CLARK ON THE END TO END PRINCIPLE 
The political acceptance of the end-to-end principle as a proof of the 
Internet’s “original” architecture seems a fait accompli in net 
neutrality policymaking, even though the end to end engineering paper 
was not published until 18 years after internet protocol had been 
designed. David Clark, one of  author of original end-to-end papers 
has devoted decades to promote network innovation and disagrees 
with “religious” interpretations and prescriptions.434 He cautioned 
interpreting the principle for policy ends  and suggested reasons why 
the internet should depart from end to end arguments namely because 
of an untrustworthy world, more demanding applications, ISP service 
differentiation, rise of third party involvement, and fewer 
sophisticated users.435 
Clark also served as the Vice Chair to the FCC’s Open Internet 
Advisory Committee. At the introductory meeting of the group he had 
the following comments.436  
Back then we didn’t use the word ‘open’. It’s not really 
part of our language.  We understood generality…if you 
go back to the end to end paper I wrote with Jerry 
Saltzer and David Reed—which has been used as a 
religious tract far beyond what it will sustain if you are a 
strict constructionist (A person who construes a legal 
text or document in a specified way)—I  believe I 
verified that the paper does not contain word ‘open’.  
That paper was about correctness, which is a narrow 
objective.  It’s not even about performance. 
                                                          
434 See separate discussion of David Clark in this paper. 
435 Clark, David and Marjory Blumenthal. “Rethinking the design of the Internet: 
The end to end arguments vs. the brave new world” 2000.  
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1519/TPRC_Clark_Blumenthal.pdf 
436 Open Internet Advisory Committee Meeting. July 20, 2012. Video 
http://www.fcc.gov/events/open-internet-advisory-committee-meeting, scroll to 65 
min  
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Clearly “open” is in play by 1994. We had a study which 
we described Open Data Network (ODN) and the 
hourglass figure. ‘Internet’ was the word that was 
contested at that time, not open.  
Now openness has taken on a sort of religious tone.  
Openness is a slippery word.  It doesn’t mean much. I 
have cynically observed that it’s a word you put in front 
of another to create a positive value (open borders, open 
conversation, open continents, open relationship). It’s 
obvious that  it’s opposite of closed, which is a bad 
word. Openness is not a goal, nor is network neutrality a 
goal. 
 
Envision not an hourglass, but a bow-tie with the word 
open in the middle.  One the one side you have a sense 
of requirements:  innovation, economic investment in the 
network and applications, freedom of discourse, civil 
society etc. On the other side you have specifics, rules 
and technological decisions. Open is the word that we 
use to tie them together. 
 
Sometimes “open” is a convenient shorthand, but 
sometimes it obscures the linkage between the decisions  
you’re making on the one hand and the requirements 
you’re trying to meet on the other. 
 
We will continue to use the word “open” in this 
conversation, just as we use the word internet, but it 
important that we go back from time to time and tag up, 
what the deeper problems that we are actually 
addressing, are we being sensitive to needs of various 
stakeholders, for example do we have the right economic 
incentives to innovate, invest and improve?  Are we 
being sensitive to the larger social construct, the civil 
society, the discourse? There are also profound 
international issues. 
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The historical message is that we’ve been using open 
since 1994 as a code word for a basket of requirements 
on the one hand and technical decisions and rulemaking 
on the other. We should not focus on open as the 
objective but with the relationship between these two 
sides. We should use ‘open’ as a code word but 
carefully. 
Clark references Steve Deering’s Watching the Waist of the Protocol 
Hourglass437, which offered another handy image in which to envision 
the internet.   The hourglass has a wide variety of host-based protocols 
at the top and the variety of networking and transmissions 
technologies at the bottom.  Internet Protocol is the “hourglass’s 
narrow waist” allowing anything at the top to communicate with 
anything at the bottom.  The beauty of the waist of the hourglass is 
internet protocol (IP) which maximizes interoperability, that is 
anything that uses IP can communicate with anything else on the 
internet that uses IP.  
However Deering expresses his concern in a phrase he calls “putting 
on weight at the waist”, meaning that as the load of content and 
applications from the top of the hourglass increases, it makes greater 
demands of the underlying networks below.  Hence the networks 
needs to evolve to keep pace with new demands.438 
Clark also mentions his work with the National Research Council.  
Consider that groups book The Internet’s Coming of Age439 published 
in 2001by the Committee on the Internet in the Evolving Information 
Infrastructure, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications.  
The book reveals that it is not openness, but rather robustness which is 
                                                          
437 Deering, Steve. “Watching the Waist of the Protocol Hourglass.” IETF 51. 
August 2001. http://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/hourglass-
london-ietf.pdf  
438 Ibid slide 5. 
439 Committee on the Internet and the Evolving Information Infrastructure. Internet’s 
Coming of Age. National Academy Press, 2001. 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9823  
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most important.  Calling it “the single most enabling characteristic of 
the internet”, the robustness principle is loosely about TCP 
implementations “being conservative in their sending behavior and 
liberal in its receiving behavior” or “be conservative in what you do, 
be liberal in what you accept from others”. 
The ARPANET had its origins in a defense environment, with the key 
goal being survivability. If the network was attacked, it could 
reconnect with a new and diverse set of networks.  This underlies the 
internet’s ability to evolve over time with new applications and 
innovations.  Beside the idea of the sender/receiver relationship, there 
is also the definition of conservative, careful design at the transport 
level to deal with packet loss and delay.  Robustness also has to do 
with the configuration of the switches and routers in the network and 
the ability for the network to constantly reconfigure the routing of 
data, for example if a package is dropped.  
The main difference is that the Saltzer, Reed and Clark had in mind 
much flexibility and “generality” whereas net neutrality supporters 
demand “hardline” rules that are at odds with the spirit of a robust 
network.  If there was a rule, it was probably “always find a 
workaround”. The ARPANET engineers never intended their 
guidelines to become religious dogma.  Indeed Bob Kahn who 
develop TCP/IP calls net neutrality is a “slogan”440 and the networks 
need the ability to innovate and experiment.  He indicates that 
engineers did not have politics, let alone net neutrality, in mind when 
they developed the architecture. 
5.2.3 OTHER CRITIQUES OF THE END TO END PRINCIPLE 
One challenge in proving the end-to-end arguments is that every 
network is in fact an end-to-end system. The argumentation is 
tautological in a sense. While we all may agree that the Internet has a 
set of beneficial features, this does not necessarily mean that this is a 
justification to enshrine a particular set of technologies and practice 
and ban the emergence of others.  Van Schewick seems to suggest that 
                                                          
440 “Computer Pioneer Robert Kahn with Ed Feigenbaum” Interview at Computer 
Museum.  November 15, 2007. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3uTKs9XZyk  
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the end-to-end design was a single, deliberate, and inviolable decision. 
More likely what we attribute  the “openness” and flexibility of the 
Internet, that anyone can write a program and it can be distributed to 
through network, is its “datagram.”  
As network engineer and co-inventor of wifi Richard Bennet explains 
in “Designed for Change: End-to-End Arguments, Internet Innovation, 
and the Net Neutrality Debate”441, the value of the datagram, instead 
of the traditional telecom control system, is that network logic can be 
exported to the end-user systems where it is easier to experiment with 
policies and protocols by writing new software. We might consider it 
the ability to conduct an A-B split test on a set of points before 
incorporating a change in the network overall. 
Bennett addresses the legal side of end to end argumentation as well. 
As network neutrality lawyers attempt to reach back to the End-to-End 
Argument as a source for justification, much like a U.S. constitutional 
lawyer would reach back to the Federalist Papers. Bennett however 
reaches further back, bypassing the TCP/IP Internet, to the original 
birth of end-to-end as a networking concept - The CYCLADES 
network designed by Louis Pouzin in France. The ARPANET 
engineers studied this and adapted this method to their own 
experimentation.442 Bennett found that Pouzin had expressed 
efficiency as a valid reason for placing functionality within the 
network. One could liken Bennett’s depth to that of a more rigorous 
U.S. constitutional lawyer, looking back beyond the Federalist papers, 
to the works of another Frenchman of great importance - 
Montesquieu.  This edge experimentation is not mutually exclusive to 
experimentation at the core of the network. 
Bennett suggests that misinterpretation of the End-to-End Arguments 
is a persistent problem in the network neutrality discussion, along with 
the refusal to include current network architectural discussions in the 
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debate. In extensive technical content, the paper exposes the 
unavoidable issues created by the functionality in higher architectural 
layers being isolated from the network layers, causing the end 
applications to be unable to properly respond to particular problems. 
As an example, Bennett presents the TCP “congestion collapse”, in 
which the situation required the reengineering of the TCP protocol. 
The issue ultimately was inadequately addressed. The modified TCP 
(which implemented the “Jacobson Algorithm”) was consistent with 
the End-to-End Arguments, as the adjusted functionality was only at 
the endpoints.  
Bennett argues in favor of an alternate resolution which would have 
placed some functionality within the network, and adds “It’s widely 
acknowledged that Jacobson’s Algorithm is no longer appropriate for 
the Internet.” Evidently, coordination between endpoints and the 
network appears to be the key to ultimately fixing the TCP traffic 
control issues. Although one could also even argue that adding such 
functionality to solve the TCP design flaw may actually comply with 
the End-to-End Arguments’ “performance enhancement” exception, 
the point still stands: Outright banning of functionality within the 
Internet is foolish to enact. 
Bennett plainly sees the problems with Lemley and Lessig’s analysis 
of the End-to-End Arguments. They insist that these network 
engineering documents carry the full weight of law. Furthermore, they 
greatly misinterpret the concepts put forth within the original works, 
ignore the true needs of varied applications, and appear to have no 
knowledge of IP network structure in general. Also, somewhat strange 
for lawyers, they do not acknowledge the clearly cautious language by 
the End-to-End Argument’s authors.  Moreover there are countless 
other engineering guidelines to consider.443 
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Yoo describes van Schewick’s approach to the End to End Argument 
as “modularity,”444 referring to the degree to which a system’s 
components can be separated and recombined. While there may be 
benefits related to the independence of applications (that the 
applications need not take into account the underlying network in 
order to function), modularity imposes costs of its own including a 
constraint for engineers to present solutions for network security, 
mobility, mass media distribution (multicasting), and support for 
multiple connections to the same location (multihoming).445 As such, 
it may be helpful to define when modularity is optimal and allow 
innovation to continue with more informed policies. 
For example Wu notes that broadband providers exaggerate security 
risk, but that observation might not hold in 2016 when security is a 
critical issue for the Internet.  
5.2.5 NEUTRAL PLATFORM 
Wu suggested that if the network is a “neutral platform”, then there 
can be “meritocratic” and “Darwinian” competition among 
applications. Wu does not state his assumptions, but they can be 
deduced. He declares that “private interests of broadband providers 
and the public’s interest in a competitive innovation environment 
centered on the Internet” are inherently in conflict. This itself is 
worthy of empirical investigation. If anything, the near universal 
uptake of mobile telephony in many countries suggests that public and 
private interests are aligned in many respects.  
This dichotomy of application versus network impugns a zero sum 
game, as if the amount of innovation were finite. This contradicts the 
notion of an ecosystem in which the actors engage in symbiotic 
relationships. In such an ecosystem, innovation can be a positive sum 
game. The parts of the system flourish together.  
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Barely a decade after Wu’s article, Internet connectivity is available 
through a variety of networks, increasingly at speeds of 100 Mbps or 
more. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development reports for the member countries,446 mobile broadband 
penetration was 85.4% in June 2015, up from 76% in June 2014.  In 
fixed-line broadband subscriptions reached 365 million in June 2015, 
up from 351 million in June 2014. Smartphones are nearly ubiquitous 
in highly developed countries. Internet adoption is near saturation in 
many developed countries; more than two-thirds of the population is 
online,447 and 3.2 billion people are online.  
As Cisco reports, mobile networks carried fewer than 10 gigabytes per 
month in 2000 and less than 1 petabyte per month in 2005, 448 but the 
amount of data consumed globally per capita has increased in real 
terms from 2.1 exabytes per month in 2014 to 3.7 exabytes per month 
in 2015. In the history of technological innovation, only the mobile 
phone has grown faster than the Internet,449 which is the foundation 
for nearly every person on the face of the earth to be connected to the 
internet.  It would seem that the growth of Internet connectivity is a 
success. 
Noted atheist Christopher Hitchens remarked, “That what can be 
asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence.”450 
As such, polemic pronouncements such as “the internet is too 
important to be left to the market” are proffered when the justification 
for the regulation is otherwise not supported by the facts.  It could be 
that broadband providers and the public interest are not aligned, but it 
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would be helpful to qualify the statement with some evidence. In any 
case, while Wu’s assumption is that the two interests are in conflict, 
the opposite is an equally acceptable premise, that the interests are in 
cooperation. 
It bears mention that Creative Commons is a stand-alone entity which 
Lessig founded to give creators a choice of how to distribute their 
content. It is Lessig’s vision of neutral platform for content which 
anyone can use. His hope is that Creative Commons would grow to be 
a counterbalance to traditional copyright. 
However to create Wu’s neutral platform of a broadband network 
requires a regulatory taking of a private network in the form of 
government-mandated restrictions. That is to say that the network 
owners have no choice in the matter. It begs the question of why not 
just build the so-called neutral network from scratch.  Indeed if it is so 
vital and can deliver the promised innovation, it’s a wonder that there 
are not more entrepreneurs, investors, and even application providers 
investing in such a network. 
Some suggest that government-owned networks could be conceived, 
built and run as “neutral, open” networks. 451 This thesis focuses on 
privately owned mobile networks, so a discussion of the pros and cons 
of government-owned networks is out of scope. Government network 
proponents note that success requires a number of factors and that the 
record to date is mixed.452  Suffice it to say that the premise of the 
superiority of government broadband rests upon the assumption that 
government providers are better stewards that private ones. However 
decades of deregulation of state-owned telephone monopolies 
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suggests that market competition has advantages.453 In addition 
governments can impose significant restrictions on the content and 
management of networks, compromising their “neutrality.”454  The 
celebrated Stokab network in Stockholm is bolstered by a set of laws 
forbidding investment by private actors in surrounding areas, so it is 
not clear that the network is neutral if other actors cannot participate. 
Even if we accept the idea of the neutral platform, the net neutrality 
assertion that zero is right access price for content providers455 is not 
supportable.  Indeed if an innovator values a platform and enjoys 
benefits, it follows that innovator should pay a usage fee or some kind 
of fee to maintain the network. It is understandable that a larger user 
would pay more.  Even if we consider the Internet a commons, there 
are still access and usage fees.  
Wu gives the example of the retail store as a neutral platform, but in 
reality even a retail store is not neutral. However retail stores, even 
being non-neutral, can support innovation. Retail stores have a 
symbiotic relationship with the companies that supply their products. 
In addition, many retail stores have a house brand in addition to the 
third party brands they offer. A supermarket earns a fee for selling the 
products to customers, but may also charge a fee to the brand to be put 
on the shelf. Some of those brands may participate in activities to help 
the overall attractiveness of the store, special promotions, marketing 
etc. The relationships are all determined by the store strategy and the 
various elasticities of demand for the product.  
There is no doubt that some products will be present in all stores 
(Coca-Cola, Kellogg’s cereal, Snickers candy bar etc), just like 
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favorite apps will be found on all networks. But some stores will 
likely differentiate. For example, some stores may engage in 
“blocking” by not stocking certain products or even classes of 
products. Consider Whole Foods456 which won’t stock foie gras or 
products that contain bleached flour, high fructose corn syrup, 
Aspartame, or any artificial colors or flavors. However people love 
Whole Foods for the upscale experience. Indeed Whole Foods’ 
“discrimination” has  opened and expanded the market to a more 
aesthetic approach to shopping. One observer calls Whole Foods the 
“luxury brand of millennials.”457 Overall American supermarkets have 
improved significantly and now offer organic foods, natural foods as 
well as to make the shopping experience more substantive458 with 
aesthetic displays, coffee bars, cafes etc.  Not allow the store to 
differentiate, the neutral platform as it were, would actually limit the 
kinds of products in the marketplace. 
Communication networks are no different. Their diversification can 
benefit users and applications providers. The same regulation which is 
purported to protect user choice and innovation may in fact do the 
opposite. Open Internet regulation could in fact retard valuable 
network innovation and innovation by third parties.  
The standard justification for why communication networks must be 
regulated is conventional wisdom that they are natural monopolies. 
Thus notion has been turned on its head by the facilities based 
competition afforded by new technologies for communications 
networks.459 The same argument appears again in justification for net 
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neutrality regulation in “internet exceptionalism,”460 the view that the 
Internet is so special and different that it must be regulated to retain its 
“original” character that was “open” and “free”. In a subsequent 
article Wu extolls the value of the Internet in that anyone can be a 
publisher, that it was founded not by “private firms” but as a non-
profit research project (but ignoring the trillions of dollars of private 
investment to make it possible), its ideology of practical 
libertarianism, and decentralization by design. He then concludes that 
the Internet is passing from its “utopian” phase to its “open” phase, 
and then will become another communications network, which, he 
implies will need to be regulated to retain the Internet’s “original” 
goal, as if to say there was a set of defined founders and defined goals 
and can never deviate. This further assumes that the regulators can be 
entrusted to achieve such a preservation and that such rules will 
actually work to return to this Paradise Lost.   
5.2.6 DISCRIMINATION 
Wu makes another assumption that managing a network for profit is 
harmful and “discriminatory.” As such, the word “discrimination” is a 
word frequently used by advocates for net neutrality and critics of 
zero rating. This word appears to be misunderstood both in the 
economic and technical context.461 The primary definition of 
“discrimination” is to recognize a distinction, to differentiate, or to 
perceive differences, as in “babies can discriminate between different 
facial expressions.”462  The economic concept of “price 
discrimination” is predicated upon this primary meaning.  When a 
vendor can perceive differences between two or more customers, then 
it may be possible to charge them different prices for the same product 
(price discrimination) or to customize the product offered to each in a 
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manner that reflects the difference (product differentiation). If the 
customized products impose different expended or expected costs on 
the vendor, then charging different prices does not constitute price 
discrimination.463 Similarly technical discrimination as is traffic 
management would imply a similar ability to differentiate.  
 
Tim Wu’s non-discrimination principle is predicated on the legal 
meaning of the word, the secondary definition of discrimination, 
which has to do with prejudice, for example “an employment policy 
that discriminates against women.”  In fact, the flat and unlimited 
plans that users enjoy are forms of price discrimination, just as zero 
rating is.464 From an economist’s perspective, these offers are not 
different.  Price discrimination, of which zero rating is one variant, is 
a fundamental tenet of economics, and its value to promote social 
welfare has been recognized for at least a century. Google’s Hal 
Varian described the social welfare effects of price discrimination in 
1985,465 Schmalensee in 1981,466 Robinson in 1933,467 and so on. 
 
In addition to economics, there is acknowledgement in engineering 
that some discrimination is required in the transference of data to 
preserve the working and security of the network; such rules are 
                                                          
463 Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 4 
edition (Boston: Pearson, 2004). 
464 Howell, Bronwyn. “The Danger of Using History to Guide Modern Internet 
Policy.” TechPolicyDaily.com, 2015. 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/history-guide-internet-policy/ 
465 Varian, Hal R. (1985) Price Discrimination and Social Welfare. The American 
Economic Review. Vol 75. No 4 (Sept 1985), pp 870-875. At: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1821366?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
466 Schmalensee, Richard. “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination,” American Economic Review, 1981, vol. 71, issue 1, 
pages 242-47 
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a71_3ay_3a1981_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a
242-47.htm 
467 Robinson, Joan. The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London, 1933 
289 
defined as “Internet traffic management.”468 Traffic management 
techniques imply at a certain level discrimination of content that might 
be independent of the protocol employed for the sending of data and 
can be applied to a specific protocol or application. These techniques 
put the operators or ISPs as the control points469 and affect the ability 
of users to send and receive information, hence traffic management is 
allowed based on the principles of a real and legitimate purpose or 
goal. 
Zero rating programs are mainly services allowing certain types of 
Internet traffic not to be counted as part of the total data plan to which 
the consumer subscribes. It is then a discrimination based on specific 
contents and their relation to payment, but it is not discrimination 
based on access. In other words, it is a commercial but not technical 
discrimination. Yoo (2016) refers to the discrepancies on the 
understanding of what zero rating is by saying “differential pricing is 
something of a misnomer, since that term suggests that different end 
users are being charged different prices for the same service. A similar 
critique applies to the tendency in European debates to refer to service 
differentiation as positive or negative price discrimination. A more 
appropriate term would be service differentiation, since ISPs vary the 
services being offered and charge the same price to every end user 
purchasing that service plan.”470. 
Some criticize usage-based pricing for artificially introducing scarcity 
that forces users to curtail Internet use. These criticisms are not 
grounded in reality, as there is nothing artificial about the scarcity of 
mobile capacity—data caps simply give operators an additional tool 
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for planning and pricing around this scarcity. Such tools are especially 
important when operators are competing on their networks’ 
performance. 
Other stakeholders criticize specific forms of usage-based pricing, 
preferring some models to known others. When it comes to zero 
rating, critics have been particularly vocal about exclusive dealing, 
where carriers only offer to zero rate particular content, and exclusive 
deals with affiliated content above all471. 
The “harmful discrimination” critique of zero rating claims that ISPs 
are allowed to discriminate against content that users want to see.472  
Critics suggest that established providers could use zero rating to 
make it more expensive for consumers to access nonproprietary 
content or new content where its providers could not pay to subsidize 
users’ transport costs. In order for this argument to hold one must 
assume that there is perfect competition in content, that any piece of 
content can be substituted for any other, that users have perfect 
information, and there are no transaction costs.  In such a market 
consumers are indifferent to content, and would only chose one over 
the other because of price.  
While this perfect competition model is interesting for academic 
purposes, it doesn’t exist in the real world. The better economic model 
is imperfect competition, which takes into account product variation 
that assumes that both users and content providers know the relative 
strength of users’ preferences for the different variations, and they 
each know where the best matches will be made. As a result, they will 
match up in a manner that maximizes total welfare. As new variations 
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are developed, customers migrate freely to their new preferred variant.  
Howell explains, 473   
The welfare effects of zero rating are highly contingent 
on the circumstances in which it is applied. Zero rating is 
likely to more beneficial the more heterogeneous the 
options are (or the greater the real difference consumers 
perceive between them) and the less informed consumers 
are about the value the differences offer them. This 
suggests that zero rating is more likely to be an issue for 
concern in the provision of a handful of homogeneous 
and easily described and defined services (cloud storage, 
for example) than in the provision of highly 
differentiated individual and content-based applications 
that make up the majority of the Internet’s content. Until 
more information is available about consumer 
preferences, case-based competition law provides more 
flexibility to take account of different contexts than 
imposing potentially costly prohibitions that favor 
homogeneity over differentiation.474 
The debates about free and subsidized content are not new. Licensed 
television providers who decried lobbed a similar criticism that free or 
advertising-supported TV would put them out of the business. Rather 
the opposite has happened.  There is a market for both because the two 
kinds of TV programming are not perfect substitutes; they produce 
different content. While users avail themselves to both, the advantage 
of the two models is that advertisers are allowed to participate, and 
hence more content is created overall.  If only licensed TV were 
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allowed, there would be less content,475 as consumers have only a 
limited amount they can spend. However by adding a second option, 
consumers get more content without the need for addition TV 
expenditure. 
The same analysis applies to free and subscription newspapers. There 
would be no room for subscription newspapers if they offered the 
same information as free newspapers.  It is frequently the case that 
volunteers and local advertisers subsidize local newspapers. Making it 
free may increase the likelihood that community members will read it 
in that town, but that does not mean they will give up their 
subscription to a national newspaper.  Moreover just because the local 
newspaper is free does not mean the people in the next town will want 
to read it. The content in that local newspaper has a particular interest 
to the people in that community.  
Internet traffic patterns show that some content is highly valuable, but 
most content is not.  In fact, much of the content on the Internet has no 
value to most users.  This is particularly the case for much of the 
worlds unconnected, as they speak a language for which there is no 
content on the Internet, and they don’t write, so they have a challenge 
to navigate on the Internet with a basic feature phone. Transliteration, 
speaking the information into the phone, can help, but this assumes 
that such a feature is enabled on the phone and that the message can 
deliver a relevant result. Free Basics may be similar to a local 
newspaper for each of the countries where it is deployed, as it has a 
set of unique content for that location in a particular format optimized 
for first time Internet users, but it is probably not a set of content that 
is interesting for most experienced Internet users.  
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As such, banning “free” or zero rated content can both reduce 
distribution and incentives for content creation. Additionally Zero 
rating programs represent effective ways to bring poor people from 
the developing world into the digital era and promote innovation and 
competition in the Internet sector. These programs enable people who 
lack the financial resources for expensive data plans to use certain 
applications without having that usage charged towards the 
individual’s data cap. Around 45 percent of mobile operators around 
the world offer some type of zero rating services. If countries can 
make progress in bringing unconnected people to the Internet, it 
would encourage greater economic development, improve education 
and health care, and strengthen civil society around the world.476 
BEREC’s recent report477 shows that consumers, those who have even 
heard of net neutrality, value its attributes differently. Some would 
value prioritized access but doubt that their provider could be able to 
deliver it. Others believed that if bad behavior occurred, they would 
switch.  Not surprising young males desired it the most. This is the 
group of users who most frequently use high bandwidth for video 
games and p2p application, and the ability to amortize the cost of the 
network across all users most benefits them. Those who desired net 
neutrality the least were older, low volume users who prefer just to 
pay for their own usage.  Across the board, users noted that if 
broadband providers blocked websites, they value their connection 
less. At least among this survey, it disproves the notion that broadband 
providers have an incentive to block content and services. They 
certainly did not adopt the tone of net neutrality advocates against 
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zero rating, as they value offers that to reduce the price of broadband 
subscriptions. 
5.3 CRITIQUE OF ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION  
5.3.1 END TO END PRINCIPLE 
Over 500 pages, van Schewick explains the so-called end-to-end 
architecture and its role in innovation. However there is one wrinkle in 
the story; the end-to-end arguments were made after the Internet 
Protocol (IP) suite was developed.  
The first document to officially define the Internet Protocol was dated 
in January 1980478, and was later tweaked in a document dated 
September 1981479 to establish the Internet Protocol we know and use 
today. Meanwhile, the original end-to-end arguments480 were 
presented in 1981 and published in 1984. The “broad” version481 of 
the arguments, which van Schewick deems most influential to the 
Internet’s design, was published in May 1998, 18 years after the 
original definition of the Internet Protocol.  
Following is a summary of the timeline of the development of the 
Internet Protocol as it relates to this point. 
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480 Saltzer, Reed, Clark “End-To-End Arguments in System Design” ACM 
Transactions on Computer Systems, Vol. 2, No. 4, (November 1984) Pages 277-288 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/End-to-
End%20Arguments%20in%20System%20Design.pdf 
481 Reed, Saltzer, Clark “Active Networking and End-To-End Arguments” IEEE 
Network 12, 3 (May/June 1998) Pages 69-71 
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1980 January - RFC7601 - Original Department of Defense (DOD) 
standard Internet protocol design specification (spec) with ToS (Type 
of Service) field.482  
1981 April - Original end to end (E2E) arguments are presented at 
conference and subsequently published in conference proceedings483  
1981 September – RFC 7912 - Original (Non-DoD) IP Internet 
protocol design spec. Derived from DoD spec. Also includes ToS 
field.484  
1984 - Original E2E paper is published, 485 a modification of original 
presentation.  
1998 – Updated E2E paper published486 
While van Schewick does acknowledge that the end-to-end arguments 
were presented and published after the development of the Internet, 
she asserts that such design practices were in informal practice prior to 
the paper’s codification of them (pgs. 111-112). Unfortunately, her 
direct reference to make this point is actually a reference to the first 
                                                          
482 “DoD Standard Internet Protocol,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
January 1980, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc760. 
483 Saltzer, J. H., D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark (1981) "End-to-End Arguments in 
System Design". In: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on 
Distributed Computing Systems. Paris, France. April 8–10, 1981. IEEE Computer 
Society, pp. 509-512. 
484 “Internet Protocol,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, September 
1981, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791. 
485 J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark, “End-to-End Arguments in System 
Design,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 2, no. 4 (November 1, 1984): 
277–88, doi:10.1145/357401.357402.  
486 David P Reed, Jerome Saltzer, and David Clark, “Active Networking and End-
To-End Arguments,” accessed November 13, 2016, 
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/ANe2ecomment.pdf. 
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published version of the end-to-end arguments from 1984,487 and not 
the “broad” version in which the evidence of direct influence is weak. 
However, her other defense points to commentary within the “broad” 
version paper which illustrate that the end-to-end arguments arose out 
of work on various systems from 1976-1978. While quite promising to 
van Schewick’s point of view, hard evidence that the distinct “broad” 
version of the end-to-end arguments was explicitly defined prior to 
1998 is lacking. Critical readers are ultimately left to judge the 
“broad” version’s specific influence on the design of the Internet for 
themselves. 
In her analysis of the “broad” version of the end-to-end arguments, 
Van Schewick discusses “evolvability” and argues that there may be 
problems with networks that support application-specific 
functionality. She states that “functionality that lets some applications 
work better may hurt other applications whose needs differ.” 
However, while the basis for the contrast with the statement is not 
explicitly clear, she later conversely explains that network Quality-of-
service (QoS) functionality offering differentiated traffic 
characteristics (and even ventures that differential pricing) actually 
would comply with the end-to-end arguments when it is requested by 
the application or the user.  
Unfortunately, she doesn’t appear to explicitly define “application-
specific functionality”. Based on inference from her given context on 
TCP/IP architecture, it appears that her definition of “application-
specific functionality” means “application specific functionality which 
takes place at the application-layer”. However, the critical eye could 
view such a definition as not analogous with the simple statement. 
Further confusing the absence of an “application-specific 
functionality” definition, van Schewick offers an example of 
telephone line load coils and DSL. However, those issues are 
physical-layer issues, affecting a physical cable, and are not related to 
the application-layer or nor applications in general when deploying 
TCP/IP architecture. 
                                                          
487 Van Schewick, Chapter 3 ref #92, referring to the first version of E2E presented 
1981, published 1984 
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Van Schewick offers an example of peer-to-peer applications as 
support for the particular claim “Today, asymmetric bandwidth 
creates problems for applications that send and receive an equal 
amount of data; these applications are called peer-to-peer 
applications.” However, in point of fact, peer-to-peer has nothing to 
do with equal amounts of traffic flow. It is only a broad term for 
decentralized alternatives to the typical client-server network 
computing model488  Peer-to-peer is a generalizable term meaning 
communication between endpoints which is not being managed or 
served from a third centralized endpoint device. For example, there is 
no centralized file server in a decentralized file-sharing app. 
Van Schewick provides examples of peer-to-peer application but these 
do not prove the point. There is not equal flow in Internet Telephony 
(Vonage, Skype). Moreover, depending on implementation, packets 
utilizing technology such as Voice Activity Detection (VAD) may 
transmit much less from an internet telephony endpoint when input is 
quiet/silent.489 Nor is flow equal for video conferencing. Many video 
compression schemes represent visual information in ways that vary 
with input and its alteration.490  Nor does file sharing (Napster, 
Gnutella, BitTorrent) require equal flows. Flows are based on supply 
and demand, which is almost never completely equal between all 
peer-to-peer file network participants. Just because one user is 
downloading a file doesn’t mean someone else is downloading or 
uploading a file of equal size.  
Van Schewick asserts that “application blindness” prevents 
discrimination and “an end-to-end network is neutral among 
applications”. The conflation of the word discrimination which 
                                                          
488 Harry Newton, Steve Schoen “Newtons Telecom Dictionary” entry for “P2P”, 
28th edition, Harry Newton (2014) 
489 “Voice Over IP - Per Call Bandwidth Consumption” Cisco Systems, Document 
ID 7934, last updated April 13 2016 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/voice/voice-quality/7934-bwidth-
consume.html 
490 “H.264 The Advanced Video Coding Standard” International 
Telecommunications Union, Last accessed September 10, 2016 
http://www.itu.int/itudoc/gs/promo/tsb/87066.pdf 
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appears to be just another word for rendering, which may simply be 
the network discharging the required treatment of the application. 
While van Schewick asserts that the end-to-end arguments are 
essentially a commandment, it is not inherent that application-specific 
network behavior automatically results with detriment to other 
applications. 
Van Schewick’s assertion seem to discount that every network has 
abilities and constraints. If a future network could allocate resources 
within a precise constraint profile to each instance of an application, 
as requested by the application itself, we would have a precision 
network which could serve all apps exactly as they want or need to be 
served. A variable allocation of network resources within specific 
constraints based on the applications’ actual wants and needs is bright 
potential future for network design. Quite simply, applications are 
individuals. To remain a stickler to van Schewick’s interpretation of 
the end-to-end arguments, to the point that it dis-incentivizes or flatly 
prohibits development of future precision networks which may be 
based on other architectures/models, is itself a “discriminatory” way 
to encourage innovation. Even the authors of the “broad” version 
paper (to which van Schewick ascribes) are careful to express in a 
footnote that “There are some situations where applying an end-to-end 
argument is counter–productive.”491 
Van Schewick also claims that the original version of the end-to-end 
arguments asks for a case-by-case evaluation, whereas the “broad” 
version is more prescriptive and “has resolved the trade-off between 
evolvability and performance on a general basis”. However, the is no 
conclusive evidence that such a trade-off between evolvability and 
performance inherently exists in the set of all possible technological 
developments – it is not natural law. Further, if one reads the full 
“broad” version paper to the end, there is a section in the paper 
specifically titled “Take it Case-by-Case” (page 3), which states, “It is 
important to keep in mind that end-to-end arguments are one of 
several important organizing principles for systems design. While 
there will be situations where other principles or goals have greater 
weight, an end-to-end argument can facilitate the design conversation 
                                                          
491 Supra Saltzer 1984, footnote 2, p. 1 
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that leads to a more flexible and scalable architecture.” This does not 
appear to be justification for a sweeping regulatory regime but rather 
guidance about strengths and weaknesses of different arguments. 
It is important to remember that the end-to-end arguments are 
“arguments”, that is they are interpretations. They are not inviolable 
principles or physical laws. While it may be useful to discuss them 
and identify the pros and cons, it is not necessarily appropriate to 
build a regulatory regime on the interpretation of an argument and 
then deem it as fact.  
Some engineers appreciate that van Schewick’s work has been helpful 
to underscore the importance of Quality of Service to push back on the 
non-technical view of net neutrality that all data must be treated 
equally.492 It is interesting to note that the end-to-end arguments have 
much greater valence with legal scholars than with network engineers 
themselves, the latter who recognize its novelty, but do not see it as 
the end-all, be-all principle.493 Van Schewick appears to have an 
implicit presumption that the “broad” version of the end-to-end 
arguments is the “correct” way to engineer a network. One network 
mathematician called this rigid approach “lawgeneering.”494 
Strict adherence to the end-to-end arguments, if enacted in regulation, 
could be a declaration of any other nonconforming network design 
principle as de-facto illegal. The U.S. Open Internet NPRM actually 
came close, including comments from select third parties within the 
                                                          
492 Richard Bennett “Van Schewick’s View of Net Neutrality and Quality of 
Service” High Tech Forum, June 14, 2012, http://hightechforum.org/van-schewicks-
view-of-net-neutrality-and-quality-of-service/ 
493 Ibid 
494 Martin Geddes “Why telecoms regulators must ignore ‘lawgeneers’” Blog Post, 
October 23, 2015, http://www.martingeddes.com/why-telecoms-regulators-must-
ignore-lawgeneers/ 
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footnotes of the rules495 which use the end-to-end arguments as 
rationalization for the Open Internet order.  
Worthy of inspection is van Schewick’s support of enacting  
regulations which bans flexible, commercial QoS (in the U.S.496 and 
the EU497) which contradicts the QoS capabilities she views as 
conforming to the end-to-end arguments. Her focus is user-control. 
She explicitly notes: 
Some researchers assume that the broad version of the end-to-
end arguments rules out the provision of Quality of Service in 
the network. This interpretation of the end-to-end arguments is 
too strong. 
She then elaborates: 
The principle of application autonomy described above 
suggests that applications (or ultimately the users) should 
determine which type of service they need; this does not imply 
that they should get this service for free. 
Further, she offers: 
Imagine that the Internet layer offered different services with 
different bandwidth and delay characteristics to higher layers 
at the end hosts. The higher layers would choose the type of 
service they desired and would communicate that choice to the 
                                                          
495 “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet” Federal Communications 
Commission, GN Docket No. 14-28, March 24, 2015, 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf 
496 Barbara van Schewick “Historic FCC Vote will Protect the Future of America's 
Economy and Democracy” Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, 
Blog Post, February 26, 2015, https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/historic-
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497 Barbara van Schewick “126 Leading Academics to Europe’s Telecom 
Regulators: Protect the Open Internet in Europe” Stanford Law School Center for 
Internet and Society, Blog Post, July 21, 
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Internet layer through the Internet layer’s service interface 
(e.g., by setting a type-of-service field). Such an architecture 
would not require application-specific functionality to be 
implemented in the network’s core beyond what is necessary 
to implement functions that cannot be implemented by the end 
hosts alone. Thus, it would not violate the broad version of the 
end-to-end arguments. 
However, the reasonable scenarios described above are explicitly 
banned in the network neutrality regulations enacted in both the U.S. 
and the EU – yet both rulemakings were largely applauded by van 
Schewick. The blanket bans on differential treatment and paid 
prioritization enacted by the U.S. and EU go beyond the approach van 
Schewick advocated in her book.498  
Van Schewick states that “the Internet Protocol provides a technology 
independent interface to the services provided by the network” (p. 
383). While the Internet Protocol, yes, acts as an interface, the claim 
of its technological independence is, quite flatly, incorrect. Interfaces 
may act as enablers, but they may also create bottlenecks. If someone 
creates a new functionality within the link layer, which resides below 
the Internet Protocol, the Internet Protocol does not automatically 
provide a compatible interface to the new underlying network 
functionality. Thus, the Internet Protocol interface naturally constrains 
the range of functionality, based on its individual design. Form can 
both support and limit function. 
Additionally, van Schewick’s seems to confuse the true architecture, 
by assuming it automatically includes the Internet Protocol. The 
Internet Protocol is simply a specific module inserted into the 
Internetwork layer of the overall architectural model. To assume that 
no other Internetwork layer protocol could, or should, appear is rather 
presumptuous. For example IPv4 and IPv6 are fundamentally different 
within internet protocol. 
                                                          
498 Barbara van Schewick “Network Neutrality and Quality of Service” Stanford 
Law School Center for Internet and Society, June 11, 2012, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/20120611-
NetworkNeutrality_0.pdf 
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Further, to suggest that the Internetwork Layer should never act as an 
application-specific interface to the network is to favor the 
comfortability of past designs at the expense of dynamism. A truly 
flexible and customizable network that can morph to serve the exact 
properties of individual applications is an admirable goal, and is one 
which would serve applications in a more precise manner. 
It begs the question of the value of Internet Protocol if there is no 
network across which the protocol can run. While some want to 
suggest that innovation starts with the IP suite, the truth is that 
innovation in computing, communications, and content have been 
going on for centuries, without which there would be no Internet 
today.  Simply put, the Internet itself is a complementary asset to 
computers and communications networks. They each add value to the 
other.  
5.3.2 INNOVATION 
For van Schewick the large American Internet companies surrounding 
her at Stanford is proof of her claims.  She describes a large group of 
diverse innovators. But a cursory review of some of the key 
innovators show that they are not so diverse; they tend to be white, 
middle to upper class, and have backgrounds in computering. Wired 
calls Silicon Valley  the “myth of meritocracy” that “denies the role of 
personal connections, wealth, background, gender, race, or education 
in an individual’s success.”499  
Jessica Livingston documents that the leading Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurs even have the same characteristics and ways of 
working. In Founders at Work: Stories of Startups’ Early Days500, in 
which she interviews the founders of more than two dozen leading 
Silicon Valley companies about their beginnings. The founders 
                                                          
499 Alice Marwick, “Silicon Valley Isn’t a Meritocracy. And It’s Dangerous to Hero-
Worship Entrepreneurs,” WIRED, November 25, 2013, 
https://www.wired.com/2013/11/silicon-valley-isnt-a-meritocracy-and-the-cult-of-
the-entrepreneur-holds-people-back/. 
500 Jessica Livingston, Founders at Work: Stories of Startups’ Early Days, 1st 
Corrected ed., Corr. 2nd printing edition (Berkeley, CA : New York: Apress, 2007). 
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typically highlight the accidental nature of the starting of their 
company. Then, once started with their idea, they were determined to 
make a great application that solved a real problem. Livingston also 
describes that the founders exhibited tremendous perseverance to 
sustain in the midst of uncertainty, isolation, and lack of progress. 
They also faced consistent rejection before their idea became a 
success.  
Interestingly these entrepreneurs never mentioned the end-to-end 
principle or network neutrality as being essential for their success.  
Moreover it would seem that the environment in which the application 
is deployed might have something to do with innovation, for example 
market need, proliferation of personal computers, proliferation of 
internet subscriptions, and so on. 
Van Schewick prefers archetypal iconic examples of a handful of 
firms to justify the regulation, but paying little regard for the 
thousands of firms which don’t succeed, as if they were just not the 
user’s choice. Van Schewick likes to illustrate her point with Skype. 
She makes a narrative about two entrepreneurs who took on the 
telecoms, and, had it not been for net neutrality, Skype would not 
exist, because telecom operators would have blocked this application 
which created competition for its own long distance service.  
But the truth is that Skype founders Nicklaus Zennstrom and Janus 
Friis met while working for Swedish telecom operator Tele2 in 
Copenhagen. Fondly describing Tele2 as “the best entrepreneurial 
school I could get”,501 Zennstrom worked as an executive assistant in 
product development. He had worked at Tele2 for 3 years during 
which time he hired Friis, then only 21, to lead the new ISP’s 
customer service support team. Their project at Tele2 was to launch a 
discount ISP brand (get2net) and a web portal (everyday.com).  
Indeed this ISP actually envisioned making an “edge” application.   
                                                          
501 Henrik Huldschiner, “Zennström: ‘Jag Behöver Ingen Lön,’” Dagens Industri, 
March 18, 2008, http://www.di.se/artiklar/2008/3/18/zennstrom-jag-behover-ingen-
lon/. 
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Zennstrom and Friis left Tele2 to focus on the file sharing music 
application KaZaa. Skype came later on and could be summarized as 
invention following necessity. It was because Zennstrom in 
Amsterdam needed to call Friis in Estonia (who was heading 
development for Joltid) and wanted to save on phone bills and that 
they used IP telephony, which did not work so well, that they created 
Skype.502 He describes that “success begets success”, and that the 
reason that his subsequent startups (Joltid, Altid, Joost) have worked 
out so well is because he has become smarter, can hire better people, 
can raise more money, etc.503 
While Zennstrom and Friis did invent Skype, they did not invent 
internet telephony; they only improved it. Much of the Internet 
applications we enjoy today are not fundamental innovations, but 
incremental innovations (innovations over 1 to 3 years). They 
represent the unique implementation and commercialization of 
underlying technologies, for example the internet protocol itself. 
Fundamental innovations can take 15 years or more to develop and are 
frequently the outcome of large budgets and extensive collaborations 
across universities, corporations, and government labs. There is no 
rigorous theory of how net neutrality leads to fundamental 
innovations. Indeed, it may lessen the revenue for investment for 
fundamental innovation. If networks cannot earn a return on their 
networks, not only will they not invest in infrastructure, they will not 
invest in research and development.   
Eugene A. Fitzgerald, the Merton C. Flemings-SMA Professor of 
Materials Science and Engineering at MIT, author of Inside Real 
Innovation – How the Right Approach Can Move Ideas from R&D to 
Market – And Get the Economy Moving (2011, World Scientific) 
explains,504 
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We were fortunate in the U.S. to have a fundamental 
innovation paradigm that gave us incredible economic growth 
for decades throughout all our institutions. Now, with Moore’s 
Law coming to an end, we’re seeing slower growth… With the 
fading away of corporate labs like Bell Labs, the innovation 
ecosystem in the U.S. has changed. The lack of forward 
corporate investments has hurt innovation productivity… The 
lack of investment has cut off the more fundamental 
innovations that are required for very high economic growth. 
 
The danger in prioritizing application innovation over network 
innovation is that we lose investment and determination for innovation 
in fundamental computing and communications. Such 
shortsightedness may limit such technologies which can power the 
next wave of economic growth, along with constraining the range of 
future applications which may not otherwise be supported. 
What van Schewick describes as end-to-end internet innovation, 
essentially, that there is a diverse group of innovators and there is user 
choice are characteristics that would describe multiple networks. 
Indeed the ability for any user to create and implement an internet 
application where end users can choice it amongst others is present in 
multiple networks  including mobile and radio and is not unique to the 
Internet.  
This ability to post information and find it has existed in other 
networks for more than a century. Consider mobile networks in which 
one can access premium SMS and value-added services. One need not 
be a subscriber of the network as the phone numbering system is 
interoperable. These solutions have been deployed distributed to 
billions of users for more than two decades. But long before mobile, 
users accessed via their landline telephones.  In fact, shortly after the 
telephone was invented in the 19th century, the “telephone newspaper” 
allowed users and innovators to share news, music, and other 
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information.505 The telephone newspaper was used for a few decades 
until it was supplanted by the radio and subsequently television.506 
While advances in delivering information across the telephone 
network continued, it wasn’t until the 1990s, a century later, that 
digital subscriber line (DSL)507 became available, offering a viable 
means to deliver news, entertainment, and host of other services over 
telephone wires. With continued innovations in vectoring, copper 
networks in conjunction with fiber optics, deliver increasing speeds, 
topping 100 Mbps, and given current buildout, is the prevailing 
broadband technology in a number of countries.  
While not comprehensive, the following chart based upon 
information508 from Silicon Valley Computer Museum shows three 
columns representing the key innovations in computing, 
communications, and content. These three categories are what 
comprise convergence, what we consider today as our experienced of 
the connected world. Considering the grading of Internet innovation, 
one can see that much of early Internet history was dependent on the 
development of binary information representation, electronics, 
computer languages to input data, machines to process the languages, 
materials to store the data, and processors to computer the data. In 
communications we have observed techniques in which to send 
messages across distances, requiring experimentation in materials and 
transmission methods. We also see the incorporation of the 
manipulation of electricity to create signals, sounds, and image. These 
innovations all came about without the TCP/IP protocol stack, and 
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moreover, enabled it, along with many other innovations. Television 
and radio immediately come to mind.  
For the purposes of the illustration, the first internet content is 
considered email in 1971, though we could trace the history of content 
through the millennia. But even the first email precedes the IP suite, as 
do bulletin boards, online shopping and usenets. There is no doubt that 
internet content and applications are in their relative infancy, but there 
is no reason to believe that the innovation in computing and 
communications is done. Indeed if we freeze the architecture of the 
internet today and not allow it to take advantage of new advances in 
computing and communications, it will certainly stunt the growth of 
edge applications.  
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Figure 52: Key advances in computing, communications and content 
Computing509 Communications Content 
1679: Modern Binary Number System  
1822: Steam-driven calculating machine 
(Babbage) 
1890: Punch cards (Hollerith 
1936: Turing machine (Turing) 
1937: Computer (Atanasoff) 
1943: Colossus 
1944: ENIAC (Mauchly, Eckert) 
1945: John V. Neumann writes draft of stored-
program computer 
1947: Transistor (Shockley et al) 
1945: First program run on a computer 
1953: Grimsdale and Webb build early 
transistor computer 
1953: COBOL (Hopper) 
1956: Direct keyboard computer 
1958: Integrated circuit (Kilby, Noyce) 
1962: MIT link, early example of a personal 
computer 
1964:Computer-mouse-GUI (Engelbart) 
1965: 3C DDP-116, the world’s first 16-bit 
commercial computer 
1969: UNIX (Bell Labs) 
1969-73: C Programming Language 
1970: DRAM Chip (Intel) 
1971: Arcade Games (By the predecessor to 
Atari) 
1971: Floppy disk (Shugart) 
1971: Intel launches the first microprocessor 
1980: Commodore launches VIC-20, the first 
to sell 20 million 
1981: IBM Computer with MS-DOS 
1982: Commodore launces the Commodore 64
1983: Apple Lisa (first computer with GUI 
1983: Gavilan SC (first laptop) 
1983: GNU OS project announced (Free 
Unix-Clone) (Richard Stallman) 
1984: Apple launches the Macintosh 
1985: Microsoft Windows 
1991: First Linux Released 
1993: Pentium microprocessor 
2001: Mac OSX, Windows XP 
2003: AMD 64-bit processor 
2010: Apple introduces the iPad 
Smoke signals 
550- BC: Mail (Persia) 
1775: Signal by lanterns in the old North 
Church (Paul Revere) 
1790: Semaphore lines (optical telegraphs) 
1838: Electrical telegraph  
1867: Signal lamps 
1876: Telephone 
1877: Acoustic phonograph 
1896: First practical wireless telegraphy 
systems based on Radio 
1914: First North American transcontinental 
telephone calling 
1915: Western Electric “Coordinate Selector” 
(used in crossbar switching systems) 
1927: Television 
1930s: Teletype 
1956: Transatlantic telephone cable 
1960: Founding of digital signal processing 
1962: ARPA 
1962:Commercial telecommunications 
satellite 
1964: Multics; a time sharing, multi-user 
system. 
1964: Intergalactic Computer Network 
1964: Fiber optical telecommunications 
1965: Electronic Switching System (ESS) put 
in service 
1965: GE/BELL/MIT Network 
1972: ARPANET 
1972: TCP/IP 
1972-1973: CYCLADES Network 
1973: Metcalfe (Ethernet) 
1973: First modern-era mobile (cellular) 
phone 
1979: Patent for the use of existing telephone 
wires for both telephones and data terminals 
1981: First mobile (cellular) phone network 
(NMT) 
1984: ISDN 
1985: First .com registered 
1988: ADSL 
1989: HTTP (Berners-Lee) 
1991: The first Wireless internet was available 
1991: Home Broadband 
1996: 56K Modem (Townsend) 
1997: DOCSIS 
1997: First version of the 802.11 protocol was 
released 
1971: ARPANET email 
1973: Bulletin Board System (BBS) 
1979: Online shopping 
1980: Usenet (Newsgroups) 
1982: Whois user information search 
1982: SMTP email 
1983: AOL 
1988: Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
1990: Archie, First content search 
1990: Browser (Tim Berners-Lee) 
1991: First voice over IP telephony 
application (Speak Freely) 
1993: Music Performance (video) broadcast 
over the Internet 
1994: Web-based Internet forums 
1995: IPTV 
1996: Google Founded 
1999: Napster 
1999: News aggregators  
1990s: blogging  
1990s: instant messaging 
2004: Facebook founded 
2005: YouTube 
2005: Android 
 
 
(uncertain year): peer-to-peer networks 
(uncertain year, depending on definition) 
social networking  
(uncertain year, depending on definition): file 
sharing 
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The idea that the internet is the first and only electronic network for 
data is wrong. Indeed, the telephone itself was used as both a 
newspaper and stereo. News, music, and other data were transmitted 
across telephone wires more than 100 years ago. A key innovation 
came from Hungarian Tivadar Puskás with his invention of the 
telephone exchange, enabling switching capacity to increase from 50 
to half half a million users. Puskas also developed a "Telephone News 
Service", launched as Telefon Hírmondó (Telephone Herald) in 1893 
and operated for 49 years in Budapest. Using telephone technology, 
the company built a dedicated network across the city, some 1100 
miles of copper, to deliver a daily schedule of spoken news, stock 
quotations, weather, and entertainment.  There was a was no license or 
regulator as such, so the service operated under a gentleman’s 
agreement with the government and police receiving a written copy of 
the day’s news before it aired.  
By 1907 Telefon Hírmondó had some 200 employees and served 
15,000 households in Budapest (population 800,000 at the time)510 as 
well as a number of establishments (cafes, doctors’ offices etc) with 
coin operated stand-alone phones.  Subscriptions cost the equivalent 
of $16/month in today’s dollars.  
Naturally to reduce the cost of the network to end users, Telefon 
Hírmondó had advertising.  In conversation with the Scientific 
American in 1907, the managing editor of Telefon Hírmondó 
remarked that ads were “sandwiched between two particularly 
interesting items of news, and so (they) commands special attention. 
Our advertising charges as a general rule are fifty cents for twelve 
seconds of the stentor's voice… "I have often marveled why a country 
like America with its amazing enterprise and development has not 
produced a 'Telefon-Hirmondo' of its own on a far vaster scale than 
Budapest could possibly manage. You Americans like novelty; your 
advertisers are enterprising above all others. Possibly before long New 
York and Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and San Francisco will each 
have a 'Telefon-Hirmondo' of its own, bringing enormous profits to 
their owners. For all kinds of expenses are eliminated from the cost of 
                                                          
510 W. G. FITZ-GERALD, “A Telephone Newspaper,” Scientific American, Page 
507, June 22, 1907, http://earlyradiohistory.us/telenew5.htm. 
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production, such as paper, ink, typesetting, and a great and expensive 
staff." 
The concept was later licensed as the Telephone Herald511 in Newark, 
NJ by M. M. Gillam, former advertising manager of the New York 
Herald, but it failed a year after launch. A discussion of the American 
concept and its challenges, including a six month delay from the 
Public Utilities Commission, appeared in Telephony on March 30, 
1912. Over 1000 subscribers took advantage of the service for the 
price of $18 a year, or five cents a day, with a second line for $7 a 
year, or two cents a day. Without a dedicated line for the service, it 
was not possible to consume news and make a phone call at the same 
time.  
A similar concept was tried in France, called the Théâtrophone512 
(1890-1932).  Transmitters were installed on the stage at the Paris 
Opera connected by wire to a dispatch center and then to hotels, clubs, 
cafes, and subscribers’ homes.  News supplemented the daily 
transmission of performances.  Price discrimination was employed to 
sell subscriptions and tickets at various rates to different levels of 
content. 
In Britain the Electrophone513 (1895-1925) service was offered over 
the existing telephone network in cooperation with the National 
Telephone Company and British Post Office.  Content included live 
theatre, music, and on Sunday, religious services.  One could request a 
particular program a la carte or by subscription. There was no 
advertising and subscriptions were high, $50/year in 1900, equivalent 
to monthly fee of $1428 in today’s dollars.  At its height, it had only 
2000 subscribers. The service was supplanted by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, funded through a mandatory licensing fee 
                                                          
511 Arthur F. Colton, “The Telephone Newspaper--New Experiment in America,” 
Telephony. Page 391-392, March 30, 1912, http://earlyradiohistory.us/telenew3.htm. 
512 “The Theatrophone,” The Electrical Engineer, Page 161, August 30, 1889, 
http://earlyradiohistory.us/1889thea.htm.  
513 “News and Entertainment by Telephone,” United  States  Early  Radio  History, 
accessed August 12, 2015, http://earlyradiohistory.us/sec003.htm. 
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AT&T made a number of attempts to deliver a news and 
entertainment service over the telephone in the 1880s-1890s, but it 
wasn’t a success. This shows that just because a network provider 
offers a service does not mean that it will succeed, even if it owns the 
network facilities. Ultimately radio broadcasting supplanted news over 
the telephone, having more favorable economic and physical 
properties to deliver information farther more cost effectively. 
Lee De Forest was a key innovator in this regard, having developed 
the audion (three electrode vacuum tube) and phonofilm (sound-on-
film recording). He also coined the name “radio”. He founded the De 
Forest Radio Company to deliver a WWW of its own: “world wide 
wireless.”  Though opera had long been broadcast by telephone in 
Europe, the company’s radio transmission of Tosca from the 
Metropolitan on January 12, 1910,514 considered a revolution in 
communications in America.  
DeForest continued experimenting in radio broadcasts in cooperation 
with the Columbia Graphophone Co., the record company getting a 
mention on the radio each time a new song was played. There were 
neither spectrum licenses to deliver radio broadcasts nor consumer 
subscriptions to receive them.  Essentially all transmission were “zero 
rated” by the network and content providers.  By setting up a tower set 
up at the Woolworth Building in New York city, transmissions could 
be received by ships at sea. “Dr. De Forest declares that by means of 
his newly-developed receiving apparatus more perfect music can be 
heard by wireless transmission than can be conveyed by telephone 
wires,”515 noted an article from the Music Trade Review in 1916. 
Such experiments ended with America’s entry into World War I. 
Clearly, the mere existence of the telephone network created 
innovative new services, as did the existence of internet. The internet 
architecture was quite different from the telephone model, however 
whether the direct influence of the architecture as the cause of 
                                                          
514 “The Decades That Invented the Future, Part 1: 1900-1910,” Wired, October 18, 
2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/10/12-decades-of-geek-part-1/. 
515 “Columbia Used to Demonstrate Wireless Telephone,” The Music Trade Review, 
Page 52, November 4, 1916, http://earlyradiohistory.us/1916col.htm. 
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innovation is questionable, perhaps, PC ownership and network access 
were strong influencers in such success. However, reading van 
Schewick, one infers an attitude of forbidding any future competitive 
technology, as if development in network architecture has finished. 
As leader of the Initiatives Group and the Chief Scientist of the 
International Computer Science Institute in Berkeley, California, Scott 
Shenker concluded, 20 years ago, “No matter what the eventual long-
term developments are, we must modify the architecture to enable the 
Internet to provide adequate support for multimedia applications in the 
near term.” 516 
We still have not completed this task, but network neutrality 
advocates want to declare the Internet as a finished product and 
preserve it in its current form. Such a network can barely stands the 
test of the application needs of today. Sicker and Lehr observe the 
“CDN overhang” that characterizes the Internet today to allow it to 
deliver the most desired application, video. This was not the 
application for the IP was expressly designed. A lot of patchwork is 
done to make it possible. This suggests that the functionality of the 
internet, especially for video, could be improved with a better 
architecture. 
5.3.3 PRIORITIZATION AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
OF TRAFFIC 
Van Schewick defines differential treatment as “discrimination” and 
takes issue with “categorization” of traffic. However, simply 
categorizing traffic does not mean actually treating it unfairly. Not 
considered by network neutrality advocates, is that the process of 
traffic categorization can be configured in a way in which packets are 
categorized, but are scheduled in an equal manner.517 
                                                          
516 Shenker, Scott. “Fundamental Design Issues for the Future Internet” (September 
1995) IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 13, No. 7: Pg. 
1186. 
517 For example, if two categories of traffic are each given 50% of time, the traffic 
would thus be treated equally. Further, this could also be done with a four category 
configuration of [25%, 25%, 25%, 25%], or a five category configuration of [20%, 
20%, 20%, 20%, 20%], and so on. 
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The Internet Protocol suite included a number of specifications for to 
allow priority for certain packets. This can be found by researching 
the protocol packet design, from the original Priority Bit, to the Type 
of Service field, and to the present-day Differentiated Services Field. 
The need for such a service option, particularly for time-sensitive 
traffic, had been foreseen by the original architects. As such, claims 
that prioritization of traffic violates the original design intentions of 
the Internet is are false. 
Some of the those protocols include 
• The original “type of service” ToS field was proposed and 
accepted in the IP header. See RFC 791  
• The “differentiated service” or DSCP (or just DS) field was 
proposed and accepted in the IP header. See RFCs “3260, 
3168, 2474 and " others." 
• The "urgent" bit was proposed and accepted in TCP RFC 793. 
• The “class of service” CoS field was proposed and accepted in 
the Ethernet frame.  See IEEE 802.1q extension from year 
1987 
 
One may ask why a network operator would set up traffic categories if 
they are treated equally, thinking that this would eliminate the benefits 
of prioritization. But such a configuration518 would separate the traffic 
into distinct congestion domains. What this means is that traffic within 
one category cannot congest traffic within another category519. This 
could be thought of as setting up individual virtual networks each with 
its own slice of capacity. For example, a category for streaming video-
on-demand traffic could be separate from an alternate category 
reserved for the bursty data patterns of instant messaging applications. 
The messaging bursts would not congest the video streams. 
                                                          
518 When combined with the appropriate queueing algorithms which have rate 
guarantees. 
519 Some may think this practice would be inefficient use of capacity, but there are 
queueing algorithm possibilities that eliminate this worry. Consult with your 
equipment vendor for their particular solutions. 
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Furthermore, once the categories have been created, they could also be 
split and sent across separate physical cables sized proportionately to 
the needs of each category. Such a practice does not prioritize one 
category over another, but still allows for different amounts of 
capacity for each category.520 Categorizing traffic, therefore, does not 
always mean that any categories are prioritized or treated in a 
hierarchical manner. 
Van Schewick also takes issue with prioritization, 521 what she calls 
“fast lanes,” 522 a choice of words which seems to have a political end 
game.  Prioritization is a general term, which includes many different 
practices and network configurations. When network neutrality 
advocates protest against the evils of enabling prioritization within the 
Internet, such claims are not technical, as they don’t  identifying the 
specific processes, options, measurements, or configurations of 
particular solutions, which by and large are legitimate activities in the 
network.   
Prioritization in networks refers to queueing and scheduling. While 
queues are virtual lanes that can be serviced differently, they are not 
always in use. In typical IP network equipment, queues only form 
when there is congestion.523 Without congestion, there are no lanes, 
and packets are immediately scheduled for output on the device. 
                                                          
520 Some critics may assume that splitting traffic categories onto separate links of 
different speed will “speed up” one category of traffic, however such an analysis is 
in error. Traffic cannot be re-transmitted any faster than it is received. Further, some 
may be fooled into “seeing” bursts of speedier packet flow transmission rates. They 
simply have not considered that for such behavior to be observed, the traffic must 
have been queued prior to transmission on the physical link, which would cause a 
delay equal or greater than the link transmission rate burst. 
521 Chris Riley and Robb Topolski “A Free Press/New America Foundation Policy 
Brief: The Hidden Harms of Application Bias”, November 2009, 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/The_Hidden_Harms_of_Application_Bias.pdf 
522 Levy, Josh. “Life in the Fast Lane”, November 15, 2011, Free Press blog post. 
http://www.freepress.net/blog/11/11/15/life-fast-lane 
523 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design” (2014) 
Chapter 5: Pg. 84. 
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Furthermore, a queue cannot make any traffic go any faster. All that 
the queueing and scheduler combination can do is to protect traffic 
during congestion or reduce some delay introduced by the congestion. 
The claim that network operators can “speed up” traffic is 
nonsensical, yet even the United States White House webpage on 
network neutrality includes such a statement.524 Packets cannot be 
retransmitted by a network device any faster than it receives them. 
Others claim that prioritized packets go “to the front of the line” 525 or 
“to the front of the queue.”526527.The problem with such explanations 
is that they only assume a particular type of algorithm to prioritize 
traffic, with a particular network configuration. The reality is quite 
different. 
The type of process that net neutrality advocates seem to refer to is 
called strict priority-queuing. Such algorithms are frequently 
presented in popular computer science texts528529 particularly in the 
study of using basic data structures. One could reasonably suspect that 
such texts are the sources being consulted by these network neutrality 
prioritization “experts”, especially by those who have studied general 
topics in computer science. Should such books be the source of the 
network neutrality advocates knowledge, then they would be failing to 
realize that the algorithms offered in such books are only simplified 
                                                          
524 The White House., November 10, 2014, Open letter, “No throttling” section. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality 
525 Lennett, Benjamin “Dis-empowering users vs. Maintaining Internet Freedom: 
Network Management and Quality of Service (QoS)”, 2009, Commlaw Conspectus 
Vol. 18: Pgs. 97-147. http://commlaw.cua.edu/articles/v18/18.1/06.Lennett.Final.pdf 
526 De Luca, Gennaro. “Net Neutrality for All”, April 28, 2015,  Leadership Society 
of Arizona blog post. http://ksmleadership.com/net-neutrality-for-all/ 
527 Rajadhyaksha, Niranjan. “The Ambiguous Economics of Net Neutrality”, April 
18, 2015, Live Mint Article. 
http://www.livemint.com/Industry/hz8BtbDLFnLkV69HU2EWUP/The-ambiguous-
economics-of-Net-neutrality.html 
528 Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein “Introduction to Algorithms” (2009) Third 
Edition. 
529 Sedgewick, Robert. “Algorithms in C” (1998) Third Edition. 
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examples for the purpose of teaching basic concepts and programming 
code. It would be extremely difficult to find any modern carrier-
network solution provider that actually recommends use of strict-
priority-queueing as an algorithm for the scheduling of any IP 
traffic530 other than for network control531 532. 
The origin of study on strict-priority-queueing systems dates back as 
far as 1954.533 Net neutrality advocates seem to imply that no further 
achievements have been made in the area of multi-service resource 
scheduling since the development of strict-priority-queueing. 
Fortunately, that is not where the state of technology stands. 
Most current network switching and routing equipment would offer a 
type of traffic queueing algorithm based on a process known as fair-
queueing534 and particularly an evolved type known as weighted-fair-
queueing535. Weighted-fair-queuing algorithms will differ by name 
and vendor implementation,536 but many generally guarantee different 
                                                          
530 Particular solutions for supporting time-sensitive traffic (such as Cisco’s interim 
PQ-WFQ and recent LLQ) may be accused of being a strict-priority-queue type, but 
they differ from classic models. In actuality, they are hybrids and the priority rates 
are policed. See: Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, Briley “End-to-End QoS Network 
Design” (2014) Chapter 4: Pgs. 73 & 89. 
531 Rich Seifert and Jim Edwards “The All-New Switch Book” (2008) Chapter 13, 
part 13.5.6.1.2: Pg. 544. 
532 However, technology is trending towards moving management/control traffic 
completely out of data streams. 
533 Cobham, Alan “Priority Assignment in Waiting Line Problems.” (1954) Journal 
of Operations Research. 
534 Demers, Keshav, and Shenker “Analysis and Simulation of a Fair Queueing 
Algorithm” (1989) Proc. SIGCOMM '89 Symposium on Communications 
Architectures and Protocols, New York, NY, ACM Press 1989: Pgs. 1-12. 
535 Rich Seifert and Jim Edwards. “The All-New Switch Book” (2008) Chapter 13, 
part 13.5.6.1.2: Pgs. 542-543. 
536 For example, Cisco has offered: CQ, WFQ, PQ-WFQ, CBWFQ, and LLQ. All 
are different implementations which use the concepts of weighted-fair-queueing. 
See: Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley “End-to-End QoS Network Design” 2014, 
Chapter 5: Pgs. 86-87 
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amounts of time (or packets, or bits) to different categories of traffic. 
It seems that network neutrality advocates have no knowledge of these 
algorithms, options, and variants. However, it is also possible that they 
may be somewhat aware of weighted-fair-queueing algorithms, but 
simply misunderstand them. Or, perhaps they consider one particular 
implementation or option as a model strictly used by all other 
configurations. 
In other words, in most modern network operator-grade network 
devices supporting multiple categories of service using modern 
queueing algorithms, “priority” packets would not simply “get to the 
front of line” or “get to the front of the queue”, nor would they 
degrade traffic in other categories as is commonly claimed. Different 
categories of traffic are simply serviced at different rates, which once 
established do not degrade each other.537 
For example, imagine that you are walking a path where there are two 
lanes. One lane is for walkers such as you, while the other is reserved 
for bicycle riders. While the bicycle riders may pass by you, your 
walk is not affected. You are not forced to stop, walk slower, nor 
move out of the way. There is no degradation of your walking rate 
caused by the bicycle riders. That is an example of a multi-service 
                                                          
537 There would actually be a degradation of service if particular queueing 
algorithms are simply enabled on an existing link interface, as it would re-allocate 
capacity. Some algorithms may minimize this effect. To completely eliminate this 
capacity re-allocation degradation, network operators could simply enable the 
algorithms while adding capacity at the same time. Such action would compensate 
for the re-allocation. Once set up, there is generally no cross-degradation caused by 
traffic in separate categories (depending on choice of implementation). 
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network configuration that network neutrality advocates cannot seem 
to think of, which clearly refutes claims of degradation538. 
Beyond traffic categorization and prioritization lays an even more 
beneficial network practice known as resource reservation.539 In 
resource reservation, a network endpoint is able to reserve an end-to-
end connection with another endpoint on the network. The practice of 
resource reservation, by reserving data capacity on the network as an 
example, could make each connection impervious to congestion. 
Currently, additional traffic creates a dilution in network capacity, and 
all user data flows suffer. The “neutral” Internet technology, as it 
stands, cannot guarantee a user end-to-end anything. Speed, latency, 
jitter, and capacity subscription are all subject to change. Right now, 
they are variables. 
Booking a hotel room is a real-life example of resource reservation. 
One pays for a chunk of capacity (the room) for a specified duration 
of time. Others staying at the hotel, and the public at large, have no 
rightful claim to access the space provided in your room or its 
contents. And you pay for this, as you are using the hotel’s resources 
for your wants and needs. 
Resource reservation also creates accountability on the part of 
network operators. For implementing resource reservation could bring 
back a concept from the telephone network – the busy signal. When a 
connection is requested of the network, if the resources aren’t 
                                                          
538 Network neutrality advocates would say that there currently exists only one path, 
and that the bicycle lanes will be created by painting a line down the middle, making 
the walker’s path narrower. They would reason that the walkers to have to slow 
down, briefly stop, or exit the lane when encountering the increased congestion of 
other walkers on the newly narrowed path. However, to provide an analogy of the 
previous footnote: If the owners of the single path widened the path when painting 
the division line, while keeping the walking path the same width (or expanding it), 
the walkers would not experience any degradation from the addition of a bicycle 
lane. 
539 This document uses the term “Resource Reservation” in a generic manner, only 
meaning the ability to reserve any network resource. It is not referring to any 
particular protocol or practice, such as “RSVP” (commonly known as “resource 
reservation protocol” or “resource reservation setup protocol”). 
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available, the network does not accept the reservation,540 thus 
preventing dilution of capacity to irritable or unusable levels. Such 
refusals would flow from provider to provider, ultimately identifying 
the network that refused the request for resources and could even 
include the reason why. This also creates a critical log of data which 
can be utilized by carriers in deciding network upgrades, 
troubleshooting customer complaints, or resolving multi-provider 
disputes. 
Resource reservation sounds great, however the FCC’s definition of 
“prioritization” somehow includes resource reservation.541 So any 
solution of this type, regardless how beneficial, is banned under US 
Open Internet rules.  
The farmers market is all about user-control. You may desire fresher 
produce, items that have had more vine-ripening time, or special 
varieties. Contrast this to commoditized produce which is from further 
away, picked early and ripens in a truck, with only a few varieties 
available. You frequently pay more for the attributes offered at the 
farmer’s market which are important to you. 
5.3.4 NETWORK ACCOMMODATION 
Network accommodation is, ideally, user-directed choice. It allows the 
user to decide how their traffic should be handled in a variety of 
situations. Before we can continue however, it is an imperative that 
we dispel an enormously popular myth about network traffic: The 
assumption that deep-packet-inspection (DPI) is required to perform 
network accommodation. For this claim is the foundation of an edifice 
of argument that declares network service providers as the judge and 
assigner of packets into categories. 
                                                          
540 This is known as admission control. 
541 United States Federal Communications Commission (March 12, 2015) FCC 15-
24, In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-
28, Part 125: Pg. 53. 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0312/FCC-15-
24A1.pdf 
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DPI is when a network looks within a data packet to determine its 
contents. Some network neutrality advocates claim that the way 
accommodation works is by a service provider enabling DPI, peering 
into a packet, assessing the packet’s content, and assigning said packet 
to a category based on what it finds within. Such vocalists sing songs 
of network service providers being the sole deciders of how content is 
interpreted, and call such practices gross privacy violations. The 
problem with the argument is its base assumption of accommodation-
requires-DPI. But DPI is absolutely not a necessary part of network 
accommodation. In fact, it is an inefficient and inaccurate way to 
implement network accommodation. Its use is simply not needed. But 
this myth perpetuates, and taints the network neutrality conversation.  
Currently, most highly-used programming languages contain the 
ability to set the field within IP packets which would indicate a 
category of service. It is not impossible, nor even just theoretical. This 
can be done right now. Programmers already have the resources 
available to make the most of this opportunity. Applications could 
easily have settings, configurable by the user. Such settings would 
dictate the categories for the constructions of packets before they are 
placed on the network. No DPI is needed, whatsoever. Further, both 
fixed and mobile operating system developers have this same 
capability, and should allow the user to create policies which cannot 
be violated or overridden by the applications. 
But the FCC, in their Open Internet order, flatly banned the practice of 
network accommodation (referred to as prioritization). Such an act 
clearly ruins the ability of service providers to enable users to enjoy 
the benefits of user-controlled configuration-of-service. However, part 
139 in the Open Internet Order contrarily expresses support for user 
control.  
In the proper practice of configuration-of-service, implementing 
network accommodation, the user would control the assignment of 
their data to categories. Exposing the imagined foundation of 
accommodation-requires-DPI (and thus also the claim of carriers 
“picking winners and losers” as the result of no flat bans) as invalid, 
we can finally move on to explaining how accommodation actually 
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works. The user, within an application’s settings, configures how their 
data should be handled. 
For example, assume a multiservice communication app that offers 
VoIP calling, text messaging, picture sharing, document sharing, a 
live video feed, and multiuser turn-based gaming. Such requires 
disparate use of the network, optimized for different types of handling. 
The app may be loaded with defaults, but the user could customize the 
assignment of each offering into categories, perhaps further divided 
into input and output, to provide maximum desired benefit. The data 
from the app is then placed into packets tagged with the appropriate 
categories, and is handed off from the device to the network. The 
network receives the packets, handles them as directed by the user, 
and charges proportionately to the network resource demands of each 
particular category of service. This is simply pay-for-what-you-use, 
and offers no preference to one user or another in any given category. 
In addition to metered billing, assumedly, service providers may also 
offer pre-determined bundles of bulk usage to a customer, or custom 
plans as well. It’s all up to the customer. 
There is a conceptual misunderstanding of network accommodation. 
The policy hype consistently communicates that in practice, service 
categories are always deployed according to a model of preferential 
treatment over one another. That is but one possible implementation, 
but it is not required. Another possible configuration is one of utilizing 
categorization, but with equal treatment of categories by network 
devices. Without getting too technical, let it suffice to say that this 
would be providing a choice of separate virtual networks, over a 
single converged physical infrastructure. Such a practice would keep 
the ability to route traffic down separate optimized paths, but without 
the ability for one set of traffic to degrade another. 
This misunderstanding of different ways to employ network 
accommodation brings fears of performance degradation. We have all 
heard that network accommodation “degrades” the performance of 
standard traffic classified as “best effort”. That can be true, but only 
when service categories are deployed according to a model of 
preferential treatment. It is certainly not true when employing a virtual 
network configuration, in the ways discussed in the previous 
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paragraph. Another problem with this degradation claim is that “best 
effort” service is non-guaranteed to begin with, and is subject to 
dilution and degradation anyway. That’s not to say that maybe mass-
market customers aren’t aware of this. If a service provider does not 
state clearly that service is not guaranteed or buries a disclaimer 
somewhere in a multi-page user agreement, they do so at their own 
peril. 
In his June 26, 2015 appearance at the Brookings Institution, FCC 
Chairman Tom Wheeler states, “The telegraph was the original open 
network. There was no prioritization in it.” While such a claim may be 
true, it doesn’t recognize the larger context. The telegraph networks 
were absolutely a prioritization over the postal network for sending 
telegrams, and prices reflected this. This is important, for perhaps we 
need to stop looking at the Internet as a single network. With network 
accommodation, it could actually be a collection of separate virtual 
networks for differentiated services, over a converged physical 
architecture, as previously described.  
Priority mail is a frequently-used real life example of network 
accommodation. It offers varied times of delivery for additional 
charge. It also offers other service enhancements that may be of 
interest such as signature options, delivery-tracking, return receipts, 
etc. – And it charges for those too. And lastly, for certain 
informational contents there is a more-affordable option: media mail. 
If one uses priority mail, makes a hotel booking, or buys produce at a 
farmers’ market, then one engages in user-controlled, paid, 
configuration-of-service. Given that these services are commonplace, 
it’s strange that they should be outlawed by net neutrality rules.  
The FCC’s Open Internet Order only bans paid accommodation 
(referred to as prioritization). So any reasonable person would then 
ask: Why, if all this user control is possible, can a service provider not 
implement it free of charge? 
The simplest answer is that assigning traffic from best-effort 
transmission to network segments featuring optimization of various 
network parameters costs money. Be it speed, shorter paths, more or 
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less shared capacity, guaranteed capacity, stable queueing rate, more 
security, or anything else, these special configuration-of-service 
options for the customer costs the service provider more money to 
design, build, and operate. 
Secondly, paying for accommodation decreases the incentive for 
application developers, content providers, and customers to 
improperly set configuration-of-service options. With the financial 
motivation to only take what they really need and pay for it, the 
application developers, content providers, and customers actually 
maximize the benefit of the network for all other network participants. 
This is efficiency, and would thus keep costs down for all users. 
Lastly, payment for accommodation and resource reservation also 
promotes quality technological solutions, namely, in upper-layer 
protocol and data design. If there is no realizable reward for efficient 
protocol and data design, they may bloat up into a single protocol or 
data format for all, and be stuffed with fields for every possible 
function possible. Such a situation is in stark contrast against slender, 
nuanced, purpose-fit protocols based on individual needs. 
Payment for accommodation and resource reservation are not 
unreasonable requests. In fact, they are required for the network to 
operate in a way which spreads benefit to all participants. Paying for 
what you want and need is far from being a foreign concept. One 
could assert that it is common sense, practiced daily in many other 
aspects of life. 
Who should pay? A simple solution would dictate that sender pays. 
The sender is placing the data on the network and taking up the 
resources. Such an arrangement would cover asymmetric usage such 
as content delivery, as well as peer-to-peer flows. Interconnection 
agreements can easily follow this. It also prevents parties from 
incurring fees upon others by sending them traffic. Consumers are 
also increasingly becoming content creators, particularly with live-
video-feed apps such as Periscope, and will require quality upstream 
real-time service options. This diverges from typical categorization of 
mass-market users as being a content-consumption based population. 
Behavioral expectations of network services need to change, along 
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with pricing to reflect the new reality: Network operators need to offer 
options to optimize a variety of types of traffic, to and from any 
endpoint. 
5.3.5 SOME LINGUISTIC ERROR CORRECTION ON 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
The net neutrality literature is full of doom-filled prophecies of 
“discrimination” and “fast lanes” threatening to “end the Internet as 
we know it” 542 and makes a call to arms against “specialised services” 
and zero rating, the “global threat to the Open Internet.”543  However 
regulation, not to mention a correct and meaningful discussion, 
requires more nuance. 
The collected set of language in all its forms may be the greatest 
protocol set ever. It can transfer ideas. It allows expression, 
explanation, and a form of artistry. It can enable education and 
facilitate detailed understanding. But its users can become prisoners of 
a limited subset of language – the words themselves. Context 
therefore is extremely important, as shifting the streams of our 
imperfect words from one context to another can have dire 
consequences for one of our most important natural apps: The 
communication of our thoughts to others. 
In debates, words can be used to invoke fear and misunderstanding as 
a means to promote a particular policy. In the net neutrality debate, 
terms such as “discrimination” and “fast lane” are deployed in 
inflammatory means to scare people into support particular regulation.  
“Fast lane” as deployed by van Schewick is not technically correct.  
Moreover, without prioritization or “fast lanes” the Internet as we 
                                                          
542 Barbara Schewick, “Europe Is About to Adopt Bad Net Neutrality Rules. Here’s 
How to Fix The,” Cyberlaw, October 22, 2015, /publications/europe-about-adopt-
bad-net-neutrality-rules-here%E2%80%99s-how-fix. 
543 Masse, Estelle. “Zero Rating: The Global Threat to the Open Internet.” 
AccessNow, accessed 7 November 2016 https://www.accessnow.org/zero-rating-
global-threat-open-internet/  
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know it will not work. Consider that content delivery networks 
(CDNs) already enable more than a majority of video traffic.544 
Take the concept of network prioritization. What is unfortunate is the 
shift of the stream of words describing Internet prioritization used in a 
technical sense, into an unfitting context of social justice. Terms such 
as “priority”, “class”, “quality-of-service”, “discrimination”, when 
kidnapped from the discrete practice of network engineering and 
forced to perform within the arena of public policy.   
What is really envisioned in the realm of differential treatment of 
Internet traffic is more appropriately conveyed with another term, 
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognizance of different 
entities with different wants or needs, and adjusting services to meet 
those most beneficial to the individual. It is a just vision, allowing for 
the network to exhibit elasticity and provide services for as many 
varied uses as possible. Also, our new term encompasses the very real 
practice in which differing traffic, while being treated separately, is 
not given any “priority” treatment resulting in detrimental effects to 
other traffic. 
Another network term which in misappropriated social justice context 
is class. Class is a word which (in one particular context) hints of a 
status within a hierarchy, and is not accurately reflective of the 
technology. A more precisely mapped term would be category. For 
each category is not necessarily better than any other category, as the 
participants may be accommodated by the network in differing ways 
which deliver disparate desired outcomes. Also appropriate, is the 
older IP term type-of-service. Type-of-service reserves a tolerance of 
differences, without inadvertently indicating any forms of superiority 
or inferiority. 
One may think that the above reasoning should therefore also require 
the removal of the term tier. Tier, however, tier argue has usefulness, 
as differing services may have alternate levels based on offering. For 
                                                          
544 “White Paper: Cisco VNI Forecast and Methodology, 2015-2020,” Cisco, June 6, 
2016, http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-
networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-481360.html. 
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example, under a service offering titled “voice” one could have the 
following categories: “Tier 1: Classic Voice”, “Tier 2: Enhanced 
Voice”, and “Tier 3: High-Definition Voice”, where all still achieve 
“quality”. This term still indicates a level of service, but without the 
snooty connotations of class.  
The next correction addresses another off-color and oft-repeated term, 
quality-of-service. The folly lies in the first segment of the term, 
quality. The word indicates that under such a phrase, all which follows 
is but a selection of variables and processes whose values either 
enhance or detract from quality. As with the prior terms, once again 
the supposed meaning lands off-the-mark. In a nod to accuracy, the 
term should be righted to describing its true definition, which is 
configuration-of-service. For individual applications absolutely have 
distinct uses, requirements, and tolerances of network variables, which 
while different, can all deliver quality. 
Finally, the last stop on the road to recovery is removing the dirtiest 
network word of all, discrimination. The term comes stock with 
negative connotation, often a misapplied and inaccurate 
approximation of functional reality and purpose. Luckily, another 
more correct term is also already present in our network vocabulary, 
differentiated service. Differentiated service a recognizance of varied 
wants and needs, and that a network can serve the application in a 
multitude of ways. 
Now, with corrected terminology, it is time to put it all together and 
state the true goals of this hotly-debated network technology: 
To provide differentiated service to meet the wants and needs of 
various applications and their users, broadband providers wish to 
implement configuration-of-service options. Participants’ traffic is 
thus accommodated by the network to deliver the desired results to the 
participants. 
Updating the vocabulary of the debate with proper and neutral 
language could improve the understanding of technology and the 
correctness of policymaking. 
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5.3.6 RESPONSE TO CALLS TO BAN ZERO RATING  
Van Schewick was invited by BEREC to provide her input to the 
guidelines for implementation of net neutrality by national regulatory 
authorities.545 She makes a number of assertions546 for zero rating 
which should be addressed for their assumptions and lack of evidence. 
Zero rating hurts competition 
BVS:  In the European Union, many ISPs zero-rate their own video 
applications. Users on these plans can watch unlimited zero-rated 
videos, but their bandwidth caps prevent them from watching more 
than 2–5 hours of video content unaffiliated with the ISPs. Similarly, 
many ISPs in Europe zero-rate their own cloud-storage applications. 
Their users can upload 10 gigabytes of traffic to the ISP’s cloud 
storage for free. But it costs between $50 and $70 to upload the same 
amount of data to other cloud storage sites like Dropbox or Google 
Drive. These plans make it effectively impossible for unaffiliated 
providers to compete with the ISP’s zero-rated application. 
There are a number of reasons why an ISP would zero rate its own 
content, but it is not necessarily problematic.  Indeed it is frequently 
pro-competitive.  One concern of zero rating opponents is that if users 
perceive two applications as close substitutes, then they will chose the 
zero rated one over the non-zero rated one.  This presumes the content 
market conforms to perfect competition (no market power of any 
actor, homogeneous products, no transaction costs, no barriers to 
entry, perfect information). This reality of the content market is 
different, so the model of imperfect competition is preferable for 
                                                          
545 “Update on BEREC Work to Produce Guidelines for the Implementation of Net 
Neutrality Provisions of the TSM Regulation,” Berec, February 2, 2016, 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/press_releases/5
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546 Barbara van Schewick, “Europe Is About to Adopt Bad Net Neutrality Rules. 
Here’s How to Fix Them,” Medium, October 22, 2015, 
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analyzing the situation. The market for content is highly imperfect, 
and as has frequently been observed, that an ISP zero rates its own 
content has little to no impact on the market. Indeed the traffic and 
price impact is frequently so small that it cannot be measured.547 
A common situation in which an ISP would zero rate its own content 
would be in the case of sports, and increasingly ISP purchase sports 
rights. The ISP already owns the content, and the subscribers 
indirectly pay for the content through their subscriptions. It may also 
be the case that a subscriber has a pay TV subscription for content for 
which they pay for the content and being able to access the content on 
a mobile device is a convenience. Many regulators may welcome new 
buyers to the sports market because it breaks the deadlock of 
established oligopolies of television broadcasters. To be sure, sports 
franchises are pleased about having ISPs as new buyers.548    
But such investments also benefit content creators. Consider the 
purchase of AOL and Yahoo by Verizon.  A key problem with classic 
internet business models is that advertising platforms only monetize 
content with ads; they don’t necessarily pay for the underlying 
content. That mobile providers find means to pay for content and 
deliver it to their customers without data charges is a necessary and 
valuable development to create incentives for content creation. A 
number of providers purchase popular content with the hope of 
winning new customers and thereby justifying greater investment over 
a larger subscriber base. It may well be that that some customers 
select the ISP because they love football, but on the other hand, non-
sports fans are not worse off by free football. Both enjoy the greater 
investment in network that can result with a larger subscriber base. 
To be sure, Netflix would likely make the same argument, that 
provisioning the network serves all customers. However if all network 
operators have deliver Netflix in the same way, there is a no ability for 
the operator to differentiate and win customers as a result.  It is 
                                                          
547 Supra Layton, Calderwood 2015.  
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perhaps the thinking of Comcast in making a partnership with Netflix 
for their Xfinity platform that the parties found a way to make a win-
win.  Comcast makes the investment in their network and technology 
to give Netflix more visibility; and Comcast and Netflix partner 
together to market Comcast’s superior platform for viewing Netflix.  
With such an offer, those customers who value Netflix above other 
video streaming apps may switch to Netflix. Or it may be done as a 
churn reducer or revenue saver.  Comcast customers may be less 
likely to downgrade to a lower package or switch to another provider 
if they have a better Netflix experience on Comcast. 
In practice, mobile operators need multiple business lines to cover the 
cost of infrastructure. The cost of voice and SMS are declining 
relative to the rise in traffic. Some operators face a two-thirds shortfall 
on their infrastructure. But the investment made as a result will 
support an ecosystem for a range of new services, connected cars, 
online education, telemedicine, IOT etc. That the investment can 
funded in part through entertainment to enable arguably more vital 
services is a defendable decision. Moreover if a subset of 
entertainment users can drive investment such that other users who 
have less ability to pay for services, then it is also a socially-beneficial 
and defendable decision. 
That ISP purchase content which they subsequently offer to their 
customers would likely be evident of competitive markets. The ISPs 
can’t compete on price alone, so they have to find other parameters to 
differentiate. To be sure, this is problematic for van Schewick as she 
only wants the ISPs to compete on the same commodity parameters, 
e.g. price, coverage, and network quality. But these parameters will 
generally be dominated by the incumbent network providers, thereby 
enforcing the market power which differentiation seeks to lessen.  In 
reality consumers have other parameters on which they buy, e.g. 
customer service, ability to go to a retail store, brand identification, 
device promotions, bundles, and so on.  Van Schewick considers these 
the improper parameters on which to select internet access,549 but 
theories of consumer choice suggest that they are appropriate 
parameters.  
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In point of fact, that market for mobile service may be more perfectly 
competitive that Internet content. Most mobile markets in the OECD 
have three or more mobile networks, with the US being one of the 
most competitive of any.550 Such offers are the result of the need to 
differentiate not only among the mobile operators but from pay TV 
providers which have many more incumbent advantages. Consider 
that wireline providers offered seemingly unlimited broadband and 
video. Mobile networks are inherently constrained, so offering a 
popular service for free is the only way to differentiate in such a 
competitive mobile market. 
In competitive markets, regulators have no advantage over consumers 
in selecting better bundles. If anything, if regulators pick the offers, 
consumers could accuse the telecom regulator of a “regulatory 
taking”—restricting consumer choice and reducing the range of 
product available. 
Regarding the case of zero rating of proprietary cloud applications, the 
case came up in Slovenia, which was only the second country to make 
a net neutrality law, and the non-binding opinion of the Slovenian 
Competition Authority was that the zero rating of Telecom Slovenia’s 
cloud service was not harmful to Google Drive or Dropbox.  In fact it 
stimulated Slovenian application and content development, a goal of 
the EU’s Digital Single Market.551 
Zero rating harms users 
BVS:  When European ISPs start zero-rating certain applications or 
content, they often reduce overall bandwidth caps or increase the 
price of unrestricted bandwidth, as the European research firm 
Rewheel has shown. This is not surprising: the lower the bandwidth 
caps, the more attractive zero-rated applications become, so lower 
bandwidth caps motivate rich providers to pay for zero-rating. Thus, 
                                                          
550 William Rogerson, “THE ECONOMICS OF DATA CAPS AND FREE DATA 
SERVICES IN MOBILE  BROADBAND,” August 17, 2016, 
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/081716-rogerson-
free-data-white-paper.pdf. 
551 Supra Layton, Calderwood 2015 
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zero-rating harms users (and the providers of applications that are 
not zero-rated) by reducing the amount or increasing the costs of 
bandwidth that users can use however they like. By contrast, when a 
Dutch regulator banned zero-rating, the provider KPN doubled its 
monthly bandwidth cap for mobile Internet access from 5 to 10 GB at 
no additional cost. 
The statement likely reflects van Schewick’s normative perspective 
which establishes net neutrality as the standard to evaluate internet 
practices. This is not an objective but rather a normative standard. 
From a competition perspective, consumer harm is observed when 
prices increase and output declines. In other words, consumer welfare 
lessens. Empirically it has not been demonstrated that consumers have 
experienced increased prices, lowered innovation, or lessened output 
from zero rating. Instead consumers experience a lowered or free 
price. Secondly zero rating has increased the traffic to various internet 
destinations; this has been shown with T-Mobile’s free data programs, 
for example.  
While a few van Schewick and a few net neutrality advocacy 
organizations have complained about such programs, the vast majority 
of consumers enjoy them. This is evidenced by their consumer 
satisfaction552 and their behavior, switching to programs they prefer.  
This consumer choice van Schewick considers suspect. T-Mobile, for 
example, has seen considerable growth in their customer base since 
the launch of their zero rated Music Freedom and BingeOn streaming 
programs.553  According to T-Mobile, customers utilizing Binge On 
streaming are watching more than two times more minutes per day 
from streaming services than before and have streamed over 190 
million hours of video for free. T-Mobile customers stream more than 
                                                          
552 John Tevs, “2016 U.S. Wireless Customer Care FS NC Performance Studies Vol 
1,” Text, J.D. Power, (January 27, 2016), http://www.jdpower.com/press-
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553 “P3 Insights Separate T-Mobile “Binge On” Fact from Fiction” P3 Group. 
January 15, 2016. http://www.p3-group.com/en/wp-
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60 video services, which now represent a full 70 percent of all video 
they watch on their phones and tablets each month.554   
T-Mobile won 8.3 million net new customers in 2015555 in part from 
free video and music offers and is reported to have the highest rate of 
customer satisfaction among US mobile carriers, as measured by 
numerous reports and surveys.556 It’s unlikely that the FCC would ban 
such a program, as the evidence points to competition and consumer 
welfare. More generally, the FCC is unlikely to ban free data as there 
is a high poverty rate in the USA and a number of groups representing 
disadvantaged communities have lobbied the FCC to keep data free.557  
Regarding KPN, that it increased its data cap comes at the expense of 
eliminating their lowest priced offer. This means that those with the 
least ability to pay now have less choice.  However the richest users 
                                                          
554 Overall, T-Mobile has zero-rated 34PB of video traffic, which is the equivalent of 
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now have more data. This “regressive progressive ruling”558 actually 
rewards the rich who already have ample access over the poor. It bears 
mention that the ban was placed on Vodafone’s zero rated offer of 
HBOGo, which incidentally was never a threat to market leader 
Netflix, which can be verified by traffic analysis and mobile app 
measurement. That KPN responds as it did reflects the incumbent’s 
larger network, so perversely the Dutch telecom regulator ACM has 
incentivized the incumbent at the expense of the entrant. 
Van Schewick does not conduct any research in the document but 
references work by consultancy Rewheel, the methodology of which 
has been critiqued by respected economists. In any case the Rewheel 
study on zero rating only  does not measure consumer harm. The same 
figures could be used to justify zero rating as pro consumer and pro- 
competitive efforts, particularly for corporate social responsibility 
arguments. While the debate on zero rating is new, the practice of zero 
rating is not.  In fact half of the world’s mobile operators559 use some 
form of zero rating, and it has been around for more than a decade560 
with little to no controversy.561  It is only with the shift to mobile 
broadband and its potential to disrupt established advertising revenue 
streams that the practice has become an issue.   
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Rewheel’s report562 states that a number of European countries want 
to ban zero rating, a report which van Schewick (and other 
advocates563) cite in policy discussions to support of hard net 
neutrality. But the assertion is not a fact; it is an interpretation from a 
meeting of the European Council in November 2014.564 Based upon 
an unofficial translation of the meeting, Rewheel deduced that a set of 
national representatives to the Council expressed interest in 
restrictions on price discrimination. However such statements as made 
in the Council could not be found in the official proceedings from 
national countries from which the representatives come, and some of 
the representatives have changed from the Council in 2014 to today. 
Therefore it cannot be concluded, as Rewheel reports, that these 
countries wish to restrict differential pricing or zero rating at this time. 
In any case, the EU law stands at present and does not suggest such a 
restriction.  
Zero-rating harms innovation and free speech. 
BVS:  Start-ups, small businesses, and low-cost speakers in Europe 
and elsewhere don’t have money to pay for fast lanes; they don’t have 
money to pay for zero-rating, either. But if some companies can pay to 
be zero-rated, those who can’t pay will find it hard to compete. Thus, 
allowing ISPs to zero-rate websites or services against a fee creates 
the same problems for innovation and free speech as allowing ISPs to 
charge for fast lanes. 
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First of all, there are ”fast lanes” all over the Internet today. They are 
called content delivery networks, bandwidth reservation systems, and 
other such technologies. If we did not have them, the internet would 
not work. These technologies exist at a range of price points, and are 
used by all manner of enterprises large and small. No one considers it 
discriminatory to buy their services. Delivery is just another input like 
electricity.  No one suggests that startups should get electricity for 
free, even though it is an input.565 There is no reason why quality of 
service should be any different.  
Van Schewick is describing a legitimate set or practices and 
technologies in an inflammatory way to scare people into her 
preferred policy. Fast lanes is not even a correct description of what 
she is trying to describe.  See the section on prioritization for further 
explanation. 
Generally there is no fee for zero rating, but if there was, the price 
would be a function of supply and demand. An ISP can only charge a 
price if it offers a commensurate value for the service which the 
startup is willing to pay.  If the ISP could deliver a startup in such a 
way that it could guarantee to lower the app’s cost of customer 
acquisition, then it would be worthwhile to pay a fee up to the price of 
the next marginal marketing strategy. At present startups are left to 
conduct marketing in a range of expensive and frequently ineffective 
means.  
What Van Schewick is saying that only rich companies will pay for 
such a service, well, if that is the case, that it true for any service 
regardless of the provider. Van Schewick has no proof that will 
happen (or evidence that is has); it’s only a conjecture, but if such an 
outcome evolves and it is anticompetitive, there are plenty of laws to 
address it. 
There is no doubt that wealthy companies can purchase a range of 
services, but if there is demand for such service by small companies, 
                                                          
565 Michael L. Katz, “Wither U.S Net Neutrality Regulation,” May 15, 2016, 
https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/MLKatzWitherUSNetNeutralityRegulation.pdf. 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
336 
the opportunity leads competitors to offer the same or similar services 
at an attractive price point. This is true for any good or service. If a 
company goes to the trouble to create a service, it wants to maximize 
the buyers of that service. If the price is too high, then companies 
won’t buy it, and the ISP will make no revenue.  
ISPs generally don’t offer such services because the transaction costs 
of making a deal with every possible end point on the Internet are too 
high.  This is another reason why blocking content in general is not 
worthwhile.  An ISP could block content for which it disagrees 
(religious, cultural, political), but this is not profit maximizing. It only 
makes sense in the case of religious ISPs such as JNet, which offers 
their customers a set of curated conservative Jewish content while 
filtering content deemed inappropriate. Indeed that net neutrality rules 
do not allow ISPs to tailor offers to their customers actually violates 
free speech. Net neutrality rules could well be struck down in the US 
because of free speech and First Amendment concerns because the 
law protects against government’s interference in speech.566    
Zero rating is likely a form of speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution.567  Zero rating conforms to all 
aspects of the classic definition of marketing:  product, price, place, 
and promotion.568 Thus bans on zero rating may be bans on free 
speech.  To be sure, “deception” and false advertising are not allowed, 
but the freedom to make an offer in the marketplace is a fundamental 
as speech itself.   
The distinction between technical and commercial reasons is 
irrelevant for the First Amendment. Indeed for a network, technical 
and commercial concerns are one in the same. Thus some net 
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neutrality rules against how operators price and manage their 
networks may be unconstitutional. Legal scholar Fred Campbell 
explains569  
It is constitutionally irrelevant that the content-related 
restrictions in the open Internet rules also implicate business 
concerns.570 The Court has long held that the commercial 
nature of the press does not deprive it of First Amendment 
protection, because there is no constitutionally permissible 
way for the government to separate the business interests of 
the press from its editorial function.571 The existence of 
“‘commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for 
narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First 
Amendment,’”572 in part because even early printers were 
capitalists who were regarded as innovators.573 The 
combination of the profit motive “with other motives that were 
self-serving and altruistic, and even evangelistic, at times,” 
played a role in the “rapid expansion of early printing 
industries.574 The editorial and business interests of the press 
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invites-the-feds-to-ignore-the-first-amendment-censor-the-internet/.  p 32-33, 51 
570 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818, quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 
(1966). (“The existence of ‘commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for 
narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment.’”). 
571 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258. 
572 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818, quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 
(1966). 
573 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: 
Communications and Cultural Trans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980). 
574 See id. at p. 23. 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
338 
have always been inextricably intertwined,575 and the Press 
Clause has always forbidden government attempts to unravel 
them.576 
While the court may recognize an argument for common carriage, this 
does mean free carriage. Thus an operator’s discretion of how to 
charge for delivery is protected as well. Price differentiation is 
enshrined in almost every country through the post, with priority, 
regular, and reduced rate postage.  It is understood that there is social 
value to give mass media and books a lower price of delivery because 
it supports communication, expression and the exchange of ideas.    
Moreover rather than declare such practices inherently 
harmful, however, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
government’s right to engage in paid prioritization of the mail 
for the purpose of subsidizing particular forms of speech.577   
In this way, it is no different for some Internet content to get the 
“book rate” or the zero rate. It supports overall expression.  
In this respect Facebook’s Free Basics realizes the very original 
conception of zero rating, a term578 that comes from the international 
trade and tax policy of the European Economic Community in the 
1950s. When value added tax (VAT) was imposed on goods 
distributed in what is today the European Union, certain “essential” 
items such as food, medicines, books, equipment for the disabled and 
were “zero rated” and not taxed.  The essential information about 
health, education, employment is offered for free is defendable.  
While broadband providers are considered common carriers and they 
must deliver communications, they need not do it for free. In U.S. 
                                                          
575 See id. (“It seems more accurate to describe many publishers as being both 
businessmen and literary dispensers of glory.”). 
576 The Press Clause has not been amended since its initial ratification. 
577 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946). 
578 Harry Wallop, “General Election 2010: A Brief History of the Value Added 
Tax,” April 13, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-
2010/7582869/VAT-a-brief-history.html. 
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Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations (1981), the 
court found that it was not incumbent on the postal service to deliver 
mail without postage. 579 Noting that the “soap box is not the letter 
box”, government-regulated communications networks do not have 
traditional free speech obligations, and operators could argue that they 
need not deliver communications for which they are not compensated. 
Given the documented value of such platforms for expression, it 
seems somehow inconsistent that people who have no internet access 
at all are better off if free data is banned. Indeed the potential options 
for expression are reduced. Free speech scholar Ellen P. Goodman 
observes,580 
Because connectivity itself is a means to expressive freedom, 
zero rating implicates expressive interests on both sides. This 
is particularly true when the services that have been zero 
rated(such as Facebook and Youtube) are actually speech 
platforms for users. Of course these users have speech interests 
as “listeners,” derivative of the speech rights of edge 
providers. But they also have speech interests as speakers, and 
these are advanced by robust and affordable broadband access 
at the user end. The end-to-end theory at the center of net 
neutrality advocacy of course recognizes the importance of 
user participation in Internet speech circulation. However, the 
policy focus on edge provider neutrality compromises user 
speech interests where they may conflict with edge provider 
speech interests. Excessive concentration on edge provider 
equality and free speech interests tend to neglect user 
community inequality and free speech constraints. User 
interests are not purely derivative of edge provider interests. 
                                                          
579 Fred Campbell, “The First Amendment and the Internet: The Press Clause 
Protects the Internet Transmission of Mass Media Content from Common Carrier 
Regulation - Viewcontent.cgi,” Nebraska Law Review, 2016, 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2831&context=nlr. 
580 Goodman, Ellen P. “Zero Rating: Equality and Free Speech at the Other Edge - 
Draft 4/416.” Forthcoming Colorado Technology Law Journal (2017), 2016. 
http://riipl.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/goodman-zero-rating-draft-1.pdf. 
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While neutral treatment of edge providers benefits users, so 
does free data. The utility of free data for consumers might 
well outweigh the disutility for certain classes of edge 
providers, at least in the short term. 
Thus banning zero rating likely creates problems for regulators in that 
it violates free speech. 
5.4 ENGINEERING CONCEPTS IN CONFLICT WITH NET 
NEUTRALITY 
Different applications have different needs of the network.  The 
growing restrictions and contradictions of net neutrality are at odds 
with the practices that engineers need to implement to make networks 
work. One of the key challenge for engineering is manage applications 
which are sensitive to delay.  Banning accommodation tools and 
techniques make it difficult, if not impossible, for many applications 
to get the configuration of service they need in order to work. 
5.4.1 VOICE AND VIDEO APPLICATIONS 
In voice communications, delay581 is an extremely important metric. 
In a recommendation582 from The International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), it is advised that a one-way maximum allowance of 400 
milliseconds is acceptable for general network planning. However, 
there are further details within the recommendation that are important. 
The ITU document includes a chart grading user satisfaction583, based 
on the delay of voice traffic. The information it presents has ranges of 
                                                          
581 There are technical arguments about when to use the term “latency” and when to 
use the term “delay”. For the purposes of this document, we only use the generic 
term “delay”. 
582 ITU-T Recommendation G.114 “General Recommendations on the Transmission 
Quality for an Entire International Telephone Connection”, 2003, One-Way 
Transmission Time. http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-G.114-200305-I 
583 Note: The satisfaction levels are not derived from actual user opinions. They are 
calculated from methods detailed in ITU-T Recommendation G.107 (2003). 
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delay times in relation to a particular level of user satisfaction. The 
results can be broken down as follows (all numbers are approximate): 
- A delay over 550 milliseconds results in dissatisfaction among 
nearly all users.  
- A delay between 390-550 milliseconds results in many 
dissatisfied users. 
- A delay between 285-390 milliseconds results in some 
dissatisfied users. 
- A delay between 200-285 milliseconds results in satisfied 
users. 
- A delay between 0-200 milliseconds results in very satisfied 
users. 
Furthermore, additional analysis of the chart curve finds that after a 
delay of approximately 125 milliseconds, the “very satisfied” rating 
begins to fall. 
There is also a very important detail behind all of the numbers. The 
delays are not just discussing network delay. They are “mouth-to-ear” 
delays which, in addition to the network, would also include the 
endpoints use of buffering, scheduling, and processing. Acceptable 
network delay, therefore, would be smaller than the presented 
numbers and proportionate to the other delays introduced within the 
endpoints. 
Network equipment manufacturer Cisco (noting the same ITU 
recommendation) suggests a requirement of 150 milliseconds 
(maximum) of one-way mouth-to-ear delay for voice traffic584. Cisco 
further advises on end-to-end and hop-by-hop jitter585 requirements, 
and recommends packet loss should be no more than 1%.  
                                                          
584 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design”, 2014, 
Chapter 10: Pg. 170. 
585 “Jitter is defined as a variation in the arrival of received packets.” See: Wallace, 
Kevin. ”Implementing Cisco Unified Communications Voice over IP and QoS 
(CVOICE)”, 2011, Chapter 2: Pg. 258. 
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The reality is that voice services have very specific needs from a 
network. Simply adding voice traffic to the general best-effort packet 
path with equal treatment will result in unpredictable delay and jitter 
for the voice service. The delay can reach levels that are irritating or 
completely unacceptable to users. Unpredictably high levels of jitter 
also forces application developers to compensate for it, increasing 
overall delay.586  
Video also has special requirements. Generally, the nature of video 
compression combined with the ability of users to visually detect 
missing packets creates challenges for the network587 588. 
Streaming video-on-demand and general one-way broadcast video can 
be reasonably delayed. However, two-way interactive multimedia 
conferencing has stricter requirements. Cisco recommends a delay of 
400 milliseconds (maximum) for one-way video streaming, and 200 
milliseconds (maximum) for multimedia conferencing589. 
This technical reality and the need to ensure quality underpins VOIP 
pioneer Dan Berninger’s lawsuit590 against the FCC for the its Open 
Internet bans on prioritization technologies. Berninger needs to offer 
real time communications for his app, a service that allows users to 
communicate about the news in real time. 
                                                          
586 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design”, 2014,  
Chapter 10: Pg. 170. 
587 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design”, 2014, 
Chapter 10: Pgs. 172-173. 
588 In the case of compression, one could argue that leaving video uncompressed 
would actually improve network demand predictability and thus engineering 
precision, but at the cost of requiring much greater capacity. 
589 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design”, 2014, 
Chapter 10: Pg. 176-177. 
590  “PETITION FOR STAY PENDING JUDICI AL REVIEW OF DANIEL 
BERNINGER,  FOUNDER OF THE VOICE COMMUNI CATION EXCHANGE 
COMMITTEE,” April 27, 2015, 
http://vcxc.org/documents/berningerstaypetition.pdf. 
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Modern gaming sometimes has components which are considered 
multimedia conferencing applications. Games can include voice and 
video chat to foster communication between players. In addition, 
Massively Multiplayer Online Games591 (MMOs/MMOGs) have strict 
multi-endpoint synchronization requirements. When the 
synchronization is delayed, gameplay suffers and results in irritated 
game customers complaining of “lag” to both the gaming service and 
also their network provider. 
There are some providers of general web sites and applications that 
view their uses as time-sensitive. Companies with such an opinion 
will often cite various time-studies to support their argument.592 
Debating the validity of whether one app or another is time-sensitive 
is only a matter of opinion. The reality is that if the application 
provider views time constraints as important, then the time constraints 
are important. 
Best-effort is currently the default level of Internet service. This 
general service is good for non-time-sensitive use, such as classic-
style Internet websites, terminals, and email. As explained in a 
paper593 by Scott Shenker, “These applications are rather elastic in 
nature, in that they tolerate packet delays and packet losses rather 
gracefully, and so they are rather well served by the current Internet’s 
best-effort service.” 
Opportunistic/Economy levels are sometimes described as 
“scavenger” traffic, and are intended for lower-priority data. If data 
has no immediate need for transmission across the Internet, then such 
                                                          
591 “Massively Multiplayer Online Game,” Wikipedia, November 3, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Massively_multiplayer_online_game&ol
did=747555680. 
592 Strangely, many companies cite time-studies to show support for network 
neutrality. Actually, such studies make clear that the application developers have an 
unfilled need for a time-sensitive traffic category on the network. 
593 Shenker, Scott. “Fundamental Design Issues for the Future Internet” September 
1995, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 13, No. 7. 
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a lower class of service could be implemented. This type of traffic 
would typically be dropped first in cases of network congestion594. 
Network usage could also be scheduled by the user. By volunteering 
particular data transfers to be transacted at off-peak hours (perhaps for 
a price discount), overall network efficiency and experience are 
improved for all. 
It is clear that different applications have different QoS needs. There 
is an abundance of literature on the topic, which is apparently being 
ignored by network neutrality advocates. It seems that in the network 
neutrality debate, the “key axiom” of “application primacy”595 has 
been pushed aside: “The sole and entire point of building a high-
performance network infrastructure is to support the distributed 
applications that need it.” 
5.4.2 NEUTRALITY DOES NOT ENSURE A QUALITY 
EXPERIENCE 
Importantly, network neutrality cannot guarantee a quality experience 
for the Internet application user. If all IP packets are treated the exact 
same on an IP network as large as the Internet, some applications will 
suffer. Network operators, and thus application developers, simply 
cannot meet all the varied needs and give customers quality 
guarantees. 
Measurement of overall service performance is generally known as 
quality-of-experience (QoE)596. Network technology standards 
                                                          
594 Szigeti, Barton, Hattingh, and Briley. “End-to-End QoS Network Design” (2014) 
Chapter 10: Pg. 180. 
595 James P. G. Sterbenz and Joseph D. Touch, High-Speed Networking: A 
Systematic Approach to High-Bandwidth Low-Latency Communication, 1 edition 
(New York: Wiley, 2001).Chapter 2: Pg. 20. 
596 Although, sometime the term used may be user-perceived-quality-of-service 
(PQoS), so as not to be confused with network-quality-of-service (QoS or NQoS). 
See: Lingfen Sun et al., Guide to Voice and Video over IP: For Fixed and Mobile 
Networks, 2013 edition (London ; New York: Springer, 2013). Chapter 6: Pg. 123. 
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organizations study QoE597, and entire books have been written on the 
topic598. QoE has been important in the analysis of communication 
networks for quite a long time. It could be argued that the first basic 
network QoE measurement was called grade-of-service for basic 
telephony. It was simply the probability of a customer experiencing a 
network busy signal599. Today, and for packet-based services, QoE is 
a bit more complicated. Congestion doesn’t create a network busy 
signal600, it creates service degradation. Packets can be delayed, 
dropped, or arrive inconsistently. 
QoE is currently defined by the ITU as application or service 
acceptability, as perceived by the end user601. QoE can be established 
in a variety of methods. One way is to question the users of the 
application, which usually results in a mean-opinion-score (MOS). 
Another way thought to measure experience is an estimation based on 
computing a score mathematically. 
One assumption by some who take the mathematical approach is that 
if QoS measurements are good, then QoE is good.602 Such persons 
usually pick a particular mathematical model with input from various 
performance measurements to result in a score. However, such a view 
and methods may be considered simplistic. Network optimization 
                                                          
597 For example, the ITU, the Broadband Forum, and the TeleManagement Forum all 
have explored QoE. See: Abdelhamid Mellouk, Said Hoceini, and Hai Anh Tran, 
Quality of Experience for Multimedia: Application to Content Delivery Network 
Architecture (Hoboken, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781118649367.Chapter 2: Pgs. 12-13. 
598 Sebastian Möller and Alexander Raake, eds., Quality of Experience: Advanced 
Concepts, Applications and Methods, 2014 edition (New York: Springer, 2014). 
599 James Martin, Telecommunications and the Computer, 2nd edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J: Longman Higher Education, 1977). Chapter 31: Pgs. 600-602. 
600 Perhaps packet networks should implement a network-resource-busy indicator for 
particular uses (also known as admission control). 
601 “P.10 : Vocabulary for Performance and Quality of Service,” ITU, (2008), 
https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-P.10/en. 
602 Pathan, Sitaraman, and Robinson. “Advanced Content Delivery, Streaming, and 
Cloud Services”, 2014, Chapter 11: Pg. 222. 
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consultant Martin Geddes603 is particularly concerned by frequent 
usage of “speed” as a proxy for QoE along with average-packet-loss 
as a metric.604 
Geddes has suggested use of an advanced mathematical QoE 
Measurement known as ΔQ,605 which is a measure of deviation from 
ideal performance,606 described as quality attenuation.  For example, a 
Network operator could set “quality” characteristics for a particular 
category of traffic, or perhaps even a particular packet flow. Such 
would define the boundaries which, when surpassed, would be 
considered failure of the service. The ΔQ metric generally represents 
both delay and probability of failure of a particular service. 
A frustrating reality exists for network operators. While some current 
or future methods of QoE-based network analysis and configuration 
may improve network performance, the network operator still cannot 
control all aspects that result in the actual quality as experienced by 
the end user. The only experience a network operator can really 
guarantee is a portion of QoE given between network demarcation 
points. Overall QoE is altered by hardware and software not 
controlled by the network operator, before a packet leaves a content 
                                                          
603 “Martin Geddes is an authority on the future of the telecoms industry, ranging 
from emerging business models to new network technologies. He is a futurologist, 
writer, speaker, consultant, and technologist… He is formerly Strategy Director at 
BT’s network division, and Chief Analyst and co-founder at Telco 2.0. Martin 
previously worked on a pioneering mobile web project at Sprint, where he was a 
named inventor on nine granted patents, and at Oracle as a specialist in high-
scalability databases.” See: “About Martin Geddes,” Martingeddes, accessed 
November 9, 2016, http://www.martingeddes.com/about-us/. 
604 Geddes, Martin. “How Should Regulators Measure Broadband Quality?”, April 
20, 2015, Blog post. See: http://www.martingeddes.com/how-should-regulators-
measure-broadband-quality/ 
605 Geddes, Martin. “An Overview of ΔQ Metrics, Calculus and Algebra for Non-
Mathematicians”, October 28, 2015, Blog post. See: 
http://www.martingeddes.com/an-overview-of-%e2%88%86q-metrics-calculus-and-
algebra-for-non-mathematicians/ 
606 Leahu, Lucian. “Analysis and Predictive Modeling of the Performance of the 
ATLAS TDAQ Network”, 2013, Section 4.2.2: Pgs. 51-53 
http://cds.cern.ch/record/1504817/files/CERN-THESIS-2013-004.pdf 
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provider, during any 3rd-party network transmission, and after the 
packet reaches customer equipment. 
Simply stated, while QoE is important, network operators cannot 
guarantee total experience quality. 
What they can do, is offer many different categories of traffic which 
are optimized to provide particular performance characteristics to 
types of applications. This puts accountability on application 
providers and end users. Application providers need to know exactly 
what network performance characteristics their application needs, and 
express that to the network operator. End users can pick categories 
based on application provider guidance and the user’s experience. 
Otherwise, it can become convenient for application providers and end 
users to simply blame the network.  Without any traffic characteristics 
requested by the application provider, there is no way to prove a 
performance failure. An application provider cannot, in using an 
extremely large and affordable network, simply accuse network 
operators of entire responsibility over QoE. Accountability is 
extremely important in commercial transactions, and there is no 
reason why Internet service should be any different. 
If application providers want quality experiences for their users, then 
application providers and users need to communicate their 
differentiated needs to the network provider, and pay accordingly. 
Forcing network operators to simply treat all packets with “hope” of 
achieving undefined acceptable-delivery is a win for nobody. The 
application provider and the network operator both lose and have no 
accountability to each other, while the end user suffers. Without 
applications and users requesting defined performance from the 
network, and with no application performance accountability, there is 
no accurate mathematical measure of overall QoE. 
Quality of experience is important, and network operators cannot 
adequately, accurately, and affordably provide their portion of it 
within the confines of network neutrality technology bans. 
WHICH OPEN INTERNET FRAMEWORK IS BEST FOR MOBILE APP INNOVATION? 
348 
5.4.3 PHYSICAL NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
One company’s comments on network prioritization submitted to the 
FCC expressed that “The Commission should adopt a presumption 
against paid prioritization, because it is impossible to define a 
workable standard for prioritization that avoids degrading and 
harming other uses of the access service.” 607 608  Such comments 
(which narrowly assume a rigid network context of enabling primitive 
queueing algorithms on pre-existing links of unchanging capacity) are 
also only applicable to a specific physical network configuration. 
One must consider the possibilities of a physical network 
configuration that varies from the simplified hierarchies presented as 
examples in many network study books. Categorized Internet traffic 
can be split off and sent down separate physical paths consisting of 
completely different cables, lengths, speeds, devices, and protocols for 
optimization of particular traffic characteristics. In such cases of 
physical separation there would be no capacity sharing by traffic 
categories whatsoever, thus making degradation impossible. 
5.4.4 NOTE ON OVERPROVISIONING 
These comments of the Vice President of Internet2609 are often quoted 
by network neutrality advocates to suggest that overprovisioning of 
                                                          
607 Chris Riley, Alex Fowler, and Mozilla. “Comments of Mozilla”, September 15 
2014, Comments Before the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, Regarding 
GN Docket 14-28 & GN Docket 10-127, Section III. 
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2014/09/Mozilla-NN-Reply-Comments-Sept-
2014.pdf 
608 A previous version asked not for a “presumption”, but for a complete ban. See:  
Chris Riley, Alex Fowler, and Mozilla. “Comments of Mozilla”, July 15 2014, 
Comments Before the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, Regarding GN 
Docket 14-28 & GN Docket 10-127, Section III-C. 
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2014/07/Mozilla-NN-Comments-July-
2014.pdf 
609 Bachula, Gary.,Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Net Neutrality, February 7, 
2006, http://www.commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bachula-020706.pdf 
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the Internet is a viable solution, “For a number of years, we seriously 
explored various “quality of service” schemes, including having our 
engineers convene a Quality of Service Working Group. As it 
developed, though, all of our research and practical experience 
supported the conclusion that it was far more cost effective to simply 
provide more bandwidth.” He added,  
 “We would like to see Congress set a national goal of 100 megabits 
of symmetrical bandwidth, meaning the same speed for both uploaded 
and downloaded content, to every home and business and school in 
America in five years – and a gigabit (1000 megabits) in ten years.  
This is absolutely doable using coaxial cable and fiber to the home.  
That would allow plenty of bandwidth for telephone, video, email, and 
many other uses – and enable brand new uses that we cannot even 
imagine today.   
It does not cost all that much, relatively, to upgrade a network once 
the basic wiring is in place – that’s the big original cost.  For 
example, a university campus in the Midwest that serves 14,000 
students and faculty, recently estimated it would cost about $150 per 
port (per end user) to replicate their current 100 Mbps network for a 
five year period, or about $30 a year per user.  To upgrade to 1000 
Mbps (1 gigabit) it would cost $250, or about $50 per year.  
University campuses are like small towns or suburban neighborhoods.  
Once cable companies and companies like Verizon make their initial 
fiber investment, the relative cost of upgrading bandwidth to 
customers is small.” 
The problem with the experience of Internet2, and thus their resulting 
analysis, is the failure to address traffic aggregation and scale. 
The Internet2’s Abilene Network (the actual network referenced 
within the comments), at its maximum, had only 13 core nodes and 
just 14 links to connect them.610 It was a test network. Contrast this to 
                                                          
610 Internet2. “Abilene Network Operations Report” (January 22, 2007 – January 28, 
2007) Abilene Network Operations Center at Indiana University. , accessed 
November 9, 2015,  
http://noc.net.Internet2.edu/uploads/tC/XW/tCXWDCYHVEut8VzBIHZnsQ/20070
128.html 
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a recent U.S. Internet Infrastructure study611 which identified 888 
nodes612 and 1258 long-haul fiber links. 
The financial estimate of upgrading a customer Ethernet port to 1 
gigabit service does not appear to include the reality that the customer 
traffic, after passing through the initial access circuit, is then 
aggregated with other traffic within the network. As more customers 
are upgraded, more back end infrastructure is needed. The Internet2 
Vice President cited an example of a college campus serving 14,000 
people. For comparison, Verizon has 6.5 million FiOS Internet 
customers613whose traffic could potentially be aggregated on to the 
Verizon network, and/or passed to and from other network operators. 
Providing all customers with adequate 1 gigabit service would require 
a massive expansion within the Verizon network. Aggregation and 
scale are very important factors. 
There are also real-world traffic QoS implementations of near-equal 
scale to Internet2 that have achieved beneficial results. Sonus 
Networks, in a private-network WAN case study,614 successfully 
implemented application-awareness and prioritization mechanisms for 
a financial institution. What was the result? The financial institution 
“…was able to run all inter-branch traffic on seven Gigabit Ethernet 
links at 90% utilization. This reduced WAN costs from $198,000 to 
                                                          
611 Durairajan, Barford, Sommers, Willinger. “InterTubes: A Study of the US Long-
haul Fiber-optic Infrastructure”, 2015, SIGCOMM ’15. 
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~pb/tubes_final.pdf 
612 The number of nodes listed here was calculated by adding up nodes from table 1 
in the study. The study authors’ initial number of 267 “unique nodes” (presented in 
section 2.1) appears to not take into account that while multiple company links may 
end at the same street address, they terminate on separate equipment. 
613 Verizon. “Verizon Reports Strong Customer Additions and another Quarter of 
Double-Digit Earnings Growth”, October 21, 2014, News Release. 
http://www.verizon.com/about/news/verizon-reports-strong-customer-additions-and-
another-quarter-double-digit-earnings-growth/ 
614 Sonus Networks. “State Street Bank Reduces Costs, Increases Network 
Utilization with Sonus VellOS”, 2015, Sonus case study. 
http://www.sonus.net/sites/default/files/state-street-bank-reduces-costs-increases-
network-utilization-with-sonus-vellos_1.pdf 
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$42,000 per month. Over a span of 36 months, WAN costs dropped 
from more than $7 million to approximately $1.5 million.” 
As one book’s authors explains succinctly, “Though 
overdimensioning is not a real QoS method, it is a widely used 
solution due to its simplicity. This type of approach may lead, 
however, to a quite expensive solution with large networks.” 
Ultimately, the overprovisioning of dumb capacity costs money in 
exponential proportion to the size of the network615. 
5.4.5 DPI AND USER CONTROL 
It is repeatedly implied that deep-packet-inspection (DPI) is required 
to perform traffic categorization.616 617 Arguing that traffic 
categorization requires use of DPI is a faulty foundation of network-
neutrality claims which declare that network operators are the judges 
and assigners of packets into categories. 
DPI is function in which a network looks within a data packet to 
determine its contents. Many network neutrality advocates claim that 
the way traffic categorization works is by a network operator enabling 
DPI, looking into a packet, assessing the packet’s content, and 
assigning the packet to a category based on what is found within. The 
assumption is that network operators are the sole deciders of how 
content is interpreted, and that such practices are gross privacy 
violations. The problem with the argument is its base assumption of 
categorization requiring DPI. DPI is absolutely not a necessary part of 
network traffic categorization. In fact, it is an inefficient and 
                                                          
615 Anttalainen and Jääskeläinen. “Introduction to Communications Networks”, 
2015, Chapter 7, section 7.5: Pgs. 272-273. 
616 Chris Riley and Robb Topolski “A Free Press/New America Foundation Policy 
Brief: The Hidden Harms of Application Bias”, November 2009, 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/The_Hidden_Harms_of_Application_Bias.pdf 
617 Chris Riley and Ben Scott. “Deep Packet Inspection: The End of the Internet as 
We Know It?”, March 2009, Free Press. 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/Deep_Packet_Inspection_The_End_of_the_Internet_As_We_Know_It.pdf 
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inaccurate way to assign packets into traffic categories, subject to 
being potentially defrauded. Its use is simply not needed nor 
recommended. But this myth perpetuates, and taints the network 
neutrality conversation. It is completely false. 
One possible source of the DPI misunderstanding is non-technical 
persons misunderstanding the TCP/IP or OSI networking models. 
They may incorrectly assume that layers 1 (physical), 2 (link), and 3 
(network) of the models are only present within a network operator’s 
network. In reality, those layers are also present at the endpoints, and 
are required for any endpoint to be able to place packets on an IP 
network. Furthermore, layers 2 and 3 are generally configurable by 
common endpoint software. 
Some of the most highly-used programming languages contain the 
ability to set a field within IP packets618 which indicates the packets’ 
category of service. Those that do not could add the ability. It is not 
impossible, nor even just theoretical. This can be done right now. 
Programmers already have the resources available to make the most of 
this opportunity. Applications, content-provider server programs, and 
web browsers could easily have settings, configurable by the user. 
Such settings would dictate the desired categories for packets before 
they are placed on the network. No DPI is needed, whatsoever.  
Now, since exposing the imagined foundation of packet categorization 
requiring DPI (and thus also the claim that network operators “pick 
winners and losers”619) as invalid, we can finally move on to 
explaining how user-controlled traffic categorization actually works. 
                                                          
618 Java (and Android implementation), Microsoft C++, and Microsoft C# can 
directly configure the ToS/DSCP field. Python and POSIX (Linux, Apple, etc.) C 
sockets have the RAW socket option. See the various APIs for details. 
619 “Net Neutrality: A Free and Open Internet,” The White House, accessed 
November 9, 2016, http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality. 
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The user, within an application’s settings, can configure how their 
data should be handled620. For example, assume a multiservice 
communication application which offers VoIP calling, text messaging, 
picture sharing, document sharing, a live video feed, and multiuser 
turn-based gaming. Such requires disparate use of the network, 
optimized for different types of handling. The application may be 
loaded with defaults, but the user could customize the assignment of 
each offering into categories to provide maximum desired benefit. The 
data from the application is then placed into packets configured with 
the appropriate categories, and is handed off from the user device to 
the network. The network receives the packets, handles them as 
directed by the user, and bills the user based the network resource 
demands of each particular category of service. This is simply pay-
for-what-you-use, and offers no preference to one user or another in 
any given category. In addition to metered billing, assumedly, network 
operators may also offer pre-determined bundles of bulk usage to a 
custom*er, or custom plans as well. It’s all up to the customer. To 
summarize and restate: In the proper practice of traffic categorization, 
the user would control the assignment of their data to the categories. 
When user control is a solution, people agree. In the U.S., prominent 
network neutrality advocates have acknowledged a possible user 
control exception to a ban on traffic prioritization621 622, at least one 
                                                          
620 Paul Ferguson and Geoff Huston, Quality of Service: Delivering QoS on the 
Internet and in Corporate Networks (New York, NY, USA: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 1998).: Chapter 9: Pg. 192. 
621 “Rather, we can preserve the possibility of e2e systems by keeping intelligence 
out of the hardware design, but by building it into some software layers on an as-
needed basis.” See: Lemley, Mark and Lawrence Lessig, “The End of End-to-End: 
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era” (October 1, 2000) 
UC Berkeley Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2000-19. Pg. 19. 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/e2e/papers/Lemley_Lessig_e2epaper.pdf 
622 “…the most reasonable short-term way is to maintain users’ control over their 
own traffic” See: Chris Riley and Robb Topolski, “A Free Press/New America 
Foundation Policy Brief: The Hidden Harms of Application Bias,” New America 
Foundation, Open Technology Initiative, November 2009, 
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/The_Hidden_Harms_of_Application_Bias.pdf. 
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has explained it technically623, and one company (An extremely vocal 
network neutrality advocate) even openly supports user-controlled 
content blocking624. In addition, The U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission has stated in their “Open Internet” ruling that they favor 
network solutions which enable user control.625 User control is a way 
for network operators to move forward with prioritization. 
With user control of packet marking, categorization, and prioritization 
of packets, the Internet would remain End-to-End Argument 
compliant. No DPI or any other additional function is added within the 
network. All the packet classification and placement within traffic 
categories would be at the endpoints. The network simply acts as 
multiple virtual networks, transmitting the packets across as requested 
by the user. 
Therefore, if user-controlled endpoint packet marking is ultimately 
pursued as a solution by network operators, the End-to-End 
Arguments are irrelevant to protests against implementation. End-to-
End would be removed from the prioritization discussion, allowing for 
more attention to be given to the remaining issues regarding network 
neutrality. 
                                                          
623 “… Imagine that the Internet layer offered different services with different 
bandwidth and delay characteristics to higher layers at the end hosts. The higher 
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setting a type-of-service field).” (Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and 
Innovation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012). Chapter 3: Pgs. 106-107 
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Blog, October 7, 2015, https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2015/10/07/proposed-
principles-for-content-blocking/. 
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28, Part 139: Pgs. 61-62,” FCC, March 12, 2015, 
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5.5 WHAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE OTHER PARTS OF 
THE VALUE CHAIN WITH SIGNIFICANT MARKET 
POWER, E.G. APPS, PLATFORMS, OPERATING 
SYSTEMS 
One heterodox interpretation is that net neutrality is a policy designed 
to protect the market position of large and established Internet 
companies. It is interesting to review the position of one company, 
Alphabet (or Google), a leading net neutrality supporter.  Net 
neutrality-justified bans on zero rating and sponsored data can be 
effective means to create an entrance barrier by ISPs and other 
providers into the advertising market. Moreover the requirement to 
treat all traffic equally means that consumers have to pay and accept 
advertising equally with valued content. Given that Google is the 
world’s largest digital advertising platform, having net neutrality 
regulations are extremely valuable to protect Google’s market 
position.  Users are thus required to pay for ad traffic in their 
subscription whether they want it or not. Regulation built on two-
sided markets would allow ISPs to extract revenue from the advertiser 
side and lower it on the consumer side. As such, net neutrality is 
frequently seen as an artificial subsidy from one side of the market to 
the other. 
Internet advertising was a $50 billion industry in the US in 2014626, on 
track to double by 2019. Its revenue exceeds that from ads on 
broadcast and cable TV by 25 percent. To be sure, internet advertising 
works well for many advertisers, largely on account of the better 
tracking and analytic abilities available with online channels, but 
many users feel “surveilled” under this paradigm. 
The IAB tracks627 growth driven primarily by the sale of ads in search, 
display, and on mobile platforms. A single company emerges as the 
                                                          
626 Tim Peterson, “Digital to Overtake TV Ad Spending in Two Years, Says 
Forrester,” Advertising Age, (November 4, 2014), 
http://adage.com/article/media/digital-overtake-tv-ad-spending-years-
forrester/295694/. 
627 “IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, April 
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overwhelming winner: Google. Over two-thirds of searches in the US 
are performed in Google, and Google takes the lion’s share of 
advertising revenue. In the $19 billion mobile advertising market in 
2014, Google earned 37 percent of the revenue. Globally Google 
earned $44 billion on advertising on its websites in 2014.628  
While it allows ad blocking extensions to its Chrome browser, Google 
outlawed ad blockers from its Google Play app store in 2013. This 
makes it very difficult for every 4 out the 5 smartphone users (which 
incidentally use the Android operating system) to take advantage of ad 
blockers. This could be an anti-trust violation. It’s no surprise that 
consumers welcomed Apple’s incorporation of ad blocking 
functionality in its iOS9 operating system.629  
 
Mobile advertising is now on track to consume 70% of all online ad 
revenues,630 and the explosion of digital advertising is exacerbating 
differences in tax policy and reducing the amount that corporations 
pay in tax. For example, American ad servers base their European 
operators in the UK and Ireland where they can enjoy a favorable tax 
rate while delivering services across the EU.631 Meanwhile local ad 
competitors have to pay (higher) taxes in the country where they are 
based.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_201
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629 “Application Launch Changes,” Developer Apple, accessed October 24, 2016, 
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630 Dave Chaffey, “Mobile Marketing Statistics 2016,” Smart Insights, October 26, 
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631 Toby Sterling and Tom Bergin, “Google Accounts Show 11 Billion Euros Moved 
via Low Tax ‘Dutch Sandwich’ in 2014,” Reuters, February 19, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-tax-idUSKCN0VS1GP. 
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This current paradigm of internet advertising is based upon a keyword 
bid and pay-per-click model. This model is very granular, enabling 
relevant ads to appear next to highly specific search queries, but it 
requires a high level of skill and budget by experts to be successful. 
This model has the advantage of offering highly tailored and targeted 
transactions between users and advertisers, and advertisers and 
platforms. But this same technology also engenders a sense of 
“creepiness”, that the technology is extremely intrusive and granular. 
 
As the FTC describes, “Effective competition is about price, selection, 
and service.” 632 If we look at the market for internet advertising, this 
is not the case today. Advertisers face increasing bid prices for 
keywords,633 and the selection of ad serving platforms are limited; 
Google has a poor reputation for customer service, apart from its very 
best advertisers.634 Though Google has made an effort to improve to 
win small and medium sized customers,635 the vast majority of its 
revenue come from the largest companies in a few verticals.636  
Having little to no competitors, Google is able to increase bid prices 
significantly above marginal cost. Having more and different ad 
providers in the marketplace along with new ad delivery models 
would change some of these dynamics. 
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Engine Land, November 19, 2012, http://searchengineland.com/why-does-the-
smartest-company-in-the-world-have-the-dumbest-customer-service-139356. 
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The online advertising market has also become highly concentrated 
through numerous mergers and acquisitions in the ad tech industry, as 
well as the massive shift of advertising spending from offline to 
online. The reality is that much of the technology running in the 
background is owned and operated by just a few large entities. The 
Google content network is a perfect illustration. It is a platform 
technology underpinning millions of websites and news outlets. To be 
sure, the ability to serve a tracked ad across millions of digital 
destinations is beneficial for advertisers, but this scale is also a 
concern for privacy advocates.637  
It does not appear that the trend will change soon. The IAB also notes 
that Internet advertising has grown more than any other advertising 
channel in the last 21 years.638 Their report shows that the largest ad 
platforms are getting more concentrated. The top 10 ad-selling 
companies commanded 75% of revenues in Q4 2015, an increase of 
the prior year. With the top 11-25 ad sellers losing market share over 
the same period, now down to 9 percent. The IAB notes, “Despite the 
emergence of a few heavyweights in internet advertising publishing, 
the concentration of top-10 revenue has remained relatively 
unchanged over the past ten years, fluctuating between 69% and 
75%.”639 
While many cheered the banning of differential pricing in India, the 
ruling has the perverse effect of enshrining a Google advertising 
monopoly. Leading mobile industry analyst Richard Windsor declares 
of the India, “game may already be over for the home grown 
                                                          
637 Electronic Privacy Information Center- www.epic.org, “Online Tracking and 
Behavioral Profiling,” Electronic Privacy Information Center, accessed November 
12, 2016, https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online_tracking_and_behavioral.html. 
638 “IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, (April 
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alternatives.”640 Further, eMarketer has reported641 the dominance of 
Google in both a US and global perspective: 
This year, eMarketer predicts, 30.9% of net digital ad revenues 
will go to Google. Facebook will be in second place with 
12.0%. Google’s lead is even stronger as a share of worldwide 
net search ad revenues, at 55.2%. Google also takes in a third 
of all mobile internet ad revenues in the world, and mobile is 
helping to power the company’s overall ad revenue growth 
rate. This year, for example, Google’s net worldwide mobile 
internet ad revenues are expected to rise more than four times 
as fast as its ad revenues overall. By 2018, mobile ad streams 
will still be growing nearly twice as quickly as the total. 
YouTube also figures significantly in Google’s worldwide ad 
revenue growth. Net ad revenues at the video site were up 
40.6% last year, and will continue to grow by 21.1% this 
year—more than twice the overall growth rate for ad revenues 
at Google. YouTube revenues are growing more quickly in the 
US than elsewhere in the world, and are accounting for a larger 
share of Google’s ad revenue stream there each year. This 
year, eMarketer forecasts, YouTube will continue 10.8% of 
Google’s net US ad revenues, up from 9.1% last year. By 
2018, the end of our forecast period, that share will rise to 
12.4%. 
A look at Google’s 2015 annual financial report642 is telling. Google 
earned $45 billion in 2014 and $52 billion in 2015, strictly from its 
                                                          
640  Windsor, Richard “Google vs. Facebook – Almost the Final Frontier,” Radio 
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website advertising. Additionally, Google posted revenues of $14.5 
billion in 2014 and $15 billion in 2015 from Google Member 
Networks website advertising. It is not just the revenue and market 
share of Google that is a concern, but rather its ubiquity. Google’s 
share of presence on the top 100 websites has increased from 74 in 
2012 to 92 in 2015.643 Google tracking is present on 92 of the top 100 
most popular websites, and on 923 of the top 1,000 websites.644 
The Google domination story continues beyond online advertising. 
According to ComScore, Google’s Android operating system 
commands 53% of the worldwide mobile market645 and Google 
Search, 64% of desktop search.646 Google’s Chrome web browser 
accounted for 56.75% of all browser usage647, and Gmail scores with 
56.4% of US websites using mail technology.648 An assiduous 
accounting of Google’s search engine, operating system, browser, and 
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193 products, services and tools has been described as a Google 
“Inner-net” regime.649 
 
A related issue is the degree to which many small and startup 
companies struggle to achieve advertising success with Google. Many 
small and medium-sized advertisers frequently don’t participate 
because it is too expensive and complex, and their businesses lack the 
scale to take advantage of such platform technology. Findability in the 
search engine requires extensive budget not just for paid search but 
the murky world of search engine optimization (SEO)650 and app store 
optimization (ASO). Companies frequently hire consultants and 
agencies for such a task. However, Google can make a change to its 
algorithm, resulting in traffic and rank disappearing overnight. There 
is a tremendous need for a more transparent, predictable experience 
for small and mediums-sized advertisers.  
 
Ivang describes that losing rank in the search results is not just an 
issue for small companies.651 Large companies such as Interflora UK 
have experienced losing the bulk of their traffic overnight when 
Google finds out that entities have purchased links to get inbound 
traffic, a “black hat” SEO technique which Google punishes.  He 
suggests that companies are compelled to purchase advertisements to 
ensure that at least some channel of traffic reaches their website. 
 
In addition, Google gives preference to websites which already have 
more traffic, so this has the perverse effect of strengthening the 
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destinations that are already strong. 652 Google’s CFO Patrick Pichette 
made a joke at an investors event about “feeding the winners and 
starving the losers” with regard to business lines within Google,653 but 
this idea also applies to the company’s advertisers. Those advertisers 
that do well are rewarded; those that don’t, are punished. In practice a 
large number of advertisers try and leave Google, but there are few 
options for other advertising platforms that deliver similar scale and 
reach.  
This problem will only be exacerbated by recent changes Google has 
made to its platform.654 Beginning in February 2016, Google phased 
out the traditional list of ads on the right side of the page. Instead, 
Google now puts only a couple of ads at the top of the page which 
look similar to “natural” search results. Users click on the ads, 
frequently not knowing they are ads.  
The right side of the page is used for Knowledge Graph results which 
provide the most authoritative informative result for the search query 
(frequently a Wikipedia entry), and for Product Listing Ads, which are 
generally consumer products from well-known brands and companies. 
These changes have the impact of increasing competition for bids, 
which increases the bid price and Google’s revenue. It also forces out 
the small advertisers, those which can’t afford higher bids and don’t 
have the time or skills to operate the complex AdWords engine. To its 
credit, Google now offers an automated version of its ad engine for 
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small business, but at least one agency advises against using the 
platform, citing that the benefits of the platform don’t scale down.655  
A number of academics have documented their concerns about 
Google from a user perspective,656 but in spite of the overwhelming 
evidence of its market power, there has been little successful antitrust 
action against the company. The European Union has tried 
unsuccessfully for a decade,657 but Google’s market share has 
increased consistently. In fact, Google enjoys significantly greater 
market share in the EU than the US.658 In the US the revolving door 
between Google and the Obama administration is an open secret,659 a 
relationship that has supported the company on many policy issues 
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including Open Internet, WCIT-12, and importantly, a cancelled 
antitrust probe by the Federal Trade Commission.660  
While net neutrality can be studied at face value as a doctrine to 
protect users rights, one heterodox interpretation is that public 
relations scheme to protect the revenue of large Internet companies 
such as Google and Netflix and curtail new entrants. Such 
interpretations are consistent with Olson’s theory of collective 
action.661 Olson described a situation within a political system where 
there are concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. In such cases, 
relatively small groups are more effective to work collectively to 
secure a set of political benefits as the costs to organize a large group 
are higher and the task more difficult. In the BEREC consultation on 
net neutrality guidelines, 7 of the 14 official stakeholders had Google 
as a funder or members.662 The specific groups advocate for particular 
regulatory interpretations of net neutrality that happen to support 
Google, bans on zero rating and sponsored data, bans on paid 
prioritization, and banning of network level ad blockers. 
5.6 OTHER ASSUMPTIONS OF NET NEUTRALITY 
5.6.1 HOMOGENEOUS USER AND CONTENT 
A related set of assumptions underlie the theory with regard to the 
homogeneity of users. For one, Wu’s conception of the Internet is 
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predicated on that of an early adopter, that of a male aged 18-30 using 
a desktop to play games and download files on peer-to-peer networks, 
quite reflective of his own Internet use. While that archetypal user still 
exists, users are far more diverse, including children or the elderly. 
Moreover they use a range of devices, primarily not computer 
desktops or laptops. Moreover the applications are quite varied. In 
addition to the diversification of human users, the number of machine 
users on the Internet is already larger than humans and is growing.  
Going forward Wu’s anthropocentric assumptions would apply to 
increasingly smaller percentage of the Internet users.   
The new paradigm of Internet of Things and 5G calls the assumptions 
of net neutrality into question. 5G is the next mobile standard which 
allows fiber fast speeds and capacity to the mobile phone, 10 gigabits 
per second or 100 times the speed of 4G. There is no way to realize 
the next generation of mobile network evolution with rules that insist 
that all data be treated the same. The essence of 5G is speed, capacity, 
and quality all integrated with intelligence.  A 5G network instantly 
optimizes and customizes the network for the ideal user experience.663  
The same social, economic, and technical assumptions for other 
networks don’t necessarily hold in a 5G perspective. For example 
millennials are not necessarily interested in the vast set of use cases 
for 5g and they only want to pay for the services they use.664 This 
could constrain the ability to invest and deliver networks as well as 
require the flexibility of business models to fill the gap. Similarly the 
paradigm of interactions are changing.  “The ICT-based service 
encounter no longer should be seen as neutral or transparent tool, as in 
existing literature, but as an independent element that essentially 
transform the service encounter. This is important for the design of 
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future automated and intelligent ICT- based services,” 665 note Skouby 
and Sørensen. 
Under net neutrality content on the internet is assumed to be 
interchangeable and that users value all content the same, and that just 
having more is better. While there may be some users who could fit 
this idealized paradigm, this is clearly not the case. Such reasoning 
leads to another myth of the “singular internet experience.” The 
discussion on net neutrality is frequently linked to the call for 
“universality of access on the Internet”666 and the demand for ”all the 
Internet for all people” or that all Internet users should be able to 
access the content of the “whole Internet” on identical terms. While 
these are noble and aspiration goals, they make assumptions that users 
value all content the same and that all users are the same. This view 
suggests the single Internet experience, an ideal archetypal way to 
access the Internet.  Such a view effectively says if one cannot access 
the Internet in that ideal way, at all times and in all circumstances, 
then one should not access it all. And indeed, one should be forbidden 
from accessing the Internet under less than pure circumstances. And if 
data is offered for free it diminishes the experience. It is the view that 
all content is equal and as such all access should be equal. 
Jonathan Donner, leading scholar in the area of Information and 
Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D) recently 
published After Access Inclusion, Development, and a More Mobile 
Internet. 667 He explores these questions in the book and an 
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interview668 presenting a conceptual framework for understanding 
effective use of the Internet by those whose “digital repertoires” 
contain exclusively mobile devices. Donner rejects the “Panglossian” 
view that mobile technologies are silver bullets for the problems that 
afflict the developing world and instead suggests that we should 
recognize both the potentials and constraints in the shift to a more 
mobile internet.  Access should not be equated with effectiveness,669 
he notes. While Donner rejects the idea of the singular internet 
experience, he suggests some alternatives for the current debate.  
There’s no single archetypal user that represents the 
majority of people in the world. So there’s no single 
experience which I could point to that would kind of say, 
well this is how the rest of the world uses it and it’s 
different from how we use it. There’s a lot of 
heterogeneity. The zero rating brouhaha, tension, crisis, 
however we want to call it, is only because of the 
metered mindset and that is only because that the only 
way you can allocate spectrum is to have people and 
have mobile network operators and charge by the bit for 
it. If we had a different internet with more Wi-Fi and 
more access points in train stations and more people with 
home connections and maybe someday with satellites 
and drones taking the pressure off the mobile channel 
then this zero rating conflict will go away. 
Wifi and train access points are on the rise in the developing world, as 
are drones, balloons, and satellites to help support backhaul 
infrastructure demand. Interestingly these are projects supported by 
companies such as Google and Facebook, which they tout as part of 
their global connectivity goals. It is welcome that companies are 
                                                          
668 John Balz, “A Conversation about the Mobile Internet with Jonathan Donner,” 
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playing a greater role to support connectivity through infrastructure 
provision (shrewdly by avoiding those points which are regulated), but 
it alludes to a key issue presented by mobile operators from the 
beginning, that content providers should play a greater role in to 
reduce the burden on the end user.  
There is an opposite and equally compelling view that people want to 
purchase a plan that is tailored to their needs and budget, that they 
don’t want to pay for data they don’t use, points they don’t touch, or 
destinations they will never see—nor desire to see. Indeed the 
insistence that every plan must access every point on the Internet is in 
fact “pure bundling”670, an act of obliging people to pay for data they 
don’t want. It may be a competition violation. In the case of the 
unconnected who are forced to pay for Internet access to all points 
which are overwhelmingly to content in languages and subjects 
irrelevant to them, this may indeed be welfare-reducing. If some data 
is offered for free, (especially for the reason to help first time users 
understand why they should adopt the Internet), it does not diminish 
the experience, rather it enriches the experiences. It seems inconsistent 
to accept the heterogeneity of content and users on one hand and then 
demand a uniformity of offer on the other. 
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5.6.2 REGULATORS ARE EXPERT, INDEPENDENT, AND 
COMPETENT WHEN IT COMES TO NET 
NEUTRALITY 
The explosion of net neutrality rulemaking puts a new responsibility 
in front of operators, one for which they are not necessarily skilled, 
resourced, or even motivated to address. To be sure, there are many 
outstanding regulatory professionals who are up to the task, but others 
are employed by the sheer happenstance of political appointment. Net 
neutrality philosophy also assumes not only that regulators are expert 
and independent but that rules can be codified to control and direct 
application innovation and that regulators can and monitor these vast 
activities and discern what is proper and what is not. Robin Mansell 
suggests that such regulation empowers a pre-ordained elite.671   
The very diversity of the rules themselves and their implementations 
suggest that regulators have diverging views, and if anything, many of 
them are reluctant to take on new regulatory mandates.  The Danish 
and Dutch regulators are cases in point. The Danish authorities saying 
the market for communications networks is competitive and that no 
more regulation is needed and should move as much as possible to ex 
post competition law672 versus that of the Dutch approach that “some 
things just have to be regulated.”673 This hardly seems to be the place 
of intellectual consensus that underpins the justification to rollout a 
new set of regulatory requirements.  
In any event, the burgeoning of new rules also suggest that there will 
be more lawsuits. In spite of their best intentions, regulators may find 
themselves in the crosshairs of litigation. The cost and demand of 
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litigation takes resources away from other important regulatory 
activities,  not to mention the social cost for taxpayers and citizens 
who may suffer from a disconnect of regulatory priorities, e.g. lack of 
spectrum being allocated,  failure to reform of universal service, 
banning of consumer centric business models and practices etc. 
5.7 THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN NET 
NEUTRALITY POLICY 
The burgeoning of net neutrality rules around the world is probably 
not the result of widespread violation by broadband providers or the 
need for more app innovation, but rather transnational activism.  
Today’s Internet activism or cyberactivism represents a marked 
change from traditional political action, particularly on telecom 
policy.  The process and implementation of telecom regulation was 
historically a sober domain, but no longer. A telecom regulator can 
receive millions of emails from activists around the world for or 
against a particular policy, challenging the standards of objectivity and 
independence. 
The various organizations and coalitions associated net neutrality are 
frequently well-funded and increasingly becoming transnational. For 
example “Save The Internet” campaigns have targeted Internet policy 
in the United States, European Union, and India.674 The management 
and target of the campaign may be based in Washington or Brussels, 
its participant are global. The following figure show interest over time 
for Save the Internet searches at key moments in the net neutrality  
debate such as 2006 initiative with Congress, the FCC’s Open Internet 
rulemaking, and the EU Parliament vote on net neutrality. 
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Figure 55: Google search trends for "Save The Internet"675  
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5.7.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WORD “ACTIVIST” 
There is no doubt that activism is an expression of the freedom of 
speech and enterprise.  Activism has an interesting history from its 
emergence as a policy to support “armed neutrality” during World 
War I; to its being incorporated into the various movements for 
women’s, workers’, and oppressed people’s rights and to anti-war, 
pacifist, and anti-corporate efforts; and today, to a strategy employed 
by corporations as a means to supplement public relations and as 
professional full-time occupation.   
An activist refers to one who engages vigorously and directly for 
political change. While any person may write letters or participate in 
political processes to bring focus to particular issues and polices, the 
difference with activist is the form of “direct” action such as boycotts, 
rallies, marches, strikes, sit-ins and so on.  Activists have incorporated 
the Internet to amplify their mobilization and communication efforts. 
This includes the used of digital tools (email, social media, electronic 
petitions, video, podcasts, online fundraising etc) to achieve political 
goals.  The historical derivation of the word activist has an interesting 
relevance for today’s net neutrality debate. 
The term activist was first used in Sweden during World War I to 
refer to a political faction, sympathetic to Germany with royal, 
cultural, and ethnic ties from the prior century, that wanted to align 
with the Central Powers (Germany/Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and the 
Ottoman Empire), culminating in the policy of “neutrality”.676  
Interestingly the “activists” challenged the groups advocating for 
social democracy, pacifism, and women’s rights. 
While “neutrality” as a concept may have the connotation as an 
unassailable position today, the reality is more complicated. While the 
dictionary term “neutrality” means not taking sides, impartial, or 
unbiased, neutrality in the political context has come under revision, 
as historians and scholars challenge the notion the “armed neutrality 
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paradox”677 of Sweden and Switzerland during the 20th century wars.  
“Essentially transfers of military technology to Sweden and 
Switzerland, which were needed to make their neutrality credible, 
effectively undermined the very credibility that they were supposed to 
ensure,” note historians Nilsson and Wyss.678  
5.7.2 THE TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 
Sidney Tarrow is a leading professor of political science and 
sociology and developed a compelling framework to understand 
transnational activism. 679The movement can be seen in the larger 
context as being comprised of individuals, corporations, and non-
governmental organizations that are focused on restructuring politics 
while transforming national norms and practices on a global scale.680   
Tarrow identifies the dynamics of transnational activism as 
• Transnational Activism 
• Internalization 
• Diffusion 
• Scale Shift 
• Externalization 
• Transnational Coalition Forming 
Internalization 
As Tarrow describes, internalization is the response to foreign or 
international pressure within domestic politics. It can result in a 
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contentious triangle structure of the people, their governments, and 
international institutions. The model was developed by studying 
activists’ objections to national austerity programs required by 
international loan organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. The 
elements include pressure applied by the international organization 
made on the country; implementation of the policy by the national 
government; protest by an activist group; and the response from the 
national government, whether it be repression, concession, or 
brokerage between the international organization and the nation’s 
people. A salient example is President Obama’s YouTube video681 
from November 14, 2014 in which he “urged the “Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to take up the strongest possible 
rules to protect net neutrality, the principle that says Internet service 
providers (ISPs) should treat all internet traffic equally.” The video 
was picked up by net neutrality activists around the world as 
justification to promulgate hard net neutrality rules.682  
Diffusion 
The transfer of claims of contention from one place to another is 
diffusion. Claims that net neutrality violations were occurring in the 
United States were copied by other countries. Tarrow describes how 
diffusion works in transnational activism: 
With the expansion and greater availability of electronic 
communication, shifting the scale of contention has become 
both easier and more rapid. The Internet can also become a 
tool of collective action, for activists and others who use their 
skills and artistic talents to disrupt the communication 
processes of their opponents. Because many social movements 
lack consistent, hierarchal organizing structures, it is only a 
short step to regarding the Internet itself as a form of 
organization. The group website, with very little need for 
formal organization behind it, can be used as a node for 
organizing protest campaigns.  
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An example of diffusion is the crowdsourced net neutrality reporting 
tool Respect My Net.683  European users can can enter “violations”, of 
which 67 are noted as “verified” cases.  Invariably the issues involve 
small mobile operators with free offers of music, video, and social 
media. Respect My Net is maintained by the French net neutrality 
advocacy La Quadrature du Net and is partially funded by the Open 
Society Foundation. La Quadrature organized a letter684 to BEREC 
with signatories from network neutrality groups located in Africa, 
Asia, North America, South America, and Central America, along 
with International organizations such as AccessNow. 
 
Scale Shift 
Scale shift is a change in the number and level of coordinated 
contentious actions to a different focal point, involving a new range of 
actors, different objects, and broadened claims. Tarrow provides a 
model of scale shift beginning with local action followed by 
coordination, the joint planning of collective action and the creation of 
instances for cross-spatial collaboration. This is done through 
brokerage (the practical mechanism of bridge-building between 
organizations) and theorization (the abstraction of core ideas taken 
from one reality and then applied to another). 
This then leads to claim-shift and target-shift, as claims and targets 
move from one level or party to another. There is also an identify-shift, 
in which the boundary between political actors shift and their relations 
adjust. It can also be observed that activists become micro-celebrities, 
gaining renown in their local as well as global networks. 
It can be observed how a variety of Internet activist groups coordinate 
to send a mass of automated messages to public consultations 
(especially telecom consultations) for or against a particular policy, 
creating the appearance of a mass movement when in fact it could be 
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between 2 and 3 key agents organizing a response. As an example, a 
content analysis study685 of comments submitted to the FCC’s Media 
Ownership Online Docket # 02-121 revealed, 
. . . major coordinated campaigns employing the use of form 
letters dominated the FCC’s online comment submission 
process. The initial analysis of where the comments were 
submitted from and when they were submitted, with the 
findings revealing that submissions came from all fifty states, 
for numerous days at a time, hinted at the idea that perhaps a 
considerable number of Americans were really engaged in the 
FCC’s process. While the findings of the content analysis do 
not suggest that the public that participated was apathetic by 
any means, the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
submissions came via form letter (or were modifications of a 
form letter) points to what perhaps could be termed a “partial” 
form of engagement. This is not to denigrate the public’s 
involvement; indeed the decision as to the value of these 
comments rests with the FCC. That being said, one would 
assume that the value of the coordinated campaign would 
likely be in the sheer number of individuals that clicked to 
submit the form letters, and not in the words that were 
communicated, suggesting what could be termed perhaps this 
“partial” engagement. 
Externalization 
The vertical projection of domestic claims of contention onto 
international or foreign actors is externalization. Such behavior was 
observed in 2014 during the outpouring of comments by parties 
outside the U.S. (such as the European Digital Rights organization, or 
EDRi686) that were submitted to the U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission Open Internet proposal. This international influence 
trend further continued with the EU BEREC’s proposed rules. An 
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open letter687 was crafted and sent to BEREC concerning their 
forthcoming European Union telecommunications regulations. The 
correspondence demanded particular action on network neutrality 
issues and included signatures from 17 non-EU-based network 
neutrality groups located in Africa, Asia, North America, South 
America, and Central America, in addition to five organizations such 
as AccessNow that deem themselves to be “international”. 
Transnational Coalition Forming 
Non-hierarchical coordination of networks among actors in different 
countries with similar claims is transnational coalition forming. 
Tarrow observes, “Coalitions are collaborative, means-oriented 
arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool 
resources in order to effect change”, adding that coalitions use 
framing, trust, credible commitments, management of difference, and 
selective incentives to ensure endurance. 
This model includes brokerage between originators and adopters, 
mobilization by activists, and certification by authoritative actors. Net 
neutrality is a global movement organized under a number of 
sophisticated coalitions, including Save the Internet and the Dynamic 
Coalition on Net Neutrality. In this way, knowledge, ideology, 
strategy, and tactics can be imparted from one group to another. For 
example, Free Press and the Mozilla Foundation in the United States 
broker a set of trainings and white label campaigns, which other 
organizations can mobilize in their respective countries. Certification 
is provided by the formalization of rules by regulatory and legal 
authorities. The goal of these coalitions is to create harmonized net 
neutrality laws worldwide, which would ban blocking, throttling, 
traffic management, paid prioritization, zero rating, and sponsored 
data. 
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Examples of such transnational coalitions are “Save the Internet” in 
the EU688, and, on a larger scale, the coalition members listed on the 
website of the Global Net Neutrality Coalition.689 Global campaigns 
are self-reinforcing through “the boomerang effect,”690 the 
circumvention of “domestic indifference or pressure by transferring 
debate to the international level.”  
5.7.3 ACTIVISM AS AN INDUSTRY 
A franchise is the authorization to license a product, concept or 
service under a brand name. Just as McDonalds has enabled billions to 
be served with signature golden arches and burger and fries menu, 
Save the Internet, Mozilla, Public Knowledge, and other groups offer 
“white label” campaigns to activist entrepreneurs. They offer net 
neutrality tools in a box so to speak, with code banks, teach-ins, and 
tool kits, local activists can kick start their own efforts. There is no 
need to re-invent the wheel and build an “authentic” campaign from 
the ground up if one can simply leverage proven messaging and 
techniques.   
 
An activist is one who advocates vigorously for or against a political 
cause. The archetype of the person taking time off from work to take a 
bus to Washington for a protest has given way to professional activists 
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with master’s degrees691 and full-time employment, and consultancy 
contracts. Activists are available for hire to plan and execute political 
action for corporate interests.692 Activism has been further 
professionalized with the integration of online marketing technology. 
As companies use digital tools and tactics to gather leads and sales 
online, activists use the same or similar technologies to win political 
victories and advance legislation. 
To be sure, cyberactivism is much more than traditional activism 
simply taking place online. The Internet, being a resource that has 
only recently (in historical terms) been leveraged by the general 
public, has increasingly enabled various advocacy groups to 
significantly extend their reach. A 2011 study693 found that “advocacy 
groups are using the Internet to accomplish organizational goals, and 
have been doing so for more than ten years.”  
Further, it is possible that particular activities are undertaken expressly 
to degrade the value of various Internet entity assets, such as app store 
or website vandalism, when activists downgrade the ratings of a 
mobile app to pressure its publisher into a particular action.  
Cyberactivism is an important trend in the digitization of political 
movements, because it enables people to conveniently participate on 
single issues. It makes participation simple, easy, and frequently 
anonymous. Internet activists may be simply asked to read some bullet 
points, fill out an online form, and click to send. Such methods can be 
effective to gather supporters at low cost, overwhelm policymakers 
with messages, and create the appearance of a mass campaign.  
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This apparent ease has earned the critique of “slacktivism,”694 
devaluing traditional activism in which people put their reputation and 
sometimes their life on the line; for example, protesters in the U.S. 
civil rights movement endured physical violence, imprisonment, etc. 
Internet activism is a relatively risk-free proposition for the 
participant, and people can safely and anonymously engage across a 
range of issues. It can even produce an oversized body of citizen 
expression, which is not representative of the very real needs of the 
populace. A prime example of this was when the U.S. government 
was petitioned in 2012 to build a real Death Star from the Star Wars 
movie.695 The petition received wide attention and enough signatures 
to qualify for a government response.  
A leading provider of such services is Micah White (co-founder of the 
Occupy movement), who runs Boutique Activist Consultancy696 to 
provide “discreet service to political mavericks, emergent movements, 
and creative activists” and is the author of End of Protest.697 The goals 
of his professional service include maintaining the authenticity of the 
appearance of activism while incorporating digital tools and 
management practices to professionalize and scale the practices 
around the world. His consulting firm offers a robust set of services 
such as the following: 
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• Protest Innovation 
• Activism & Movement Strategy Workshops 
• Campaign Direction 
• Movement Storyline 
• Research & Insights 
• Novel Protest Methods 
• Full-Service Social Movement Creation 
White, while implementing such measures, warns of overuse of digital 
tactics. He notes: 
Is protest broken? Movements ranging from Black Lives 
Matter to environmentalism are leaving activists frustrated. 
Meanwhile, recent years have witnessed the largest protests in 
human history. Yet these mass mobilizations no longer change 
society. Now activism is at a crossroads: innovation or 
irrelevance.  . .Over time, the Internet becomes harmful 
because things start to look better online than in real life. This 
happened with Occupy. The protest looked better on Facebook 
than it did in the streets. This is negative because people start 
to prefer the online experience to the real world. 
 
Just how successful can online protests be to effect change when they 
are not so much “alive in the streets” as they are alive in in living 
rooms? After the digital protest has become passé, will tomorrow’s 
users simply roll their eyes and scroll by, as the tired digital marketing 
gimmicks now employed by cyberactivists wear down with time? 
White directly compares current activism efforts to marketing 
strategy:698 
The trouble is that this model of activism uncritically embraces 
the ideology of marketing. It accepts that the tactics of 
advertising and market research used to sell toilet paper can 
also build social movements. This manifests itself in an 
inordinate faith in the power of metrics to quantify success. 
                                                          
698 “Clicktivism Is Ruining Leftist Activism,” The Guardian, August 12, 2010, sec. 
Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism-
ruining-leftist-activism. 
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Thus, everything digital activists do is meticulously monitored 
and analyzed. The obsession with tracking clicks turns digital 
activism into clicktivism. Clicktivists utilize sophisticated 
email marketing software that brags699 of its “extensive 
tracking” including “opens, clicks, actions, sign-ups, 
unsubscribes, bounces, and referrals, in total and by source”. 
And clicktivists equate political power with raising these 
“open-rate” and “click-rate” percentages, which are so 
dismally low that they are kept secret. The exclusive emphasis 
on metrics results in a race to the bottom of political 
engagement. Gone is faith in the power of ideas, or the poetry 
of deeds, to enact social change. Instead, subject lines are A/B 
tested and messages vetted for widest appeal. Most tragically 
of all, to inflate participation rates, these organizations 
increasingly ask less and less of their members. The end result 
is the degradation of activism into a series of petition drives 
that capitalize on current events. Political engagement 
becomes a matter of clicking a few links. In promoting the 
illusion that surfing the web can change the world, clicktivism 
is to activism as McDonald’s is to a slow-cooked meal. It may 
look like food, but the life-giving nutrients are long gone. 
Digital activists hide behind gloried stories of viral campaigns 
and inflated figures of how many millions signed their petition 
in 24 hours. Masters of branding, their beautiful websites paint 
a dazzling self-portrait. But, it is largely a marketing 
deception. While these organizations are staffed by well-
meaning individuals who sincerely believe they are doing 
good, a bit of self-criticism is sorely needed from their leaders. 
The truth is that as the novelty of online activism wears off, 
millions of formerly socially engaged individuals who trusted 
digital organizations are coming away believing in the 
impotence of all forms of activism. They will offer phone-
based, alternate reality, and augmented reality alternatives. 
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Another criticism is that Internet activism, while purporting to be the 
voice of the people, can ultimately marginalize certain groups. People 
without digital access or skills (frequently minority populations and 
the elderly) can’t and don’t participate. One observation is that leaders 
of the current US and EU digital activist campaigns, to a large extent, 
are elite and educated, and frequently white. The net neutrality debate 
and its ideas and assumptions about the Internet and what kind of 
access is appropriate were studied by communication and media 
scholar Maria Löblich who suggests that the positions of stakeholders 
aligns primarily with race and class.700 Using Giddens's theory of 
structuration which posits a set of relationships between human agents 
and social structures,701 she researched 13 US internet advocacy 
organizations and their documentation to regulatory authorities during 
the Open Internet rulemaking period in 2014. She critiques that 
assumption of journalists that “communication advocacy and activism 
as a unified front” and notes the wide cleavages between the various 
public interest community groups and consumer/civil liberties groups. 
“The assumption of unity “glosses over the real, and often sharp, 
conflicts” among civil society organizations.” Her research explains 
why zero rating may not be a unifying theme among stakeholders, 
which both claim to support end users.   
Löblich observes that the advocacy groups themselves “represent a 
highly professionalized field of collective action, which hardly fits the 
criteria of a social movement” and that a “typical civil advocate works 
inside the Beltway was dressed in a business suit and sat in front of a 
computer” and invariably “holds a law degree.” She describes how a 
professional advocates’ workday is organized around regulator’s 
notice-and-comment system with e-mails, phone calls, and meetings; 
writing policy papers and filings; visits to the regulator etc. She 
organized the advocacy groups into four categories: Believers (Public 
Knowledge, Open Technology Institute, and Free Press), Cyber 
                                                          
700 Maria Löblich, “Dissent and Political Participation: The Many Faces of 
Communication Policy Advocacy and Activism: Dissent and Political 
Participation,” Communication, Culture & Critique 9, no. 3 (September 2016): 395–
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Enthusiasts (Electronic Frontier Foundation), Mobilizers (Media 
Justice and Center for Rural Strategies), and Reframers (National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and League of 
United Latin American Citizens) and noted that their positions tended 
to reflect the particular race and class of their constituencies and staff.  
The Believers and the Cyber Enthusiast are both based 
on White middle-class users who adopted the Internet 
years ago, and who can afford Internet access and 
devices. For them, the key issue was individual rights, as 
opposed to rights for specific racial groups or 
socioeconomic classes which were claimed by the 
Mobilizers and the Reframers. To start, these differences 
have to do with the fact that the constituencies of both 
the Mobilizers and the Reframers lag behind in Internet 
adoption, and often are not able to afford Internet access. 
According to Giddens, these differences are related to 
the structures of domination and legitimation that people 
of color and low-income groups have experienced for a 
long time. Race and class also explain why the 
Mobilizers and the Reframers have developed specific 
routines. The Mobilizers developed a grassroots 
approach and encouraged their constituency to 
participate in the Open Internet proceeding. In contrast, 
the Reframers regard close partnerships with media and 
telecommunications corporations—a legacy of the mid-
20th-century civil rights struggle that civil rights 
organizations originally developed to hold companies 
accountable and foster diversity—as indispensable to 
changing the structures of the communication system). 
Both groups have emphasized that they do not want 
other organizations such as the Believers to speak on 
their behalf, because these would not represent their 
interests. The Mobilizers and the Reframers were aware 
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of “the noticeable lack of people of color within media 
advocacy organizations.”  
It is significant that the Minority Media Telecom Council, an 
advocacy group from the Reframers category, supports zero rating, 
noting “The digital elite can afford to intellectualize the value of free 
data, but for communities of color it can mean an affordable digital 
connection to the future. This is even more true for small, 
multicultural businesses that rely on mobile connections to reach their 
audiences.”702 A number of advocacy groups in the Believers category 
support the global efforts against zero rating and declared victory 
when a ban was imposed in India. However this position was critiqued 
by another advocacy organization saying,  “Ideological purity is 
easy…when it doesn’t cost you anything.”703 
Cyberactivism on a global could not be achieved without a significant  
investment in digital tools and technologies. This includes a database 
of users and associated marketing and communications technologies 
to engage the user bases.  Activists organizations and political parties 
have honed these tools over the last decade with regard to net 
neutrality. A 2006 article704 describes net neutrality as “the brainchild 
of the likes of Google and Amazon.com, which want to offer 
consumers things like high-speed movie downloads, but don’t want to 
pay the network operators a fee to ensure what in the industry is called 
“quality of service”– i.e. , ensuring the consumer gets what he pays 
for quickly and reliably.”  
The article then describes the founding of a “Data Warehouse” by 
Hillary Clinton political adviser Harold Ickes, a fundraising list 
                                                          
702 Supra MMTC  
Rose Mendoza, “Zero-Rating Programs Provide One Form of Bridge across the 
Digital Divide,” April 14, 2016, http://httponline.org/2016/04/zero-rating-programs-
provide-one-form-of-bridge-across-the-digital-divide/. 
703 “The Zero Access Country Club,” accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://nointernetforpoorpeople.com. 
704 “Selling the Internet Rope,” The American Spectator, March 27, 2006, 
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service and data mining operation. The $11.5 million investment was 
supported primarily by Soros, Google and Amazon. Former 
Democratic National Committee Director of Engineering Nick Gaw 
explains in a video705 how the data warehousing function runs on 
Amazon Web Services to enable Democratic party members to be 
elected at local and national level and to mine the information of its 
voters. Gaw706 is now the Senior Technology Advisor for 
Avaaz.org707, an online platform to conduct online activist campaigns 
including European campaigns against Brexit and Monsanto’s 
Glyphosate. The website notes some 44 million members. Avaaz was 
founded by Brett Solomon,708 now Executive Director of Access, a net 
neutrality advocacy.  
An insight to the value to such systems was highlighted in article 
about WikiLeaks emails between Presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton and her campaign manager John Podesta, in which Alphabet 
Chairman Eric Schmidt helped the Hillary campaign with its election 
tech, proposing to build individual voter dossiers, 
But Schmidt’s outline gave clues to the basic tech 
challenges he foresaw building on Obama’s 2012 effort. 
Clinton, he said, would need to push vendors and her 
staff to move their technology to the cloud so it would 
scale more easily and to avoid expensive investments in 
servers. And he saw the need for new tools to integrate 
the various datasets—voter files, social media profiles, 
cable box records—into one system. 
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Inc., accessed November 9, 2016, //aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-
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708 “Brett Solomon,” World Economic Forum, accessed November 9, 2016, 
https://www.weforum.org/people/brett-solomon/. 
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“Key is the development of a single record for a voter 
that aggregates all that is known about them,” he wrote. 
“In 2016 smart phones will be used to identify, meet, 
and update profiles on the voter….[q]uite a bit of 
software is to be developed to match digital identities 
with the actual voter file with high confidence.”709 
This investigation could not determine whether broadband providers 
employ such strategies, but it is doubtful. In any case, the telecom 
industry appears to be outmatched by net neutrality activists in 
funding, digital sophistication, and coordination with other 
advocacies. 
 
Transnational activism was on display in the US when FCC Chairman 
Wheeler announced that based upon the command of “4 million 
Americans”710 that the FCC would implement Open Internet rules. A 
fact check reveals that not only were at least a quarter of the responses 
against Internet regulation,711 but hundreds of thousands of responses 
came from non-Americans outside of the US, in addition to a 
significant part of the comments being unintelligible and unrelated to 
the proceeding.712 President Obama echoed the 4 million number on 
the White House website,713 and created his own YouTube video 
instructing the FCC to make the toughest rules possible, a highly 
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unusual intervention reported to have been conducted as a “secret and 
parallel FCC.”714 As the White House website demonstrates, Obama 
Administration made net neutrality as campaign pledge in 2007, a 
critical move to get the support of the NetRoots Nation715 and later a 
strategy that aligned with the business interests of Google716 and 
Netflix.717  
SavetheInternet.eu is a key stakeholder for BEREC, which opened its 
press conference718 by noting that the organization delivered the bulk 
of the 480,000 of the “unprecedented” number of submissions to a 
BEREC consultation. While BEREC describes its consultation process 
as “transparent and inclusive,” it will publish only 46% of the total 
comments received as Save the Internet respondents frequently choose 
to make their submissions confidential.  
 
All told, BEREC reports just 1000 substantive submissions which 
responders read the guidelines and made original comments.719 The 
FCC reported a similar number of limited number of substantive 
comments amidst the avalanche of clicktivism. 
 
In India, Save the Internet activists efforts including 1 million emails 
to the Telecom Regulatory Authority precipitated a two year ban on 
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accessed November 9, 2016, http://niemanreports.org/articles/the-netroots-bloggers-
and-the-2008-presidential-campaign/. 
716 See generally GoogleTransparencyProject.org,  
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differential pricing.720 The decision appears to contravene India’s 
Telecom Tariff Order (TTO),721 the source of authority which TRAI 
uses to justify its action. The TTO notes the need to stimulate 
competition (specifically to support entrant telecom providers and 
reduce the power of incumbents), the requirement of the “social 
objective” of encouraging low users of telecom to get connected and 
use the system more intensively; and the provision of enhanced 
flexibility for pricing and giving alternative tariff packages to 
customers. India was considered one of the great regulatory success 
stories. Because of the reforms to unleashing market forces, mobile 
subscriptions increased 500-fold and prices dropped more than 95 
percent.722  This story is a textbook example of the value of good 
telecom regulatory policy.  
A forthcoming paper by Sharada Srinivasan723 based upon personal 
interviews with TRAI regulatory staff suggests that TRAI banned 
differential pricing because it did not have the expertise to address the 
questions of zero rating.  She also notes that a lawsuit is in the works 
by the nation’s trade association for mobile operators which notes the 
lack of justification rooted in any sort of empirical evidence, which 
goes against the transparency in framing regulations that is mandated 
by section 11 (4) of the act that sets up the regulator. On October 25, 
2016 TRAI is reported724 to have held an open house on free data 
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architecture, with the idea to develop a regime in which free data can 
be employed for a range of actors in the Internet ecosystem. This 
would suggest that the regulator is attempting to facilitate a pro-
consumer and pro-innovation solution for zero rating and free data and 
perhaps obviate a lawsuit. 
Google supported activists led the charge against Facebook in India,725 
saying that the poor should not have free Facebook.  But it does not 
appear that activists have a problem with the poor getting “free 
Google”, as the Android platform which is effectively the only 
operating system in India delivering the lion’s share of content and 
earning greater part of ad revenue.  Google’s ad revenue in the 
country exceeds $1 billion annually and accounts for 70 spent of all 
digital spend in the country, an effective “monopoly.”726  Leading 
mobile industry analyst Richard Windsor declares that it “was 
lobbying by Alphabet-funded advocates that was largely responsible 
for Free Basics being blocked by the Indian regulator…”727 He 
explains Google’s strategy in India “one of the last remaining Internet 
wildernesses” with 1.3bn people where only 35% of the population 
(462m) have access to the Internet, 
Google is way ahead of all of its competitors and in particular, 
has been able to keep Facebook from getting real traction. 
Google’s strategy has been to begin with Android and it has 
cleverly managed to move user awareness from the Android 
software to its app store Google Play. 4 years ago, Indian 
shoppers would clamor for an Android device but now they 
have become more sophisticated and are demanding Google 
                                                                                                                                        
“Trai to Come out with Recommendation for Free Data Architecture Soon,” Tech2, 
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Play. Much to the dismay of Indian handset makers, this has 
meant that they have been effectively forced to produce 
Google Ecosystem devices, leaving their own Indian 
ecosystems728 to wither and die on the vine.  The next stage for 
Google is to increase the number of users that have access to 
the Internet as these users will almost certainly use Android 
and Google’s services. In this regard Google is offering  free 
WiFi at 24 railway stations with the intention to expand to 100 
by year end and 400 in the medium term. Following on from 
this, Google intends to launch its Internet balloons (Project 
Loon) to offer free access to Indian users but it must get past 
the regulator first. This is where Facebook came a cropper as 
its Free Basics service was blocked by the Indian regulator on 
the grounds of net neutrality giving Google a free pass. 
Windsor concludes that India the “game may already be over for the 
home grown alternatives.”729 
5.7.4 THE VALUE PROPOSITION ACTIVISTS OFFER 
THEIR FUNDERS 
The rise of Internet activism can also be explained by the school of 
public choice economics which has criticized the received wisdom 
that regulators work in the “public interest” to promote the “common 
good.”730  Rather people are motivated by self-interest subject to 
incentives and constraints. They challenge the view that there are 
meaningful groups such as “the community” or “the people” who 
make decisions. Rather they focus on “collective action” of special 
interests , which tend to be small homogeneous groups which are 
more effective to supply pressure and support to policymakers than 
are large groups with diffuse interests.  Smaller groups have a greater 
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stage in particularized policy decisions, can organize more cost-
effectively, and can more effectively eliminate the free rider problem 
when benefits are distributed to parties which do not contribute.  
Watchdog.org describes731 that the Ford Foundation uses net 
neutrality advocacy as a way to protect is portfolio which is heavily 
invested in Google and other Silicon Valley stocks. This world’s 
second largest foundation earned $1.65 billion in 2007 on investments 
in YouTube and received nearly 220,000, valued at more $100 
million. Holdings also include 3 million shares of Google company 
stock; $5 million of stock in Microsoft, $5 million in Oracle, and $2 
million invested in more than 480 companies to net more than $402 
million in 2012 based on stock investments alone.732 
Perhaps the single largest supporter of net neutrality is Hungarian 
billionaire currency trader George Soros, known as the “Man Who 
Broke the Bank of England” who made USD $1 billion with a short 
sale of USD $10 billion British pounds during the Black Wednesday 
in 1992733 and has a personal net worth of $23 billion.  One of his 
signatures has been to parlay the concept of “open” to a variety of 
ventures, such as open government, open internet, and open borders.   
 
Like Ford, Soros’ Open Society also appears to use net neutrality as 
strategy to protect its financial portfolio. A copy of the recent 13F 
form of the Open Society Foundation notes significant holdings of 
stock in Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Broadcom, EBay ($94 million) 
PayPal ($106 million), and Level3 Communications ($173 million). 
The foundation also holds stocks of Time Warner Cable and Charter 
Cable. It is significant to note that the FCC denied Comcast the ability 
buy TimeWarner but Charter Cable, by agreeing to significant “Open 
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Internet” concessions such as not to add data caps or usage-based 
pricing to subscriptions,734  was approved to acquire the company for 
$66 billion, a sum $21 billion greater than suggested by Comcast.  The 
Soros and Open Society funded Free Press campaigned735 vigorously 
against the attempted Comcast-TimeWarner merger, but the deal was 
evidently enabled by former Free Press counsel Marvin Ammori who 
explained how his new employment at Charter would make the 
pending merger an acceptable network provider for the Open 
Internet.736  
 
There is no doubt that telecom industry lobbying is significant. Open 
Secrets reports some $90 million spent in 2015 in the US by some 87 
firms (this includes pro-net neutrality groups such as Level3 
Communications and INCOMPAS with almost $2 million).737  
However this amount has been declining in recent years, and net 
neutrality comprises a fraction of the total spend and activities. In fact 
total telecom industry lobbying pales in comparison to the spend of 
just two foundations, Ford and Open Society, which have spent almost 
$200 million on net neutrality in recent years.738 The support of tech 
companies such as Google, Netflix, and so on is additional. 
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American telecom firms likely spend significantly with regard to 
litigation against net neutrality, for example 9 lawsuits were filed 
against the FCC for its 2015 Open Internet Order.  
 
5.7.5 SAVE THE INTERNET CAMPAIGN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Origins of the U.S. Campaign: 
The original Save the Internet campaign began in the United States, 
coordinated by Free Press.739 George Soros provided seed money to 
Free Press with a $200,000 grant in 2004, and $400,000 in 2005 
through his Open Society Institute, with the mission to “assure greater 
fairness in political, legal, and economic systems."740 Co-founder 
Robert McChesney observed, “At the moment, the battle over network 
neutrality is not to completely eliminate the telephone and cable 
companies. We are not at that point yet. But the ultimate goal is to get 
rid of the media capitalists in the phone and cable companies and to 
divest them from control…Any serious effort to reform the media 
system would have to necessarily be part of a revolutionary program 
to overthrow the capitalist system itself.”741 
While records show the website domain savetheinternet.com 
registration in 1999,742 Internet archives of the actual website site start 
at April 23, 2006743. The website detailing the coalition was officially 
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launched by Free Press the following day, on April 24, 2006.744 "Free 
Press has become a juggernaut in the District of Communications. By 
utilizing digital tools early and often, the Free Press team has built a 
machine that can deliver results," note Christopher Parandian, a 
former industry lobbyist.745 
Figure 56: Original Heading and Navigation Bar of 
savetheinternet.com746 
 
 
The earliest campaign singularly addresses the issue of network 
neutrality747, and it outlines the aims of the coalition as follows: 
The SavetheInternet.com Coalition was formed to prevent 
Internet gatekeepers from blocking or discriminating against 
new economic, political, and social ideas. We are mobilizing 
millions of Americans to urge Congress to preserve the free 
and open Internet.748 
The original coalition consisted of 44 members shown on the 
following figure. 
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Figure 57: Original "Save The Internet" Coalition 
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Growth of the U.S. Campaign: 
Less than one month after the launch in 2006, some 750 groups 
organized under the banner “Save the Internet” delivered 1 million e-
mail petitions to Capitol Hill “urging lawmakers to preserve the 
current practice that all Internet traffic should get the same 
treatment.”749 A later coalition list in 2008 stated, “The 
SavetheInternet.com Coalition is more than 1.5 million everyday 
people who have banded together with thousands of non-profit 
organizations, businesses, and bloggers to protect Internet 
freedom.”750 The 2008 coalition (short) document only lists a coalition 
of 79 members; however the full list is much larger.751 It also states 
that Free Press was still the Coalition Coordinator at that time.752 
  
                                                          
749 Tom Abate and Chronicle Staff Writer, “SPEED BUMPS ON THE 
INFORMATION HIGHWAY,” SFGate, June 18, 2006, 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SPEED-BUMPS-ON-THE-INFORMATION-
HIGHWAY-2516873.php. 
750 “Coalition Members,” Save the Internet, accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/sites/default/files/resources/coalition_members.pdf. 
751 “Save the Internet : Members,” September 19, 2008, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080919041927/http://www.savetheinternet.com/=mem
bers. 
752 “Coalition Members,” Save the Internet, accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/sites/default/files/resources/coalition_members.pdf. 
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Figure 58: 2008 savetheinternet.com Coalition List 
 
 
 
The U.S. Campaign Today: 
Today, savetheinternet.com states its goals are to “Secure Real Net 
Neutrality” and “Stop the Merger Mania.” 
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Figure 59: Stated Goals of savetheinternet.com 
 
 
No current coalition member list appears to be available, and the site 
is still being run by Free Press. 
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Figure 60: Statement at Bottom of savetheinternet.com753 
 
 
 
Funding of the U.S. “Save the Internet” Campaign: 
The U.S. campaign is presumably financed solely by Free Press and/or 
the Free Press Action Fund organizations. The organizations primarily 
receive donations totaling in the millions from various funds, 
foundations, and trusts. 
In addition net neutrality has been funded by prestigious organizations 
such, the MacArthur Foundation, the Wallace Global Fund, and the 
Hewlett Foundation for advocacy organizations and as lobbyists for 
net neutrality policies.754  Following is a list of some of Free Press’s 
recent funders. 
  
                                                          
753 “Save the Internet | Free Press,” March 8, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160308114530/http://www.savetheinternet.com/sti-
home. 
754 “Re: Notice of Ex Parte Communications, WC Dockert No. 14-28,” Ford 
Foundation, June 12, 2014, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521306031.pdf. 
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Figure 61:  Free Press Top Donors (Anon. not included) 2013-2015755 
 
Brett Family Foundation Peter B. Lewis Philanthropy 
Carsey Family Foundation Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
Craigslist Charitable Fund Rockefeller Family Fund 
CS Fund / Warsh-Mott Legacy Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors 
Democracy Fund (Omidyar Group) San Francisco Foundation 
Dudley Foundation Schwab Charitable Fund 
Evolve Foundation Sixteen Thirty Fund 
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund Solidago Foundation 
Fidelity Charitable Trust  
(Bright Horizon Fund) 
Steve and Paula Child Foundation 
Ford Foundation Sy Syms Foundation 
Foundation to Promote Open Society The Democracy Fund 
Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation The Kaphan Foundation 
Holthues Trust Tides Foundation 
Hugh M. Hefner Foundation Tomkins Family Foundations 
Lederer Foundation Vanguard Charitable Trust 
New Venture Fund (Media Democracy 
Fund) 
Voqal Funding Group 
Overbrook Foundation Wallace Global Fund 
Park Foundation William B. Wiener, Jr. Foundation 
Paul Gallant Foundation Woodcock Foundation 
Pechet Foundation Working Assets/CREDO 
                                                          
755 Free Press 2013 end of year review, 2014, 2015 annual reports: Free Press, 
“What We Do,” Free Press, accessed November 9, 2016, 
http://www.freepress.net/about. 
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Figure 62: Free Press Total Gifts, Grants, Contributions, and 
Membership Fees 2009-2015756 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 
$3,57
7,203 
$4,29
1,484 
$2,86
4,048 
$2,12
4,782 
$3,73
5,707 
$1,53
2,084 
$2,43
8,062 
$20,56
3,370 
 
5.7.6 SAVE THE INTERNET CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE 
The next significant “Save the Internet” campaign emerged in Europe. 
Current registration records show savetheinternet.eu as established 
Dec 16, 2013757, and the first Internet archive entry of the website is 
Dec 31, 2013.758 
  
                                                          
756 Free Press IRS Form 990 from years 2013, 2014, 2015: Ibid. 
757 “EURid Whois,” accessed November 9, 2016, 
https://whois.eurid.eu/en/?domain=savetheinternet.eu. 
758  “Save the Internet - Contact Your Parlamentarian Today!,” December 31, 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131231150533/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
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Figure 63: Original Heading of savetheinternet.eu website759 
 
 
While the website registration record is not disclosed760, judging from 
their 2013 annual report761, EDRi (a self-described association of 
European rights organization762) was the founder of the European 
campaign. “We launched a portal for our “Save The Internet” 
campaign, in cooperation with EDRi members Bits of Freedom, IFNF, 
Digitale Gesellschaft, and observer member La Quadrature du Net: 
http://savetheinternet.eu.” 
The European campaign was originally an association of five 
organizations. 
  
                                                          
759 “Save the Internet - Contact Your Parlamentarian Today!,” December 31, 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131231150533/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
760 “EPAG.de,” accessed November 9, 2016, https://www.epag.de/. 
761 “Annual Report,” EDRi, 2013, https://edri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/EDRi_Annual_Report_2013.pdf. 
762 “About - EDRi,” March 4, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304231109/https://edri.org/about/. 
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Figure 64: The savetheinternet.eu attribution at bottom of website on 
Dec 31, 2013763 
 
 
The initial issue raised by the European campaign was to eradicate 
what was considered loopholes in proposed network neutrality law. At 
the time, the target legislation was a proposal for regulation of 
telecommunications in the EU as a single market.764 There were three 
specific issues: 
- The undefined term “specialised services” as an exception to 
the proposed regulations. 
- Interpretation of the freedom of users to choose discriminatory 
services. 
- The lack of definition for the term “serious crime” or the 
measures to prevent it. 
  
                                                          
763 “Save the Internet - Contact Your Parlamentarian Today!,” December 31, 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131231150533/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
764 “Laying down Measures Concerning the European Single Market for Electronic 
Communications and to Achieve a Connected Continent,” EU, (September 3, 2013), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013PC0627. 
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Growth of the European Campaign 
In their 2014 annual report,765 EDRi stated, 
In 2014, we carried out several activities to raise awareness 
on this issue, published analysis of the proposed legislation, 
drafted crucial amendments and met with policy-makers 
across the political groups. We published an FAQ for 
citizens on the draft Regulation and promoted our “save the 
internet” portal: http://savetheinternet.eu. It contributed to 
over 20,000 faxes being sent to the European Parliament by 
concerned citizens. In the course of the year, we held several 
meetings on the “Telecoms single market” dossier with 
national permanent representations to the EU 
When one reads the next item from EDRi’s 2014 annual report, it 
appears to be the evidence of transnational network neutrality 
activism: 
Net neutrality was also an issue on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Since these discussions have repercussions in 
Europe, we responded to a consultation launched by the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission, and we spoke at a 
RightsCon panel on “net neutrality – how to identify 
discriminations and advance solutions” that took place in the 
U.S. in March 2014. 
The report goes on further to state that in November 2014, “EDRi 
joined forces with other civil society organizations to relaunch the 
savetheinternet.eu.” The resulting savetheinternet.eu relaunch 
included a modification of the contested issues.766 
  
                                                          
765 “Annual Report,” EDRi, 2014, https://edri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/EDRi_Annual_Report_2014.pdf. 
766 “Save the Internet,” December 7, 2014, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20141207234846/https://savetheinternet.eu/. 
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Figure 65: Re-launched savetheinternet.eu issues (December 2014) 
 
 
Per the savetheinternet.eu website767 in early 2016, the legislative 
outcomes desired by the European “Save the Internet” campaign were 
not reached. However, the website stated further that it had a 
remaining path to achieve their goals: 
The BEREC guidelines have to be prepared between now 
and July 2016. These guidelines will be based on a 
consultation that is open for everyone. This is the step in 
which the fight for net neutrality that was key to successes in 
both the U.S. and in India. 
The continued 2015 activities of the campaign and discussion of the 
legislative outcomes are also covered in EDRi’s 2015 annual report.768 
The European Campaign Today: 
The 2016 savetheinternet.eu website769 addressed the ongoing BEREC 
consultation period on proposed network neutrality regulations. 
                                                          
767 “Save the Internet - Contact Your Representative Today!,” March 11, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160311065438/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
768 “Annual Report,” EDRi, 2015, 
https://edri.org/files/Annual_Report_2015_Final.pdf. 
769 Arbeitskreis Vorratsdaten Österreich, “Save the Internet,” SaveTheInternet, 
accessed November 8, 2016, https://savetheinternet.eu/. 
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Figure 66: savetheinternet.eu (June 2016) 
 
 
The campaign centers on three main areas of concern in the proposed 
EU regulations and the proposed revisions are referenced in Free Press 
documents: 
- Specialized Services 
o The savetheinternet.eu campaign is pushing for all new 
specialized services to be judged to meet all five 
proposed safeguards before even being allowed to be 
offered to customers. Further, they state that “if a 
comparable service exists in the open internet, then a 
specialized service should not be granted.”   
- Traffic Management 
o The campaign wants the hierarchy on traffic 
management contained within the proposed regulations 
to become part of the official rules, thus dictating 
congestion management practices. 
- Zero Rating 
o The campaign sees zero-rating as a clear violation of 
network neutrality, and they would like the practice to 
be banned. 
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The savetheinternet.eu website urges the use of their questionnaire 
tool to notify national regulators and BEREC to “protect net 
neutrality.” The questionnaire tool is a combination of checkboxes and 
open questions, which then generates an email based on the user’s 
selections and input. The email is then submitted by BEREC from the 
individuals email account. The questionnaire addresses a variety of 
topics. It goes beyond the three main areas of concern outlined above, 
seeking input on transparency, definitions of “commercial practices”, 
and use of deep-packet inspection. The current organizational 
membership of the EU “Save the Internet” campaign has grown, and 
the website is now offered in various European languages. 
Figure 67: Organizational membership of savetheinternet.eu (June 
2016)770 
 
 
  
                                                          
770 Ibid. 
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Funding of the European Campaign: 
The European campaign is presumably financed by its founder, the 
EDRi organization. EDRi receives donations from many sources. 
Their corporate donors include Google, Mozilla, Twitter, Intel, and 
Yelp (among others).771 Following is a list of EDRi’s recent funding. 
Figure 68: EDRi Budget Sources 2014-2015 
 
Source 2014 2015 
Foundations € 260,667 € 277,845 
Foundations (Prior Yr. 
Overdue) 
€ 104,433 € 0 
Corporate € 23,053 € 40,306 
Individuals € 9,807 € 29,644 
Member/Observership 
Fees 
€ 24,761 € 26,857 
Non-Corporate € 0 € 15,720 
Projects € 0 € 21,544 
Other (Tax Rmbrsmnts., 
Rent) 
€ 32,272 € 15,357 
TOTAL € 454,993 € 427,273 
 
5.7.7 ACCESSNOW 
AcesssNow is one of the founding coalition members behind the EU 
“Save the Internet” campaign and currently bills itself as an 
international advocacy organization.772 As one can see in the map 
portion of the graphic below, AccessNow is located in a variety of 
countries: 
  
                                                          
771 EDRi Annual reports for years 2014, 2015: “About,” EDRi, accessed November 
8, 2016, https://edri.org/about/. 
772 Interestingly, they also contribute rent to EDRi. See earlier EDRi annual report 
reference (2015) 
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Figure 69: About AccessNow773 
 
 
AccessNow is active in a few different areas, but its section on “Net 
Discrimination” is related to network neutrality: 
Figure 70: accessnow.org section on "Net Discrimination"774 
 
 
AccessNow is funded by a wide variety of foundations and corporate 
interests, as follows:  
 
  
                                                          
773 “About Us,” Access Now, accessed November 8, 2016, 
https://www.accessnow.org/about-us/. 
774 “Net Discrimination Archives,” Access Now, accessed November 8, 2016, 
https://www.accessnow.org/issue/net-discrimination/. 
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Figure 71: AccessNow Funding Sources 2012-2016 (June 7, 2016)775 
Funder 
USD$ 
2012-16 
Funder 
USD$ 
2012-16 
Sida 4,805,674 
Global Movement 
Donations 
35,166 
Google 1,200,000 ICANN 35,000 
The Sigrid Rausing Trust 987,615 Knight Foundation 35,000 
Oak Foundation 460,000 
Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
35,000 
Oxfam Novib 435,539 London Media Trust 25,000 
John Templeton Foundation 350,000 Mozilla Foundation 25,000 
Mozilla 320,000 Yelp 25,000 
The 11th Hour Project 300,000 Yahoo! 20,000 
Ford Foundation 275,000 New America Foundation  16,245 
Voqal 221,250 Hamish Parker 15,870 
Anonymous Donation 195,000 New Venture Fund 15,000 
Facebook 175,000 AnchorFree 10,000 
Humanity United 160,000 BSA 10,000 
Microsoft 150,000 Dropbox 10,000 
Swedbank 118,556 Ebay 10,000 
IDRC 114,633 
New America Foundation 
(OTI) 
10,000 
RightsCon.org 113,749 New IT Foundation 10,000 
LinkedIn 102,500 
Silicon Valley Community 
Fund 
10,000 
Skype 95,000 Web We Want 10,000 
Media Democracy Fund 60,000 SecDev Foundation 9,982 
Twitter 60,000 
Private Internet Access | 
London Trust Media 
5,000 
Internet Society  57,500 
The Minneapolis 
Foundation 
5,000 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
49,982 
Asia-Pacific Network 
Information Centre  
3,943 
Anne Coombs 40,777 Access Now  3,000 
Hivos 40,000 All Out/Purpose  2,500 
                                                          
775 Derived from data on AccessNow website: “Funding,” Access Now, accessed 
November 8, 2016, https://www.accessnow.org/financials/. 
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In addition to their EU “Save the Internet” efforts, AccessNow also 
maintains the domain776 for the thisisnetneutrality.org website. 
Figure 72: Global Net Neutrality Coalition homepage 
 
 
The thisisnetneutrality.org website is home to 74 “Global Net 
Neutrality Coalition” members.777 
  
                                                          
776 Whois search at: “Your Public Interest Registry | Buy, Sell, Register .ORG .NGO 
.ONG IDNs Domain Names,” PIR, accessed November 8, 2016, http://pir.org/. 
777 “Status of Net Neutrality Around the World,” Thisisnetneutrality, accessed 
November 8, 2016, https://dejiaccessnow.carto.com/viz/4f239c60-356f-11e5-b01c-
0e853d047bba/embed_map. 
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Figure 73: The 74 members of the Global Net Neutrality Coalition 
AccessNow Article19 EFF Greenpeace Web We Want 
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5.7.8 PAST SIMILARITIES OF THE “SAVE THE INTERNET” 
CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES & EUROPE 
Interestingly, even while pursing legislative efforts in separate 
regions, for some time there were curious similarities between the 
U.S. and EU campaigns. Of first notice was the website interfaces, 
which (at the time) contained identical words in similar layouts, and 
with a similar color scheme: 
Figure 74: Navigation Bar of savetheinternet.com778 
 
 
Figure 75: Navigation Bar of savetheinternet.eu779 
 
 
Up to Spring 2016, the two sites had also defined the issue of network 
neutrality in similar terms. Although there were modest variations in 
                                                          
778 “Save the Internet | Free Press,” March 4, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304051401/http://www.savetheinternet.com/sti-
home. 
779 “Save the Internet - Contact Your Representative Today!,” March 11, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160311065438/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
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content, language, and presentation, the arguments presented were 
nearly identical.780  
Campaign Claim #1 – Network Operators Want to Limit Freedom of 
Speech 
Per the U.S. campaign website network neutrality section, “What You 
Need to Know Now”781: 
Net Neutrality means an Internet that enables and protects 
free speech. It means that Internet service providers should 
provide us with open networks — and should not block or 
discriminate against any applications or content that ride 
over those networks. Just as your phone company shouldn't 
decide who you can call and what you say on that call, your 
ISP shouldn't be concerned with the content you view or post 
online. 
Per the EU campaign website, “Why is Net Neutrality Important?”782: 
  
                                                          
780 Notable exception is invoking skin color as a net neutrality issue in the U.S.: “Net 
Neutrality: What You Need to Know Now | Free Press,” March 4, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304065648/http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-
neutrality-what-you-need-know-now. 
781 “Net Neutrality: What You Need to Know Now | Free Press,” March 4, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304065648/http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-
neutrality-what-you-need-know-now. 
782 “Save the Internet - Contact Your Representative Today!,” March 11, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160311065438/http://savetheinternet.eu/. 
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Figure 76: EU Campaign, Freedom of Speech Issue 
 
 
Campaign Claim #2 – Customers and Content Creators Will be 
Unfairly Discriminated Against and Forced to Pay More to Network 
Operators 
Per the U.S. campaign website network neutrality section, “What You 
Need to Know Now”: 
Without Net Neutrality, cable and phone companies could 
carve the Internet into fast and slow lanes. An ISP could 
slow down its competitors’ content or block political 
opinions it disagreed with. ISPs could charge extra fees to 
the few content companies that could afford to pay for 
preferential treatment — relegating everyone else to a slower 
tier of service. 
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Per the EU campaign website, “Why is Net Neutrality Important?”: 
Figure 77: EU Campaign, Discrimination and Cost Issue 
 
 
Campaign Claim #3 – Internet Innovation Will Suffer, and Is 
Threatened by Network Operators 
Per the U.S. campaign website network neutrality section, “What You 
Need to Know Now”: 
It’s because of Net Neutrality that small businesses and 
entrepreneurs have been able to thrive on the Internet. 
No company should be able to interfere with this open 
marketplace. ISPs are by definition the gatekeepers to the 
Internet, and without Net Neutrality, they would seize every 
possible opportunity to profit from that gatekeeper control. 
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Per the EU campaign website, “Why is Net Neutrality Important?”: 
Figure 78: EU Campaign, Innovation Issue 
 
In July 2016 the websites have been slightly updated. Free Press 
updated the American website with a timeline of the “victory” of net 
neutrality being held up in court, and expeditiously requesting a 
donation to keep the fight going should it come to Congress or the 
Supreme Court. The EU version focuses on the BEREC process and a 
changed color scheme.  
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5.7.9 SAVE THE INTERNET CAMPAIGN IN INDIA 
The Indian campaign has evolved from its first iteration to focus on 
issues of net neutrality, censorship, privacy and innovation. The 
official domain information783 shows savetheinternet.in was registered 
in September of 2012. Interestingly, the domain registration is not in 
the name of any organization, but of a single individual, Pranesh 
Prakash, former attorney for the Creative Commons India and founder 
of India’s Center for Internet & Society.784 The first Internet archive 
record is recorded on April 13, 2015.785 The campaign’s initial issue 
was to collect arguments in favor of network neutrality, in response to 
a TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) consultation paper 
on the regulatory framework for over-the-top Internet services.786 In 
just 24 hours the group was able to mobilize 27,000 emails to TRAI in 
response to the consultation. 787 The issue appears to have exploded 
upon the plans of Airtel to introduce zero-rating.788  
  
                                                          
783 “Whois Lookup | Registry.In,” Registry, accessed November 8, 2016, 
https://registry.in/whois/savetheinternet.in. 
784 “Pranesh Prakash,” LinkedIn, accessed November 11, 2016, 
https://www.linkedin.com/in/praneshprakash. 
785 “Save The Internet!,” April 13, 2015, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150413054725/http://www.savetheinternet.in/. 
786 Jawahar Marg and Mahanagar Bhawan, “Consultation Paper On Regulatory 
Framework for Over-the-Top (OTT) Services,” Trai, March 27, 2015, 
http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReaddata/ConsultationPaper/Document/OTT-CP-
27032015.pdf. 
787 Kim Arora, “Fight for Net Neutrality Unites Internet | Gadgets Now,” Gadget 
Now, April 13, 2015, http://www.gadgetsnow.com/social/Fight-for-net-neutrality-
unites-internet/articleshow/46896316.cms. 
788 Jon Russell, “Bharti Airtel Fuels Net Neutrality Fire In India With Free Access 
To Partner Apps,” TechCrunch, April 6, 2015, 
http://social.techcrunch.com/2015/04/06/bharti-airtel-airtel-zero-india/. 
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Figure 79: Save the Internet India (first iteration) 
 
The group also maintains a Github project member list789 and was also 
focused on a TRAI consultation paper regarding differential 
pricing.790 They adopted a specific definition of network neutrality as 
follows,791 
Net neutrality requires that the Internet be maintained as an 
open platform, on which network providers treat all content, 
applications and services equally, without discrimination. This 
includes ensuring that network providers do not supply any 
competitive advantage to specific apps/services, either through 
pricing or Quality of Service. 
 
They also addressed the “Free Basics” zero-rated offering from 
Facebook.792 Further, the campaign reported that it had moved793 
                                                          
789 “Netneutrality/savetheinternet.in,” GitHub, accessed November 8, 2016, 
https://github.com/netneutrality/savetheinternet.in. 
790 “Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs for Data Services Regulations.” 
791 “What Is Net Neutrality?,” March 10, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160310104121/http://blog.savetheinternet.in/what-is-
net-neutrality/. 
792 “Free Basics,” March 10, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160310104127/http://blog.savetheinternet.in/free-
basics/. 
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towards the creation of an “Internet Freedom Foundation”, with the 
registration794 of a new website795 (internetfreedom.in) by an 
individual named Nikhil Pahwa, with no organization listed. 
The group has since upgraded the web properties in time for TRAI’s 
pre-consultation paper on network neutrality, offering an editable pre-
formed consultation letter email submission tool. A picture of the new 
site is below. 
Figure 80: Updated Internet Freedom Foundation website and 
SaveTheInternet.in796 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
793 Save The Internet, “We Have Moved to @iffsti. Follow Us There!,” microblog, 
@neutrality_in, (February 20, 2016), 
https://twitter.com/neutrality_in/status/703075813277609984. 
794 “Whois Lookup | Registry.In,” accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://registry.in/whois/internetfreedom.in. 
795 “Internet Freedom Foundation,” February 18, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160218081607/http://www.internetfreedom.in/. 
796 “SaveTheInternet.in,” Internet Freedom Foundation, accessed November 11, 
2016, https://internetfreedom.in/campaigns-savetheinternet/. 
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The website also has a page on Innovation which discusses intellectual 
property issues and licensing regimes being too strict for innovators, 
noting “The chilling effects on online content by overbroad 
intellectual property laws is well documented.”797 
Funding of the Indian Campaign: 
Information on the funding of the Indian campaign has been hard to 
discern, though the site notes that it receives funds from users.   
5.7.10 PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 
Like Free Press, Public Knowledge is a similar special interest group 
focusing on a narrow set of telecom issues. Google is a key funder, 
and its co-founder Gigi Sohn was a program officer for the Ford 
Foundation. In addition to their domestic efforts and offerings such as 
their "advocacy toolkit",798 Public Knowledge advocates 
transnationally. They have an International team which is dedicated to 
influencing Internet policy across the globe as they describe, 
Public Knowledge is working in collaboration with 
organizations, advocates, and users from around the 
world, especially in Latin America and the Global South, 
to provide support and capacity building on local, 
regional, and global internet issues. As the internet 
becomes more politicized and business and government 
interests attempt to increase their representation in 
negotiations and fora, it is crucial that the civil society 
movement be expanded to protect the public interest and 
internet rights both domestically and abroad. 
PK is also dedicated to helping educate domestic and 
international activists to notice the signs of and prevent 
                                                          
797 “Innovation. Internet Freedom Foundation,” Internet Freedom 
Foundation, accessed November 11, 2016, 
https://internetfreedom.in/issues-innovation/. 
798 “Public Knowledge Advocacy Toolkit,” accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://pkadvocacy.tumblr.com/?og=1. 
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policy laundering on issues that impact consumers, such 
as privacy and intellectual property. 799 
PK targets Latin America with an online "Open Internet" 
course entirely in Spanish.800 PK notes "The first round 
of the course, which concluded in June 2015, hosted 30 
participants, from advocates, to judges, to journalists, 
from various countries in Latin America, with the top 
performers gaining professional development 
opportunities to further their advocacy careers."801  
One stated goal of Public Knowledge is to "train" the next generation 
of global Internet activists and to promote Public Knowledge's 
particular Internet vision.802  
5.7.11 MOZILLA 
There is no doubt that amidst the shifting winds of consumers' 
usage requirements of the Internet, for some existing entities have 
been caught off-guard. As network operators attempt to introduce 
                                                          
799 “Public Knowledge’s International Team,” Public Knowledge, accessed 
November 5, 2016, https://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/international. 
800 Melanie Penagos, “PK Empowers Latin American Digital Rights Activists with 
Its First Open Internet Course,” Public Knowledge, July 14, 2015, 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/pk-empowers-latin-american-
digital-rights-activists-with-its-first-open-int. 
“Un Curso de Public Knowledge En Colaboración Con P2PU,” Open Internet, 
accessed November 5, 2016, http://open-internet-p2pcourse.org. 
“Open Internet Course,” Public Knowledge, June 2016, 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/open-internet-course. 
801 Melanie Penagos, “Public Knowledge Calls for New Applicants for Our Open 
Internet Course,” Public Knowledge, May 23, 2016, 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/public-knowledge-calls-for-
new-applicants-for-our-open-internet-course. 
802 Natalie Green and Carolina Rossini, “Training the Next Generation of Digital 
Rights Advocates,” Public Knowledge, February 20, 2015, 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/training-the-next-generation-of-
digital-rights-advocates. 
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diverse network capacity allocation solutions (in response 
to developing user needs) and some established players may felt 
threatened.  
Consider the possible fate of Firefox, Mozilla's web browser. 
Already forced to compete with a multitude of mobile browsers803 and 
networked applications, the potential of also competing within a 
context of advanced IP network options may be an existential threat to 
its business model. Detailed understanding and the ability to 
implement application functionality to embrace these network 
enhancements is not a widely available skill-set. Entities such as 
Mozilla have likely either misunderstood the exact promise of such 
technologies, which can customize packet delivery to the satisfaction 
of end users, or found themselves unable to compete effectively in the 
real-time multimedia technology arena. Whereas Google made 
WebRTC (a real-time voice/video system for the web) available five 
years ago804, Mozilla's records detail, WebRTC implementation in 
Firefox appears to have only begun at the end of 2014805 and was not 
available until release 40806 which was not deemed an official release 
until quite recently, August 2015.807  
Quite possibly, in an Internet context without the impending doom of 
network neutrality technology restrictions, countless startups with 
appropriate expertise and effort could have released products 
surpassing the capabilities of Firefox (and even the base WebRTC 
technology itself) years ago. By "investing" in network neutrality, 
Mozilla has bought time and the chance to live another day. The 
                                                          
803 “10 Best Mobile Browsers,” Tom’s Guide, May 12, 2016, 
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/pictures-story/408-best-mobile-browser.html. 
804 “WebRTC @5 – Google Grupper,” Google Groups, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/discuss-webrtc/I0GqzwfKJfQ. 
805 “Feature Board for WebRTC,” Mozilla, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://mozilla.aha.io/published/b40393012432847d857ee68299a8a82f?page=2. 
806 “Media/WebRTC,” MozillaWiki, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Media/WebRTC. 
807 “Calendar - MozillaWiki,” accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/RapidRelease/Calendar. 
425 
realities of users' network performance requirements are currently 
boiling over, precisely as Mozilla's real-time audio/video skills are 
being honed. It shall prove fascinating behavior if Mozilla's position 
on network neutrality now transitions to a more lenient position, in 
light of their growing ability to actually implement the functionality of 
diverse packet handling for a variety Internet media.  
While Mozilla frequently presents itself  as a non-profit, according to 
U.S. tax documents,808 the Mozilla Foundation directly controls the 
Mozilla Corporation – a for-profit entity with substantial vested 
interest in government policy pertaining to the Internet. Mozilla 
engages in global advocacy in many forms, on a variety of Internet 
topics. For example, their web fellows program having placed fellows 
in Canada, Chile, Kenya, the European Union, and the United States. 
Many of Mozilla’s fellows809 in 2015 were transplants from other 
network neutrality advocacy organizations such as Free Press, the 
Open Technology Institute, and Public Knowledge. 
Further, Mozilla maintains a Github site810 for “Tools for Activism”, 
with various open and free software and services to assist in 
conducting digital activist campaigns. They also offer Mozilla clubs 
and “hives”, marketed as community resources811. However, most 
intriguing is their educational offerings such as the “Net Neutrality 
Teaching Kit”,812 and Net Neutrality training modules813. Mozilla’s 
net neutrality training for the relevant country. They describe, 
                                                          
808 “Mozilla_Foundation Public Disclosure,” Mozilla, 2014, 
https://static.mozilla.com/moco/en-
US/pdf/2014_Mozilla_Foundation_Fed_990_Public_Disclosure.pdf. 
809 “Netpolicy/advocacy/openwebfellows - MozillaWiki,” Mozilla, accessed 
November 5, 2016, https://wiki.mozilla.org/Netpolicy/advocacy/openwebfellows. 
810 “Mozilla/toolsforactivism,” GitHub, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://github.com/mozilla/toolsforactivism. 
811 “Community - Mozilla Learning,” accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://learning.mozilla.org/en-US/community. 
812 “Net Neutrality Teaching Kit,” Mozilla Webmaker, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://keyboardkat.makes.org/thimble/LTQzNjIwNzM2MA==/net-neutrality-
teaching-kit. 
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This module is all about teaching you about Net Neutrality: 
why it’s important, who is influencing public policy, and how 
YOU can make a difference. We want you to be able to teach 
others so that we can all protect the Web we want. We are in a 
fight for the future of the Internet. By participating, you are 
part of #TeamInternet. 
Also Mozilla encourages users to throw net-neutrality-themed “maker 
parties”:814 
A small Maker Party is a fun way to spend an hour exploring 
the Web as a platform for change. Gather your family, friends, 
or interested participants and explore Net Neutrality and take 
action to protect the open web. 
5.7.12 ANALYSIS OF SAVETHEINTERNET.EU TARGETED 
TO EU TELECOM REGULATORS 
As part of this investigation, a trance of emails from 
SavetheInternet.eu for the BEREC net neutrality consultation was 
obtained from a European telecom regulator and subsequently 
analyzed in July 2016.  At the time the Savetheinternet.eu was 
formatted to stimulate comment in the BEREC consultation with a set 
of preformed questions and answers.  The platform offers seamless 
dynamic content for the petition in multiple European languages.  
Users have the option to submit the pre-formed answer or they can 
submit original answers. Users overwhelming chose to respond with 
the pre-formed answers.  
Approximately 709 mails were sent to the following 28 regulators, 
each representing a EU nation. Thus each mail was replicated 28 
times, helping to inflate the responses from these 709 individuals into 
20,000 mails.  While the coding of SavetheInternet.eu was 
                                                                                                                                        
813 “What Is Net Neutrality?,” Webmaker Training, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://training.webmakerprototypes.org/en/net-neutrality/concepts/. 
814 “Host a Maker Party (Net Neutrality),” Mozilla Webmaker, accessed November 
5, 2016, https://laura.makes.org/thimble/LTIwMDkzMzEyMA==/host-a-maker-
party-net-neutrality. 
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subsequently updated, a part of BEREC’s reported 480,000 mails 
were achieved through this  technique. 
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Figure 81: Mail forwarding list of European regulators from 
SavetheInternet.eu 
 
1. nn@rtr.at (Austria) 
2. info@bipt.be (Belgium) 
3. info@crc.bg (Bulgaria) 
4. KMU@hakom.hr (Croatia) 
5. info@ocecpr.org.cy (Cyprys) 
6. podatelna@ctu.cz (Czech Republic) 
7. erst@erst.dk (Denmark) 
8. info@konkurentsiamet.ee (Estonia) 
9. kirjaamo@ficora.fi (Finland) 
10. Consommateurs@arcep.fr (France) 
11. info@bnetza.de (Germany) 
12. ncrtv@otenet.gr (Greece) 
13. info@nmhh.hu (Hungary) 
14. info@comreg.ie (Ireland) 
15. info@agcom.it (Italy) 
16. sprk@sprk.gov.lv (Latvia) 
17. rrt@rrt.lt (Lithaunia) 
18. info@ilr.lu (Luxembourg) 
19. info@mca.org.mt (Malta) 
20. uke@uke.gov.pl (Poland) 
21. info@anacom.pt (Portugal) 
22. international@ancom.org.ro (Romania) 
23. roman.vavro@teleoff.gov.sk (Slovakia) 
24. info.box@akos-rs.si (Slovenia) 
25. info@cnmc.es (Spain) 
26. pts@pts.se (Sweden) 
27. info@acm.nl (Holland) 
28. contact@ofcom.org.uk (United Kingdom 
 
Of the mails analyzed, at least 30 percent were from American 
senders.  As the announcement of the guidelines, BEREC noted that it 
considers all submissions equally, so that a submission from a person 
in the USA has equal weight as one from the European Union. 
Following are examples of some of the respondents which were 
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identified by matching their email to the corresponding Facebook 
profiles.   
Stephanie Shaw815 is an American living in California is a former 
employee of Californian local government and evident Bernie Sanders 
supporter.  
Figure 82: American user in BEREC consultation 
 
 
  
                                                          
815 “Stephanie Shaw,” Facebook, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/stephanie.shaw.12576?fref=ts. 
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Daniel Grantham,816 is an American who lives in Hawaii. His 
Facebook page features posts noting the EU Save the Internet effort, 
support for Black Lives Matter and Bernie Sanders, support for “food 
democracy”, and advocacy against Monsanto. 
Figure 83: American user in BEREC consultation 
 
 
  
                                                          
816 “Daniel Grantham,” Facebook, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/daniel.grantham.758?fref=ts.  
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Charlie Berger817 is a retired software engineer living in Colorado. His 
Facebook page includes posts about policy violence and President 
Obama. 
Figure 84: American user in BEREC consultation 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
817 “Charlie Berger,” Facebook, accessed November 5, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008753852614&fref=ts. 
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The content of the form letter on Save the Internet’s petition include 
the same arguments proposed by Barbara van Schewick. Similar  
provisions and requirements which she was noted in the FCC 
rulemaking appear in the Save the Internet comments, for example 
that Open Internet rules are need to ensure low cost of innovation and 
that ISPs interfere openness through with economic and technical 
discrimination. A paragraph on class-based traffic management also 
echoes her discussion. Her argument that transparency is not sufficient 
to ensure an Open Internet is also noted. 
The specific questions are: 
1 Should the ISP be allowed to monitor your traffic, including its 
content (e.g. through deep packet inspection) for the purpose 
of traffic management? 
2 How much should your ISP be able to interfere with your 
Internet connection - for example to throttling or prioritise 
certain types of online traffic (video, P2P, etc)? 
3 What could be the positive and negative impacts of specialised 
services on future innovation and openness of the Internet? 
4 Is there a demand for specialised services? Which services 
should be allowed this special treatment? 
5 What information would you like to receive about your 
Internet connection, such as its speed, quality of service or 
how your traffic is managed?  
6 Is there a demand for “commercial practices” such as zero 
rating? Could these limit 
your rights as an end-user? Please provide examples. 
 
When sending the petition, users almost always use the default 
response which follows.  
The diversity and innovative capacity of the Internet 
ecosystem is built upon the low cost of innovation and low 
barriers to market entry. These principles ensure that from day 
one, every enterprise, startup or non-commercial service – no 
matter how small or well-funded – has the potential to reach a 
global audience in a manner equal to their competitors. This 
driving force for the prosperity and diversity of the online 
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economy is only ensured by an open, neutral and non-
discriminatory Internet. When ISPs are allowed to interfere 
with the decisions of their customers by economic or technical 
discrimination, this essential freedom is lost. According to 
Recital 1 of the Regulation on net neutrality, the legislation has 
to be interpreted in light of these goals. 
The Regulation allows specialized services only under strict 
safeguards. Article 3(5) and Recital 16 require the optimisation 
of specialised services to be objectively necessary for the 
functionality of key features of the service. This cannot be the 
case with services that can also function on the open, best 
effort Internet. Furthermore, Recital 16 prevents specialised 
services from being used as circumvention of the general net 
neutrality traffic management rules. Any deviation from these 
safeguards to widen the applicability of the concept of 
specialised services would inevitably result in increased 
market entry barriers and thus weaken the innovative potential 
of the Internet as a whole. 
Transparency cannot, as proposed by the Commission in its 
initial draft of the Regulation and subsequently rejected, be 
considered an antidote to anti-competitive behavior in itself. 
Transparency has limited scope in fixing problems, 
particularly in this context. 
Economic discrimination (zero rating) interferes with my right 
under Article 3(1) to access and, in particular, to distribute 
information freely. When an ISP discriminates between 
providers of content, applications and services via an Internet 
access service by making them unequally accessible, this 
constitutes an arbitrary interference in the essence of my right. 
Furthermore, this practice restricts my rights under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Articles 11, 15(2), and 16). Therefore, 
economic discrimination must not be allowed under the 
BEREC guidelines. 
The Regulation has very clear rules on what constitutes 
reasonable traffic management. According to Article 3(3), all 
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traffic management should be done in an application agnostic 
way, if possible. Class-based traffic management harms 
competition; it risks unintended damage to specific 
applications; it can discriminate against encrypted traffic; it 
creates uncertainty for content application and service 
providers; it stifles innovation; it can harm individual users, 
and can create regulatory overload. Therefore, applying class-
based traffic management in situations where application 
agnostic traffic management would suffice is neither 
necessary, proportionate, transparent for the user, nor non-
discriminatory. 
Certain activist groups were able to gain distinct negotiating power as 
part of the BEREC Net Neutrality Stakeholder dialogue on 15-16 
December 2015,818 a closed-door meeting which BEREC used to craft 
the net neutrality guidelines.  The following information is based upon 
an email request to BEREC to identify the participants in the meeting.  
The BEREC meeting featured 5 representatives for the ISP 
associations and equipment manufacturers, 5 from content and 
application providers, and 4 from “consumer and end user 
organizations and civil society.”  
Of the 14 official stakeholders, 7 have Alphabet funding, notably 3 of 
the 4 civil society organizations. Digital Europe’s members819 include 
Google, Microsoft, and Amazon.  CCIA is an American computer 
industry lobbying organization known for key members820 Google, 
Netflix, Amazon, and Microsoft. The C² Coalition is backed by 
Google and Microsoft.821 Allied for Startups has an number of 
                                                          
818 “Statement on BEREC Work to Produce Guidelines for the Implementation of 
Net Neutrality Provisions of the TSM Regulation,” Berec, December 15, 2015, 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/press_releases/5
588-statement-on-berec-work-to-produce-guidelines-for-the-implementation-of-net-
neutrality-provisions-of-the-tsm-regulation. 
819 “Corporate Members,” Digital Europe, accessed November 5, 2016, 
http://www.digitaleurope.org/About-Us/Corporate-Members. 
820 “Members,” CCIA, September 7, 2012, http://www.ccianet.org/about/members/. 
821 “c2 Coalition,” Communications & Connectivity Coalition, accessed November 
5, 2016, http://c2coalition.eu/. 
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members, many of which receive soft money from Google, including 
Engine which hosts a Google Policy Fellow.822 Google funds EDRi 
and Access.  ISOC cooperates with Google in studying the Internet 
and received a grant for this work.823 The remaining organization is 
the EU-funded European Consumer Organization (BEUC), which 
supports the European Commission in a lawsuit824 against Google. 
Netflix funds two of the organizations, ECTA and CCIA. Google has 
representation in all three categories; Netflix in 2; and broadband 
providers only in 1.  
Figure 85: Official stakeholders in BEREC net neutrality consultation 
(*denotes Google funding) 
 
Associations of ISPs 
and Equipment 
manufacturers (5) 
Content and 
application providers 
(CAPs) (5) 
Consumer and End-
User organisations 
and Civil Society (4) 
Cable Europe 
Digital Europe* 
ECTA 
ETNO 
GSMA Europe 
ACTE  
CCIA* 
C2 * 
EBU 
Allied for Startups* 
Access* 
BEUC 
EDRi* 
ISOC* 
                                                          
822 “Host Organizations – Policy Fellowship – Google,” accessed November 5, 
2016, https://www.google.com/policyfellowship/hosts.html#toc-tab8. 
823 “Google.org Awards Grant to the Internet Society to Advance Internet Exchange 
Points in Emerging Markets,” Internet Society, February 25, 2013, 
https://www.internetsociety.org/news/googleorg-awards-grant-internet-society-
advance-internet-exchange-points-emerging-markets. 
824 “Google Antitrust Investigation,” Www.beuc.eu, accessed November 11, 2016, 
http://www.beuc.eu/digital-rights/google-antitrust-investigation. 
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5.8 WHY IS THERE NOT MORE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
AND INVESTIGATION OF NET NEUTRALITY AND 
ITS STATED LINK TO NET NEUTRALITY? 
There is certainly a substantive body of literature on net neutrality 
from law and communications disciplines. This literature discusses 
theoretical, legal, and historical aspect of the policy. In economics 
there are many quantitative but theoretical papers using game theory 
and econometrics to model the outcome of net neutrality to welfare 
and revenue, but not necessarily to innovation.  Innovation in general 
is hard to measure. While that might explain why there is not so much 
measurement, it might also suggest that policymakers be cautious 
before asserting that net neutrality supports innovation, especially if it 
is hard to measure. 
This paper represents one method to measure innovation, but it has 
some important limitations. For one, there is a relatively small group 
of people who have the skills to use and interpret data traffic analytics. 
The analytics tools are designed for trade professionals, not ideally for 
researchers or policymakers. The expense of tools is also an issue, and 
they are marketed to enterprise users, not typically academics or 
regulators. It could also be an issue is that the analytics companies 
themselves may be reluctant to license their tools for public policy 
measurement, particularly if the findings were incorporated in 
political or legal debates. Similarly I find that some app developers 
can sometimes feel reluctant to discuss net neutrality for fear if 
something they say something that accidentally impugns net 
neutrality, they would be the unwitting target of activists. This fear of 
backlash can also make research difficult. 
In a few instances regulators have conducted evidenced-based 
assessments of net neutrality, but no specific studies that could 
estimate outcome to innovation vis-à-vis the policy. For example 
Ofcom, the UK telecom regulator, conducted a comprehensive 
assessment825 of network traffic management detection tools and 
                                                          
825 “Traffic Management Detection Methods and Tools - Ofcom,” Ofcom, August 5, 
2015, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/technology-research/2015-
reports/traffic-management. 
 
437 
found none of them reliable for regulatory purposes. Ofcom has 
worked with a detailed regulatory impact assessment framework826 
since 2005. This may explain why the regulator preferred a soft 
approach to net neutrality with a code of conduct, believing that strict 
rules could have negative consequences. 
A paper produced by Oscar Saens de Miera Berglind of the study 
center of the Federal Institute of Telecommunications, the Mexican 
regulator, examined the the practice of zero-rating on mobile 
broadband demand. He presents a regression model based on panel 
data of price, income, platform competition, and cost conditions, as 
well as the presence of zero rating, He finds that the presence of zero 
rating “is a statistically significant determinant of mobile broadband 
demand.” 827 He concludes that zero rating should be offered as a 
complement to data plans along with requirements that ISPs not be 
allowed to refuse dealings with particular content providers.  
More generally regulatory impact assessments (RIA) have been 
widely adopted in OECD countries.828 RIAs consist of They consist of 
a defined process and steps of (1) problem definition; (2) 
identification of alternative options; (3) data collection; (4) 
comparison of options; (5) preferred policy options, and (6) 
monitoring and evaluation of indicators. The OECD itself notes that 
“RIA within an appropriate systematic framework can underpin the 
capacity of governments to ensure that regulations are efficient and 
effective in a changing and complex world.”829 They add that though 
there is successful implementation, RIA poses administrative and 
technical challenges.   
                                                          
826 “Better Policy Making - Ofcom’s Approach to Impact Assessment - Ofcom,” 
Ofcom, June 26, 2010, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-and-
statements/better-policy-making-ofcoms-approach-to-impact-assessment. 
827 Oscar Saenz de Miera Berglind, “The Effect of Zero-Rating on Mobile 
Broadband Demand: An Empirical Approach and Potential Implications,” 
International Journal of Communication 10, no. 0 (May 15, 2016): 18. 
828 “Regulatory Impact Analysis - OECD,” accessed November 11, 2016, 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ria.htm. 
829 Ibid 
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While it’s likely regulators support evidenced-based assessment and 
impact analysis, in practice it does not always happen. Renda offers 
some explanations including procedural and organizational 
challenges, the regulatory process being chaotic and last-minute, the 
lack of adequate governance arrangement, civil servants detesting 
additional administrative burdens, lack of skills amongst 
administrators, a lack of transparency in the administration, and a lack 
of accessible public information. 830 
These challenges are part and parcel of the “knowing-doing gap” 831  
which plagues organizations of all kinds, particularly when it comes to 
using data to inform decisions. Individuals and organizations may not 
have the skills or budget to conduct measurement. They might not 
know what study, or what they want to study might not be able to be 
measured with the available tools.  Moreover measurement frequently 
introduces information that is unpopular, embarrassing, or 
controversial. Under these circumstances, it can be understood why 
measurement is avoided.  
One of the main reasons to conduct an empirical assessment is to 
ensure credible and legal regulation. The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet 
Order was challenged with 9 lawsuits, and while upheld by the DC 
Circuit 2-1, a scathing dissent832 from Justice Williams for the lack of 
empirical assessment in the justification for rules may in part bring a 
rehearing. Indeed Tim Brennan’s the FCC chief economist at the time 
of the Order’s release, noted that the rulemaking process was an 
                                                          
830 Andrea Renda, “Using Regulatory Impact Analysis to Improve Decision-Making 
in the ICT Sector,” Centre for European Policy Studies, (2014), 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2014/Discussion%20papers%20and%20prese
ntations%20-%20GSR14/Session%207%20GSR14%20-
%20Discussion%20paper%20-%20RIA.pdf. 
831 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, The Knowing-Doing Gap: How Smart 
Companies Turn Knowledge into Action, 1 edition (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2000). 
832 “US Telecom et Al v. FCC. United States District Court of Appeals,” June 16, 
2016, 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/3F95E49183E6F8AF85257FD
200505A3A/%24file/15-1063-1619173.pdf.See p. 116  
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“economics free zone.”833 He later corrected his statement to to say 
the order was wrong, unsupported, and irrelevant.834 
Faulhaber and Singer explore what they see as a worrying trend in 
“The Curious Absence of Economic Analysis at the Federal 
Communications Commission: An Agency in Search of a Mission.”835 
They note a lack of cost benefit analysis not just for net neutrality, but 
the set top box proceeding, special access, and privacy rulemakings. 
They point out that the agency conducted no cost benefit for its Open 
Internet rules, and submitted to Congress in March 2015 noting the 
Order should generate gross benefits of $100 million in edge 
investment annually without any back up calculation.836 Separately 
this amount is a scintilla of the revenue of the Internet industry and the 
amount that broadband providers invest in infrastructure annually.  
 
In its letter to Congress, the FCC reminds that it is not required to 
conduct cost benefit analysis.  However Faulhaber and Singer say that 
this is no longer tenable. “There is no reason why the Department of 
Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, and a host of other agencies should be required to 
perform cost-benefit analysis, while the FCC is free to embrace 
populism a guiding principle.”837 Mark Jamison notes similarly that 
the FCC demonstrates “institutional weakness” by disengaging from 
                                                          
833 L. Gordon Crovitz, “‘Economics-Free’ Obamanet,” Wall Street Journal, January 
31, 2016, sec. Opinion, http://www.wsj.com/articles/economics-free-obamanet-
1454282427. 
834 Tim Brennan, “Perspectives from FSF Scholars,” June 28, 2016, 
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/Is_the_Open_Internet_Order_an_Econo
mics_Free_Zone_062816.pdf. 
835 Gerald Faulhaber and Hal J. Singer, “The Curious Absence of Economic 
Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission: An Agency in Search of a 
Mission,” Calinnovates, July 10, 2016, 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10711657902329/FaulhaberSinger_FINAL%20TO%20FI
LE.pdf. 
836 “FCC. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT ABSTRACT WG Docket No.14-28; 
FCC15-24,” March 12, 2015, http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/20150403-CRA-Abstract-Open-Internet-Order.pdf. 
837 Supra Faulhaber, Singer 
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economic analysis and being openly political in its decisions.838 
Jamison directs the University of Florida, Public Utility Research 
Center, an institute which teaches regulation and infrastructure 
policy.839 It alumni include representatives from over hundreds of the 
world’s telecom and utility regulators.   
 
If measured by the number of comments received by telecom 
regulators, net neutrality represents the most politicized of 
rulemaking. The following section explores the role of advocacy in 
rulemaking.  While advocacy may come from multiple actors, there is 
an unprecedented level of sophistication and coordination in activism.  
  
                                                          
838 Mark A. Jamison, “Emerging Institutional Weaknesses in US Regulation?,” 
September 19, 2016, http://www.rpieurope.org/Publications/JamisonM.pdf. 
839 “Public Utility Research Center,” Warrington, accessed November 11, 2016, 
http://warrington.ufl.edu/centers/purc/.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis investigated the degree to which net neutrality rules 
(depending on their instrumentation) stimulates the development of 
mobile applications. Some correlation was found between countries 
with soft net neutrality rules and mobile app innovation. While there 
may be other important outcomes for net neutrality, this investigation 
did not find support for hard net neutrality rules and an increase in 
mobile app innovation. Indeed that a number of countries create 
significant mobile app innovations with no net neutrality rules  
suggests that greater work needs to be done to test and theorize the 
role of net neutrality regulation to mobile app innovation.    
This thesis has made two contributions. It has supplemented the 
academic literature with an empirical investigation of net neutrality 
rules and their relationship to mobile app innovation. The work offers 
scholars and policymakers another perspective to consider when 
thinking about the relationship of actors in a complex system and the 
expectation for the outcome of rulemaking. It also exposes the 
limitations of prevailing net neutrality.  
The second contribution is to highlight the lack of measurement for 
net neutrality policy, particularly for its assertions of supporting 
innovation. Having a more robust framework for measurement would 
likely force scholars and policymakers to test their assumptions, 
temper the proposed goals, and refine the the proposed policies to 
better match the stated objectives.  
There is no doubt that many policymakers would welcome measuring 
their net neutrality policies but face barriers to doing so. This thesis 
highlights a number of barriers to measurement such as the fitness of 
tools, the expense of measurement, and the limited expertise of 
knowing what information is important. 
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It could also be that policymakers do not measure on purpose for fear 
of revealing information that does not support their chosen policy 
path.  
6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR RULEMAKING 
The results of this thesis question the wisdom of imposing hard rules 
on one actor in a complex, integrated, multi-sided Internet markets. 
Following are other options to consider. 
Option 1: Extend hard rules to entire Internet ecosystem 
One option is to extend the same hard open internet rules to other 
Internet actors, as there is significant evidence that edge providers 
have the ability and incentive to harm openness. The stumbling block 
to this is that telecom regulators don’t necessarily have the authority 
to police actors other than licensed telecom operators. Extending rules 
would likely require updating national laws first.  
Option 2: Extend hard rules to only to players with monopoly power 
A related option could be to extend rules only to those players with 
controlling monopoly power if such power emerges and is exploited to 
the harm of customers. Such ex ante regulation could be appropriate 
when a firm is a natural monopoly, and there is a need to address 
monopoly pricing, poor service quality, and an obligation to serve. 840 
Such a measure would require the application of economic analysis to 
characterize the market and its participants. 
Option 3: Adopt soft net neutrality rules  
This thesis finds support for soft net neutrality rules and mobile app 
innovation. Soft rule regimes employ multistakeholder models and 
codes of conduct. In fact regulators have the most experience and 
longest running track record with these methods. Countries which 
                                                          
840 Roslyn Layton and Mark Jamison, “Beyond Net Neutrality: Policies for 
Leadership in the Information, Computing, and Network Industries,” AEI, June 14, 
2016, https://www.aei.org/publication/beyond-net-neutrality-policies-for-leadership-
in-the-information-computing-and-network-industries/.  
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opted for this approach (Nordic countries, Switzerland, UK, Japan, 
and South Korea) have experienced a high level of mobile innovation. 
Moreover limited violation has occurred these regimes. Moreover 
rules have not been litigated.  
An important question is whether soft rules should be applied to a 
single actor or the ecosystem as a whole. While it was not the focus of 
this thesis, a glaring reality emerges when looking at the data: two app 
stores are the essential gatekeepers for mobile apps. That this point 
rarely enters into the Open Internet discussion seems suspect and this 
would seem an appropriate area to address with further research.  
Regulators have significant comments on record over the years noting 
the downside of “one-sided Internet policy”. For example as part of 
the FCC’s 2009 NPRM on Open Internet rules, MIT’s David Clark, 
William Lehr ,and Steve Bauer, supported841 the FCC’s efforts to 
establish “clear regulatory guidance” with “general guidance rather 
than overly detailed specifications because the Internet continues to 
evolve.” They reiterated the value of the core of soft rules, the heart of 
Tim Wu’s recommendation which was embedded in the FCC’s “Four 
Freedoms”842 of 2005: the rights of end users to access content, to use 
applications of their choice, and to connect with the devices of their 
choice. They also support competitive choice in different components 
of the value chain.  
However they critiqued the FCC’s narrow focus on broadband 
providers and imposition of obligations applicable only to them, as 
they are not the only market actor whose behavior would pose a threat 
                                                          
841 David Clark, William Lehr, and Steve Bauer, “Before the Federal 
Communications Commission  Washington, D.C. 20554,” FCC, accessed November 
5, 2016, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7020373725.pdf. 
842 Michael Powell, “Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the 
Industry,” Silicon Flatirons Symposium, February 8, 2004, 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf. 
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to an open and healthy Internet. Lehr reiterated843 this view in 2014 in 
the FCC’s third attempt to make rules 
Lehr describes FCC’s third attempt at rules as reliance on an “overly 
simplistic 2-sided market model that fails to recognize the inherent 
complexity of the Internet ecosystem” and its failing to account for 
interdependencies in the system.844 He explains that “Internet 
openness depends on open access to broadband, devices, applications, 
content, and other services (i.e., non-access ISP and other value-added 
services),” and warns that one-sided rules could lead to 
misidentification of problems and remedies that “distort market 
incentives and accentuate the potential risk of harms from agents not 
constrained by the rules, while perversely weakening the potential for 
access ISPs to mitigate those harms.”845  
To demonstrate the need for Open Internet rules across the ecosystem, 
he provides four significant examples between 2009-2014 when 
content providers such as Viacom, News Corp, and CBS, otherwise 
engaged in bona fide negotiations with multichannel video 
programming distributors (MVPD) such as TimeWarnerCable, 
Cablevision, and Bright House Networks, over carriage rights and 
retransmission consent, would use threats and/or used the punishment 
of  blocking content or refusing to supply content as a means of 
extracting preferable agreements.846 Similarly this paper observed how 
Netflix, in a secret and ostensible attempt to pick winners among ISPs, 
purposely sent a lower quality video stream of its content to mobile 
subscribers of AT&T and Verizon while sending superior versions to 
Sprint and T-Mobile. 
Option 4: Employ vigorous competition across all actors to police net 
neutrality violations 
                                                          
843 “Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554,” 
FCC, July 17, 2014, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521683605.pdf. 
844 Ibid 
845 Ibid 
846 Ibid 
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If in the fact Internet and its plays the whole system needs oversight, 
competition law may be appropriate. Net neutrality type violations are 
well-theorized within antitrust (restrictive agreements, 
vertical/horizontal constraints, market concentration etc) and policed 
by competition authorities. Already in 2006 the Federal Trade 
Commissions, the American competition authority, indicated that it 
was up to the task to police net neutrality concerns across the 
ecosystem.847 Moreover employing an antitrust framework, with its 
emphasis on empirical and economic analysis and consumer welfare, 
is arguably superior to manage net neutrality.848 Separately this could 
address the issue of the lack of evidence for rulemaking in a number 
of countries. 
Moreover if is accepted that convergence--the coming together of 
communication, computing, and content--has been ongoing for for 
almost half a century, then it follows that there should be a 
convergence in the rules that govern the ecosystem. Oddly enough, 
while Internet markets are converging, the regulatory response in the 
US and EU has been to increase the silos of regulation. 
Concepts such as common carriage, long retired in other industries, 
are resurrected by telecom regulators to justify an expanding role of a 
subset of the converged system.  One explanation is that the FCC 
survives, indeed thrives, despite its declining relevance as an 
economic regulator because the it has succeeded to rebrand itself as a 
social regulator, a feat it accomplishes by blurring the lines of 
                                                          
847 “Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy,” FCC, (June 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-
competition-policy/v070000report.pdf. 
848 Joshua Wright, “Broadband Policy & Consumer Welfare: The Case for an 
Antitrust Approach to Net Neutrality Issues,” FCC, April 19, 2013, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/broadband-
policy-consumer-welfare-case-antitrust-approach-net-neutrality-
issues/130423wright_nn_posting_final.pdf. 
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common carriage and private carriage or “quasi–common 
carriage.”849   
The FCC calls its rulemaking “adapting and modernizing to keep up 
with the times”850 and issues notices at will. This would be laudable if 
its activities were authorized by Congress, but they are not.  The FCC 
is only supposed to issue new rules when Congress updates 
telecommunications laws.851 While Congress is well overdue on an 
update to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, this should not empower 
the FCC to make up rules as it sees fit.     
In any case the evidence in this thesis should support policymakers to 
overhaul long overdue communications laws and modernize them for 
the Internet era. The Danish case  provides inspiration of multi-party 
cooperation and vision for a digital society. The wisdom of this 
approach has been confirmed in the rankings of Denmark as a leading 
digital nation. The goal of moving communications regulation to a 
competition framework has a number of benefits for resolving the 
distortions and asymmetries created by one-sided Open Internet 
policies. 
Following is author’s assessment of the standards of good policy when 
applied to  net neutrality regulation and competition law.852 
  
                                                          
849 Brent Skorup and Joseph Kane, “The FCC and Quasi-Common Carriage,” 
Mercatus Center, September 20, 2016, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/fcc-
and-quasi-common-carriage-case-study-agency-survival. 
850 “Empowering the 21st Century Consumer,” Federal Communications 
Commission, October 19, 2016, https://www.fcc.gov/document/empowering-21st-
century-consumer. 
851 “Rulemaking at the FCC,” Federal Communications Commission, May 1, 2011, 
https://www.fcc.gov/general/rulemaking-fcc. 
852 Framework developed with the assistance of Niels Rytter, former head of section 
Danish Competition Authority “Konkurrencerådgivning,” accessed November 11, 
2016,  http://www.konkurrenceraadgivning.dk/.  
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Figure 86: Standards of good policy applied to net neutrality 
regulation and competition law 
 
Standard Net neutrality 
regulation 
Competition 
law 
Aligned with national laws and 
institutional goals 
Depends on 
country 
Yes 
Based on rational, comprehensive 
data and evidence—both 
quantitative and qualitative 
No Yes 
Clearly states the reasons why it’s 
needed and the proposed outcome 
No Yes 
Provides a framework for 
achieving the outcome 
No Yes 
Neccesity No Yes 
Comprehensitivity No Yes 
Accurate in its objective No Yes 
Concise, clearly communicated 
and widely understood  
No Yes 
Predictable and not to be changed 
prematurely 
No Yes 
Designed to be followed No Yes 
Internationally harmonized No Yes 
Creates value and benefits with 
measurable outcomes 
No Yes 
Monitored, evaluated and 
reviewed regularly 
No  Yes 
 
One final interpretation is a heterodox view of regulation, that creating 
net neutrality rules only broadband providers is a way for a regulator 
to pay tribute to another constituency, that of “edge providers.” This is 
George Stigler’s regulatory capture observation: regulation is acquired 
by industry and operated for its benefit.853  For example the FCC said 
in no uncertain terms that it had no intention to police edge providers 
                                                          
853 George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of 
Economics 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21. 
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even if they break the law.  “The Commission has been unequivocal in 
declaring that it has no intent to regulate edge providers,”854 wrote a 
FCC official to a the consumer organization Watchdog in response to 
a request that the FCC police the privacy violations of Internet 
companies. 
Watching the explosion of rulemaking around the world which 
proceeds with so little evidence gathering and measurement makes 
one skeptical of the premise of regulatory expertise and independence. 
It could be that regulators are merely “satisficing,”855 that is, creating 
open internet rules because they think they should and feel a pressure 
to “keep up on the regulatory trends of other countries”, lest they look 
like they are doing nothing.  
The incidence of net neutrality violation is quite small in relation to 
the explosion of rules. Indeed blocking by broadband providers is rare 
whereas it is commonplace when practice by governments. As such 
the growth of net neutrality rulemaking does not appear to be driven 
by bad behavior from ISPs but rather transnational activism which is 
incentivized to deliver hard rules as a means to certify success to their 
funders. Ironically internet activism, even if it overloads the IT 
systems with millions of emails, may well be embraced by regulators 
because it provides a reason for being. 
Macy and Miller observe, “An agency that has been rendered obsolete 
by exogenous changes in the form of technological development or 
new marketplace developments will find that it must provide favors to 
discrete constituencies in order to preserve some measure of support 
for its continued existence.”856 For example French regulator 
                                                          
854 Matthew DelNero, “Before the Federal Communications Commission 
Washington, D.C. 20554,” FCC, (November 6, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-1266A1_Rcd.pdf. 
855 Simon Herbert, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment,” 
Psychologial Review, March 1956, 
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=33544. 
856 Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, “Reflections on Professional 
Responsibility in a Regulatory State,” Faculty Scholarship Series, January 1, 1995, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1442. 
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Sebastian Soriano noted during the BEREC consultation, "I must 
confess that some of these tweets and messages that I received made 
me emotional... people asking me to "Save the Internet" and "Stop 
corporate capture..." I really wanted to respond to them."857 Hence 
regulators have found its new constituency. 
If it fact it is the case that net neutrality is urgent and necessary, it 
bears mention why more empirical studies have not been performed. 
For indeed if the policy works so well, as purported, then evidence 
should be forthcoming.    
There is no doubt that net neutrality may have a value, but for nations 
to engage in policymaking without methods and standards to assess 
their impact, this undermines credibility for policymakers and 
policies. As such this project represents one possible, and preliminary, 
way to measure the impact of rules.  
 
                                                          
857 “The Internet is… saved??!!” Avaaz.org September 2016. 
https://secure.avaaz.org/en/we_saved_the_internet/?slideshow Accessed November 
11, 2016 
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